# SMT. SHANTI AND ANR v. STATE OF HARYANA

- **Citation:** [1990] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 675
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1990-11-13
- **Case number:** Criminal Appeal No. 368 of 1990
- **Bench:** S. Ratnavel Pandian, K. Jayachandra B Reddy
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/smt-shanti-and-anr-v-state-of-haryana-10908
- **Pages:** 9

## Headnote

Indian Penal Code,-1860: Sections 304-B and 498-A-Scope of.
Dowry Death-Relaiive of the husband !if a woman subjecting her
to cruelty-Woman's death occurring in unnatural circumstancesProsecution of A_ccused-Conviction under section 304-B-:Acquittal
under section 498-A-Effect of-Seciions 304-B and 498.-A~Whether
mutually exclusive.
· ·
.
Evidence Act,· 1872: Section I 13:8-Presumption as to dowry
death.
Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961: Section 2-Dow,.Y..,.Meaning of,
The ~ppellants, along with three other co:acctised," we~e charged_
c
D
of committing a. dQwry death. They were prosecuted under sections 201, ·
304-B and 498-A of the Indian Penal Code .. The Trial Court convicted
E
the appellants on all the counts but acquitted the other three co-accused.
The appellants preferred ari· appeal before the High Court which_
set aside their conviction· '!Ilder section 498-A holding that_ Sections
304-B and 498-A. are mutually exclusive and that when on~. the
cruelty envisaged in section 498-A culminates in dowry death of the
F
victim Section 304-B alone is attracted~ Accordingly, the High Court
acquitted the appellants under section 498-A. But their convictions
under section 304-B and 201 were affirmed.
·
In the appeal to this Court, it was contended on behalf of the
appellants: (i) that the acquittal of the appellants under section 498-A
G
indicates that cruelty on the part of the acctised was not proved and
consequently the death cannot be one of "dowry death'', and (ii) that
there was no direct evidence in this case and that all the ingredients of
section 304-B oflndian Penal Code were not made out.
.
'
Disposing of the appeal, this Court,
H.
675
A
B
c
·o
676
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[ 1990) Supp. c S.C.R.
·HELD: 1. The view of the High Court that Sections 304-B and
498-A I.P.C. are mutually exclusive is not correct. Sections 304-B and
498-A cannot be held to be mutually exclusive. These provisions deal
with two distinct offences. It is true that "cruelty" is a common essential to both the Sections and that has to be proved. The Explanation to
Section 44)8..A gives the meaning of "cruelty". In Section 3()4.B there is
no such explanation about the meaning of "cruelty" but having regafd
to the common background-to these offences, the memiing of "cruelty
01· harassment" will be the same as found in the explanation to Section
498-A under which "cruelty" by itself amounts to an offence and is
punishable. Under Section 304-B, It IS the "dowry death" that Is
punishable and such death should have occurred within seven years of
the marriage. No such period Is mentioned in Section 498-A end the
husband or his relative would be liable for subjecting the woman to
"cruelty" any time after the marriage. Further a person charged and
acquitted under section 304-B can be convicted under Section 498-A
. without charge being there, If such a case is made oul. But from the
point of view of practice and procedure and to avoid technical defects It
is neceSsary in such cases to frame charges under both the Section and If
the case Is established they can be convicted under both the Sections but
no separate sentence need be awarded under Section 498-A in view of
the substantive sentence being awarded for the major offence under
section 304-B. [682D-H; 683A]
E
1.1 In the instant case, the High Court has not held that the
prosecution has not established cruelty on the part of the appellants but
on the other hand it considered the· entire evidence and held that the
element of cruelty which is also an essential of Section 3()4.B I.P .C has
been established. In these circnmstances, therefore, thi mere acquittal
of the appellants under Section 498-A I.P.C. makes no dltJerence for
•
F
the purpose of this case. [682C-D]
·
0
2. In the instant case, there Is absolutely no material to indlcale
even remotely that it was a case of natural death. It Is nobody's case
that it was accidental death. In the result It was an unnatural death;
either homicidal or suicidal. But even a

## Text

SMT. SHANTI AND ANR.
v.
STATE OF HARYANA
NOVEMBER 13, 1990
A
[S. RATNAVEL PANDIAN AND K. JAYACHANDRA
B
REDDY, JJ.]
Indian Penal Code,-1860: Sections 304-B and 498-A-Scope of.
Dowry Death-Relaiive of the husband !if a woman subjecting her
to cruelty-Woman's death occurring in unnatural circumstancesProsecution of A_ccused-Conviction under section 304-B-:Acquittal
under section 498-A-Effect of-Seciions 304-B and 498.-A~Whether
mutually exclusive.
· ·
.
Evidence Act,· 1872: Section I 13:8-Presumption as to dowry
death.
Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961: Section 2-Dow,.Y..,.Meaning of,
The ~ppellants, along with three other co:acctised," we~e charged_
c
D
of committing a. dQwry death. They were prosecuted under sections 201, ·
304-B and 498-A of the Indian Penal Code .. The Trial Court convicted
E
the appellants on all the counts but acquitted the other three co-accused.
The appellants preferred ari· appeal before the High Court which_
set aside their conviction· '!Ilder section 498-A holding that_ Sections
304-B and 498-A. are mutually exclusive and that when on~. the
cruelty envisaged in section 498-A culminates in dowry death of the
F
victim Section 304-B alone is attracted~ Accordingly, the High Court
acquitted the appellants under section 498-A. But their convictions
under section 304-B and 201 were affirmed.
·
In the appeal to this Court, it was contended on behalf of the
appellants: (i) that the acquittal of the appellants under section 498-A
G
indicates that cruelty on the part of the acctised was not proved and
consequently the death cannot be one of "dowry death'', and (ii) that
there was no direct evidence in this case and that all the ingredients of
section 304-B oflndian Penal Code were not made out.
.
'
Disposing of the appeal, this Court,
H.
675
A
B
c
·o
676
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[ 1990) Supp. c S.C.R.
·HELD: 1. The view of the High Court that Sections 304-B and
498-A I.P.C. are mutually exclusive is not correct. Sections 304-B and
498-A cannot be held to be mutually exclusive. These provisions deal
with two distinct offences. It is true that "cruelty" is a common essential to both the Sections and that has to be proved. The Explanation to
Section 44)8..A gives the meaning of "cruelty". In Section 3()4.B there is
no such explanation about the meaning of "cruelty" but having regafd
to the common background-to these offences, the memiing of "cruelty
01· harassment" will be the same as found in the explanation to Section
498-A under which "cruelty" by itself amounts to an offence and is
punishable. Under Section 304-B, It IS the "dowry death" that Is
punishable and such death should have occurred within seven years of
the marriage. No such period Is mentioned in Section 498-A end the
husband or his relative would be liable for subjecting the woman to
"cruelty" any time after the marriage. Further a person charged and
acquitted under section 304-B can be convicted under Section 498-A
. without charge being there, If such a case is made oul. But from the
point of view of practice and procedure and to avoid technical defects It
is neceSsary in such cases to frame charges under both the Section and If
the case Is established they can be convicted under both the Sections but
no separate sentence need be awarded under Section 498-A in view of
the substantive sentence being awarded for the major offence under
section 304-B. [682D-H; 683A]
E
1.1 In the instant case, the High Court has not held that the
prosecution has not established cruelty on the part of the appellants but
on the other hand it considered the· entire evidence and held that the
element of cruelty which is also an essential of Section 3()4.B I.P .C has
been established. In these circnmstances, therefore, thi mere acquittal
of the appellants under Section 498-A I.P.C. makes no dltJerence for
•
F
the purpose of this case. [682C-D]
·
0
2. In the instant case, there Is absolutely no material to indlcale
even remotely that it was a case of natural death. It Is nobody's case
that it was accidental death. In the result It was an unnatural death;
either homicidal or suicidal. But even assuming that It Is a case of
G
suicide even then It would be death which had occurred in unnatural
circumstances. Even in such a case, Section 304-B Is attracted. Therefore, the prosecution has established that the 11ppellants have commlted
an offence punishable under Section 304-B beyond all reasonable
doubt. [681G-H; 682A]
H
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
No. 368 of 1990.
o"1T. SHANfi '·STATE OF HARYANA [K. JAYACHANDRA REDDY, l.[
077
From tht Judgment and Order dated 1.2.1990 of the Punjab and
Haryana High Court in Crl. A. No. 703 D.B. of 1988.
U.R. Lalit, Ranbir Singh Yadav andP. Gaurfor the Appellants.
Mahabir Singh for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
K. JAYACHANDRA REDDY, J. This is a case of dowry death.
A
B
The deceased by name of Smt. Kailash was the daughter of Hari
Bhagwan, P.W. 1 of Jonala. She was married to one Sat Pal of
Mundaliya Village about 9 kilometres away from Jonala. The marriage
C
· took place on 18th April, 1987. Sat Pal, the husband at the relevant
time was serving in the Army. His father namely the father-in-law of
deceased was employed in Railways. Accused No. I Smt. Shanti is the
mother of Sat Pal, and the mother-in-law of the deceased. The other
appellant Smt. Krishna, wife of the brother of Sat Pal was another
inmate. After marriage the deceased was livi.r\g in her matrimonial
D
home with accused Nos. 1 and 2, the two appellants herein. It is
alleged that these two women were harassing the deceased all the
while after the marriage for not bringing Scooter and Television ·as part of
the dowry and she was treated cruelly. The marriage of one Munni, a
cousin of the cleceased was fixed for 30th April, 1988. Her brother
)NCnt to Mundaliya village twice for bringing the deceased but the
E
accused only taunted him and sent him away without sending the
deceased. Ultimately, P.W. I, the father himself went to the home of
his dauther, the deceased on 25th April, 1988. The two. appellant\
misbehaved with him saying that if he was fond of his daughter he
ought to have arranged Scooter and Television as part of the dowry
and he was insulted and pushed out of the house. On 26th April, 1988
F
at about 11 P .M: P. W. I came to know that the deceased had been
murdered and was cremated by the two ladies with the help of another
three persons. A report was given and the police could recover only
bones and ashes. After investigation, the charge-sheet was laid.
The Additional Sessions Judge, who tried all the five accused
G
convicted the appellants under Section 304-B I.P.C. and sentenced
each of them to life imp!isonment and under section 201 Ii>.C,,
. sentenced them to undergo_ imprisonment for one year and to pay a fine
of Rs.2,000 each and also under Section 498:A I.P.C. to t.wo _years
rigorous imprisonment and to pay a fine of Rs.3,000. The sentences
were directed to run concurrently, The other accused were acquit~ H
A
B
c
678
SUPRF.).IB COURT REPORTS
[1990] Supp. 2 S.C.R.
These two appellants preferred an appeal to the High court and the
same was dismissed. The High Court, however, set aside the conviction under Section 498-A LP .C. The present appeal, pursuant to the
leave granted by this Court, has been preferred against the judgment
of the High Court.
Mr. La lit; learned counsel for the appellants submitted that there
is no direct evidence in this case and that all the ingredients of an
offence under Section 304-B 1.P.C. are not made out. According to
him, it is not conclusively proved that the two appellants subjected the
deceased to cruelty or harassment and the very fact that the High
Court has acquitted the appellants of the offence punishable under
Section 498-A would itself indicate that the prosecution case regarding
cruelty is not accepted and consequently the death cannot be one of
"dowry death". On merits, he submitted that in the absence of clear
proof of the .cause of death one cannot presume that the death occilrred in unnatu.ral circumstances.
D
Section 304B l.P.C. reads as follows:
E
F
G
•
"304B. Dowry death-(1) Where the death of a woman is
caused by .any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise
than under normal circum.stances within seven years of her
marriage and it is shown that soon before her death she was
subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any
relative of her husband for, or in connection with, any .
demand for dowry, such death shall be_ called "dowry
death", and such husband or relative shall be deemed to
have caused her death.
Explanation-For the purposes of this sub-section, "dowry"
shall have the same meaning as in Section 2 of the Dowry
Prohibition Act, 1961.
(2) Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished with
imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than seven
years but which may extend to imprisonment for life."
This Section was inserted by the Dowry Prohibition (Amendment)
Act, 1986 with a view to combat the increasing menace of dowry
deaths. It lays down that wl!ere the death of a woman is caused by any
~
burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumsH
lances within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that soon
-.
SMT. SHANTI v. STATEOFHARYAl'lA lK.JAYACHANDRA REDDY,J.J
679
•
before the death of the woman she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or his relations for or in connection with any
demand for dowry, such death shall be called "dowry death" and the
husband or relatives shall be deemed to have caused her death and
shall be punishable with .imprisonment for a minimum of seven years
but which may extend to life imprisonment. As per the explanation to
the Section, the "dowry" for the purposes of this Section shall have the
same meaning as in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961
which defines "dowry" as follows:
"2. Definition of "dowry"-In this Act, "dowry" means
any property or valuable security given or agreed to be
A
B
given either directly or indirectlyC
1
(a) by one party to a marriage to the other party to the
marriage; or
(b) by the parents of either party to a marriage or by any
other person, to either party to the marriage or to any
other person, at or before or any time after the marriage in
connection with the marriage of the said parties, but does
not include dower or mahr in the case of persons to whom
the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) applies."
Keeping in view the object, a new Section 113-B was introduced in the
Evidence Act to raise a presumption as to dowry death. It reads as
under:
"113B. Presumption as to dowry death-When the question as whether a person has committed the dowry death of
a woman and it :s shown that soon before her death such
woman had been subjected by such person to cruelty or
harassment for, or in connection with, any demand for
dowry, the Court shall presume that such person had
caused the dowry death.
Explanation-For the purposes of this section,
"dowry death" shall have the same meaning as in Section
304B of the Indian Penal Code."
One another provision which is relevant in this context is Section
498-A LP .C. which reads as under:
D
E
F
G
H
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
680
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1990]. Supp. 2 S.C.R.
"498-A. Husband or relative of husband of a women subjecting her to cruelty-Whoever being the husband or the
relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such woman
to cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment for a term
which may extend to three years and shall also be liabt.e to
fine.
Explanation-For the purposes of this section, "cruelty"
means-
(a) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely
to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave
injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or
physical) of the woman; or
(b) harassment of the woman where such harassme11t is
with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to
meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable
security or is on account of failure by her or any person
related to her to meet such demand."
A careful analysis of Section 304B shows that this Section has the
following essentials:
"(l) The death of a woman should be caused by burns or
bodily injury or otherwise than under normal circumstances;
(2) Such death should have occurred within seven years of
her marriage;
(3) She must have been subjected to cruelty or .harassment
by her husband or any relative of her husband;
( 4) Such cruelty or harassment should be for or in connection with demand for dowry."
Section 113B of the Evidence Act lays down that if soon before the
death . .such woman has been subjected to cruelty or harassment for or
in connection with any demand for dowry, then the Court shall presume that such person has committed the dowry death. The meaning
of "cruelty" for the purposes of these Sections has to be gathered from
•
H
the language as found in Section 498-A and as per that Section
SMT. SHANTI v. STATEOFHARYANA [K. JAYACHANDRA REDDY, J.l
681
'.'cruelty" means "any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is
likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave in jury or
danger to life etc. or harassment to coerce her or any other person
related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is in account of failure by her or any person related to
her to meet such demand." As per the definition of "dowry" any
property or valu.able security given or agreed to be given either at or
before or any tiine after the marriage, comes within the meaning of
"dowry", With this background of the provisions of law we shall
examine the facts in the instant case.
Both the courts below have held that the two appeilants did not
send the deceased to her parent's house and drove out the brother as
well as the father of the deceased complaining that scooter and television have not been given as· dowry. We have carefully examined this
part of the pro~cution case and we are satisfied that the prosecution
nas established beyond all·reasonable doubt that the appellants treated
the deceased cruelly and the same squarely comes within the meaning
of "cruelty" which is an essential under Section 304-B and that such
cruelty was for demand for dowry. It is an admitted fact that death
occurred within seven years of the marriage. Therefore three essentials are satisfied. Now we shall see whether the other essential namdy
whether the death occurred otherwise than under normal circumstances is also established? From the evidence of P. W. 1, the father,
PW: 2 the brother, and P.W. 3 the mother, it is clear that they were
not even informed soon about the death and that the appellants
hurriedly cremated the dead body. Under these ci~cumstances, the
presumption under Section 113B is attracted. The accused examined
defence witnesses to rebut the presumption and to show that the
deceased suffered heart~attack. We have examined the evidence of
A
B
c
D
E
D. Ws 2 and 3 and we agree with the courts below that this theory of
F
natural death cannot b.e accepted at all. No material was placed to
show that the deceased suffered any such attack previously. If it was
natural death, there was no need for the appellants to act in such
unnatural manner and cremate the body in great and unholy haste
without° even informing the parents. Because o1 this cremation no postmortem could be conducted and the actual cause of death could not be
established clearly. There is absolutely no material to indicate even
remotely that it was a case of natural death. It is nobody's case that it
G
was accidental death. In the result it was an unnatural death; either
homicidal· or suicidal. But even assuming that it is a case of suicide
even then it would be death which had occurred in unnatural circumstances. Even in such a case, Section 304B is attracted and this position
H
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
682
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1990] Supp. 2 S.C.R.
is not disputed. Therefore, the prosecution was established that the
appellants have committed an offence punishable under Section 304B
beyond all reasonable doubt.
Now we shall consider the question as to whether the acquittal of
the appellants of the offence punishable under Section 498-A makes
any difference. The submission .of the learned counsel is that the acquittal under Section 498-A I.P.C. would lead to the effect that the
cruelty on the part of the accused is not established. We see no force in
this submission. The High Court only held that Section 304B and
Section 498-A I.P.C. are mutually exclusive and that when once the
cruelty envisaged in Section 498-A 1.P.C. culminates in dowry death of
the victim, Section 304B alone is attracted and in that view of the
matter the appellants were acquitted under Section 498-A I.P.C. It can
therefore be sr~n that the High Court did not hold that the prosecution
has not established cruelty on the part of the appellants but on the
other hand the High Court considered the entire evidence and held
that the element of cruelty which is also an essential of Section 304B
l.P.C. has been established. Therefore the mere acquittal of the appellants under Section 498-A I.P.C. in these circumstances makes no
difference for the purpose of this case. However, we want to point out
that this view of the High Court is not correct and Sections 304B and
498-A cannot be held to be mutually exclusive. These provisions deal
with two distinct offences. It is true that "cruelty" is a common essential to both the Sections and that has to be proved. The Explanation
to Section 498-A cives the meaning of "cruelty". In Section 304B
there is no such explanation about the meaning of "cruelty" but having
regard to the common background to these offences we have to take
that the meaning of "cruelty or harassment" will be the same as we
find in the· explanation to Section 498-A under which "cruelty" by
itself amounts to an offence and is punishable. Under Section 304B as
already noted, it is the "dowry death" that is punishable and such
death should have occurred within seven years of the marriage. No
such period is mentioned in Section 498-A and the husband or his
relative would be liable for subjecting the woman to "cruelty" any
time after the marriage. Further it must also be borne in mind that a
person charged and acquitted under Section 304B can be convicted
under Section 498-A without charge being there, if such a case is made
out. But from the point of view of practice and procedure and to avoid
technical defects it is necessary in such cases to frame charges under
both the Sections and if the case is established they can be convicted
under both the Sections but no separate sentence need be awarded
under Section 498-A in view of the substantive sentence being awarded
..
/"
"'""-~··
~-
SMT. SHANTI v. STATE OFHARYANA [K. JAYACHANDRA REDDY, J.] 683
for the major offence under Section 304B. '
~
· These are all the submissions and we do not find merit in any of
them. Therefore, we confirm the convictions.
Now coming to the sentences, accused No. 2, the wife of ihe
hU•band's brother is a young lady of 20 years at the time of the trial. As
alteady mentioned, there is no evidence as to the cause of death but as
discussed above, the cruelty on the part of these two appellants is
established but in bringing about the death, there is no evidence as to
the actual part played ·by accused No. 2. Further both the appellants
are women. Under these circumstances, a minimum sentence of seven
years' rigorous imprisonment would serve .the ends of justice. Accordingly the convictions are confirmed but the sentence of imprisonment
for life under Section 304B LP.C. of each of the accused appellant is
set aside and instead each-of them is sentenced to undergo seven years'
rigorous imprisonment. The appeal is disposed of accordingly.
T.N.A.
Appeals disposed pf.
A
B
c