# SIR KIKABHAI PREMCHAND v. COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX (CENTRAL), BOMBAY. PATANJALI SASTRI C.J., s. R. DAS, VIVIAN BOSE

- **Citation:** [1954] 1 S.C.R. 219
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1954
- **Case number:** CIVIL APPELLATE JumsDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 144of1952
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/sir-kikabhai-premchand-v-commissioner-of-income-tax-central-bombay-patanjali-257
- **Pages:** 17

## Headnote

S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
219
SIR KIKABHAI PREMCHAND
v.
COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX (CENTRAL),
BOMBAY.
PATANJALI SASTRI C.J., s. R. DAS, VIVIAN BOSE,
GHULAM HASAN and BHAGWATI JJ.
Indian Income-tax Act (XI of 1922), s. 13-Ascertainment of
2)rofits-Assessee adopting mercantile system rind valuin(J stock at
cost price at begimiing and close of each yerw·-Withdrawal of stock
from biisiness-Whether business should be credited with mnrket
price on date of withdrawal..
The assessee who carried on business in bullion and shares
kept accounts in the mercantile system and the method adopted
by him for ascertaining his profits was to value stock at the
beginning and close of each year at cost price. In the accounting
year he withdrew some silver bars and shares from the business
and settled them in trusts, and in the accounts of the business he
valued them at the close of the year at cost price:
Held, per PATANJALI SASTRI C. J., S. R. DAS, VIVIAN BOSE
and GHULAM HASAN ,J.T. (BHAGWATI J. dissenting)-that the
assessee was entitled to value them at cost price and was not
bound to credit the business with their market price at the close
of the year for ascertaining his assessable profits for the year.
BHAGWATI J.-So far as the business was concerned it made no
difference whether the stock-in-trade was realised or withdrawn
from the business and the business was entitled to be credited
with the market value of the assets withdrawn as at the date of
the withdrawal, whatever be the method employed by the assessee
for the valuation of its stock-in-trade on hand at the close of the
year.
In re Chouthmal Gola.pchand (6 I.T.R. 733) and fo re Spanish
.Prospecting Co. Ltd. ([1911] 1 Ch. 92) referred to.
CIVIL
APPELLATE
JumsDICTION: Civil
Appeal
No. 144of1952.
Appeal by special leave granted by the Supreme
Court on 3rd October, 1950, from the Judgment and
Decree dated the 14th day of September, 1949, of the
.High Court of Judicature at Bombay (Chagla C.J. and
Tendolkar J.) in its Original Civil Jurisdiction in
Income-tax Reference No. 1 of 1949 arising out of the
Order dated the 20th day of February, 1948, and 9th
1953
Oct. 9,
1963
Sir Kikabhai
Premchand
v.
220
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954]
April, 1948, of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal,
Bombay Bench 'B', Bombay, in LT.A. No. 894 of
1947-48.
Oo1nniissioner of
Inco1ne-taz,
(Central)
Bombay.
R . .J. Kolah for the appellant.
M. C. Seta.lvad, Attorney-General for India, (G. N.
.Jo8hi, with him) for the Commissioner of Incometax.
1953~ October 9.
The Judgment of the Chief
Justice ahd S. R. Das, Bose and Ghulam Hasan JJ.
was delivered by Bose J. Bhagwati J. delivered a separate dissenting judgment.
BosE ,J.-· This is an appeal by an assessee against a
judgment and order of the High Court at Bombay
'delivered on a reference made by the Income-tax
Appellate Tribunal.
The Bombay High Court refused
leave to appeal but the assessee obtained special leave
from this court.
The appellant deals in silver and shares and a sub.
· stantial part of his holding is kept in silver bullion and
shares.
His business is run and. owned by himself.
His accounts are maintained according to the mercantile system. It is admitted that under this system
stocks can be valued in one of two ways and provided
there is no variation in the method from year to year
without the sanction of the Income-tax authorities an
assessee can choose whichever method he wishes. In
this case, the method employed was the cost price
method, that is to say, the cost price of the stock was
entered at the beginning of the year and not its market
value and similarly the cost price was again entered at
the close of the year of any stock which was not disposed of during the year. The entries on the one side of
the accounts at the beginning of the year thus balance
those on the other in respect of these items with the
result that so far as they are concerned the books show
neither a profit nor a loss on them. This was the
method regularly employed and it is

## Text

S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
219
SIR KIKABHAI PREMCHAND
v.
COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX (CENTRAL),
BOMBAY.
PATANJALI SASTRI C.J., s. R. DAS, VIVIAN BOSE,
GHULAM HASAN and BHAGWATI JJ.
Indian Income-tax Act (XI of 1922), s. 13-Ascertainment of
2)rofits-Assessee adopting mercantile system rind valuin(J stock at
cost price at begimiing and close of each yerw·-Withdrawal of stock
from biisiness-Whether business should be credited with mnrket
price on date of withdrawal..
The assessee who carried on business in bullion and shares
kept accounts in the mercantile system and the method adopted
by him for ascertaining his profits was to value stock at the
beginning and close of each year at cost price. In the accounting
year he withdrew some silver bars and shares from the business
and settled them in trusts, and in the accounts of the business he
valued them at the close of the year at cost price:
Held, per PATANJALI SASTRI C. J., S. R. DAS, VIVIAN BOSE
and GHULAM HASAN ,J.T. (BHAGWATI J. dissenting)-that the
assessee was entitled to value them at cost price and was not
bound to credit the business with their market price at the close
of the year for ascertaining his assessable profits for the year.
BHAGWATI J.-So far as the business was concerned it made no
difference whether the stock-in-trade was realised or withdrawn
from the business and the business was entitled to be credited
with the market value of the assets withdrawn as at the date of
the withdrawal, whatever be the method employed by the assessee
for the valuation of its stock-in-trade on hand at the close of the
year.
In re Chouthmal Gola.pchand (6 I.T.R. 733) and fo re Spanish
.Prospecting Co. Ltd. ([1911] 1 Ch. 92) referred to.
CIVIL
APPELLATE
JumsDICTION: Civil
Appeal
No. 144of1952.
Appeal by special leave granted by the Supreme
Court on 3rd October, 1950, from the Judgment and
Decree dated the 14th day of September, 1949, of the
.High Court of Judicature at Bombay (Chagla C.J. and
Tendolkar J.) in its Original Civil Jurisdiction in
Income-tax Reference No. 1 of 1949 arising out of the
Order dated the 20th day of February, 1948, and 9th
1953
Oct. 9,
1963
Sir Kikabhai
Premchand
v.
220
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954]
April, 1948, of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal,
Bombay Bench 'B', Bombay, in LT.A. No. 894 of
1947-48.
Oo1nniissioner of
Inco1ne-taz,
(Central)
Bombay.
R . .J. Kolah for the appellant.
M. C. Seta.lvad, Attorney-General for India, (G. N.
.Jo8hi, with him) for the Commissioner of Incometax.
1953~ October 9.
The Judgment of the Chief
Justice ahd S. R. Das, Bose and Ghulam Hasan JJ.
was delivered by Bose J. Bhagwati J. delivered a separate dissenting judgment.
BosE ,J.-· This is an appeal by an assessee against a
judgment and order of the High Court at Bombay
'delivered on a reference made by the Income-tax
Appellate Tribunal.
The Bombay High Court refused
leave to appeal but the assessee obtained special leave
from this court.
The appellant deals in silver and shares and a sub.
· stantial part of his holding is kept in silver bullion and
shares.
His business is run and. owned by himself.
His accounts are maintained according to the mercantile system. It is admitted that under this system
stocks can be valued in one of two ways and provided
there is no variation in the method from year to year
without the sanction of the Income-tax authorities an
assessee can choose whichever method he wishes. In
this case, the method employed was the cost price
method, that is to say, the cost price of the stock was
entered at the beginning of the year and not its market
value and similarly the cost price was again entered at
the close of the year of any stock which was not disposed of during the year. The entries on the one side of
the accounts at the beginning of the year thus balance
those on the other in respect of these items with the
result that so far as they are concerned the books show
neither a profit nor a loss on them. This was the
method regularly employed and it is admitted on all
hands that this was permissible under this system of
accounting.
' (
s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
221
The accounting year with whiCh we are concerned is
1953
the calendar year 1942. The silver bars and shares
Sir Kikabhai
lying with the appellant at the beginning of the year
Pnmc1iand
were valued at cost price;
v.
In the course of the year the appellant withdrew Oommissionerof
some bars and shares from the business and settled
rn,0come-tlax
th
·
t
h
·
b
Th
1
entra ),
em on certam rusts, t ree m num er.
e appe -
Bombay.
lant was one of the beneficiaries in all three trusts
retaining to !J.imself a reversionary life interest after
Bose J.
the death of his wife who was given the first life interel'!t.
After certain other life interests the ultimate
beneficiaries were charities. The appellant was the
managing trustee expressly so created in two of the
trusts and virtually so in the third. In his books the
appellant credited the business with the cost price of
the bars and shares so withdrawn and there lies the
crux of the issue which we have to determine. There
is no suggestion in this case that the bars and shares
were withdrawn from the business otherwise than in
good faith.
According to the appellant, the act of withdrawal
resulted in neither income nor profit nor gain either to
himself or to his business, nor was it a business tramiaction, accordingly it was not taxable.
The learned Attorney-General raised two contentio11s.
First, he said that as the bars and shares were
brought into the business any withdrawal of them
from the business must be dealt with along ordinary
and well-known business lines, namely, that if a person
withdraws an asset from a business he must account
for it to the business at the market rate prevailing at
the date of the withdrawal. He said that the mere
fact that the appellant was the sole owner of the business can make no difference, for under the Act incorne
is assessable under distinct heads and when we are
working out the income of a business the rules applicable to business incomes must be applied whoever is
the owner. His second contention was that if the act
of withdrawal is at a time when the market price is
higher than the cost price, then the St~te is deprived,
~o
222
SUPREME COURT· REPORTS
[1954)
1953
of a potential profit. He conceded that had the market
Sfr Kikubhai rate been lower than the cost price, then the appellant
Premchand
would have been entitled to set off the loss on those
v.
transactions against his overall profit on the other
Commi,,ioner of transactions and thus obtain the advantage of a lower
J,,come-tax
tax on the overall picture.
(Central),
W
f
• .
th t th 1
d A
G
Bomba,•.
e are o opm10n
a
e earne
ttorney- en-
-
eral's second contention is unsound because, for incomeBose J.
tax purposes, each year is a self-contained accounting
period and we can only take into consideration income,
profits and gains made in that year and are not concerned with potential profits which may be made in
another year any more tha.n we are with losses which
may occur in the future.
·
As regards the first contention, we are of opinion
that the appellant was right in entering the cost value
of the silver and shares at the date of the withdrawal,
because it was not a business transaction and by that
act the business made no profit or gain, nor did it sustain a loss, and the appellant derived no income from
it. He may have stored up a future advantage for
himself but as the transactions were not business ones
and as he derived no immediate pecuniary gain the
State cannot tax them, for under the Income-tax Act
the State has no power to tax a potential future advantage. All it can tax is income, profits and gains made
in the relevant accounting year.
It was conceded that if these assets had been sold at
cost price the State could have claimed nothing, for a
man cannot be compelled to make a profit out of any
particular transaction. It was also conceded that if the
silver and stocks had lain where they were, then again
there would have been no advantage to the State because
the appellant would have been entitled to enter their
closing values at cost at the end of the year. The
learned Attorney-General even conceded that. if they
had been sold at a loss the appellant would have been
entitled to set that off against his other gains, but he
said that that is because all those are business transactions and that is the way the law deals with such
matters when they o'ccur in the ordinary course of
1
A
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
223
business. But, he argued, when there is a withdrawal
1953
and no sale or its equivalent, the matter is different. As
Sir Kikabhcii
this is a business, any withdrawal of the assets is a
P1'ernchand
business matter and the only feasible way of regardv,
ing it in a business light is to enter the market price Commissioner of
at _the date of the withdrawal and whether that hapI(nOcome·t1a·"'
£
h
th St t . .
t . l
entra } ,
pens to a vour t e assessee or
e
a e is muna ena .
Bombay,
We do not agree.
It is well recognised that in revenue cases regal'd
must be had to the substance of the transaction rather
than to its mere form.
In the present case, disregarding technicalities, it is impossible to get away from the
fact that the business is owned and run by the assessee himself. In such circumstances we are of opinion
that it is unreal and artificial to separate the business
from its owner and treat them as if they were separate
entities trading with each other and then by means of
a fictional sale introduce a fictional profit which in
truth and in fact is non-existent.
Cut away the fictions and you reach the position that the man is supposed to be selling to himself and thereby making a
profit out·ofhimself which on the face of it is not only
absurd but against all canons of mercantile and
income-tax law. And worse. He may keep it and not
show a profit.
He may sell it to another at a loss and
cannot be taxed because he cannot be compelled to sell
at a profit. But in this purely fictional sale to himself
he is compelled to sell at a fictional profit when the
market rises in order that he may he compelled
to pay to Government a tax which is anything but
fictional.
Consider this simple illustration. A man trades in
rice and also uses rice for his family consumption.
The bags are all stored in ono godown and he draws
upon his stock as and when he finds it necessary to do
so, now for his business, now for his own use. What
he keeps for his own personal use cann.ot be taxed
however much the market rises; nor can he be taxed on
what he gives away from his own personal stock, nor,
so far as his shop is concerned, can he be compelled to
sell at a profit. If he keeps two sets of books and enters
Bose J.
224
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954]
1953
in one all the bags which go into his personal godown
and in the other the rice which is withdrawn from the
Sir K ikabhiii
Premchand
godown into his shop, rice just sufficient to meet the
v.
day to day demands of his customers so that only a
Oommi.,ioner of negligible quantity is left over in the shop after each
Income-taz
day's sales, his private and personal dealings with the
(Central),
bags in his personal godown could not be taxed unless
Bomhay.
he sells them at a profit. What he chooses to do with
Base J.
the rice in his godown is no concern of the Income-tax
department provided always that he does not sell it or
otherwise make a profit out of it. He can consume it,
or give it away, or just let it rot. Why should it make
a difference if instead of keeping two sets of books he
keeps only one ? How can he be said to have made an
income personally or his business a profit, because he
uses ten bags out of his godown for a feast for the
marriage of his daughter ? How can it make any
difference whether the bags are shifted directly from
the godown to the kitchen or from the godown to the
shop and from the shop to the kitchen, or from the
shop back to the godown and from there to the
kitchen ? And yet, when the reasoning of the learned
Attorney-General is pushed to its logical conclusion,
the form of the transaction is of its essence and it is
taxable or not according to the route the rice takes
from the godown to the wedding feast. In our opinion,
it would make no difference if the man instead of giving the feast himself hands over the rice to his
daughter as a gift for the marriage festivities of
her son.
The appellant's method of book-keeping reflects the
true position. As he makes his purchases he enters his
stock at the cost price on one side of the accounts. At
the close of the year he enters the value of any unsold
stock at cost on the other side of the accounts thus
cancelling out the entries relating to the same unsold
stock earlier in the accounts; and then that is carried
forward as the opening balance in the next year's
accounts. This cancelling out of the unsold stock from
both sides of the accounts leaves only the transactions
on which there have been actual sales and gives the
,,
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
225
true and actual profit or loss on his year's dealings.
1953
In the same way, the appellant has reflected the true
Sir K ikabhai
state of his finances and given a truthful picture of the
Prenwhand
profit and loss in his business by entering the bullion
v.
and silver at cost when he withdrew them for a purely Gommissionei· of
non-business purpose and utilised them in a transaction
Income-tax
•
which brought him neither income nor profit nor
(Central),
•
Bombay.
gam.
There is no case quite in point.
The learned
Bo<e J.
Attorney-General relied on Gold Coast Selection Trust
Limited v. Humphrey (H. M. Inspector of Taxes) (1),
but there the assessee received a new and valuable
asset in exchange for another in the ordinary course of
his trade. It was held that he was bound to account
for the receipt at a fair market valuation, for though
the receipt was not money it was capable of being
vaiued in terms of money. In the present case, the
assessee's business received nothing in exchange for
the withdrawal of the assets, neither money nor
money's worth, therefore the only fair way of treating
the matter was to do just what the appellant did,
namely to enter the price at which the assets were
valued at the beginning of the year so that the entries
would cancel each other out and leave the business with
neither a gain nor a loss on those transactions.
The learned Attorney-General contended that if that
was allowed great loss would ensue to the State because all a man need do at the end of the year would
be to withdraw all assets which had risen in value and
leave only those which had depreciated and thus
either show a loss or reduce his taxable profits.
This argument can only prevail on the assumption
that the State can tax potential profits because, except
for that, the State would neither gain nor lose in a
case of this kind. Had the assets been left where they
were, they would have been valued at the end of the
year as they were at the beginning, at the cost price
and we would still be where we are now. But the
assumption that there would be a gain at some future
(I) 30 Tax Cas. 209·
226
SUPREME couk± i'tEPOkTS
[lrJfJ4]
1953
i:tidefiiiite date is mere guess work for equally there
s;,. Kilabhai might be loss.
Apart, however, from that the learned
Premchand
Attorney-General's rule is equally capable of abuse.
v.
A man could as easily withdraw from the business
.aammi,.,ioncr of assets which had depreciated and enter in his books
Income-ta.,
the deprc~cfated market value and leave at cost price
(Oenfral)
th
t
h' h h d '
B6mbrn/
e asse s w IC
a risen.
There are two cases which bear a superficial resemBose .r.
blance to this case.
They are In the matter of ~Messrs.
Chouthmal Golapchand (1) and In re The Spanish
Prospecting Company Limited (').
\Ve refrain from expressing any opinion about them,
especially as they appear to reach different conclusions, because the facts are not the same and the questions which arose on the facts there were not argued
here. They raise matters of wider import which will
require consideration in a suitable case.
These cases
were not cases of a business owned and run by a single
owner and so the fiction of treating the business as a
separate entity from its owner actually trading with
-him, which we are asked to apply here, does not arise:
In the next place, the businesses there were not continuing as here.
In the Calcutta case, - a partnership was wound up
and the question related to the valuation ofassets
consisting of stocks and shares, on the dissolution. In
the English case, a company with no fixed capital was
under liquidation and the question was whether the
market value of certain debentures which the company
had purchased ought to be brought into the profit and
loss account so as to augment the profits actually
shown in the balance-sheet. The company wished to
treat those debentures as of no value and thus show a
much smaller profit than would otherwise have been
the case.
On the answer to that question hung the
fate of two servants of the company who, under the
terms of their agreement with the company, could
only be paid their salaries out of the profits of the
company. In our opinion, neither case is apposite
here.
(l) [\938) 6 l.T.R· 733.
(2) [1911] 1 Ch. 92,
I •
,.
I
~
S.C.R.
SUPREl}{E COURT REPORTS
227
The. questions referred were :-
1953
. " (I) Whether in the circumstances of the case
Sir ~ikabhai
a;ny income arose to the assessee as a result of the
Premchand
transfer of shares and silver bars to the trustees ?
v.
(2) If the answer to the question (1) is in the Oommi .. ionerof
ffi
·
h h
h
d b
h
Income-ta>:
a rmative, "'. et er t. e . m_ethod employe
y t e
(Central).
Appellate Assistant Comm1ss10ner and upheld by the
Bombay.
Appellate Tribunal in computing the assessee's income
from the transfer is the proper method for computing
Bose J.
the income?"
Our answer to the first question is that in the
circumstances of this case no income arose to the appellant as a result of the transfer of the shares and silver
bars to the trustees. In view of that the second question does not arise.
·
The appeal is allowed with costs.
BHAGWATI J.-This appeal by special leave from a
judgment of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay
on a reference by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal
under section 66(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act (XI
of 1922) raises an interesting question as to the valuation of an asset withdrawn from the stock-in-trade of
a running business.
The assessee was in the year of account (calendar
year 1942) a dealer in shares and silver. On the 21st
January, 1942, he withdrew from the business certain
shares and silver bars and executed two deeds of trust
and on the 19th October, 1942, he withdrew further
shares and silver bars and executed a third deed of
trust.· The terms and conditions of the deeds of trust
are not material for the purpose of this appeal.
The assessee kept his books of account on the mer·
cantile basis and the method employed by him in the
past for valuing the closing stock of his stock-in-trade
was valuation at the cost price thereof. The deeds of
trust were valued for the purpose of stamp at the
market value of the shares and silver bars prevailing
at the dates of their execution. The assessee however
i;howeq . the transfer of t4es© shares a11d silver barii to
228
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954]
uas
the trustees in the books of account at the cost price
thereof thus setting off the debit shown in respect of
Sir Kikab-hai
b
Premchand
the same at the eginning of the year of account. He
v.
contended that the market value of the said shares and
OmnmissioneroJ silver bars on which the stamp duty was based could not
Income-tax
be the basis for computing his income from the stock-
(Oentral),
in.trade thns transferred. The Income-tax authorities
Bombay.
did not accept this contention and assesseil the profit
Bhagwati J.
at the difference between the cost price of the said
shares and silver bars and the market value thereof
at the date of their withdrawal from the business. The
Income-tax Officer, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner as also the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal
rejected this contention of the assessee and the Income.
tax Appellate Tribunal submitted at the instance of
the assessee a case under section 66( 1) of the Act
referring the following two questions for the decision
of the High Court :-
" (1) Whether in the circumstances of the case any
income arose to the petitioner as a result of the transfer of shares and silver bars to the trustees ? .
(2) If the answer to the question ( 1) is in the
affirmative, whether the method employed by the
Appellate Assistant Commissioner and upheld by the
Appellate
Tribunal in computing the petitioner's
income from the transfer is the proper method for
computing the income? "
The High Court answered both the questions in the
affirmative.
It was not disputed beforethe Income-tax Appellate
Tribunal that the shares transferred were the stock-in.
trade of the business.
As regards the silver bars the
Tribunal found that t.he assessee had been making
purchases and sales frequently and that the silver also
was stock-in-trade and not a capital investment. Both
the shares and the silver bars were thus part of the
stock· in-trade of the business. They had been purchased
by the assessee from time to time and formed part of the
stock-in-trade of the business and had been shown at the
cost price thereof in the books of account of the previous
~ears and also at the opening of the year of account,
,.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
229
If the shares and the silver bars which were thus
1953
withdrawn from the stock-in-trade of the business had Sir Kikabhai
continued to form part of the stock-in-trade at the
Premchand
closing of the year of account, the value of these shares
v.
and silver bars would also have been shown at the cost Commissioner of
price in accordance with the system of accounts mainIncome-taz
. d b
h
Th
t' . h
h' h
(Central),
tame
y t e assessee.
e ques ion· owever w 10
Bombay.
falls to be determined is what is the effect of these
assets having been withdrawn from the stock-in-trade
Bhagw11.ti J.
of the business.
So far as the business itself is concerned the asset
which has been brought in is of a particular value at
the date when it has been so brought in and it is then
valued in the books of account at its cost. In the course
of the business ho.wever the asset appreciates· or depreciates in value in accordance with the fluctuations of
the market. If the cost price basis is adopted for the
valuation of the stock-in-trade R,t the close of the year
this appreciation or depreciation in the value as the
case mav be would not be reflected in the accounts.
If howe\;-er the market value basis is adopted for such
valuation, the asset on being valued at the market rate
thereof at the close of the year might show a loss and
this loss would be allowed by the Income-tax authorities in computing the profit or loss of the business.
In either event, the assessee would have to carry over
the asset in the books of account of the subsequent
year at the valuation adopted at the close of the previous year and the assessee would not be allowed to
change the basis of valuation thus adopted unless he
chose to adopt at the end of the subsequent year or
years valuation at the cost price or the market value
thereof whichever was lower. This process would continue until the asset is realised. When the asset is
realised the assessee would have to show the actual
price realised by the. sale of the asset in the books of
account and the difference between the price thus
realised and the value shown in the beginning of the
year of account would be the profit or loss as the case
may be, in regard to that asset and that profit or loss
230
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954)
19S3
would be allowed by the Income-tax authorities in the
SirKikabhai computation of profit or loss for that year of account.
Premchand
The adoption of the one or the other basis of valuav.
tion would not however make any difference in the
Connni'8ioner of ultimate result. On the cost price basis of valuation
Inwn,,.tax
all intermediate fluctuations of price during the interval
(Central),
between the bringing of the asset in the business and
Bo111.bay.
1 '
f
b
d
d h
1
the rea is .. tion o it would e eliminate an t e on y
mmywati J.
thing considered in the accounts would be the difference between the price of the asset when it was
brought into the business and the price thereof when
the asset was realised. On the other hand, the market
value basis would bring into account each year the
fluctuations in the market value of the asset as at the
close of every year of account until the asset was
realised with the result that in each and every year of
account a rectification would have to be made in the
result of the trading of the previous year which was
not correctly reflected in the accounts by reason of the
•
assessee having adopted the market value obtaining
at the close of the previous year as the value of the
asset. This process of rectification would continue from
year to year until the asset was realised in a particular
year of account when the actual price realised on the
sale of the asset would be brought into account in that
year. The ultimate result of these operations so far as
the asset itself is concerned would be no different,
Because if regard be had to the various fluctuations in
the market value which have been reflected in the
accounts of the intermediate period, what the business
actually gains or loses would be the difference between
the cost price of the asset when it was brought in and
the price at which it was sold when it was actually
realised. The only advantage which the assessee obtains would be that he would be able to anticipate in
a particular year the loss that may be made on the
asset in the following year or ye~rs, which however
might have to be rectified in the following year or
years if the prices rose again.
Is there any difference in the position when instead
oft.he asset being realised is withdrawn from the stock1 •
,.
I
)
S.d.R.
SUPREME COURT i{,EPORTS
in-trade of the business? So far as the business is
1953
concerned the asset ceases to be a part of the stock-intrade whether it is realised or is withdrawn from the
Siv Kikabhai
Premchand
stock-in-trade. The asset after it has been brought into
v.
the business appreciates or depreciates in value in Oommissiancr of
accordance with the fluctuations of the market and
Income.tax
that appreciated or depreciated asset continl!es to be
(Central).
a part of the stock-in-trade of the business until it is
Bombay.
realised or withdrawn. This appreciation or depreciaBh
· J
agu:ati •
tion in value is not reflected in the books of account
when the cost price basis is adopted for the valuation of the stock-in-trade at the close of the year of
account, but is certainly reflected as above indicated
in the books of account at the close of each year of
account when' the market value basis is adopted. In
each case however the actual profit or loss to the
business as the case may be in relation to the price at
which the asset was brought into the business would
be determined at the date when the asset is realised.
That would be the measure of the appreciation or de·
preciation in value of the asset which till then formed
a part of the stock-in-trade of the business, and would
also be the n.ieasure of the ultimate profit .or loss as
the case may be of the business in regard to that particular asset. When the asset is withdrawn from the
stock-in-trade of the business the position in my
opinion would be no different. So far as the business is
concerned the asset would go out and cease to be a part
of its stock-in-trade and this again would be the
measure of the profit or loss as the case may be of the
business qua that particular asset. To my mind it
makes not the slightest difference whether an asset is
realised in the course of the business or is withdrawn
from the stock-in-trade of the business. An asset which
has appreciated or depreciated in value as the case
may be in accordance with the fluctuations of the
market ceases to be a part of the business, by the one
process or the other. So far as the business is concerned
it is entitled to credit in its goods account the price of
that asset as has been realised by the sale thereof or
the market value of that asset as at the date of its
withdrawal.
..
232
SUPREME COUR.T REPORTS
[1954]
1958
Looking at the matter from assessee's point of view
Sir Kik•bhai also it does not make any the slightest difference whether
Premchand
he realises the asset in the course of the business or
v.
withdraws it from the business and utilises it in any
Commissioner of manner he chooses. Having brought into the business
Income.tax
an asset which was of a particular value at that time,
(Central),
he withdraws from the business that asset at a time
Bombay.
h
d
d
1
when it as appreciate or epreciated in va ue.
The
Bhagwati J.
business would be entitled to the appreciation or
depreciation in value of that asset in so fur as the
asset had become a part of the stock-in-trade of the
business. When the asset is withdrawn by the assessee, the assessee obtains in his hands by reason of such
withdrawal an asset which at the time of the withdrawal has appreciated or depreciated in value as the
case may be in comparison with its value at the time
when it was brought into the business and the assessee on such withdrawal would be able to deal with or
dispose of an asset which had thus appreciated or
depreciated in value. In my opinion the manner of
his dealing with the asset after he withdraws it from
the stock-in-trade of the business is really immaterial.
What is .material to consider is what, is the value of
the asset which he was withdrawn from the stock-intrade of the business and that value can only be determined by the market value of the asset as at the date
of its withdrawal.
It was urged that the withdrawal of the asset from
the stock-in-trade of the business was not a business
operation and that an entry on the credit side crediting the cost price of the particular asset would therefore be enough. This argument however does not
take into account the appreciation or the depreciation
in the value of the asset on the date of the withdrawal
as compared with its value when it was initially
brought into the business. It also does not take into
account the fact that the assessee might have adopted
the market value basis for valuation of the stock-intrade on hand at the close of the previous year or years
of a;ccount.
The entry on the debit side at the beginning of the year of account would not then represent
the cost price of the asset but would represent
'
)
s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
233
the market value of the asset at the close of the pre1963
vious year of account. What would then be the rational
Sir Kikabhai
basis on which the credit entry should be made at the
Premchand
date of withdrawal? Should it be the cost price of
v.
the asset which was not at all reflected into the accounts Co1n1nissioner
except at the initial stage when the asset was brought
Income-ta.~
.
.
h
k t
l
f h
(Central)
mto the busmess or t e mar e va ue o t e asset
B
b
'
when it was withp.rawn?
Surely the method of
om ay.
accounts keeping q~nnot make any difference to the
Bhagwati J;
actual position, wh~ther an asset has appreciated or
depreciated in value and what profit or loss if any
accrued to the business when the asset was withdrawn
from the stock-in-trade of the business. There is also a
further fact to be considered and it is that when the asset
is withdrawn from the stock-in-trade of the business
there would be of necessity an entry in the account of
the person withdrawing it debiting the price of that asset
to him. If the assessee withdraws from the stock-intrade of the business an asset which has thus appreciated or depreciated in value, is there any justification
whatever for debiting him with the cost price of that
asset· and not the market value of the asset as at the
date of withdrawal? In the event of the asset having
appreciated in value the assessee should be debited in
his account with the appreciated market value of the
asset inasmuch as he withdraws from the stock-intrade of the business an asset which is at that date of
that market value. If however the asset has depreciated in value the assessee should certainly not be
mulcted. He withdraws from the stock-in-trade of
the business an asset which is of a depreciated value
as compared with its value when it was hr.ought into
the business and he should not certainly be debited
with a higher price even though it may be the cost
price as appearing in the books of account according
to the particular system of accounting adopted by the
assessee.
·
I am therefore definitely of the opinion that even in
the case of withdrawal as in the case of the realisation
of the asset the business is entitled to credit in the
goods account the market value of the asset as at the
date of its withdrawal whatever be the method adopted •
234
sb:PRllJME couitT h:EPoitTs
[i954]
1953
by it for valuation of its stock-in-trade on hand at
the close of a year of account.
Sir Kikabhai
Pmnchand
Shri H. J·. Kolah >tppearing for the appellant partiv.
cularly relied upon a decision of the Calcutta High
Oommi>Sioncr uf Court, In the matter of il'Iessrs. Ghoutlvmal Golap1 nwmc-ta.•
chand ('). The assessees there were the firm · of
<z::;:;:
Messrs. Ch.outhmal Golapchand constituted by four
partners with equal shares, and they had at the
Bhagwati J.
beginning of the accounting year 1935-36 an opening
stock of shares valued at cost price of Rs. 85,331.
On
the 8th January, 1936, the partners resolved to dissolve
the firm with effect from the 30th March, 1936, and in
view of the pending dissolution they divided amongst
themselves on the 9th March, 1936; these shares which
were then valued at the rates prevailing in the market
at an aggregate sum of Rs. 51,966.
There was a difference of Rs. 33,365 between the value of the opening
stock, viz., Rs. 85,331, and the then market valuation
of Rs. 51,966 and this difference was claimed by the
assessees as a loss in the assessment. This claim of
the assessees was negatived on the ground that there
was nothing to show that loss had occurred in the
year of account. The assessees having adopted the
system of valuing the shares at cost price at the end
of every year and the opening of the next year, the
cost price of the shares was taken to have been their
value at the beginning of the year of account and
the partition was taken as not amounting to a sale
of the shares with the result that -there was no evidence
of any loss.
With great respect to the learned J"udges
I do not see my way to agree with the reasoning of this
judgment. Apart from the fact that this distribution
of shares 11mongst the' partners was in view of the impending dissolution of the firm and different considerations may arise when one considers the distribution of
the . assets of a dissolved partnership amongst its
partners, the judgment does not take count of the fact
that at the date of the partition the assets which had
been bro.ught into the business at the earlier dates had
depreciated in value ·and it was these depreciated
•
. (1) [1938] 6 I. T. R. 13~-
}
•
)
S.O.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
I
235
assets which were the subject-matter of partition bet1953!
ween the partners. Even if the partition be not treatSir K ikabhai
ed as a sale it was a transfer of property, the property
Premchand
of the firm being transferred to the individual partners
v.
thereof and each partner obtaining an absolute inter-. Commissioner of
est in the shares thus transferred to him by the firm
Income-tax ·
to the exclusion of the other partners therein. So far
c;entral),
as the firm was concerned it was certainly a transfer
ombay.
of the property to the individual partners and even as
Bhagwati J.
regards the partners themselves it was a transfer of
the interest of the partners inter se in the shares respectively transferred absolutely to each of them. If
it were necessary to do so I would certainly say that
the case was erroneously decided. [See also the judgment of Fletcher Moulton L. J. in In re. Spanish
Prospecting Co., Ltd.(')].
The result therefore is that the answers given by the
High Court to both the questions referred to it were
correct and the appeal must be dismissed with costs.
Appeal allowed.
Agent for the appellant: Rajinder Narain.
Agent for the respondent: G. H. Rajadhyaksha.
JAGADGURU GURUSHIDDASWAMI
•
v.
DAKSHINA MAHARASHTRA DIGAMBAR
JAIN SABHA.
[MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, MuKHER.JEA, and
JAGANNADHADAS J,J,]
Religions endowinent.1-Perm<me11t lease by head of mathDemise by lessee by wa11 of gift~ Decree obtained by s1wceedin.g head
aga.inst heirs of lessee for recovery of possession-Whether binding
on donee-Fresh wit against donee-Maintainnbility-Limitati011.
-Liniitation Act (IX of 1908), s. JOA, Art. ]34B-"Val11able
consideration" menning of.
(J) [1911] 1 Ch. 92 atp. 98,
,
1963
Oct. 14.