# SMT. S. VANITHA v. THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, BENGALURU URBAN DISTRICT & ORS

- **Citation:** [2020] 12 S.C.R. 1057
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 2020-12-15
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 3822 of 2020
- **Bench:** Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, Indu Malhotra, Indira Banerjee
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/smt-s-vanitha-v-the-deputy-commissioner-bengaluru-urban-district-ors-34509
- **Pages:** 33

## Headnote

Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act,
2007:
2(b) and 3 - Petition under the Act - By respondent Nos. 2
and 3 seeking eviction of their daughter-in-law (appellant) from
their house - Plea of appellant that she had been living in the house
as her matrimonial residence and that her husband (respondent
No. 4) had deserted her and their daughter - The authorities
concerned directed the appellant to vacate the house - Writ Petition
- Single Judge of High Court held that the appellant had no cause
of action against respondent Nos. 2 and 3 as they owned the house
and that her right to claim shelter lied only against her husband -
Division Bench of High Court affirmed the judgment of Single Judge
- Appeal to Supreme Court - Held: The premises in question
constitute a 'shared household' within meaning of s. 2(s) of
Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 - Object of
2005 Act is to recognize right of woman to reside in a shared
household - Both pieces of legislation are intended to deal with
salutary aspects of public welfare and interest - Both the Acts are
special Acts - Both sets of legislations have to be harmoniously
construed - The right of a woman to secure a residence order for a
shared household under the 2005 Act cannot be defeated by
securing an order of eviction under the 2007 Act. The over-riding
effect for the remedies sought under 2007 Act cannot preclude all
other competing remedies under 2005 Act - It would be appropriate
for a Tribunal u/s. 2007 Act to grant such remedies of maintenance
as envisaged u/s 2(b) of 2007 Act that do not result in obviating
competing remedies under other statutes - The Tribunal under 2007
Act should appropriately mould reliefs after noticing competing
[2020] 12 S.C.R. 1057
1057
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
1058
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2020] 12 S.C.R.
claims of the parties claiming under 2005 and 2007 Acts - The
aggrieved woman after obtaining a relief for shared household from
the Tribunal constituted under 2007 Act, is duty bound to inform
the Magistrate under 2005 Act as per s.26(3) of 2005 Act - This
course of action would ensure speedy relief to both the groups -
Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 - ss. 2(s),
17, 26(3) and 36.
Interpretation of statutes:
Two special Acts - Prevailing effect - Held: Where both the
Acts contain non-obstante clauses, later Act will prevail - However,
in the event of conflict between the Special Acts the dominant
purpose of both the statutes have to be analysed to ascertain which
one would prevail over the other - The primary effort of the
interpreter must be to harmonize, not excise.
Definition clause - Interpretation of - Held: Where the
definition of an expression adopts 'means and includes' stipulation,
it is intended to be exhaustive.
Words and Phrases:
'Shared household' - Meaning of, in the context of Prevention
of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005.
Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1. On construing the provisions of sub-Section (2)
of section 23 of the Senior Citizen Act 2007, it is evident that it
applies to a situation where a senior citizen has a right to receive
maintenance out of an estate and such estate or part thereof is
transferred. The situation in the present case is that the eviction
was sought of the daughter-in-law, i.e. the appellant. The land,
where the house has been constructed, was originally purchased
by the son of the applicants who are seeking eviction of their
daughter-in-law. The son had purchased the property a few months
before his marriage to the appellant. He had subsequently
transferred the property by a registered sale deed to his father
and the fact that it was for the same consideration after the lapse
of several years is of significance. The father, in turn, executed a
gift deed in favor of his spouse. The appellant has asserted that
she had been living in the house, as her matrimonial residence,
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
1059
until the application was filed. Her spouse has (accor

## Text

_Characters 0–39,680 of 78,550. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39680 for what follows._

A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
1057
SMT. S. VANITHA
v.
THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, BENGALURU URBAN
DISTRICT & ORS.
(Civil Appeal No. 3822 of 2020)
DECEMBER 15, 2020
[DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD,
INDU MALHOTRA AND INDIRA BANERJEE, JJ.]
Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act,
2007:
2(b) and 3 - Petition under the Act - By respondent Nos. 2
and 3 seeking eviction of their daughter-in-law (appellant) from
their house - Plea of appellant that she had been living in the house
as her matrimonial residence and that her husband (respondent
No. 4) had deserted her and their daughter - The authorities
concerned directed the appellant to vacate the house - Writ Petition
- Single Judge of High Court held that the appellant had no cause
of action against respondent Nos. 2 and 3 as they owned the house
and that her right to claim shelter lied only against her husband -
Division Bench of High Court affirmed the judgment of Single Judge
- Appeal to Supreme Court - Held: The premises in question
constitute a 'shared household' within meaning of s. 2(s) of
Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 - Object of
2005 Act is to recognize right of woman to reside in a shared
household - Both pieces of legislation are intended to deal with
salutary aspects of public welfare and interest - Both the Acts are
special Acts - Both sets of legislations have to be harmoniously
construed - The right of a woman to secure a residence order for a
shared household under the 2005 Act cannot be defeated by
securing an order of eviction under the 2007 Act. The over-riding
effect for the remedies sought under 2007 Act cannot preclude all
other competing remedies under 2005 Act - It would be appropriate
for a Tribunal u/s. 2007 Act to grant such remedies of maintenance
as envisaged u/s 2(b) of 2007 Act that do not result in obviating
competing remedies under other statutes - The Tribunal under 2007
Act should appropriately mould reliefs after noticing competing
[2020] 12 S.C.R. 1057
1057
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
1058
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2020] 12 S.C.R.
claims of the parties claiming under 2005 and 2007 Acts - The
aggrieved woman after obtaining a relief for shared household from
the Tribunal constituted under 2007 Act, is duty bound to inform
the Magistrate under 2005 Act as per s.26(3) of 2005 Act - This
course of action would ensure speedy relief to both the groups -
Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 - ss. 2(s),
17, 26(3) and 36.
Interpretation of statutes:
Two special Acts - Prevailing effect - Held: Where both the
Acts contain non-obstante clauses, later Act will prevail - However,
in the event of conflict between the Special Acts the dominant
purpose of both the statutes have to be analysed to ascertain which
one would prevail over the other - The primary effort of the
interpreter must be to harmonize, not excise.
Definition clause - Interpretation of - Held: Where the
definition of an expression adopts 'means and includes' stipulation,
it is intended to be exhaustive.
Words and Phrases:
'Shared household' - Meaning of, in the context of Prevention
of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005.
Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1. On construing the provisions of sub-Section (2)
of section 23 of the Senior Citizen Act 2007, it is evident that it
applies to a situation where a senior citizen has a right to receive
maintenance out of an estate and such estate or part thereof is
transferred. The situation in the present case is that the eviction
was sought of the daughter-in-law, i.e. the appellant. The land,
where the house has been constructed, was originally purchased
by the son of the applicants who are seeking eviction of their
daughter-in-law. The son had purchased the property a few months
before his marriage to the appellant. He had subsequently
transferred the property by a registered sale deed to his father
and the fact that it was for the same consideration after the lapse
of several years is of significance. The father, in turn, executed a
gift deed in favor of his spouse. The appellant has asserted that
she had been living in the house, as her matrimonial residence,
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
1059
until the application was filed. Her spouse has (according to her)
deserted her and their minor daughter and left them in the lurch.
The electricity to the premises was disconnected for non-payment
of dues. Their daughter has sought admission to an engineering
degree course however her father- Fourth respondent has not
provided any financial support. The transfers which took place
cannot be viewed in isolation from the context of the on-going
matrimonial dispute which has taken place. [Paras 17 and
23][1087-C-D; 1077-E-H; 1078-A]
2.1 The appellant has submitted that the premises
constitute a "shared household" within the meaning of Section
2(s) of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act,
2005 (PWDV Act). The definition of the expression "shared
household" in Section 2(s) uses the familiar legislative formula
of a "means and includes" definition. Where the definition of an
expression in an enactment adopts a 'means and includes'
stipulation, it is intended to be exhaustive. The 'means' part of
the definition indicates what would normally fall within the ambit
of the expression, while the 'includes' element gives it an
extended meaning. Together they indicate that the legislature
has provided for an exhaustive enumeration of what falls within
the ambit of the definition. The use of the expression 'means' is
intended to make it exhaustive. On the other hand, the use of
the expression 'includes' is intended to make it more extensive.
The legislature by using an expression 'includes' evinces,
notwithstanding the meaning of the phrase, an intention: "to
enlarge the meaning of the words or phrases occurring in the
body of the statute". "Includes" is utilized so as to comprehend:
"not only such things as they signify according to their nature
and import but also those things which the interpretation clause
declares that they shall include". [Para 18][1078-C; 1079-B-C;
D-F]
Principles of Statutory Interpretation by Justice G P
Singh, Lexis Nexis, 14th Ed. Page 197-199 - referred
to.
2.2 However, when a statutory definition incorporates the
'means and includes' approach, the intent is to make the definition
exhaustive. The definition of 'shared household' in Section 2(s)
SMT. S. VANITHA v.THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, BENGALURU
URBAN DISTRICT
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
1060
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2020] 12 S.C.R.
of the PWDV Act 2005 is exhaustive. The definition of the
expression 'shared household' in Section 2(s) of the PWDV Act
of 2005 is in two parts: in the means part of the definition the
expression 'shared household' means (i) A household where the
person aggrieved lives in a domestic relationship either singly
or along with the respondent or; (ii) At any stage has lived in a
domestic relationship either singly or along with the respondent.
This is followed by an inclusive element, so as to cover such a
household (i) whether owned or tenanted either jointly by the
aggrieved person and the respondent or (ii) owned or tenanted
by either of them in respect of which either the aggrieved person
or the respondent or both jointly or singly have any right, title or
equity. This has also been given an inclusive or extended
meaning, which extends to a household which may belong to the
joint family of which a respondent is a member, irrespective of
whether the respondent or the aggrieved person have any right,
title or interest in the shared household. The last part of the
inclusive definition is intended to extend the meaning of a shared
household to a situation where the household in fact belongs to a
joint family, of which the respondent is a member. The legislature
has made it clear that though neither the respondent, nor the
aggrieved person in such case may have a right, title or interest
in the shared household it would irrespective fall within the ambit
of the definition. [Paras 18 and 19][1080-B-C, E-H; 1081-A-B]
Satish Chandra Ahuja v. Sneha Ahuja Civil Appeal No.
2483 of 2020, decided on 15 October 2020 - relied
on.
3.1 Section 36 of the PWDV Act 2005 stipulates that the
provisions of the Act shall be in addition to, and not in derogation
of, the provisions of any other law for the time being in force.
This is intended to ensure that the remedies provided under the
enactment are in addition to other remedies and do not displace
them. The Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior
Citizens Act 2007 is undoubtedly a later Act and Section 3 thereof
stipulates that its provisions will have effect, notwithstanding
anything inconsistent contained in any other enactment. However,
the provisions of Section 3 of the Senior Citizens Act 2007 giving
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
1061
it overriding force and effect, would not by themselves be
conclusive of an intent to deprive a woman who claims a right in
a shared household, as under the PWDV Act 2005. [Para 20][1082G-H; 1083-A-C]
3.2 Principles of statutory interpretation dictate that in the
event of two special acts containing non obstante clauses, the later
law shall typically prevail. In the present case, the Senior Citizen's
Act 2007 contains a non obstante clause. However, in the event
of a conflict between special Acts, the dominant purpose of both
statutes would have to be analyzed to ascertain which one should
prevail over the other. The primary effort of the interpreter must
be to harmonize, not excise. In the present case, Section 36 of
the PWDV Act 2005, albeit not in the nature of a non-obstante
clause, has to be construed harmoniously with the non obstante
clause in Section 3 of the Senior Citizens Act 2007 that operates
in a separate field. [Para 20][1083-C-D; 1084-B-C]
Solidaire India Ltd. v. Fairgrowth Financial Services
Ltd., (2001) 3 SCC 71 : [2001] 1 SCR 932; Bank of
India v. Ketan Parekh (2008) 8 SCC 148 : [2008] 9
SCR 346; Pioneer Urban Land and Infrastructure Ltd.
v. Union of India (2019) 8 SCC 416 : [2019] 10 SCR
381 - relied on.
3.3 Both pieces of legislation are intended to deal with
salutary aspects of public welfare and interest. The PWDV Act
2005 was intended to deal with the problems of domestic violence
which, as the Statements of Objects and Reasons sets out, "is
widely prevalent but has remained largely invisible in the public
domain". The Statements of Objects and Reasons indicates that
while Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code created a penal
offence out of a woman's subjection to cruelty by her husband or
relative, the civil law did not address its phenomenon in its
entirety. Hence, consistent with the provisions of Articles 14, 15
and 21 of the Constitution, Parliament enacted a legislation which
would "provide for a remedy under the civil law which is intended
to protect the woman from being victims of domestic violence
and to prevent the occurrence of domestic violence in the
society". [Para 21][1084-C-E]
SMT. S. VANITHA v.THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, BENGALURU
URBAN DISTRICT
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
1062
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2020] 12 S.C.R.
3.4 The object of the legislation of PWDV Act, 2005 is to
provide for and recognize the rights of women to secure housing
and to recognize the right of a woman to reside in a matrimonial
home or a shared household, whether or not she has any title or
right in the shared household. [Para 21][1085-B-C]
3.5 Allowing the Senior Citizens Act 2007 to have an
overriding force and effect in all situations, irrespective of
competing entitlements of a woman to a right in a shared
household within the meaning of the PWDV Act 2005, would defeat
the object and purpose which the Parliament sought to achieve
in enacting the latter legislation. The law protecting the interest
of senior citizens is intended to ensure that they are not left
destitute, or at the mercy of their children or relatives. Equally,
the purpose of the PWDV Act 2005 cannot be ignored by a sleight
of statutory interpretation. Both sets of legislations have to be
harmoniously construed. Hence the right of a woman to secure a
residence order in respect of a shared household cannot be
defeated by the simple expedient of securing an order of eviction
by adopting the summary procedure under the Senior Citizens
Act 2007. [Para 21][1085-G-H; 1086-A-B]
3.6 The Senior Citizens Act 2007 was promulgated with a
view to provide a speedy and inexpensive remedy to senior
citizens. Accordingly, Tribunals were constituted under Section
7. These Tribunals have the power to conduct summary
procedures for inquiry, with all powers of the Civil Courts, under
Section 8. The jurisdiction of the Civil Courts has been explicitly
barred under Section 27 of the Senior Citizens Act 2007. However,
the over-riding effect for remedies sought by the applicants under
the Senior Citizens Act 2007 under Section 3, cannot be
interpreted to preclude all other competing remedies and
protections that are sought to be conferred by the PWDV Act
2005. The PWDV Act 2005 is also in the nature of a special
legislation, that is enacted with the purpose of correcting gender
discrimination that pans out in the form of social and economic
inequities in a largely patriarchal society. [Para 22][1086-B-D]
3.7 In deference to the dominant purpose of both the
legislations, it would be appropriate for a Tribunal under the
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
1063
Senior Citizens Act, 2007 to grant such remedies of maintenance,
as envisaged under S.2(b) of the Senior Citizens Act 2007 that do
not result in obviating competing remedies under other special
statutes, such as the PWDV Act 2005. [Para 22][1086-E]
3.8 Section 26 of the PWDV Act empowers certain reliefs,
including relief for a residence order, to be obtained from any
civil court in any legal proceedings. Therefore, in the event that
a composite dispute is alleged, such as in the present case where
the suit premises are a site of contestation between two groups
protected by the law, it would be appropriate for the Tribunal
constituted under the Senior Citizens Act 2007 to appropriately
mould reliefs, after noticing the competing claims of the parties
claiming under the PWDV Act 2005 and Senior Citizens Act 2007.
Section 3 of the Senior Citizens Act, 2007 cannot be deployed to
over-ride and nullify other protections in law, particularly that of
a woman's right to a 'shared household' under Section 17 of the
PWDV Act 2005. In the event that the "aggrieved woman"
obtains a relief from a Tribunal constituted under the Senior
Citizens Act 2007, she shall be duty-bound to inform the
Magistrate under the PWDV Act 2005, as per Sub-section (3) of
Section 26 of the PWDV Act 2005. This course of action would
ensure that the common intent of the Senior Citizens Act 2007
and the PWDV Act 2005- of ensuring speedy relief to its protected
groups who are both vulnerable members of the society, is
effectively realized. Rights in law can translate to rights in life,
only if there is an equitable ease in obtaining their realization.
[Para 22][1086-E-F; 1087-A-C]
3.9 The fact that specific proceedings under the PWDV Act
2005 had not been instituted when the application under the
Senior Citizens Act, 2007 was filed, should not lead to a situation
where the enforcement of an order of eviction deprives her from
pursuing her claim of entitlement under the law. The inability of a
woman to access judicial remedies may, as this case exemplifies,
be a consequence of destitution, ignorance or lack of resources.
Even otherwise, recourse to the summary procedure
contemplated by the Senior Citizen Act 2007 was not available
for the purpose of facilitating strategies that are designed to defeat
SMT. S. VANITHA v.THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, BENGALURU
URBAN DISTRICT
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
1064
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2020] 12 S.C.R.
the claim of the appellant in respect of a shared household. A
shared household would have to be interpreted to include the
residence where the appellant had been jointly residing with her
husband. Merely because the ownership of the property has been
subsequently transferred to her in-laws (Second and Third
Respondents) or that her estranged spouse (Fourth respondent)
is now residing separately, is no ground to deprive the appellant
of the protection that was envisaged under the PWDV Act 2005.
[Para 23][1087-G-H; 1088-A-C]
3.10 Therefore, the claim of the appellant that the premises
constitute a shared household within the meaning of the PWDV
Act 2005 would have to be determined by the appropriate forum.
The claim cannot simply be obviated by evicting the appellant in
exercise of the summary powers entrusted by the Senior Citizens
Act 2007. The Second and Third Respondents are at liberty to
make a subsequent application under Section 10 of the Senior
Citizens Act 2007 for alteration of the maintenance allowance,
before the appropriate forum. [Para 24][1088-C-E]
Case Law Reference
[2001] 1 SCR 932
relied on
Para 20
[2008] 9 SCR 346
relied on
Para 20
[2019] 10 SCR 381
relied on
Para 20
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 3822
of 2020.
From the Judgment and Order dated 17.09.2019 of the High Court
of Karnataka at Bengaluru in Writ Appeal No. 2874 of 2019.
Yatish Mohan, E. C. Vidya Sagar, Subhash Chandra Sagar, Rajesh
Mahale, Harisha S.R., Advs. for the appearing parties.
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
1065
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.
Index
A
Background
B
Submissions
C
Legislative scheme: Senior Citizens Act 2007
D
A woman's right of residence: safeguard against domestic
violence
E
Harmonising competing reliefs under the PWDV Act 2005
and Senior Citizens Act 2007
F
Summation
A Background
1. The present dispute arises out of an application filed by the
Second and Third respondents against the appellant, who is their daughterin-law. The Second and Third respondents are the parents of the Fourth
respondent, who is the estranged spouse of the appellant. The Second
and Third respondents filed an application under the provisions of the
Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act 20071,
and inter alia, sought the appellant and her daughter's eviction from a
residential house in North Bengaluru2.
2. The Assistant Commissioner, and the Deputy Commissioner in
appeal, allowed the application under the Senior Citizens Act 2007 and
directed the appellant to vacate the suit premises. Aggrieved by this
order, the appellant unsuccessfully pursued a writ proceeding under Article
226 of the Constitution before a Single Judge, and in appeal before a
Division Bench of the High Court of Karnataka. The Division Bench by
its judgment dated 17 September 2019 held that the suit premises belonged
to the mother-in-law (the Second respondent) of the appellant and the
remedy of the appellant for maintenance and shelter lies only against
her estranged husband (the Fourth respondent). The Division Bench
upheld the Order of the Deputy Commissioner, and directed the appellant
to vacate the suit premises before 31 December 2019. Challenging the
SMT. S. VANITHA v.THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, BENGALURU
URBAN DISTRICT
1 "Senior Citizens Act 2007"
2 "suit premises"
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
1066
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2020] 12 S.C.R.
jurisdiction of the authorities3 to decree her eviction under the Senior
Citizens Act 2007, the appellant has moved this Court under Article 136
of the Constitution.
3. The appellant and the Fourth respondent were married on 30
May 2002. Soon thereafter, a matrimonial dispute arose between the
parties. The appellant alleges that she was harassed for dowry and even
compelled to institute a suit for partition against her father in 20034 which
she later withdrew, after her spouse allegedly deserted her to be in a
relationship with another woman. The subject matter of the controversy
is a residential house situated at Gangondonahalli, Dasanapura, Hobli,
Bengaluru North Taluk. The land was purchased by the Fourth respondent
on 2 May 2002, a few months before the appellant married him. The
appellant alleges that her father had financed a portion of this purchase.
4. On 5 October 2006, the Fourth respondent sold the land to his
father - the Third respondent. The transaction of sale between the father
and the son was for the same consideration of Rs.1.19 lacs, as was paid
by the Fourth respondent for the original purchase of the property in
2002. By then, the appellant and the Fourth respondent had a daughter.
In 2009, the Fourth respondent instituted a petition for divorce5 under
Section 13(1)(ia) and (ib) of Hindu Marriage Act 1955 before the Senior
Civil Judge and Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Nelamangala6. The Third
respondent, following the purchase of the property and after constructing
a house, gifted it to his spouse - the Second respondent, on 19 July 2010.
Soon thereafter, on 17 August 2010, the Second respondent instituted a
suit against the appellant7 before the JMFC, Nelamangala seeking a
permanent injunction restraining the appellant from interfering with the
possession of the suit property. The suit is pending. On 5 December
2013, the petition for divorce was allowed by the Trial Judge and the
marriage between the appellant and the Fourth respondent was dissolved.
On 19 March 2014, the appellant instituted a proceeding8 for
maintenance. She also filed an appeal before the High Court of
Karnataka9 against the dissolution of her marriage by the Trial Judge.
The proceedings for divorce and maintenance are also pending.
3 The Assistant Commissioner, Bengaluru North Sub-Division at Bengaluru and the
Deputy Commissioner, Bengaluru District
4 OS 211 of 2003
5 MC 22 of 2009
6 "Trial Judge"
7 OS 312 of 2010
8 Criminal Miscellaneous 114 of 2014 before the Civil Judge (Jr. Dn.), JMFC Nelamangala
9 MFA 3968 of 2014
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
1067
5. In 2015, the Third and Fourth respondents invoked the provisions
of the Senior Citizens Act 2007 by instituting an application before the
Assistant Commissioner, Bengaluru North Sub Division. Their son (the
Fourth respondent) and the appellant were impleaded as respondents to
the petition10. The reliefs sought were:
(i) Eviction of the appellant from the suit premises where she
was residing;
(ii) A direction to the Fourth respondent to pay an amount of
Rs.15,000 to the parents by way of monthly maintenance;
and
(iii) A direction to the appellant and fourth respondent to pay an
amount quantified at Rs. 25,000 towards legal expenses.
The appellant filed an objection to the petition filed under the Senior
Citizens Act 2007, alleging it to be a malicious proceeding that was
instituted with the sole intent to evict her from the suit premises. The
appellant also claimed that the proceedings were collusive in nature and
an attempt by the Second and Third respondents and her estranged spouse
(the Fourth respondent) to evict her from her matrimonial home. The
appellant specifically raised an objection to the jurisdiction of the
authorities to entertain the proceedings seeking her eviction from the
premises. She submitted that while the Senior Citizens Act 2007 provides
for the maintenance of a senior citizen or a parent, there is no provision
envisaging an order of eviction, and that the authorities had no jurisdiction
to direct her removal from the premises.
6. The Assistant Commissioner by an Order dated 25 June 2015,
held that the residential house was the self-acquired property of the
Third respondent which he subsequently gifted to the Second Respondent.
The appellant was residing in the property, but was held to have no right
or authority. The appellant's plea for maintenance could (in the view of
the Assistant Commissioner) only be raised against the Fourth respondent.
Therefore, the Assistant Commissioner allowed the petition by directing
(i) the Fourth respondent to pay a monthly maintenance of Rs.10,000 to
his parents; and (ii) the appellant to vacate the premises.
7. The appeal filed by the appellant under Section 28 of the Hindu
Marriage Act 1955 against the decree for dissolution of marriage, was
SMT. S. VANITHA v.THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, BENGALURU
URBAN DISTRICT [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]
10 Petition 31 of 2015
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
1068
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2020] 12 S.C.R.
allowed by a Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court on 14 January
2016. The High Court set aside the order of the Trial Court and remanded
the proceedings to the jurisdictional Family Court, for passing fresh orders
after hearing the parties. During the pendency of the appeal, the Fourth
respondent entered into a marriage with another woman. On remand,
the proceedings for divorce and the application for maintenance are
pending disposal.
8. On 29 February 2016, the Deputy Commissioner, acting as the
appellate authority under the Senior Citizens Act 2007, dismissed the
appeal filed by the appellant as well as a companion appeal by the Fourth
respondent against the order of the Assistant Commissioner. The order
requiring the appellant to vacate the suit premises was thereby confirmed.
The appellant challenged the order passed by the Deputy Commissioner
in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution. The Single Judge
of the Karnataka High Court, by a judgement dated 18 June 2019, held
that the suit premises have been transferred by the Third respondent to
his wife - the Second respondent - by a registered gift deed dated 19
July 2010. The Single Judge noted the contention of the Second and
Third respondents that following a matrimonial dispute, their son (the
Fourth respondent) had left the house after which the appellant had
ousted them on 12 August 2010 and they are currently living in their
"native place". In light of the fact that the marriage between the appellant
and Fourth respondent had been dissolved by the Trial Judge, the Single
Judge held that the appellant had no right over the suit premises and her
claim for maintenance could only by asserted against the Fourth
respondent. Though, the appellant has specifically questioned the
jurisdiction of the authorities under the Senior Citizens Act 2007 to order
her eviction, the Single Judge did not address the submission.
Aggrieved by the order of the Single Judge, the appellant
challenged the order in a writ appeal. Once again, it was urged in the
course of the hearing that the proceedings which were instituted under
the Senior Citizens Act 2007 were only a device to oust the appellant
and that the authorities had no jurisdiction to direct her eviction. The
Division Bench reiterated the views of the Single Judge, and held that
the appellant had no cause of action against the Second and Third
respondents who owned the suit premises. It held that the appellant's
claim for maintenance and shelter would lie only against the Fourth
respondent. In dealing with the preliminary objection as regards the
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
1069
jurisdiction of the Assistant Commissioner to direct eviction, the Division
Bench merely observed that it was not in agreement with the submission
that "the Assistant Commissioner was powerless to pass an order
directing dispossession of the appellant".
B Submissions
9. The appellant, aggrieved by the judgement of the Division Bench
of the High Court, has preferred the present special leave petition.
Mr Yatish Mohan, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant
submitted that:
(i)
The appellant is residing in her matrimonial home as the
lawfully wedded spouse of the Fourth respondent and she
cannot be evicted from her shared household, in view of
the protection offered by Section 17 of the Protection of
Women from Domestic Violence Act 200511;
(ii)
The proceeding under Sections 3 and 4 of the Senior Citizens
Act 2007 was filed by her mother-in-law and father-in-law
in connivance with her estranged spouse to deprive her of
her matrimonial home;
(iii)
The finding of the Division Bench on the appellant's current
residential status was based on a fraudulent set up. The
alleged postal cover was dispatched on 21 June 2018, during
the pendency of the proceedings before the Single Judge,
and merely indicated a postal endorsement ("no such
person") as it arrived when nobody was present at home to
receive it;
(iv)
The decree for the dissolution of marriage which was passed
against the appellant by the Trial Judge on 5 December
2013 has been set aside by the High Court on 14 January
2016 and the proceedings have been remanded back to the
jurisdictional Family Court for a disposal afresh. Hence, as
of date, the appellant continues to be in a lawful relationship
of marriage with the Fourth respondent and she has no other
place to live except the suit premises, with her minor
daughter;
SMT. S. VANITHA v.THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, BENGALURU
URBAN DISTRICT [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]
11 "PWDV Act 2005"
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
1070
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2020] 12 S.C.R.
(v)
The provisions of the Senior Citizens Act 2007 have been
manipulated to defeat the rights of the appellant. The manner
in which the premises were transferred by the spouse of
the appellant to his father and the gift deed thereafter to
mother-in-law of the appellant are indicative of an attempt
to misuse the provisions of the Act, to defeat the claims of
the appellant; and
(vi)
In asserting her right under Section 17 of the PWDV Act
2005, the appellant relies on the decision of this Court in
Satish Chander Ahuja vs Sneha Ahuja12.In sum and
substance, it has been urged that the authorities constituted
under the Senior Citizens Act 2007 had no jurisdiction to
order the eviction of the appellant. Moreover, the
proceedings have been utilised to secure the eviction of the
appellant so as to deny her claim of a right to reside in the
shared household under the PWDV Act 2005.
10. On the other hand, while seeking to rebut the submissions of
the appellant, Mr Rajesh Mahale, learned Counsel appearing on behalf
of the Second and Third respondents submits that:
(i)
Both the Second respondent (who is 72 years old) and the
Third respondent (who is 82 years old) are senior citizens;
(ii)
The suit premises was constructed by the Third respondentthe father-in-law of the appellant, on a plot of land
admeasuring 1200 square feet situated in Gangondanahalli,
Bengaluru North Taluk. This was subsequently gifted to
the Second respondent, the mother-in-law of the appellant;
(iii)
The appellant has been concurrently found to have ousted
the Second and Third respondents from the property
belonging to them and to have illegally entered into
possession; and
(iv)
The Second and Third respondents filed an application under
the Senior Citizens Act 2007 before the Assistant
Commissioner for evicting the appellant and for the
restoration of their possession, which has been allowed by
the authorities and the High Court concurrently.
12 Civil Appeal No. 2483 of 2020, decided on 15 October 2020
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
1071
11. Dealing with the issue of jurisdiction, Mr Mahale submitted
that
(i)
The Tribunal constituted under the Senior Citizens Act 2007
has the jurisdiction to pass appropriate orders for protecting
the life and property of parents and senior citizens, including
orders of eviction;
(ii)
The intent and object of the Act is to provide for an
inexpensive and speedy relief to parents and senior citizens;
(iii)
While Chapter II entitles parents and senior citizens to apply
for orders to provide monetary relief for sustenance and
maintenance, Chapter V contains provisions for protecting
the life and property of parents and senior citizens;
(iv)
The Tribunal constituted under the Act has been entrusted
to issue orders after a summary enquiry, for effective
maintenance of parents and senior citizens including relief
against neglect, harassment and protection of the property
of senior citizens;
(v)
Section 23 confers two separate and distinct rights:
(a)
Section 23(1) empowers the Tribunal to declare a
transfer of property by a senior citizen void, where
the transfer was conditioned upon providing basic
amenities and physical needs to a senior citizen, where
the transferee fails to provide them;
(b)
Section 23(2) recognises a pre-existing right of a
senior citizen to receive maintenance out of an estate
and secures the right of making it enforceable against
a transferee who had notice of the right;
(vi)
The expression "maintenance" in Section 2(b) includes
provision for residence and a right to reside can be enforced
by a senior citizen, if the property is transferred without
making a suitable provision for maintenance; and
(vii)
Though the Senior Citizens Act 2007 does not contain an
express provision enabling the Tribunal to pass eviction
orders, the power has to be read within its jurisdiction by
necessary implication. Such an interpretation, it has been
SMT. S. VANITHA v.THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, BENGALURU
URBAN DISTRICT [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
1072
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2020] 12 S.C.R.
urged, would be purposive, in order to effectuate the
provisions of the Act. The contrary view would cause
hardship to senior citizens who would be powerless, despite
being forcibly dispossessed of their means of sustenance.
Parliament has empowered the State governments to
authorise local authorities to take remedial measures for
protecting the life and property of senior citizens and it would
be incorrect to limit the relief that can be granted by a
Tribunal only to monetary relief. Relegating a senior citizen
to a civil court for the recovery of their property would
result in defeating the provisions of the Act. Hence, it has
been urged that such an interpretation should not be adopted.
C Legislative scheme: Senior Citizens Act 2007
12. The rival submissions will now be analysed.
13. Our analysis of the rival submissions must begin with explaining
and interpreting the salient feature of the Senior Citizens Act 2007 which
have a bearing on the present controversy. 'Maintenance' is defined in
an inclusive manner to incorporate, among other things, provisions for
food, clothing, residence, medical assistance and treatment13. In defining
the expression 'property', the legislation uses broad terminology
encompassing "property of any kind" and to include "rights or interests
in such property"14. Overriding effect is given to the provisions of the
enactment by Section 315. Besides the definitions which are comprised
in Chapter I, Chapter II is titled "Maintenance of Parents and Senior
Citizens" while Chapter V is titled "Protection of Life and Property of
Senior Citizen". The Statement of Objects and Reasons indicates the
rationale for the enactment of the law:
"Traditional norms and values of the Indian society laid stress on
providing care for the elderly. However, due to withering of the
joint family system, a large number of elderly are not being looked
after by their family. Consequently, many older persons, particularly
13 2(b) "maintenance" includes provisions for food, clothing, residence and medical
attendance and treatment
14 2(f) "property" means property of any kind, whether movable or immovable, ancestral
or self acquired, tangible or intangible and includes rights or interests in such property;
15 3. Act to have overriding effect.-The provisions of this Act shall have effect
notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any enactment other
than this Act, or in any instrument having effect by virtue of any enactment other than
this Act.
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
1073
widowed women are now forced to spend their twilight years all
alone and are exposed to emotional neglect and to lack of physical
and financial support. This clearly reveals that ageing has become
a major social challenge and there is a need to give more attention
to the care and protection for the older persons. Though the parents
can claim maintenance under the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973, the procedure is both time - consuming as well as expensive.
Hence, there is a need to have simple, inexpensive and speedy
provisions to claim maintenance for parents."
Briefly reviewed, Section 4 recognises an entitlement of
maintenance to inhere in parents and senior citizens. Section 5 lays down
the procedure by which an application for maintenance can be made.
Section 6 elucidates provisions governing jurisdiction and procedure.
Section 7 contains stipulations for the constitution of a Maintenance
Tribunal. Section 8 envisages a summary procedure for making an inquiry.
Section 11 provides for the enforcement of an order of maintenance.
14. A senior citizen, including a parent, who is unable to maintain
themselves from their own earning or out of property owned by them, is
entitled to make an application under Section 4(i). A parent or grandparent may make an application against one or more of their children. A
childless senior citizen can make an application against a relative specified
in Section 2(g). Section 4 recognises a corresponding obligation on the
part of the children or relative to maintain a senior citizen, extending to
such needs as would enable them to lead a normal life. In the case of a
relative, the obligation is if they are in possession of the property of the
senior citizen or would inherit property from them. Hence, in the case of
the children of a senior citizen, the obligation to maintain a parent is not
conditional on being in possession of property of the senior citizen or
upon a right of future inheritance16.
SMT. S. VANITHA v.THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, BENGALURU
URBAN DISTRICT [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]
16 4. Maintenance of parents and senior citizens.-(1) A senior citizen including parent
who is unable to maintain himself from his own earning or out of the property owned
by him, shall be entitled to make an application under section 5 in case of-
(i) parent or grand-parent, against one or more of his children not being a minor;
(ii) a childless senior citizen, against such of his relative referred to in clause (g) of
section 2.
(2) The obligation of the children or relative, as the case may be, to maintain a senior
citizen extends to the needs of such citizen so that senior citizen may lead a normal life.
(3) The obligation of the children to maintain his or her parent extends to the needs of
such parent either father or mother or both, as the case may be, so that such parent may
lead a normal life.
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
1074
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2020] 12 S.C.R.
15. The procedure to be followed by a Maintenance Tribunal
(constituted under Section 7) is of a summary nature as provided in
Section 8(1) and with all the powers of a Civil Court, as provided in
Section 8(2)17. Under Sub-section (1) of Section 9, where a senior citizen
is not able to maintain himself or herself and the children or relatives, as
the case may be, neglect or refuse to maintain them, the Tribunal is
empowered to order them to make a monthly allowance at such monthly
rate for the maintenance of the senior citizen, as the Tribunal may deem
fit18. The amount of the monthly allowance can be altered inter alia
upon a change in circumstances, under Section 1019
16. Of particular relevance to the facts of the case at hand is
Chapter V, which enacts provisions for protecting the life and property
of a senior citizen. Section 23 proceeds in the following terms:
(4) Any person being a relative of a senior citizen and having sufficient means shall
maintain such senior citizen provided he is in possession of the property of such
citizen or he would inherit the property of such senior citizen:
Provided that where more than one relatives are entitled to inherit the property of a
senior citizen, the maintenance shall be payable by such relative in the proportion in
which they would inherit his property.
17 8.