# Singh Clkludh11ri v. 'The Jlon'l>U tl~

- **Citation:** [1962] 3 S.C.R. 305
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1962
- **Bench:** B. ·P. Sinha, s. K. DAS, A. K. Sarkar, N. Rajagopala Ayyangar, J. R. Mudholkar
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/singh-clkludh11ri-v-the-jlon-l-u-tl-2447
- **Pages:** 8

## Headnote

Mukhmr-Right to
practise in
Civil Court-Legal
Practitioners Act, 1879 (XV ill of 1879), ss. 9, Ji-General
Rules and Circular Orders of the Patna High Court, Oh. 111
Part VII, r. 2.
Section 9 of the Legal Practitioners Act, 1879, entitles a
duly enrolled Mukhtar to "practise" in any Civil Court, and
s. 11 thereof empowers the High Court to make rules declaring
what shall be deemed to be the "functions,
powers and
duties" of Mukhtars practising in the subordinate Courts.
Rule 2 framed under s. 11 lays down that a Mukhtar shall not
be allowed to address any Civil Court except for the purpose of
"stating the nature and effect of his application or to offer
any legal argument or to examine any witness" without the
leave of the Court. The petitioners contended that r. 2 was in
excess of the rule-making power under s. 11 and was an
unreasonable restriction on their rights under Art. 19 ( l) (g) of
the Constitution.
Held, that ss. 9 and 11 of the Act must be read together
and the right to
'~practise" given under s. 9
cannot be
dissociated from
the ''functions,
powers
and duties of
Mukhtars" ·as contemplated under s. 11.
In declaring what
shall. be the functions, powers and duties of a Mukhtar the
High Court may by its rules so delimit them as to regulate
their right of practice in the Civil Courts, and such delimitation
is no violation of their fundamental
right to practise the
profession as allowed under the Act.
Aswini Kumar Ghosh v. Arabinda BoBe, (1953) S.C.R. I,
explained and distinguished.
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Petition No. 117 of
1958.
Petition under Art. 32 of the Constifotion of
India. for enforcement of Fundamental Rights.
R. K. Cfarg, M. K. Ramamurthi, S. G. Agarwala
and D. P. Sirtgh, for the petitioners.
The respondent did not appear.
1961
Auguat 29.
19G/
/1,t:ala Pra1:id
Singh Clkludh11ri
v.
'The Jlon'l>U tl~
Chit.f Justiu a,1d
Judzts of tlu
Palna JJigh Coiirl
S. K, Da• J,
306
SUPREi\IE C'OURT REPOHTS
[ l!J(ii J
]f){il. August 2H. The ,J uclgment of the Court
was delivered by
S. K. DAS, J.--This is a writ petitiun 011 behalf of the .Bihar State i\fukhtars' ARsoeiation,
Patna. and the Vice-Presid\·nt and the General
:-:lccrotary thereof. The petitio11 has been jicard
ex-parte as there baa been no appearance on behalf
of the Chief JuAticc and Judges uf the Patna High
Court who were cited as respcndcnts to the petition.
The petitioners contend that certain rul\'8 of the
Patna High Court ma1le as Jar back as HJ22 under
e.ll of the Legal Practitioners Act, 18i9 (Act XVIII
of 18i9), hereinafter referred to as the Act, in
respect of the functfons,
powers and duties of
Mukhtars praetioiug in the subordinate courtB arc
now invalid and void, U..icause they contravene the
fw1damontal right of tho petitioners guaranteed
under i\rt. 19(l)(g) of the Constitution of India ancl
are not saved by cl. (u) thereof. The petitioners
h;we, in particular, challenged the validity of r. 2
made by the said High Court under s. JI of tho Aot
and incorporated iu Chapter III, Part Y rI of tho
General Hules aud Circular Orders of the High Court
of Judicature at Patrni (Ci\·il), 1922. The petitioners
pray that an appropriate writ, dil'cction or ord<·r be
issued by this Court r!ccl<tring that r. :! aforesai<l is
unconstitutional nnd therefore, void au<l inopernti\·c.
We shall presently read the rule ; but before
wo <lo so a few facts which are not in dispute may
be stated.
The potitionern state that the llihar ::State
:.\lukhtars' Association was formed some 30 years
back with the object of gc1wrally protecting the
interests of the l\Iukhtars in tho State of Bihar
J>ractising in the courts subordinate to the High
Court of Patrni within the meaning of s. 3 of the
Act. At its various annual confercnres the said
Association passed resolutions to move tho High
Court for the remo\·al of tho restriction imposed by
r. 2 aforesaid on tho right of Mukhtars practising in
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L
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•
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3 S.C.R. . SUPREME COURT REPORTS
307
aubordinate civil courts. The llig4 Court did

## Text

-
3S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
305
DEVATA PRASAD SINGH CHAUDHURI AND
OTHERS
v.
THE HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE AND
JUDGES OF THE PATNA HIGH COURT
(B. ·P. SINHA, c. J., s. K. DAS, A. K. SARKAR,
N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR and J. R. MUDHOLKAR, JJ.)
Mukhmr-Right to
practise in
Civil Court-Legal
Practitioners Act, 1879 (XV ill of 1879), ss. 9, Ji-General
Rules and Circular Orders of the Patna High Court, Oh. 111
Part VII, r. 2.
Section 9 of the Legal Practitioners Act, 1879, entitles a
duly enrolled Mukhtar to "practise" in any Civil Court, and
s. 11 thereof empowers the High Court to make rules declaring
what shall be deemed to be the "functions,
powers and
duties" of Mukhtars practising in the subordinate Courts.
Rule 2 framed under s. 11 lays down that a Mukhtar shall not
be allowed to address any Civil Court except for the purpose of
"stating the nature and effect of his application or to offer
any legal argument or to examine any witness" without the
leave of the Court. The petitioners contended that r. 2 was in
excess of the rule-making power under s. 11 and was an
unreasonable restriction on their rights under Art. 19 ( l) (g) of
the Constitution.
Held, that ss. 9 and 11 of the Act must be read together
and the right to
'~practise" given under s. 9
cannot be
dissociated from
the ''functions,
powers
and duties of
Mukhtars" ·as contemplated under s. 11.
In declaring what
shall. be the functions, powers and duties of a Mukhtar the
High Court may by its rules so delimit them as to regulate
their right of practice in the Civil Courts, and such delimitation
is no violation of their fundamental
right to practise the
profession as allowed under the Act.
Aswini Kumar Ghosh v. Arabinda BoBe, (1953) S.C.R. I,
explained and distinguished.
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Petition No. 117 of
1958.
Petition under Art. 32 of the Constifotion of
India. for enforcement of Fundamental Rights.
R. K. Cfarg, M. K. Ramamurthi, S. G. Agarwala
and D. P. Sirtgh, for the petitioners.
The respondent did not appear.
1961
Auguat 29.
19G/
/1,t:ala Pra1:id
Singh Clkludh11ri
v.
'The Jlon'l>U tl~
Chit.f Justiu a,1d
Judzts of tlu
Palna JJigh Coiirl
S. K, Da• J,
306
SUPREi\IE C'OURT REPOHTS
[ l!J(ii J
]f){il. August 2H. The ,J uclgment of the Court
was delivered by
S. K. DAS, J.--This is a writ petitiun 011 behalf of the .Bihar State i\fukhtars' ARsoeiation,
Patna. and the Vice-Presid\·nt and the General
:-:lccrotary thereof. The petitio11 has been jicard
ex-parte as there baa been no appearance on behalf
of the Chief JuAticc and Judges uf the Patna High
Court who were cited as respcndcnts to the petition.
The petitioners contend that certain rul\'8 of the
Patna High Court ma1le as Jar back as HJ22 under
e.ll of the Legal Practitioners Act, 18i9 (Act XVIII
of 18i9), hereinafter referred to as the Act, in
respect of the functfons,
powers and duties of
Mukhtars praetioiug in the subordinate courtB arc
now invalid and void, U..icause they contravene the
fw1damontal right of tho petitioners guaranteed
under i\rt. 19(l)(g) of the Constitution of India ancl
are not saved by cl. (u) thereof. The petitioners
h;we, in particular, challenged the validity of r. 2
made by the said High Court under s. JI of tho Aot
and incorporated iu Chapter III, Part Y rI of tho
General Hules aud Circular Orders of the High Court
of Judicature at Patrni (Ci\·il), 1922. The petitioners
pray that an appropriate writ, dil'cction or ord<·r be
issued by this Court r!ccl<tring that r. :! aforesai<l is
unconstitutional nnd therefore, void au<l inopernti\·c.
We shall presently read the rule ; but before
wo <lo so a few facts which are not in dispute may
be stated.
The potitionern state that the llihar ::State
:.\lukhtars' Association was formed some 30 years
back with the object of gc1wrally protecting the
interests of the l\Iukhtars in tho State of Bihar
J>ractising in the courts subordinate to the High
Court of Patrni within the meaning of s. 3 of the
Act. At its various annual confercnres the said
Association passed resolutions to move tho High
Court for the remo\·al of tho restriction imposed by
r. 2 aforesaid on tho right of Mukhtars practising in
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3 S.C.R. . SUPREME COURT REPORTS
307
aubordinate civil courts. The llig4 Court did not
remove the restriction. On July, 27, 1958 at an
emergent Executive Committee meeting of the
Association it was resolved to move the Supreme
Court under Art. 32 of the Constitution. The present
writ petition has been filed in pursuance of that
resolution.
The enrolment of Mukhtars is made under
certain provisions of the· Act to which a reference
must now be made. Under s.3 of the Act "a subordinate Court" means all courts subordinate to the
High Court including.courts of Small Causes established under Act IX of 1850 or Act XI of 1865.
"Legal practit.ioner" means an advocate, vakil or
attorney of any High Court, a pleader, Mukhtar or
revenue,agent. Section 6 of the Act empowers the
High Court to make from time to time rules consistent with the Act in respect of certain matters
including inter alia the qualifications, admission and
certificates of proper persons to be, Mukhtars of .the
subordinate courts. It appears that by a rule made
under s. 6 of the Act, the High Court of Patna laid
down that any person who shall produce a certificate
from a committee constituted by tho High Court
that he has passed an examination in the subjects
prescribed from time to time by the High Court for
the mukhtarship examination may be admitted as
a Mukhtar to practise in courts subordin~te to the
High Court. Rule 10 laid down the subjects in
which the examination was to be held. This examination was known as the Mukhtarship examination. It was abolished some time in the year 1947-48.
Under s. 7 of the Act, the High Court made
certain rules for the grant of certificates to Mukhtars who had passed the necessary examination for
admission as prescribed . by the rules referred to
above. Section 7 also provided for annual renewal
of such certificates. ['he argument of learned advocate for thEf petitioners is rested mainly on the provisions of s. 9 and they must be quoted in foll.
1961
Devata Prat.ad
Singh O!KZUdhuri
v.
The Hcm/ble the
Chlef Justi~ and
Judges of t~
Patna High Courl
S. K.DM J.
1961
Detuta Pra4ad
Singh Chaudh11ri
v.
Tht 11011' blc tht
Ghirf Justice a11d
Ju dg1t1 of tltr
Patna /lig1• Coud
s. h·. /Jcu J.
308
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
"Every mukhtar holding . :t eortiJir,aw
issued unde; section 7 may apply to be <'nrolled in any Civil or Criminal Court mentioned
therein and Rituate within the same limits ;
and, subject to such rules as the High Court
may from time to time make in this behalf,
the prt·siding Judge "hall enrol him according·
Jy ; and thereupon he may practise ;rn a mukh·
tar in any such Civil Court and any Court
subordinate thereto, and may (subject to the
provisions of tho Code of Criminal Procedure)
appear, plead and act in any sud1 Criminal
Court and aay Court subordinate thcrnto."
::iection JO sayB in effect that except as provid·
ed by tho Aot or any other enactment for the timo
being in force, no person shall practise as a Mukhtar
in any Court unless ho holds a r.ortificate issued
wider s. 7 and has been enrolled in such court or in
some court to which it is suborrlinate. Then comoa
s. ll under which the impugned rule was made. This
soction is in these terms.
"Notwithstanding anything contained in
the Code of Civil Procedure, tho High Court
may, from timo time, make rules declaring
what shall be deemed to lie the functions,
powers and duties of :\fukhtars practising in
the subordinate courts and, in the case of a
High Court not established by Hoyal Charter,
in such Court."
Tho High Court of Patna made a num her of
rnles definin~ the functions, powers and duties of
ll!ukhtarn practising in the subordinate courb. One
<•f these rules is r. 2 which is in th1·se tenns.
'-'Ruic 2 : A :llukhtar shall not be allow·
cd to address any Civil Court except for the
purpose of stating the nature and effect of
his application or to off or any legal argument
or to examine any witnoas without the leaYo
oithe '1ourt Hpocially giYen."
" ..
•
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
309
The argument of learned Advocate for the
petitioners is this. He has submitted that s.9 of
the Act gives every Mukhtar holding a certificate
issued under s. 7 the right to apply to be enrolled in
any Civil or Criminal Court subordinate to the Higli
Court and on enrolment in accordance with the
rules, he has the right to practise as a Mukhtar in
any Civil
Court
and
in
Courts
subordinate
thereto and has
further the right to appear,
plead and act in any
Criminal Court. This
right of practice,
learned
Advocate for the
petitioners has contended, cannot be curtailed and
s. 11 which empowers the High Court to Make rules
declaring what shall be deemed to be the functions,
powers and duties of the Mukhtars practiJing in the
subordinate courts does not empower the High
Court to make a rule which curtails the r:ight given by
s.9. His argument further is that the in1pugned rule
curtails the right of a Mukhtar to practise in tho
Civil Courts inasmuch as it says that a Mukhtar
shall not be allowed to address any Ci vi! Court
except for the purpose of stating the nature and
effect of his application or to offer any legal
argument or to examine any witness without the
leave of the court specially given.
He has
contended firstly, that 1 he rule is in excess of the
rulemaking power under s. 11 and secondly, is an
unreasonable restriction on the right guaranteed
under Art. 19( l)(g) of the Constitution.
The simple question for decision really is this:
is the impugned rule in
exce~s of the powers given
to the High Court under s. 11 of tho Act ? If the
rule is intra vires the Act, then olearly enough
there has been no violation of any fundamental
right of the petitioners. The right of the petitioners
to practise in the subordinate courts was created by
the Act. In the arguments before us there was no
challenge to the constitutional validity of s. 11 of
the Act as permitting an unreasonable restriction of
a guaranteed right, if on a proper construction that
section enabled the High Court to regulate the right
1961
Devata Prasad
Singh Chaudhuri
. v.
The Hon' ble the
Chief Justice and
Judges of tht
Patna High Court
S. K. Ca• J,
1161
D1tJJta Pruad
Sin~h Chaudhuri
v.
Tiu Hon'blt tlk
(,'hit/ Jwti« n11d
Judgea of the
P<Una Jligl• Co11rt
S. K. De11 J.
310
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962)
of practicP of :1-tukhtars. The comphint before us
was that the impugned r. 2 was not justified by
s. I I of the Act. Th~refnre, the only question which
~ve need consider is\' hethPr tho impugned ·rule is in
l'XCPSS of the authority given by s. I I of the Act. It
seems to us that the impmp1ed rule is clearly within
that authority. 'fhe learned Advocate for
the
petitioners has sought to make a distinction
bPtween the right to practise as given by s. 9 and
the functions, powers and duties as ruontioned in
s. I I. Relying on tho majority decision in A.9wini
Kumar Ghosh and
another v. Arabind(1 Bo.•e &
onolher(') he has submitted that tho right to pmctise
means the right. to appear and plead as woll as to
act on beh>ilf of suito1·s in tho subordinate courts;
the power of the High Court to make rules under
s.11 of the Act as respects th•i function8, powers and
duties of l\Inkhtars practising in the subordinate
courts merely means that the High Court may give
effect to the right givP,n undor s. 9 by making rules,
but it cannot curtail that right ; when therefore the
High Court made the impugned rule re;;tricting the
right of ?lfukhtarn to plearl in civil
courts, it did
something in excess of tho powPr ginn bys. I I.
We are unable to accept this line of argument
as correct.
Soctions 9 and 11 of the Act must be
read
together and it won Id ho wrong to treat the
right to practise gi\·en by s. !l as dissociatPcl from
tho functions, powers and duties of lllukhtars
referred to in s. 11. 4'Thc learnod Advocate for the
petitionNs is reading the two section" as though ono
section gives an abHolute right and thn other section
merely empowers t.he making of rules to effectuate
that right. That, we do not think, is a proper
readin~ of the t"·o section;;.
It. is worthy of not-0
that under s. 9 itself a distinction is made between
the right of a :\Inkhtar to practiHe in civil courts
and hiH
right to appear,
plead and act in any
criminal conrt..
In express terms s. fl gives every
(I) [1953) S.C.R. I.
l...
•
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3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
311
Mukhtar the right to appear, plead and act in any
criminal court ; it does not, however, give such an
unlimited right in a civil court. On the contrary, it
merely says that on enrolment a Mukhtar may
practise in any civil court, but under s. 11 the High
Court may make rules declaring what shall be
deemed to be the functions, powers and duties of
Mukhtan practising in the subordinate courts. It
i~ clear to us that in declaring what shall be the
functions and powers of mukhtars practising in the
subordinate courts, the High Court can so delimit
them as to regulate the right of practice. It will be
wrong to treat the
functions and powers as
dissociated from the right to practise.
The right to
practise must depend on the functions and powers.
It is also worthy of note that the expression used
ins. 11 of the Act is much wid1ir than the
expression used in s. 15 of the Indian Bar Council
Act, 1926, (Act XXXVIII of 1926), which gives
the Bor Council the power to make mies to provide
for and regulate the rights and duties of Advocates
of the High Court.
We do not think that the
majority decision in Aswini [( umar Ghosh v. Arabinda
Bose (1) is of any assistance to the petitioners.
That decision depended on the interpretation of s. 2
of the Supreme Court Advocates (Practice in High
Courts) Act, 1951. That section
provided that
"notwithstanding anything contained in the Bar
Councils Act or any other law regulating the
conditions subject to which a person not entered
in the roll of Advocates of a High Comt may be
pertnitterl to practise in that High Court, every
Advocate of the Supreme Court shall be entitled
as of right to practise in any High Court whether
or not ho is an Advocate of that High Court".
It was held by the majority that a rule made by
a Hig~ Court which denied to an Advocato of the
Supreme Court the right to exercise an essential
part of his function, by insisting on a dual agency
on the Original Side was much more t,han a rule
(l) [1953] S.C.R. I
1961
De'IJata Prasad
Singh Chawi.huri
v.
Phe Hon'ble the
Chief JuBtice a'ld
Judges of 'he
Patna High Couri
S. K. Da• J.
1961
Dt'Uata l)ro.t<Jd
Singh Ch«udhuri
v.
Tl11 llon'blt t11~
Cir.it/ Juati~ and
Jv.dg1• of th~
Patna High Court
S.K. Dai J.
312
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
of practice and constituted a serious invasion of
his statutory right to practise and tho power of
m~king such a rule, unless expressly reserved, was
repugnant to the right conferred by s. 2 aforesaid,
Tho point to be noticed is that the majority held
that unless the power was expressly reserved by the
statuto, a rule could not be made repugnqnt to the
right conferred by s. 2 of the Supremo Court
Advocates (Practice in High Courts) Act, 1951. If it
be held that ss. IJ and l l of tho Act must be read
together and functions and powers mentioned in
s. ll aro not dissociated from tho right to practise
mentionecl in s. 9, then it is clear enough that s. l l
expressly reserves the power of the High Court to
make mles declaring what shall be the functions,
powers and duties of l\Jukhtars practising in the
su bonlinatc courts. If this be the correct. interpretation of se. 9 and l l of tho Act, then the principle
111.id down by the majority in Aswini Kumar Ghosh v.
Arabinda Bose (') is of no assistance
to tho
petitioners in the present case.
For the reasons given above, we hold that
r.2 of tho rules made by tho Hi~h Court undor s. 11
of the Act is not in excess of the rule-making power
and the
petitioners
cannot complain of any
violation of their fundamental right to practise the
profession to which they have been enrolled under
tho provisions of the Act. The petition fails and is
accordingly dimissed.
As
there has been no
appearance on behalt of tho respondents, there will
he no order for costs.
Petition dismissed .
. l [:~~l]S.C.R. I
_,,, ..