# • . . . - - Slate of .\fadhya Prade.>h v. Re~·ashatikaY • • , • •

- **Citation:** [1959] 1 S.C.R. 1367
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1959
- **Case number:** Criminal Appeal No. 103 of 1956
- **Bench:** Jafer Imam, S. K. Das, J. L. Kapur
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/slate-of-fadhya-prade-h-v-re-ashatikay-1561
- **Pages:** 18

## Headnote

Contempt of Court-Ouster of High Court's jurisdiction-Test
September 24.
-Contempt of Courts Act, I952 (XXXII of I952), s. "J(2)-Indian
•
Penal Cwie, I86o (XLV of I86o), s. 228.
The respondent, who h~d filed a complaint in respect of an
alleged offence under s. 500 of the Indian Penal Code in the
Court of the Additional District Magistrate' of I1\dore, macfe a
number of aspersions against the Magistrate in in a·pplication
•
•
•
174
• .
. .
-
-
Slate of .\fadhya
Prade.>h
v.
Re~·ashatikaY
•
• ,
• •
1368
SUPREME COURT REPORTrf
[1959]
made to him uncler s. 528 of the Co<le of Crimi!lil Procedure, two
of which were of a serious ch!trac<er. It was alleged that the
!\lagistratc \\.·as a party tu a.conspiracy \\'ith certain others the>
ohjt>ct of \\'hich 1,1,·as t\\·o implicate the complainant in a false
casr of theft anrl that a lawyer appearing for the accr.sed persons, to whom the ~!agistrate was favourably inclined, had
declar<!tl that he had paid a sum of Hs. 500 to the Magil;tratc.
Those allegations were later on repeated in an affida~it. The
~lagistrate reported the matter to the J{egi;trar of the High
Court for necessary action. The High Court called upon the
respondent to show cause why he shoulcl not be proceeded
against in contempt under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952.
The .Judges of the Di,·ision Bench who hearcl the matter, without going into the merits of the case. hrld that, prin1': facif, the
offence ,., .. as one of intentional in~ult under s. 228 of the l ndian
Penal Coric ancl, cunsequrutly, the jurisdiction of the High
Court was ousted under s. 3(2) of the Contempt of Courts Act,
1952.
•
/Icld, that the lligh Court had taken au erroneous \·iew of
the 1natter and it:; orcler n1ust he set aside.
The ITI.:!re existence of an clement of insult in I he alleged
act of conten1pt \\'as not conclusi,·e as to the applicahility of
s. 228 of the Indian Penal Code so as to oust lhc jurisdiction
of the High Court under s. 3(2) of the Contempt of Court';
Act.
\Vhilc Judges and Courts arc not beyond critU:isrn, and
there are v.·ell-recognisecl linWts to such critic:istn, and contctll..Pt
proceedings arc not n1eant to shield .Juclges fro1n μcr~onal insul1s,
there can he no question that \vhcre defan1atory aspersif,ns are
cast upon the.cha<acter and ability of individual Judges or of
Courts in general, which in substancr. scandalise the Court itself
and have the effect of undermining the confidence o·,: the public
in it and thus hinder <lue achninistration of justice, t:he contcrnpt
is of a kind which exceeds the limits of s. 228 of the Indian
Penal Code.
'fhc true test, therefore, is: is the act compl;incd of an
off«nce un<lcr s. 228 of the Indian Penal Code, ;)f son1cthing
tnore than that? If it is sornething 1nore, the jurisdii.c:tion of
the High Court is not oustec:\ by s. J(2) of the Contempt of
Courts Act.
So jo<lgr.cl, there could be no cloubt that the aspersions cast
in the present case arnountecl to scandalising the con rt itself, and
\\"ere no mere personal insults, and the lfigh Court had.jurisdiction to take cognizance of the satne.
Hathi11a Ramkrishna Reddy v. T)1c State of /,fadras, [1952]
S. i;:. K 425 a,n<l Br.ahma l'rakash Shanna v. '/'he State of Ullar
Pradesh, [19581 S.C.K u69, relied on.
•
Ambard v. Allonrey-G·c11eralfor Trinidad. a11d J'o<Jago, [1936]
A.C. 322, rc!erre~ to,
•
•
I
. \.
•
) .
' .
• •
S.C.R.
\SUPRE:\\iE COURT REPOR'JIS
1369
The question whether an insult offered to a public servant
is intentional so"as to attrac1; s. •28 of the Indian Penal Code
has to be decided on the facts of each particular case and it
is neither necessary nor advisable•to lay down any hard and
fast rule.
Narotam Das v. Emperor, A.LR. 1943 All. 97, Queen Empress
v. Abdullah Khan, (1898) A.W.N. 145 and Emperor v. Mu1li Dhar,
(1916) I.L.R. 38 All. 284, considered. ·
CRIMINAL
APPELLATE
JURISDICTION:
Criminal
Appeal No. 103 of 1956.
H. J. Umrigar and R.H. Dhebar, for the appellant.
The sole question arising for determination is

## Text

_Characters 0–39,874 of 41,213. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39874 for what follows._

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S.C.R.
\sUPREME COURT REPORTS
1367
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since affirmed.by the House of Lords and they quoted
r958
with approval the followtng 'passage from the judg5 1
T
Offi
ment of Romer L. J., at p. 13-of the earlier report:
a es
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"'
" The short answer is that a Court of Equity Mukundlal Sarnf
cannot say that it is equitable to compel a person to
pay •moneys in respect of a transaction whitih as
Bhagwati J.
against that person the Legislature has declared to be
void."
That ratio was applied by their Lordships to the .
facts of the case before them and the contention was
negatived. Merely because the State of U. P. had not
retained the monies paid by the respondent but had
spent them a way in the ordinary course of the business
of the State would not make any difference to the
μpsition and under the plain terms of s. 72 of the
Indian Contract Act the respondent would be entitled
to recover back the monies paid by it to the State of
U. P. under mistake of law.
The result, therefore; is that none of the contentions
vrged before .us on behalf of the appellants in regard
• to the non-applicability of s. 72 of the Indian Contract Act to the facts of the present case avail them
and the 'appeal is accordingl.Y, dismissed with costs. ·
. .
Appeal dismissed.
. .
8TATE OF MADHYA PRADESH
v.
•
REV ASHANKAR
(.JAFER IMAM, S. K. DAS and J. L. KAPUR JJ.)
Contempt of Court-Ouster of High Court's jurisdiction-Test
September 24.
-Contempt of Courts Act, I952 (XXXII of I952), s. "J(2)-Indian
•
Penal Cwie, I86o (XLV of I86o), s. 228.
The respondent, who h~d filed a complaint in respect of an
alleged offence under s. 500 of the Indian Penal Code in the
Court of the Additional District Magistrate' of I1\dore, macfe a
number of aspersions against the Magistrate in in a·pplication
•
•
•
174
• .
. .
-
-
Slate of .\fadhya
Prade.>h
v.
Re~·ashatikaY
•
• ,
• •
1368
SUPREME COURT REPORTrf
[1959]
made to him uncler s. 528 of the Co<le of Crimi!lil Procedure, two
of which were of a serious ch!trac<er. It was alleged that the
!\lagistratc \\.·as a party tu a.conspiracy \\'ith certain others the>
ohjt>ct of \\'hich 1,1,·as t\\·o implicate the complainant in a false
casr of theft anrl that a lawyer appearing for the accr.sed persons, to whom the ~!agistrate was favourably inclined, had
declar<!tl that he had paid a sum of Hs. 500 to the Magil;tratc.
Those allegations were later on repeated in an affida~it. The
~lagistrate reported the matter to the J{egi;trar of the High
Court for necessary action. The High Court called upon the
respondent to show cause why he shoulcl not be proceeded
against in contempt under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952.
The .Judges of the Di,·ision Bench who hearcl the matter, without going into the merits of the case. hrld that, prin1': facif, the
offence ,., .. as one of intentional in~ult under s. 228 of the l ndian
Penal Coric ancl, cunsequrutly, the jurisdiction of the High
Court was ousted under s. 3(2) of the Contempt of Courts Act,
1952.
•
/Icld, that the lligh Court had taken au erroneous \·iew of
the 1natter and it:; orcler n1ust he set aside.
The ITI.:!re existence of an clement of insult in I he alleged
act of conten1pt \\'as not conclusi,·e as to the applicahility of
s. 228 of the Indian Penal Code so as to oust lhc jurisdiction
of the High Court under s. 3(2) of the Contempt of Court';
Act.
\Vhilc Judges and Courts arc not beyond critU:isrn, and
there are v.·ell-recognisecl linWts to such critic:istn, and contctll..Pt
proceedings arc not n1eant to shield .Juclges fro1n μcr~onal insul1s,
there can he no question that \vhcre defan1atory aspersif,ns are
cast upon the.cha<acter and ability of individual Judges or of
Courts in general, which in substancr. scandalise the Court itself
and have the effect of undermining the confidence o·,: the public
in it and thus hinder <lue achninistration of justice, t:he contcrnpt
is of a kind which exceeds the limits of s. 228 of the Indian
Penal Code.
'fhc true test, therefore, is: is the act compl;incd of an
off«nce un<lcr s. 228 of the Indian Penal Code, ;)f son1cthing
tnore than that? If it is sornething 1nore, the jurisdii.c:tion of
the High Court is not oustec:\ by s. J(2) of the Contempt of
Courts Act.
So jo<lgr.cl, there could be no cloubt that the aspersions cast
in the present case arnountecl to scandalising the con rt itself, and
\\"ere no mere personal insults, and the lfigh Court had.jurisdiction to take cognizance of the satne.
Hathi11a Ramkrishna Reddy v. T)1c State of /,fadras, [1952]
S. i;:. K 425 a,n<l Br.ahma l'rakash Shanna v. '/'he State of Ullar
Pradesh, [19581 S.C.K u69, relied on.
•
Ambard v. Allonrey-G·c11eralfor Trinidad. a11d J'o<Jago, [1936]
A.C. 322, rc!erre~ to,
•
•
I
. \.
•
) .
' .
• •
S.C.R.
\SUPRE:\\iE COURT REPOR'JIS
1369
The question whether an insult offered to a public servant
is intentional so"as to attrac1; s. •28 of the Indian Penal Code
has to be decided on the facts of each particular case and it
is neither necessary nor advisable•to lay down any hard and
fast rule.
Narotam Das v. Emperor, A.LR. 1943 All. 97, Queen Empress
v. Abdullah Khan, (1898) A.W.N. 145 and Emperor v. Mu1li Dhar,
(1916) I.L.R. 38 All. 284, considered. ·
CRIMINAL
APPELLATE
JURISDICTION:
Criminal
Appeal No. 103 of 1956.
H. J. Umrigar and R.H. Dhebar, for the appellant.
The sole question arising for determination is whether
on the facts and circumstances of the case the High
Court was correct in holding that the act of the respondent complained of constituted an offence under
s~ 228 of the Indian Penal Code, and. the jurisdiction
of the High Court was, therefore, ousted by reason of
the provision of s. 3(2) of the Contempt of Courts Act,
1952. The High Court in coming to this conclusion
appears to have relied on two decisions of the Supreme
Court-[1952] S.C.R. 425 and [1953] S.C.R. ll69. The
facts in the two Supreme Court cases were quite
different and they do not, in any way justify the view
taken by the High Court. It will be my submission
that the allegations made in the so-called transfer
application as also the affidavit are o( su.ch a serious
nature that they are not a mere personal insult to the
Magistrate, but go far beyond ; they scandalise the
Court in such a manner as to create distrust in the
minds of the public, and pollute the stream of justice,
and in sdch cases the jurisdiction of the High Court is
not ousted (Reads out portions of the transfer apJllicationrand the affidavit in support). :From a perusal
of the extracts which have been read, it will be seen
that the aspersions made against the Magistrate are of
a very serious nature alleging criminal conspiracy, and
also that he had taken a bribe of Rs. 50Q from the
opposite side.
So far as the offence under s. 228 of the Indian
Penal Code is concerned, the first esfl()ntiaJ ingredient
is that there must be an "intention " to• insult. In
the affidavit filed in the High Court in reply to the•
•
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Slate of Madhya
Pradesh
v.
Revashanka,-
•
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S/11/t of .~fadhy<i
Pradesh
v.
Ret:asllanhar
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• •
1370
SUPREME COURT R~:I>ORTs/ [1959]
show cause· notice the respondent had ~t/ited that there
\HIS no intention to insnrt CJf show disrespect to the
lllagistrate.
•
[lnwin .J.-I cannot agree with that, the lauguagc
used in the application and affidavit is such that intentio1t to insult was clearly there.]
•
That may be true, but there arc several earlier
decisions of the Albhabad High Court whi<h have
been referred t.o in the case relied upon by the High
Court-Naro/am Das v. The Emperor, A.LR 1943 All.
97, wherein it was held that where scandalous allegations were incorporated in a transfer applicat.i• .. n, there
was not necessarily an intention to insult, as the
primnry object was to seek a transfer and not to insult
the Court.
•
•
So far as the decisions are concerned, they support
my contention that when scandalous allegations are
made agninst a l\lngistrate in a transfer application
they would not necessarily constitute an ~ffence under
s. 228 of the Indian Pcrnd Code and could be punishecl
by the High Court.
Jn I.L.R. 1941 Nagpur 304, the
Judge, who was seizec.l of the case, made a cc1mpl:Liut
to the High Court about ~ Jetter sent to him by one ef
the parties, and it was there held that the sender of
the Jetter co.uld.be punished for Contempt of Court by
the High Court. It is true that there is no di8cussion
about s. 228 of the Indian Penal Code hut in the course
of the judgment the case of Emperor v. Jagnath
Prasad Swadhiry, I.L.R. 1938 All. 548, was mentioned.
In the Alhthahad case a person during the pen<lency
of .a suit sent communict\tions by post U> tlie Judge
containing seanclalous allegations.
It aprieat's that
it was urged that s. 228 of the Indian Penal Code
would bar the jurisdiction of the High Court under
s. 3(2) of the Cont{!mpt of Courts Act, 1926, but this
contention· was repelled and the High Court stated
that its jurisdiction to punish for contempt :·as not
ousted.
'
~Reference waR nlso made to I.L.R. 12 Patna 1 and
I.L.R. 12 Patna I i2].
•
•
I submit t.hat where the allegations made go beyond
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S.C.R.
\suPREME COURT REPORTS
1371
mere personil' insult and tend to bring the whole
1958
administration of justice 'tnto' disrepute, then the jurisState of Madhya
diction of the High Court \1'0uld not be ousted by --
Pradesh
s. 3(2) of the Act. In a case where there is only an
v.
insult to the Judge by using vulgar abuse such as
Rcvashankar
" rogue or rascal " and this abuse was made " e-x facie
curiae", then it may be said ·that the jurisdiction of
the High Court is ousted as the offence falls within the
purview of s. 228 of the Indian Penal Code.
[Das J.-Also if the abuse relates to the private
life of the Judge, such as, calling him a drunkard or
imputing some immorality to him, unconnected with
his judicial duties.]
I agree. In the instant case the Magistrate must
l!a ve been fully conscious of the powers possessed by
him under s. 228 of the Indian Penal Code as also
the relevant provisions in the Criminal Procedure Code
which permit him to punish for Contempt of Court,
yet he presumably must have felt that the aspersions
.made in the•present case were so grave as to transcend
mere personal insult and as such it was a fit case to
be refetred to the High Court for taking necessary
action. In conclusion, it is ,submitted that the view
taken by the High Court is much too narrow and
cannot be supported either in principle or by the
authorities cited.
•
•
J. B. Dadachanji and S. N. Andley, for the respondent. The view taken by the High Court is correct
and is in accordance with the judgments of the
Suprem@ Court in the cases reported in [1952] S.C.R.
and [1953] S.C.R. If the act complained of intentionally
offers, a personal insult to the Magistrate concerned., it
may tend to undermine the administration of justice
thereby, but it will nevertheless amount to an offence
under s. 228 of the Indian Penal Code and as such the
jurisdiction of the High Court will be ousted by s. 3(2)
of th~ Act. It is unsound to say that there are two
kinds of con tern pt, aad the lesser kind of contempt
will come under s. 228 of the Indian Penal Code and the
grosser kind will not come under s.
0228 ; : exery illsult
to a C<iurt, whatever its nature, is contempt am!
punishable, under s. 228 of,the,Indian .Penal Code.
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State ()f .\Jadliy!1
J>radesh
v.
Ueua-~hat1kar
-
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1372
E+UPRE~1E COURT REPORTS/
[1959]
[Kapur J.-Every insult to a
J1v}ge wJI not
necesHarily be a contenipt.' A libel attacking the
integrity of a Judge ma! 11ot, in the circumstam·es of a
particular case, amount t-0 a contempt at all, akhough
it may be the subject matter of a libel proceeding.]
[DaS' J.-It appears that there is a further diTieulty
in your way, that is, whether the Magistrate was
sitting in any stage of a judicial proceeding when tho
npplication and the affidavit were filed; if he was not,
then one of the essential ingredients of s. 228 of the
Indian Penal Code was not satisfied.]
The High Court has as;umed that the }lagistrate
was sitting as a Court at that time and this was also
borne out by the facts stated in tho pct-ition for special
leave to appeal filed by the appellant wherein it. if!
stated "the application having IJCcn presented during
the sitting of the Court- was clearly ciilculated to lower
the dignity of the Court in tho public mi11d ".
Section 480 of the Code of Criminal Procedure specifically mentions s. 228 of the Indian Pen~) Code and•
treats it as a form of contempt-, therefore, it will be an
offo11cc of contempt pu11ishable under the .Indian
Penal Code and as such tlie jurisdiction of t-rie Higb
Court would be ousted under s. 3(2) of the AcL
I submit ttia.t .the viPw taken by the II igh Court is
the correct ,·iew and is su pportcd by the t.wo decisions
of t-he Sn pr(' me Court 118 a !so the judgmen<; of the
Bombay High C'onrt in (]\)22) 1.1.R. 46 llom. 973.
l./mrigar in reply.
During the eourse of discussion,
doubts ha Ye arisen whet iwr there was a11v ii1tention
to i1<sult., or whPther what was said was a-ii insult, or
whether the insult was offered in any stage of tt• jucli·
e;i,d proceeding. If a11y onP of these three ''ssentials
is lacking, then, obviously, there is no offence under
s. 228 oft he Indian Penal Coclc.
Where there is so
muC"h doubt° as to whether an offence under s. 228 of
the l nrlian Penal Code has been committed o~ not-, and
there is no doubt that " prima t'acie" a Contempt of
Coutt 11part .from. the provisions of s. 228 has been
committoo, it is wrong to say that the juriHrliction of
the High Court is ousted.
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S.C.R.
\suPRE~E COURT REPOR'PS
1373
I submit ittat the case relied upon by the High
Court, Narotam Das v. hp~ror, A. I. R. 1943 All. 97,
correctly lays down the law so far as the question of
" intention " is concerned.
1958. September 24.
The Judgment of the Court
was-delivered by
•
S. K. DAs, J.-This is an appeal by special leave
from the judgment and order of the then Madhya
Bharat High Court, dated February 9, 1955, in
·Criminal Miscellaneous Application no. 2 of 1954.
Originally, the appeal was filed on behalf of the
State of Madhya Bharat, now substituted by the
State of Madhya Pradesh. The appeal raises an important question with regard to the interpretation of
!!. 3(2) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952 (XXXII
of 1952), hereinafter referred to as the Act, which
repealed the earlier Contempt of Courts Act, 1926 (XII
of 1926), as also the Indore Contempt of Courts
Act (V of 1930) which was earlier in force in the
• State of M1tdhya Bharat.
The facts so far as they are relevant to this appeal
are these. One Ganga Ram, stated to be the landlord of
phe respondent RevashankJtr, instituted a suit, which
was numbered as 1383 of 1952 in the court of the
Additional City Civil Judge, Indore, for ejectment and
arrears of rent against Revashankar.' It was stated
that the suit was filed in the name of Ganga Ram and
his wife Chandra Mukhi Bai. It was further alleged
that one Mr. Uma Shankar Chaturvedi, a lawyer
acting cm behalf of Ganga Ram, advised the latter to
sign the name of his wife Chandra Mukhi Bai though
Chan,dra Mukhi Bai herself did not sign the plaint or
the vakalatnama. In this suit Chandra Mukhi Bai filed
an application for permission to prosecute her husband
for forgery.
Another application was filed by certain
other persons said to be other tenants of Ganga Ram
in whoich some alleg\l'tions were made against Revashankar. On June •29, 1953, Revashankar filed a
complaint against five persons for an alleged offence
under s. 500, Indian Penal Code'.
T]tis comp1aint
was ver.ified on.July 13, 1953, and was registered ~
Criminal Qase no. 637 of 1953 i.ri the court of one
. .
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State of Madhya
Pradesh
v.
Revashankar
S. K. Das].
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State of .~ft1dl1ja
l'tadt5h
v.
Rt<iashCJ11ktu
•
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1374
i;UPREME COURT R;EPORTil
[1959]
:IIr. X. IC Ac:harya, Additional
Distti~t :IIagistrate,
Indore. In timt case ont1 .\)}·. Kulkarni appeared Oil
hehalf of t.hc complainawt Hcva;;hankar. The accusecl
persons appeared on August 8, 1953, t.hrough .llessrs.
l\loh1111 Ringh and Uma Shank"r Chatune<ii.
An
object.Loll W<LS raised on !J!'half of the fL<'eusecl. pe1·sons
lo the appearance of ~fr. Kulkarni as the latter's
name appeared in the list of witrn•sscs.
This "·as
followed hy a spat;, of applications and counterapplications and on October 12, 19.'i3, the learned
Addit.iorrn.I District l\Iagist.ratc passccl an order to t.hc
effeet that the' copies of the applicaliorrn as wP1l as Df
the aflidaYits filed by both parties shoulcl be sent. to
the District Judge for necessary action against the
lawyers concerned. In the•meantime a criminal cas~
was st11.rtcd 11gainst HeYashankar in the court of the
Additional City Magistrnk, Circle !\o. 2, for an alleged
offence under s. 497, Jndian Penal Code.
The case
wa.s started on the complaint of (~anga Ram. That
case was numbered ns 644 of l!J53.
\Ve tJ1cn come to
the crucial date, namely, llecember 17, l9.'i3. On that•
date Revashankar filed an application in the court of
the Additiorml District .Magistrate who was in s1'!izin of
Criminal Case no. 637 of 1953. The application pur•
ported to be one under s. 528, Code of Criminal Procedure. Thisp.pplicat.ion contained some serious aspersions against the '.lfagistrate, Mr. X. K. Acharya. The
aspersions were summarised by tlrn learned Judges of
the High Court under the following four cntcgorieA.
The first. aspersion was that from the order datecl
October 12, 191>:3 it appeared that :llr. ~- K. Acharya
wa1ikd to fa,·our :llr. Cma Shankar.Chaturvcdi. The
S<'coud aspersion
\\"<LS t.hat from certain opl111io11s
expressed by the :\Iagistrate, Revashaulrnr asserted
that. he was sure that he would not gcJt impa."tial and
legal justice from the :llagistrate. The third aspcr"ion
was of a more serious character a.nd it w11s that the
-
llfagistrntc had ,L hand in a conspiracy h:it.ehed by
l\lessrs. Mohan Singh and Uma'Shankar Chaturvedi
regardiug ce~tain .ornaments of Ch<tudra i\lukl1i Bai
with the object of involYing, HeYashankar and his
hwthcr Sushi! Kumar in a false m~e of t'heft of
ornaments.
Tlvi fo~rtk aspersion was th11.I; ~Ir. Urna
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S.C.R .. \sUPRE~E COURT REPOR'.00
1375
...
:.
Shankar ChattJrvedi had declared that he had paid
Rs. 500 to the Magistra~ th1·ough Ganga Ram. These
aspersions were later repeat"d in an affidavit on
December 21, 1953. On January 11, 1954, the learned
. Magistrate reported the aforesaid facts to the Registrar
of ti}e Madhya Bharat High Court and prayed for
necessary action against Revashankar for contempt
of court. On this report the High Court directed the
issue of notice to Revashankar to show cause why
action should not be taken against him under the
Contempt of Courts Act, 1952 and Criminal Miscellaneous Application no. 2 of 1954 was accordingly started
against Revashankar. On March 3, 1954, Revashankar
showed cause.
The case was then heard by a
Division Bench consisting of V. R. Newaskar and
fj, M. Samvatsar, J J. and by an order dated February 9, 1955, the learned Judges held that by reason
of the provisions in s. 3(2) of the Act the jurisdiction
of the High Court was ousted inasmuch as the act
complained of constituted an offence under s. 228 of
the Indian Penal Code.
The question for consideration in the present appeal is if the aforesaid view of
the High Court is correct .
• Mr. H. J. Umrigar, who h!ts appeared on behalf of
the appellant, has very strongly submitted before us
that the High Court has erred in holding that the act
of the respondent complained of constituted an offence
under s. 228, Indian Penal Code, and the jurisdiction
of the High Court was, therefore, ousted by reason
of the provisions in s. 3(2) of the Act. It is necessary
to read 'first s. :3(2) of the Act. We may state here
that the corresponding section in the earlier Contew.pt
of Couts Act, 1926 was s. 2(3) and in the judgment
under consideration there is some confusion as to the
correct number of the sub-section. Section 3(2) of
the Act is in these terms:-
. "No High Court shall take cognizance ·of a contempt alleged to have Ueen committed in respect of a
Court subordinate to' it where such contempt is an
offence punishable under the Indian Penal Code (,;\.ct
XLV of 1860)."
· .
•
'75
•
•
•
•
State of Madhya
Pradesh
v •
Revasllankar
S. J(. Das].
•
•
-
-
Sttll-: of ;lfadhy11
Pr(ldtsh
v.
Rt;;asha11har
S. Ii. Das j.
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•
. , (
• •
. ',
1376
SUPREME COURT R~PORT8/ . [1959]
,.
The sub-section was ':onsidered in 1rwo decisions of
this Court, Bathina Ra.mt.tkri!Jhna Reddy '" 'l'h; State
of Madras(') and Bra/i,ma Prakash Sharma '" 'l'he
State of U itar Pradesh ('). Jn the earlier case of Hamakrishna Heddy (') the appellant was the publisl.er and
mana14ing editor of a Trlugn Weekly know11 as
"Praja Rajyam ". In an issue of the said paper
dated February IO, 1949, an article appeared which
contained defamatory statements a.bout the stationary
sub-Magistrate, 1\0\;vnr, itnd the point for consideration wa.A if the jurisdiction of the High Court to take
cognisance of such a c11,se was expressly barred under
s. 2(3) of the earlier Contempt of Courts Ad, when
the allegatiorrn made in the article in qucstiou constituted an offence under s. 499, Indian Penal C.1de. On
behalf of the appellant it was argued that "·hat tlie
sub-section meant was that if the act by which the
party was alleged to have committed coutcrnpt of a
subordinate comt constituted offence of any description what.~oever puni:ihable under the Indian Penal
Code, the High Court was precluded lrom taking
cognizance of it. This <trgument was rcpdlcd and
this Court said (at pitge 429):-
·
"ln our opinion, the-Sub-section referred to abo\ie
ex dudes the jurisdiction of High Court only in cases
where the JLCtii alleged to con&titnte contempt of a
subordinate court arc punishable as contempt under
specific provisions of the Indian Penal Code but not
where these acts mereh· amount to offences of other
description for which l;unishmcnt has been provided
for in the Indian Penal Code. This would be clear
frum the language of the sub-section which uses the
words "where such contempt is an offence' arxl does
not say "where the act <~lleged to constitute such
contempt is an offence".
On an examination of the decisions of several High
Courts in fndia it was laid down that the Hig~ Court
had the right to protect su~rdinatc courts against
contempt but subject to this restriction, that cases of
eontcmpt \\;hich .fia,-e already been provided for in the
Indian PenlLI Code should no(. be ta.ken cognizance of
0
(t) [195'] S.C.K 4'5'
(2)°[1953] s.C.R 1169.
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S.C.R .. \suPREME COURT REPOR'.PS
1377
by the Hig'- Dourt. This, it was stated, was the
1958
principle underlying s. 2~) of the Contempt of Courts St I
1 M di
Act, 1926. This Court then observed that it was not
a' ;radco~ •ya
necessary to determine exhaustively what were the
v.
cases of contempt which had been already provided
llevashankar
for in the Indian Penal Code; it was pointed out,
however, that some light was thrown on the matter by
5 · K. Das f.
the provision of s. 480 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which empowers any civil, criminal or r.evenue
court to punish summarily a person who is found
guilty of committing any offence under ss. 175, 178,
179, 180 or s. 228 of the Indian Penal Code in the
view or presence of the court. The later decision
of Brahma Prakash Sharma (1) explained the true
qbject of contempt proceedings. Mukherjea J. who
delivered the judgment of the Court said (at page 1176):
"It would be only repeating what has been said
so often by various Judges that the object of contempt
proceedings is not to afford protection to Judges
.Personally ~om imputations to which they may be
exposed as individuals ; it is intended to be a protection to the public whose interests would be very much
affected if by the act or conduct of any party, the
a:uthority of the court is lowered and the sense of
confidence which people have in the administration of
justice by it is weakened''.
It was also pointed out that there were innumerable
ways by which attempts could be made to hinder or
obstruct the due administration of justice in courts
and one .type of such interference was found in cases
where there was an act which amounted to "scandalising the court itself": this scandalising might ma:nifest it~elf in various ways but in substance it was an
attack on individual Judges or the court as a whole
with or without reference to particular cases, causing
unwarranted and defamatory aspersions upon the
charaaier and ability qf the Judges. Such 'conduct is
punished as contempt /for the reason that it tends to
create distrust in the popular mind and impair the
confidence of the people in the conrts which ar& of
prime im,portance to the litigants in the protection of
their rights and liberties.
•
(1) [1953] ~.C.R. II6g.
•
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•
•
•
•
-
-
State of .\ludhya
l)riJ.itsh
, ..
Revaslia11har
5. K. D•s J.
•
•
• I
• •
•
1378
S'L'PREME COURT R;EPORTt/ . [1959]
Bearing the aforesaid principles in n1i~d, let U'l now
examine the case und~ oonsideration. The High
Court expressed the Yie1'· tlmt the act of the rnspon.
dent complained of merely amounted to an oflence
under s. 228, Indian Penal Code. Ncvaskar J. said:
"J.t appearR to me that the application, thm~h it
was stated to be an application for transfer, was
intended to offend and insult the M:i.gistrate. A man's
intention can be judged by the nature of the act he
commits.
The application directly and in face <ittri.
buteR partiality and corruptign t-0 the Magist.rnte.
It.
was not an application made bona fitle to a court
having jurisdiction to transfer the case from that
Court. to some other Court. It was an applicat.ion
thrown in tho face of the llfagistrate himself.
Tl~c
action is no better than telling the Magistrate in face
that he was partial and corrupt.. The allegations in
the application no doubt are insulting t-0 t.h<, Magistrate and he felt them to be so and at the time the
application was submitted on 17th Dcct0mb(•r, 1953,
when he was sitting as a l'-0urt and dealing with the
case of the opponent."
"Thus, since I hold that the opponent itJtended
to offer insult t-0 the Magtst.rate concerned there is nu
doubt that the act would fall within the pt1rview of
sect.ion 228, ludian Penal Code, :i.nd this Court will
be precluded from taking :wtion for the contempt committ<!d before the Court of the '.llagistrate by reason of
section 2(3) of the Contempt of Courts Act".
The other learned Judge also expressed the ~me view
in the following words:
• "The subordinate Courts c:.n sufficiently vindic11te their dignity by proceeding against the off!mdcrs
under the provisions of criminal ·1aw in such cases.
Legisl:.ture lms deemed it proper to exclude such cases
from the jurisdiction of the High Court under section 2(3) of the Contempt of Courts Act.
Th~ how .
ever, does not mean that High \;ourt's jurisdiction is
excluded even in cases where t.he act complained of,
which is alkged t.o constitute contempt, is otherwise an
offence und~r the Indian Penal Code."
•
"The question to \Je considcrell in th
0is case is
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S.C.R .• \sUPRE:fy!E COURT REPORT~
1379
whether the .a"ct complained of is punishable as
contempt under any one'of \he specific provisions of
the Indian Penal Code. In t>ther words whether it
falls under any one of the sections 175, 178, 179, 180
or 228 of the Indian Penal Code."
:•If the act complained of constitutes an .offence
under any of these sections, it can be dealt with by
the subordinate Court itself under section 480 of the
Criminal Procedure· Code and the High Court will
have no power to take cognizance of it under the
Contempt of Courts Act."
We are of the opinion that the learned Judges were
wrong in their view that prima Jacie the act complained of amounted to an offence under s. 228, Indian
fenal Code, and no more.
We are advisedly saying
prima facie, because the High Court did not go
into the merits and we have no desire to make any
final pronouncement at this stage on the merits of the
case. Section 228, Indian Penal Code, is in these
terms:
•
"\Vhoever intentionally offers any insult, or
causes any interruption to any public servant, while
such pllblic servant is sitting in any stage of a judicial
:proceeding, shall be punish'!ld with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months, or
with fine which may extend to one thousaJJd rupees, or
with both."
The essential ingredients of the offence are (1) intention,
(2) insult or interruption to a public servant. and (3)
the public servant insulted or interrupted must be
sitting in any stage of a judicial proceeding. In the
present case there is an initial difficulty which -has
been 'pointed out to us.
The respondent was sought
to be proceeded against by reason of the aspersions he
made in the application dated December 17, 1953, and
the affidavit dated December 21, 1953. It is not very
clear t;rom the record jf the learned Magistrate was
sitting in any stage ofla judicial proceeding when the
application and the affidavit were filed.
The High
Court rio doubt says that the MagistPate was sitting as
a court at the time; but there is no refeienbe to the
particulir work', judicial or
oth~rwise, which the
0
..
•
•
State oj Madhya
Pradesh
v.
Revashankar
S. K. Das j.
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-.
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• •
•
1380
~UPRE.ME COURT REPORTEI. [1959]
l\Iagistrntc w1~s doing at the time. 'l'hc liroi.ctice as to the
State of .\fad;•ya filing of applications ancf aflfdavits varies from court
rra,Jcsh
to court and in some c:ollrts applications and affidavits
1trc filed within stated hours before the reader or t.hc
Nrvu;/;a"'"
bench clerk; they are oo tiled even when tho Jt:dge or
Magistrate is in chamber or pre.occupied with '80mc
S. /\·. /Jas j.
d . ,
.
d
~·
v.
•
•
a m1mstrat1,·c uties. ,:)o far as the present case is
concerned, it is not at all clear, from the record as
placed before us, <LS to what was the judicial work
whieh the learned :11agistrate was doing when the
application and affidaYit were filed. If he was not
doing any judicial work at the rcleYant. time, then the
third essential ingredient mentioned 11bove was not
fulfilled and the act complained of would uot. amount
t-0 an offence under s. 228, Indian Penal Code.
•
\Ve are not, however, basing our decision on the
mere absence of m1tterials to show what puticula.r
judicial work the learned Magistrate was doing when
the application dated Der·emher li, 1953, a,nd the
affidavit dated December 21, 1953, were ti.led. If that
were the only infirmity, the proper order would be to'
<Lsk for a finding on the qucRtion.
Our decision is
based on a more fundamental ground.
Lcame'd conn.
sel for the parties lmvc taken ns through the applie1ttio11 dated December 17, 1953, and the affida,·it: dated
December 2-l, i.953.
The aspersious nrnde therein
prima Jacie showed that they were much more than a
mere insult to the learned Magistrate; in effect, they
scandalised the Court in such a way ILS to create distruHt in the popular mind and impair the C'Jnfidence
of people in Courts. Two of the <LSpcrsions made,
takoen at their face value, were (1) that the learned
Ilfagistrate had joined in a conspiracy to irnplica'te the
rec;pondent in a false case of thPfr.
ln the aflidnvit
it w:Ls st<Lted that the lell.rned M<Lgistra.te had sent for
the respondent. ancl his brother and had asked them to
make a fabe report to the policl\ th:tt the ornlj,ments
of Chandr<L :IIukhi B<Li hn,d been\stolen. The learned
Magistrate characterised the aspersion as totally false
and•said tha.t he 11either knew the respondent nor his
brother Mid 'had !HJ acquaintance with them. Another
·aspersion was that the :'lfagistrate hud ta,kci1 a bribe
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S.C.R. ~UPRE~E COURT REPORT$
1381
of Rs. 500.
This aspersion was also stoutly denied.
We must mak"e it clear here &hat at this stage we are
expressing no opinion on merits, nor on the correctness or otherwise of the aspersions made. All that we
are saying is that the aspersions taken at their face
vain~ amounted to what is called scandalisipg the
court itself, manifesting itself in such an attack on the
Magistrate as tended to create distrust in the popular
mind and impair the confidence of the people in the
courts. We are aware that confidence in courts cannot be created by stifling criticism, but there are
criticisms and. criticisms. "The path of criticism'',
said Lord Atkin in Ambard v. Attorney-General for
Trinidad and Tobago (1), "is a public way: The wrongheaded are permitted to err therein: provided that
members of the public abstain fiom imputing improper
motives to those taking part in the administration of
justice, and are genuinely exercising a right of criticism, and not acting in malice or attempting to impair
the administration of justice, they are immune". If,
therefore, tlie respondent had merely criticised the
Magistrate, no notice need have been taken of such
criticism as contempt of court whatever action it
might have been open to the· Magistrate to take as an
aggrieved individual; but if the respondent acted in
malice and attempted to impair the acjministration of
justice, the offence committed would be something
more than an offence under s. 228, Indian Penal
Code.
Learned counsel for the respondent has contended
before us'that as soon as there is an element of insult
in the act complained of, s. 228, Indian Penal Code, is
attracied and the jurisdiction of the High Court to
take cognizance of the contempt is ousted. We are
unable to accept this contention as correct. Section
228 deals with an intentional insult to a public servant
in certain circumstances.
The punishment for the
offence"'is simple impri#onment for a term which may
extend to six months or with fine which may extend
to one thousand rupees or with botti. Our attention
has been drawn to the circumstance that iinder s. 4 of
(<) [r9J6] A. C. 312, 335.
•
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•
State of Madhya
Pradesh
v.
Revaskankar
S. K. Das j.
•
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•
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State nf .\-fadhya
}'radesh
v.
Ueuashat1kar
S. }(, }Jas }.
•
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1382
SUPREME COURT R~PORTs/ [1959]
•.
the Act the sentBnce for contempt of t:ourt is more or
le~ the same, namely, simphlfimprisonm~mt for ,, term
which may extend to si~ months. The fine is a little
more and may extend lo two thousand rupees.
Section 4 of the Act contains a proviso t.hnt- the aGcused
person, may be discharged or the punishment a1;r11-rded
may be remitted on apology being made to the satisfaction of the court.
\\' e do not, howe1·cr, think that.
a similarity of the sentence in the two sect ions referred
to above is a real test. The true test is : is the act
complained of an offence under s. 228, India!' Penal
Code, or is it something more than that ? If in its true
nature and effect, the act compl<iined of
i~; really
" scandalising the court" rather than a mem insult,
then it is clear that on the ratio of our decision in
Ramakrishnu Reddy's ca.se ('} the jurisdictior, of ll~e
High Court is not ousted by reason of the pro·:ision in
s. 3(2) of the Act.
!llr. Umrigar has urged a further point in this connect.ion and has eontendcd that for an offence under
s. 228, Indian Penal Codr, the insult inust be
;Lir
intentional insult. The tirst essential requirement of
the offence, according t-0 him, is that the in"1it must.
be offered intentionally.• He has point.eel out tha.t
the application which the respondent filed l,urported
to be an applica,.tion under s. 528, Criminal Procedure
Code, and though it is di!Iicult t-0 see how that section
applied in the present case, the intention of t~1e respondent 1rns not to insult the 1'fagistrate, but merely to
state the circumstances in which the respo:1dent was
prnying for a tra1rnfer of the case. :\Ir. Urm'igar has
poijltcd out that in the reply which the reporulent
gave to the notice issued from the High Co11rt, he said
that he had no intention to insult or show disrespect
to the learned '.llagistratc.
:lfr. Umrigar has further
Hubmittecl that the decision in Narotam Da.s v.
Emperor(); (on which the learned .Judges of the High
Court relied) where in somewhat similiar cii·cumstances it was hel<l that s. 22~, Indian Penal Code,
applied, cloes not ,correctly lay down the law. In that
case y orke :J. observed thitt it would be lt matter for
•
(1) (195l) S.C.H. 425 •
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S.C.R. ~UPRE.ll:IE COURT REPORTS
1383
...
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consideration jn· each individual case how insulting the
expressions used were ~nd' whether there was any
•
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l'
k
f
h
State of Modhya
necessity 1or t e app want to ma e use o
t ose
P d h
expressions in the application which he. was actually
':."
making to the court. While we agree that the queBRevashankar
tion Qf intention must dflpend on the facts and oircumstances of each case, we are unable to accept as correct
s. K Das J .
the other tests laid down by the learned Judge as
finally determinative of the question of intention.
In two earlier decisions of the same High Court, in
Queen Empres8 v. Abdullah Khan (1) and Emperor v.
Murli Dhar('), it was held that where an accused
person made an application for transfer of the case
pending against him and inserted in such applicatjon assertions of a defamatory nature concerning the
Magistrate who was trying the case, there was no intention on the part of the applicant to insult the court,
but the intention was merely to procure a transfer of
the case.
We do not think that any hard and fast
rule can be .laid down with regard to this matter.
Whether there is an intention to offer insult to the
Magistrate trying the case or not must depend on the
facts arid circumstances of each case and we do not
consider it necessary, nor advisable, to lay down any
inflexible rule thereto.
Taking the aspersions made by th~ respondent in
the application dated December 17, 1953, and the
affidavit dated December 21, 1953, at their face value,
we have already
expressed the view that they
amounted to something more than a mere intentional, personal
insult to the Magistrate ; they
scandalised the court itself and impaired the admililistratiol'l of justice. In that view of the matter s. 3(2)
of the Act did not stand in the way and the learned
Judges of the High Court were wrong in their view
that the jurisdiction of the High Court was ousted.
We ~ccordingly alloy the appeal and set aside the
order of the High Couift dated :February 9, 1955. In
our view, the High Court had jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the act complained of and tb.e case must
(1) (1898) A.W.N. 145·
(2) (1916) 38"All.•284 .
•
176
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Stolt r:j 1'1adhy.:J
1'1adf;;h
v.
Ueuashankar
S. K. Das j.
Septen1ber 2 4.
•
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1384
SUPH.ElllE COURT R~PORTS/ [1959]
now be decided by the High Court on merits in
accordance with law. It ~s ottly necessa~y to adr.1 that
the act complained of was committed a.s far ba~k as
l9;i3 and it is desirable that. the case should be dealt
with as expeditiously as possible.
•
Appeal aUoweJ'.
S. l\L JAKATI & ANOTHER
11.
S. JL BORKAR & OTHERS
•
(B. P. 81~HA, JAFER h1,n1 and J. L. KAPUf: JJ.)
Hindr1 La<()-Dcbt.1' of fathcr--Pious oblt'gation uf son---I)artition. if ajf1:r:fs such obligation-A\
0yavaharika, J/raning •Jf- ·S11!r of
joint Ja1nily property-" J?ight, title and interest Qf d~Jaulter "-.
Bombay Land Rcrcntte Code, 1879 (Rom. V of 1879), s. i55 .
.J \\'as the 1nanaging director of a Co-operative Bc..nk getting
a y•mly remuneration of I<s. 1,000. The Bank went iat~ liquidation and an examination of th~ affairs ha\'ing
~ho\,·l'ci that the
n1011ies of the Bank ,,·ere not properly invested and that J \Vas
ncglige11t in the discharge of his duties, a payment order for
Rs.