# SMT. SITABATI DEBI & ANR v. STATE OF WEST BENGAL & ANR

- **Citation:** [1967] 2 S.C.R. 949
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1967
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 322 of 1961
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/smt-sitabati-debi-anr-v-state-of-west-bengal-anr-4184
- **Pages:** 4

## Headnote

A
SMT. SITABATI DEBI & ANR.
v.
STATE OF WEST BENGAL & ANR.
December 1, 1961
B
(P. 13. GAJENDRAGADKAR,
A. K. SARKAR,
K. N. WASCHOO,
c
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G
K. C. DAS GUPTA AND
N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR, JJ.]
Co11stitu1ion of India, 1950, Arts. 19 and 31(1) and (2)-l<M wuler
Art. 31(2)-/f .rnhject 10 Arr. 19(1)(/).
Before tho Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955, it had been
held by this Court in Bhanjl Munji's case [19551 I S.C.R. 777 and other
earlier cases, that both clauses (I) and (2) of the Art. 31 of the Constitution dealt with a Jaw giving pov.·er to the State to acqu:re or requisition
property, and that, Art. 19(! )(f) was not attracted to such a law. After
the Amendment, in Kochunrs case [1960! 3 S.C.R. 837, this Court held
that cl. (2) of the Art. 31 alone dealt with acquisition and requisition
of property hy the State, that cl. (I) dealt with depr:vation of property
in other ways, and that, a law under cl. (I) had r.o satisfy the te:st of
reasonableness under Art .. 19(1). The Court also obse·ved that Bhanji
Munji's case "no longer holds the field".
This Court, in Babu
Barkva
Thakur's case, J 19611 I S.C.R. 128, decided after Kochuni's case held
that an Act providing for acquisition or requis:tion of property hy the
State could not be at'acked for the reason that it onended Art. 19(l)(f).
The appellant's land was requisitioned under the West Bengal Land
(Requisition and Acquisition) Act, 1948, and •he questioned the validity
of the Act by a writ petition in the High Court on the ground that it
offended Art.19(1)(f). The High Court followed lhe decision in Barha
Thakur's case- and dismissed the petition.
In appeal to this Court it Was contended that Barkva Thak11r's case
was based on Bhanj Munji'• case which had lost its authority in view of
Kochuni's case and that therefore, should not have been followed.
HELD :Kochuni's ca'ie was not
concerned with a law of requisition
or acquisition.
Therefore, the observation in that case he; to be under·
stood as only meaning that Bhanji Munji's case no longer governs a case
of deprivation of property by means other than requisition and acquisition
by the State. There is thus no conflict between Barkva Thakur's case and
Kochuni's case with respect to acquisition and requisition of property by
the State under Art. 31 (2) and, therefore the valtdity of an Act relating
to acquisition or requisition cannot be questioned
on the ground that it
offends Art. 19(1 )(f) an~ need not be
tested by the criterion in Art.
19(5).[951 F-H; 952 B-Cl

## Text

A
SMT. SITABATI DEBI & ANR.
v.
STATE OF WEST BENGAL & ANR.
December 1, 1961
B
(P. 13. GAJENDRAGADKAR,
A. K. SARKAR,
K. N. WASCHOO,
c
0
E
F
G
K. C. DAS GUPTA AND
N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR, JJ.]
Co11stitu1ion of India, 1950, Arts. 19 and 31(1) and (2)-l<M wuler
Art. 31(2)-/f .rnhject 10 Arr. 19(1)(/).
Before tho Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955, it had been
held by this Court in Bhanjl Munji's case [19551 I S.C.R. 777 and other
earlier cases, that both clauses (I) and (2) of the Art. 31 of the Constitution dealt with a Jaw giving pov.·er to the State to acqu:re or requisition
property, and that, Art. 19(! )(f) was not attracted to such a law. After
the Amendment, in Kochunrs case [1960! 3 S.C.R. 837, this Court held
that cl. (2) of the Art. 31 alone dealt with acquisition and requisition
of property hy the State, that cl. (I) dealt with depr:vation of property
in other ways, and that, a law under cl. (I) had r.o satisfy the te:st of
reasonableness under Art .. 19(1). The Court also obse·ved that Bhanji
Munji's case "no longer holds the field".
This Court, in Babu
Barkva
Thakur's case, J 19611 I S.C.R. 128, decided after Kochuni's case held
that an Act providing for acquisition or requis:tion of property hy the
State could not be at'acked for the reason that it onended Art. 19(l)(f).
The appellant's land was requisitioned under the West Bengal Land
(Requisition and Acquisition) Act, 1948, and •he questioned the validity
of the Act by a writ petition in the High Court on the ground that it
offended Art.19(1)(f). The High Court followed lhe decision in Barha
Thakur's case- and dismissed the petition.
In appeal to this Court it Was contended that Barkva Thak11r's case
was based on Bhanj Munji'• case which had lost its authority in view of
Kochuni's case and that therefore, should not have been followed.
HELD :Kochuni's ca'ie was not
concerned with a law of requisition
or acquisition.
Therefore, the observation in that case he; to be under·
stood as only meaning that Bhanji Munji's case no longer governs a case
of deprivation of property by means other than requisition and acquisition
by the State. There is thus no conflict between Barkva Thakur's case and
Kochuni's case with respect to acquisition and requisition of property by
the State under Art. 31 (2) and, therefore the valtdity of an Act relating
to acquisition or requisition cannot be questioned
on the ground that it
offends Art. 19(1 )(f) an~ need not be
tested by the criterion in Art.
19(5).[951 F-H; 952 B-Cl
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 322 of
1961.
Appeal by speci~: leave from the judgment and order dated
H
January 31, 1961 of the Calcutta High Court, in Civil Rule No.
2112 of 1957.
Arun Kumar Dutra and D. N. Mukherjee, for the appellants.
·950
SUPllBMB COUllT llBPOllTS
[1967) 2 S.C.ll.
S. M. Bose, Advocate-General for the State of West Bengal,
S. C. Bo.>e :11;d P. K. Bme, for the respondents.
The Jud!lmcnt of the Court was delivered by
Sarkar, J. In this ca'c the validity of the West Bengal Land
( Requi,ition and Acquisition) Act, 1948 was questioned by the
appellants by a petition moved under Art. 226 of the Constitution in the High Court at Calcutta. The High
Court having
dismi"cd the petition, the :1ppcllants have filed this appeal with
'pecial leave granted by this Court.
The Act provided for requisition and also for acquisition of
land by the
Seate Government "for maintaining
supplies and
services essential 10 the life of the community or for providing
proper facilities for transport, communication, irrigation or drainage, or for the creation of better living conditions in rural or
urban areas ........ by the construction or
reconstruction of
dwelling places for people residing in such areas."
The Act
provided for payment of compensation in respect of requisition and
acquisition made under it.
An order was made under the Act on July 22, 1957 requitioning certain lands belonging to one of the .ipJY!llants, the other
appellant being a Jessee thereof, and it was stated in the order
that possession would be taken on August 2, 1957.
Thereupon
the appellants filed the petition.
The appellants challenged the validity of the Act in the High
Court on various grounds.
In this Court however
only
one
ground was advanced in support of the appeal and that alone,
therefore, we are called upon to discuss in this judgment.
It was said that the Act offended Art. 19( 1) (f) of the Constitution as it put unreasonable restrictions on the right to hold
property.
The High Court had rejected this contention on the
ground that this Court had decided in Ealm Barkya Tiiakur v.
The Stair of Bomba.v(1) that an Act providing for acquisition of
property by the State could not be attacked for the reason that
it offenJed Art. 19(1 )(f). It also held that the
decision
in
Kavalarrwra Kochuni v. The State of Madras(') did not hold
that Art. ~I (21 of the C011stitu:ion docs not exclude the applicability of Art. 19( 1) (f).
We think th:,t the High C,ourt was
right on both these pllints.
Obviously_ what was said in Bab11
Barkya Tlwk11r's case(') about a Jaw relating to acquisition of
propertv by the Stale would apply to a l:1w relating to requisition.
It would follow that the valic.Jity of the Act cannot be questioned
on the ground that it offends Ari. 19( 1 )(f).
jll[l%l( I S('.R.118.
111 {!% 1 .1 s.c.~. 887.
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SITABATI DEBI v. WEST BENGAL (Sarkar, J.)
951
The 1earncd advocate for the appellants contended that the
decisions of this Court earlier mentioned were in conllict with
each other and that the later decision, namely, that in
Babu
Bark.va Thakur's case(') concerning the applicability of Art.
J9(1)(f) to a law of requisition or acquisition by the State covered by Art. 31(2) had been based on two earlier decisions of
this Court, namely, The State of Bombay v. Bhanji M_unji(') a~d
Lilavati Bai v. The State of Bombay('), both of which must, m
view of the decision in Kavalappara Kochuni's(') case, be deemed
to hs.ve lost their authority after the Constitution (Fourth Amend·
men!) Act, 1955. It was pointed out that in Kavalappara
Kochuni's case(') it was said that B/Janji Munji's( 2 )
case "no
longer holds the field after the Constitution (Fourth Amendment)
Act, 1955".
The same observation, it was contended, would
also apply to the case of Lilavati Bai v. The State of Bombay("').
It is true that Babu Barkyi. Thakur's case(') in so far as it
dealt with Arts. 19( 1) (f) and 31 (2), was based on Bhanji Munji's
case(') and Liia••ati Bai's case(') both of which had been decidD
ed on Art. 31 as it stood prior to the. aforesaid amendment of
the Constitution. It is also true that both these cases dealt with
a statute giving power to the State to requisition land an:! held
that such a Jaw if valid under Art. 31 as it stood before the
amendment, would not be void on the ground that it infringed
Art. 19(1)(f).
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Now, before the amendment it had been held by this Court
by a majority-Das J., as he then was, alone taking a different
view-that both els. (1) and (2) of Art. 31 dealt with a Jaw
giving power to the State to acquire or
requi~ition property.
Kavalappara Kochuni's case(') held that after the amendment,
cl. (2) of Art. 31 alone dealt with acquisition and requisition
of property by the State and cl. ( 1) dealt with deprivation of
property in other ways.
This case did not deal with a Jaw of
acquisition or requisition of property by the State but was concerned with a law by which deprivation of property was brought
about in other ways, which Jaw, it held, had to satisfy Art. 19
and the principle in Bl mji Munji's(') case which could have
saved that law before the amendment could not save· it after the
amendment. The observation in Kava/apvara Koc/Juni's(') case
that Bhanji Mllnjt's(2) case "no longer holds the field" has, therefore, to be understood as meaning that it no longer governs a
case of deprivation of property by means other than requisitioa
and acquisition by the State. Kavalappara Kochuni's case(') was
not concerned with a law of requisition or acquisition. It was
not directly concerned with the question whether Bhanji Munjts
ill 11961] I S.C.R. 121.
(3) [1957] S.C.R. 721.
12\ [1955] 1 S.C.R. 7n.
r4l [196'] 3 S.C.R. 887.
952
SUPRl!MI! COURT REPORTS
(1967] 2 S.C.R.
case( 1 ) woulJ not after the amendment, apply even to a law of
requisition or acquisition of property governed by A rt. 31 ( 2),
as it now stands, and did not decide that question.
Indeed it might be said that the rcawning in some passages
of the judgment in tho Kavalappara(') decision would appear to
~uggest that a law providing for "acquisition" and "requisition"
by the State as
understood in the
sense
indicated
by
Art.
31(2)(a), does not fall within Art. 19(1)(f) and that the validity of such a law is not to be tested by the criterion in Art. 19(5).
Otherwise the point made in it regarding the disseverance effected
between the content of Art. 31 (I) and of Art. 31 (2) by the
Fourth Amendment would lose all significance.
It would therefore appear that there is nothing in that case which would bring
it into any conflict with Babu Barkya Tltakur's( 3 ) case.
As the
only ground on which the correctness of the decision in Babu
Barkya Thakur's case(') was challenged was that it wa' inconsistent with Kava/appara Kochuni's case('), that argument must fail.
The appeal, therefore, fails and is dismissed with costs.
V.P.S.
(I) [195;) I S.C.R. 777.
L3 Sup C.l."67.- 2,5 lf
(Jl (llJf,r,J JS CR i-8:'
:!i'-12·67
(,IP!-=
Appeal dismissed.
12! fl<Jfil J I S.C.R.
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