# SMT. SOMAVANTI A~D OTHERS v. THE STATE OF PUNJAB AND OTHERS

- **Citation:** [1963] 2 S.C.R. 774
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1961-08-25
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/smt-somavanti-a-d-others-v-the-state-of-punjab-and-others-2549
- **Pages:** 58

## Headnote

774
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963]
1962
ta.ken by the Madras High Court and we see no
w,,1 Ramnu
reason to diffor from it. Therefore the challenge
EZ..uio DU1ritu1;.n
!'<> the validity of the Act on the g~ound that its
(',.Lid.
IDlporta.nt provisions contained in section 5 offend
.sw. .j·Mab"'
against Art. 31 (2) must be rejected. That being
-
. our view, we must held that the High Court was
f1oj•n4ro~alk•J. right in rejeoting both the writ petitions filed by
the l!'Ppellant. Op that view, it is unnecessary to
oons1der whether appellant would have been entitled
to get the relief of poBBession or mesue profits whioh
it purported to claim by its two petitions.
Jl4y 2.
The appeals accordingly fail and are di.amilllled
with costs.
One set of hearing fees.
Appeals di.smisst,tl.
SMT. SOMAVANTI A~D OTHERS
v.
THE STATE OF PUNJAB AND OTHERS
(And Conneote.d Petitions)
lB. P. SINHA, c. J., K. SuBBA. R.t.o, N. RA.J.t.GOP.ALA.
AYYA.NGA..R, J. R. MuoBOLXA.B and
T. L. VKN.K.A.TA..RA.JU. .AIYA.B, JJ .)
Land Acqu;.ifiqn....-Puhlic purpo .. --Qovemmt>&I tltdaration
l .
aa lo public purpo-1/ juaU<:iable-"ComlmitJO ellid•-"
"Concluafoe proof", Meaning of-Compen11alio..-~,,,.,.1'•
cofllribution of w•t-1/ •hould be aublllanlial-l..dia11 Et1i<UllU
Acl 1872 (I of 1872), u. J, 4-Land Acquiaition Act, 1894
(I~! 1894), ••· 4, 6A, 6-Conatilmion of lnrlia, Art. 14.
In February, 1961, the petitioners purchucd over si:r
acres of land situate in the State of Punjab for a 1um of
Its. 4,50,000 and claim to have done so for the purpo.sc of
establishing a paper mill. The sixth respondent, private
limited company, which had a licence from the Govcrn~ent
of India for 1tarting a factory for the manufacture of vanoua
'
2 s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
.775
ranges of refrigeration compressors and ancillary equipment,
requeoted the State of Punjab for the allotment of an ·appro·
priate site for the location of the fattory,
Tn the official
Gazette of August 25, 1961, was published a notification of the
.Governor of Punjab dated August 18, 1961, unders~ 4ofthe
Land Acquisition Act, 1894, to the effect that the land belong·
ing to the P'titioners was likely to be needed by the Government at public expeoses for a public purpose, namely, for
setting up a factory for manufacturing various ranges of
refrigeration
compressors and ancillary equipment.
The
Govrrnment directed that action under s. 17 of tho Act shall
be taken because there was uriency and that the provisions of
s. 5A shall not apply to the acquisition. In the same Gazette
another notification under s. 6 of the Act dated August 19,
1961, was published to the effect that the Governor of Punjab
was satisfied that the land was.required by the Government at
public expense for the said purpose. The notification provide
for the immediate taking of possession of the land under
the provisions of s. 17 (2) (c} of the Act. On September 29,
1961, the Government of Punjab sanctioned an expense of
Rs. 100 for the purpose of acquisition of the land. The peti·
tioners filed an application under Art. 32 of the Constitution
of India challenging the legality of the action taken by the
Government on the grounds, inter alia, (I} that the acquisition
was nqt for a public purpose either under s. 4 ors. 6 of the
Land Acquisition Act; (2) that the land was in reality being
acquired for the benefit of t]le sixth respondent and that the
action of the Government amounted to discrimination against
the petitioners and violated. Art. 14 of the Contitution of
India; (3} that the alleged contribution of Rs. I QO made by
the Government was a colourable exercise of pnwer inasmuch
as the amount was so unsubstantial sum compared to the value
of the property that it could not raise an inference of Govern.
ment participation in the proposed activity; and (4) that foe
notifications under ss. 4 and 6 could riot have been made
simultaneously and were, therefore, without efficacy.
Helil. (per Sinha, C. ]., Rajagopala Ayyangar, Mudhol·
kar and V~nkatarama· Ai

## Text

_Characters 0–39,929 of 112,227. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39929 for what follows._

774
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963]
1962
ta.ken by the Madras High Court and we see no
w,,1 Ramnu
reason to diffor from it. Therefore the challenge
EZ..uio DU1ritu1;.n
!'<> the validity of the Act on the g~ound that its
(',.Lid.
IDlporta.nt provisions contained in section 5 offend
.sw. .j·Mab"'
against Art. 31 (2) must be rejected. That being
-
. our view, we must held that the High Court was
f1oj•n4ro~alk•J. right in rejeoting both the writ petitions filed by
the l!'Ppellant. Op that view, it is unnecessary to
oons1der whether appellant would have been entitled
to get the relief of poBBession or mesue profits whioh
it purported to claim by its two petitions.
Jl4y 2.
The appeals accordingly fail and are di.amilllled
with costs.
One set of hearing fees.
Appeals di.smisst,tl.
SMT. SOMAVANTI A~D OTHERS
v.
THE STATE OF PUNJAB AND OTHERS
(And Conneote.d Petitions)
lB. P. SINHA, c. J., K. SuBBA. R.t.o, N. RA.J.t.GOP.ALA.
AYYA.NGA..R, J. R. MuoBOLXA.B and
T. L. VKN.K.A.TA..RA.JU. .AIYA.B, JJ .)
Land Acqu;.ifiqn....-Puhlic purpo .. --Qovemmt>&I tltdaration
l .
aa lo public purpo-1/ juaU<:iable-"ComlmitJO ellid•-"
"Concluafoe proof", Meaning of-Compen11alio..-~,,,.,.1'•
cofllribution of w•t-1/ •hould be aublllanlial-l..dia11 Et1i<UllU
Acl 1872 (I of 1872), u. J, 4-Land Acquiaition Act, 1894
(I~! 1894), ••· 4, 6A, 6-Conatilmion of lnrlia, Art. 14.
In February, 1961, the petitioners purchucd over si:r
acres of land situate in the State of Punjab for a 1um of
Its. 4,50,000 and claim to have done so for the purpo.sc of
establishing a paper mill. The sixth respondent, private
limited company, which had a licence from the Govcrn~ent
of India for 1tarting a factory for the manufacture of vanoua
'
2 s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
.775
ranges of refrigeration compressors and ancillary equipment,
requeoted the State of Punjab for the allotment of an ·appro·
priate site for the location of the fattory,
Tn the official
Gazette of August 25, 1961, was published a notification of the
.Governor of Punjab dated August 18, 1961, unders~ 4ofthe
Land Acquisition Act, 1894, to the effect that the land belong·
ing to the P'titioners was likely to be needed by the Government at public expeoses for a public purpose, namely, for
setting up a factory for manufacturing various ranges of
refrigeration
compressors and ancillary equipment.
The
Govrrnment directed that action under s. 17 of tho Act shall
be taken because there was uriency and that the provisions of
s. 5A shall not apply to the acquisition. In the same Gazette
another notification under s. 6 of the Act dated August 19,
1961, was published to the effect that the Governor of Punjab
was satisfied that the land was.required by the Government at
public expense for the said purpose. The notification provide
for the immediate taking of possession of the land under
the provisions of s. 17 (2) (c} of the Act. On September 29,
1961, the Government of Punjab sanctioned an expense of
Rs. 100 for the purpose of acquisition of the land. The peti·
tioners filed an application under Art. 32 of the Constitution
of India challenging the legality of the action taken by the
Government on the grounds, inter alia, (I} that the acquisition
was nqt for a public purpose either under s. 4 ors. 6 of the
Land Acquisition Act; (2) that the land was in reality being
acquired for the benefit of t]le sixth respondent and that the
action of the Government amounted to discrimination against
the petitioners and violated. Art. 14 of the Contitution of
India; (3} that the alleged contribution of Rs. I QO made by
the Government was a colourable exercise of pnwer inasmuch
as the amount was so unsubstantial sum compared to the value
of the property that it could not raise an inference of Govern.
ment participation in the proposed activity; and (4) that foe
notifications under ss. 4 and 6 could riot have been made
simultaneously and were, therefore, without efficacy.
Helil. (per Sinha, C. ]., Rajagopala Ayyangar, Mudhol·
kar and V~nkatarama· Aiyar, JJ.), (l} that the declaration
made by the Government in the notification under s. 6 (I) of
the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, that the land was required
for a public purpose, was made conclusive by sub-s. 3 of s. 6
and that it was not open to a court to go behind it and try to
satisfy itself whether in fact the acquisition was for a public
purpose.
Whether in a particular case the purpose for which
land was needed was a public purpose or not was for the
1962
So11UW.inti
v.
81a1e tJj Punj,6
SomaDCMfi
..
St.te •f Pm/ab
776
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963)
Government to be satisfied about and the declaration of the
Government would be final subject to one exception, n{mely
that whi;re there was a colourable exercise of the power the
decl~raUon would be open to challenge at the instance of the
aggneved party.
Hamabai Framju Petit v. Secrela•y of Stale for India
(1914) L. R. 42 I. A. 44- and R. L. Arora v. Tha Stat.. of Utta~
Pra4t•h, (1962) Supp. 2 S. C.R. 149 distinguished.
VtdlaJ)tllla Suryanarayana v. The Provi..u of Ma<lrM
I. L. R. (19%) Mad. 153, approved.
'
(2) that there was no difference between the effect of
the expression "conclusive evidence" ins. 6 (3) of the Act
from that of "conclusive proof", the aim of both being to
give finality to the establishment of the existence of a fact fro n
the proof of another.
(3) that the conclusiveness in s. 6 (3) must neces•arily
attached not merely to a '
1nted" but also to the question
whether the purpose was a public purpose. There could be
no "need" in the a 'Jstract.
(l) that the provisions of .the Act which provided that
the declaration made by the State that a particular land was
needed for a public purpose, shall be conclusive evidence of
the fact that it was needed, did not infring the Constitution.
St<Ui nf Bihar v. Maharajacfhiraja Sir Kam .. hwar Singh of
Darbhanga d: Ors.,
[19~2) S. C.--R.. 889, Babu Barltya Thakur
v. Stal< of Bombay & Or.•.. [ 196 IJ I S. C. R. 128, and State of
Bombay v. Bhanji Munji & Anr., (1955] I S. C.R. 777, relied
on.
(5) that it was for the State to say whicn particular
industry might be regarded as beneficial to the public and to
decide that its establishment would serve a public purpose;
therefore, no question of discrimination would arise merely
from the fact that the Government had declared that the
establishment of a particular industry was a public purpose.
Accordingly, the notifications in qucation, did not contravene
.l\rt. 14 of the Constitution.
(6) that as •. 5A was out of the- way the publication in
the same issue of th<· Gazette of the both the notifications
that is the one dated August 18, 1961, and that dated August
19, 1961, was not irregular.
Held, further (Subba Rao, J, di88enfing), that the not~
fication daterl Acgust 19, 1961, under s. 6 of the Land Aco"'t·
sition Act, 1694, was not invalid on the ground that th'
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
777
amount contributed by the State towards the cost of the
acquisition was only nominal compared to the value of the
land.
The expression "party out of public revenues". in the
proviso to . s. 6 (I) of the Act did not necessarily mean
that State's contribution must be substantial; but whether a
token contribution by the State towards the cost of acquisition
would be sufficient compliance with the law would depend
upon the facts of each case and it was open to ' the court in
every case which came before it to ascertain whether the :.ction
of the State was a colourable exercise of power.
'-,;·
Sa11(ja Naicken v. Secretary of State, (1926) I. L. R. 50
Mad. 308 and Vadlapatla Suryanaryana v. The Province of
Jladraa, I. L. R. [1946] Mad. 153, approved.
Ponnaia v. Secretary of State, A. I. R. 1926 Mad. 1099,
disapproved.
Chatterton v. Oave,
( 1878) 3 App. Cas. 483 and
Maharajah &uch,,...war Singh v. Chairman of the Durbhanga
Municipality, ( 1890) L. R. 17 I. A. 90 held inapplicable.
Per Subba Rao, J.-in interp~ting the proviso to s. 6 (l)
of the Act a reasonable meaning" should be given to the
expression "wholly or partly." The payment of a part of a
compensation must have some rational relation
to the
compensation payable in respect of the acquisition for a public
purpose. So construed "part can only mean substantial part
of the estimated compensation.
What was substantial part
of a compensation depended upon the facts of each case. In
the instant case, it was impo'8ible to say that a sum of
Rs. I 00 out of an estimated compensation which might go
, even beyond Rs. 4,00,000 was in any sense of the term a
substantial part of the said compensation. The Government
had clearly broken the condition and, therefore, it had no
jurisdiction to issue the declaration under s. 6 of the Act.
'
.
ORIGINAL JurosDIOTION: Petitions Nos. 246 to
248of196L
Petitions under Art. 32 of the Constitution of
India for the enforcement of Fundamental , Rights.
G. 8. Pathak, Rameahwar Nath, 8. 0. Andley
-O)
and P. L. Vokra, for the petitioners (in petition No.
246 of 1961).
1962
S•marxinti
••
Stoto of Punjab
1911
Somiu.,nti
Y.
St.II•[ PwajU
JlwlAJlor J.
778
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963]
Rameshwar Nath, S.N. Andky andP. L. Vohra
for the petitioners (in petitions Nos. 24 7 and 248
of 1961).
S. M. Sikri, Advocate-General for the SI.ale of
Punjab, N. S. Bindra and P. D. Menon, for respondent No. 1 (in all the petitions).
8. P. Varma, for respondent No. 6 (in a.II the
petitions).
H. N. Sanyal, Atlclitional Solicitor-General of
India, R. B. Dhehar and P. D. Menon, for the State
of Gujarat !Intervener) (in a.II ihe petitions).
1962. May 2. The following judgments were
d .. livered. The judgment of Sinha, C. J., Rajagopala
Ayyangar, Mudholkar and Venka.tarama Aiya.r, J J.,
waR delivered by Mudholker, J.
MunHOLKAR. J.-Tbe petitioners who have
acquired over six acres of land by purchase for
Rs. 4,50,00'l in February. 1961, under
five sale
deedq and one lease deed claim to ha.ve done so
for the purpose of establislling a pa.per mill in
collaboration with Messrs. R. S. Ma.dhoram and
Sons who had been granted a licenoe for the establishment of a pa.per plant in Gha.zia.had in Uttar
Pra.deAh.
The aforesaid land is situate in the village Meola. Ma.harajpur, Tehsil Balla.bhgarh, District
Gnrga.on, and a.buts on the Mathura. Road, and is
only about IO or 12 miles from Now DPlhi.
Respon<lent No. 6, Air Conditioning Corporation
(P) Ltd., is a private limited concern and holds a
licence from the Government of India. for starting
a. fa.otor.v for the manufacture of various ranges of
refrigeration compressors and ancillary equipment.
We may mention here that initially this project
was allotted to the State of West Bengal but at
the raquest of St1.te of Punjab its location was
shifted to the State of Punjab.
•
2 S.C.R.
SOPR'F.Ml!l.COUR'r REPORTS
7tr9
Respondent No. 6 requested the State of
Punjab for the allotment of an appropriate site
for the location oi"' the factory. The petitioners
contend that respondent No. 6 being interested in
acquiring land in the village Meola . Maharajpilr
approached the State of Punjab in •or about the
month of March, 1961, for the purpose of acquiring
land for their factory under the Land Acquisitfon
Act, 1'894 (hereinafter referred to as the Act)., One
of the petitioners having learnt of this made an
applieation on March 23, 1961, to the Deputy
Commissioner, Gttrgaon, 'requesting him that ·none
of the lands purchased by the petitioners should
be acquired for the benefit · of respondent No. 6.
(l);vriers of adjacent lands Mr.
Om Prakash,
'Mr Ram Raghbir, Mr. Atma.ram Chaddha and
Mr. Bari Kishen who are petitioners in W .. P. 247
'and 24!! of 1961 which were heard 11.long with this
petition Iilitde similar requests. The petitioners
allege
th~t they 'were . af!Suforl by the Deputy
ConiniiSsioner that their 18.iids 'would not, be· acquired for the benefit ofrestiondent No. 6. Thereafter
retrponden't No, 6 pni'llhased by private treaty a
plot of %'tid measuririg · ii.pproxitnately 70,000 sq.
yards cont'lgaous to the land owned 'by the petitioners on ~r about April.21, 1961.
The petitioners' grievance is that notwithstanding 'the a.llSurances giVeil to them by the Deputy
Commissioner, Gtirgaon, . the. Governor of Punjab,
by not1fication dated. August 25, 1!161, under s. 4
oftlie Act declared tl,at the lands .of the petition,
era in this petition as well as those of the petitioners
in the other two writ petitioils were likely to be
ne11ded by Government at public · expense for a
public ,purpose, namely,. for retting up a factory
for manufacturing V&;J,"ious ra~es of refrig~ration
oompressors ·amd ancillary eqmpment. ·It ,accordingly notified that the land in the localit;y-desoribed
Smiiaooriti
••
SW• of Nir'1Jb
IHI
,y..,..,,,,i
••
si.u./Ponj<I>
M"'Mltn !.
780
SUPREME COURT REPORTS·[I963]
in the notifioation W&B required for the aforesaid
purp06e. Similarly it authorised the Sub.Divisional
Officer and Land Acquisition Officer, Palwal, to
enter upon and survey the land io the locality
and to do all other aots required or permitted by
s. 4 of the Act.
It further directed that action
under s. 1 7 of the Act shall be taken because there
was urgency and also directed that the provisions
of s. 5A shall not apply to the acquisition. On
August 19, the Governor of Punjab made a notifieation under s. 6 of the Act to the effect that he
was satisfied that the land specified in the notification was required Ly Government at public expense for public purpose, namely, for setting up a
factery for the manufacture of refrigeration comprt>esors and other ancillary equipment and declared
that the aforesaid land was required for the aforesaid purposes.
Thi~ declaration was made "to all
whom it may concern" and the Sub-Divisional
Officer, Palwal, was directed to take all steps for
the acquisition of this land. Finally the notification
provided for the immediate taking of possession of
the land under the provisions of .s.
17 (2) (c) of
the Act.
Both these notifications were published in
the Punjab Government Gazette of August 25, 1961.
The petitioners contend that these notifications and the land acquisition proceedings permitted to be taken under them violate their fundamental rights under Art. 19 (1) (f) and (~)to po88e88
the said land and carry on th1>ir ocoupat-ion, trade
or
business and that,
therefore, they must
be qua.shed.
It is their contention that they have purchased.this land bona /irle for industrial purposes as
land in t.he vicinity of this land is being acquired
by industrialists for establishing various indastries.
The purpose is said to be the establishment of a
paper manufaeturiDg plant.
Acoo~ to them
~.
\
/•
. ' '
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS
781
they have entered into an arrangement with
Messrs. R. S. Madho Ram & Sons who· hold industrial licence No.
L/2! ( l)/N-60/62. The proposed
industry, according to them, would employ about
200 people. The industry they wish to start is a
new one s·1 far as they are concerned, whereas
according to them, the respondent No. 6 is
already engaged in refrigeration industry and as far
as they know, it has established a factory for manufacturing refrigeration equipment at Hyderabad in·
the State of Andhra Prade~h.
·It may· be mentioned that some time after
the. notification was published, that is, on September 29, 1961, the Government of Punjab sanctioned
the expense of Rs. 100 for the purpose of acquisi·
.tion of this land. According to the petitioners
this was an after·thou1?ht and besides, a token oenti-ibution of this kind is not sufficient to show
that the acquisition is being made ·partlY at public
expense.
·
The petition was opposed not only by respondent No. 6 but also by the State of Punjab which
is respondent No. 1 to the petition. The respondent
No. 1 denied that the petitioners had purchased the
land for a bona fide industrial purpose and would
in. fact ·use it for such purpose. It also denied that
any assurance was give to the petitioners that their
lands would not be acquired. It admitted that .
the respondebt No. 6 had. made an application in
December, 196tl for acquiring land for setting up its
factory and that, therefore, the Punjab Government agreed to do tbe needful. According to respondent No. 1 the acquisition proceedings have been
undertaken fo.r a public purpose and at public
expense as stated in the notification and that the
State Governm.ent would make part contribution
towards the payment of compensation of ~he land
out of publio revenues. In the cirowut-anoee it if!
1958
'9'1m1•nli
v.
S- oJ l"u•J•b
· Jlulieoll:ar J.
1951
s-
••
8•,t• of P-jab
782
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1963]
contended that the petitionerB would not be entitled
to any relief whatsoever.
fhey would of course
get compensation for the land as determined by the
Land Acquisition Officer.
M...rAolloar J.
The action of the State Government is said to
be legal and in accordance with the provisions of
the law because what was done was permissible
under ss.4 and 6 of the Act, that it was done bona
fide, that part of the compensation would be paid
out of the public revenues, that the declaration
made by the Government is conclusive evidence
under sub-s.(3) of s.6, that the land is needed for
a public purpose. that the notifications were made
on different dates though thev were published in
the same issue of the Gazette and are perfectly valid,
that the land is not being acquired for a company
but for a public purpose, that, therefore, the provieions
of Part VII of the Act arl' inapplicable and that the
lands are lying vacant and their owners will be paid
ccmoensation. No questio11 of depriving them of
their fundamental rights under Art. 19( I )(f) and
(11:) or <;>f violation of their right under Art. 14 therefore arises.
According to respondent No. I it would be
open to the petitioners to make their claim for
compensation to the L1md Acquisition Officer for
such IOHs as the acquisition would en tail on them.
It also stated that as the land purchased by the
respondent No. o through private negotiation has
no access to the main road and as the land is
inadequate to meet the minimum essential 1"1!qulr&-
ments the acquisition of the lands in question became necessary.
On behalf of the respondent No. 6 it is stated
that the need for a facto1y like the one in its contemplation is acutely felt in India inasmuch a.
manufacture of compressors and the C01I1pones
nts of"big and small air-oonditionen, refriger!Mors,
,,
f·
2 S.C.R.
SUPB.EME COURT REPORTS
783
water coolers and cold storage cabinets is not being
"'(
carried out anywhere in the country so far. The
import of these goods naturally drains away a considerable amount of foreign exchange. It wa3,
therefore, felt that by starting manufacture of these
articles in our country not only will foreil!D exchange
be saved, but some foreign exchange will eventually
be earned by the export .of manufactured goods.
They further contend that the purpose for which
the faotory is being set up must be regarded as a
'y public purpose because inter alia it is intended by
manufacturing the aforesaid goods, to cater to the
needs of the public at large. It is in view of these
circumstances · that the Government of India,
accepting the recommendation made in. this regard
by the licensing committee under the Indmitries
Development and Regulation Act, 1951, issued a
licence in its favour on April 8, 1951. It then
pointed out that it has secured the collaboration in
this project of a . well-known Amerioan Company
named Borg•Warner International Corporation of
~· Chicago, which is the biggest manufacturers of air
conditioning plants and equipment in the wor~d,
and that the collaboration agreement has been
approved by the Government of India in the Minis·
try of Commerce. Its grievance is that .this agreement has not been implemented so far because ·it
· has not been able to get the land for constructing
the building in which the necessary machinery and
'implements' could be installed. Finally it says
Y:r that originally the licence was issued for setting up
a faotory in the State of West Bengal and that it
was at the instance of the Government of Punjab
that the Central Government permitted the looation
of the factory tQ be shifted from .West Bengal to
Ponjab; According to it· once the factory gets going it is likely to employ at least liOOO workem,
':~
It is not necessary to refer to the other affidavits and the rejoinder affidavits except to some
1961
Somattanti
'·
Btat. .J Punjab
Mudholk" J.
'S0111Gva11ti
v.
Strite of J>wVab
Mudll<l"'1r J.
78'
8UPREME OO'URT REPORTS (1003)
portions of the additional a.ffida.vit filed by Mr. M.R.
Bhagat, Under Soo .. tita.ry on bcha.lf of the respond-
'·
ent No. I. We a.re referring only to those portions
whioh were relied on durin~ the
argu~1ents before
us. In tha.t a.ffidavit it is denied tha.t a.ny licence
had been gra.nted to Messrs. R. S. Madho Ram &
Sons for the csta.blishment of a. pa.per plant in the
Punj~b. According to respondent No. I McB8rs.
R. S. Madho Ram &,Sons were gra.nted a. lioenee on
August .17, 1960, for the establishment of an industria.l undertaking in Ghazia.bad (U.P.) for the ma.nu-
•
facture of writing and printing pa.per and pulp. It
further stated that even this licence has been ca.ncelled by the Government of India by their letter
dated Ja.nua.ry 31, 1962. Sinoe the said licensee did
not take any etftictiva steps• to establish the same.
It then stated that the Air Conditioning Corporation whioh wa.s incorporated
&B a. private limited
company h&B since, with the permiBllion of the
Gentral Government, been converted into a. pnblio
limited company with the name and style of "York
,
India. Ltd.", a.nd that the oompa.ny ha.e been gra.nted
•
a licence to ma.nufa.oture refrigeration equipment
by the Industrial Licensing Committee. There is
-
an agreement between York India Ltd., and Me1111re.
York Corporation, U.S.A. a. subsidiary of BorgWarner of the U.S.A. whereunder the la.tter have
undertaken to give au technical &BBistanoe and
technical training to the Indian personnel a.e also to
contribute 500/o of the initial investment in the ·~
undertaking. The respondent No. 6 expects to
'-
manufacture 70% of the equipment in the very first
year and cent. per oent. by the end of 1966. It
further stated that the foreign collaborators also
have a.greed to sell the products of the iirm outai.de
India. at price11 and on terms and oondition11 mOllt
favourable to the.Indian iirm, thereby enabling it
...
to obtain aoceBB to the foreign market. The foreign
1 ·
collaborator would make available to the Indian
2 s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT R:E'PORTS
785
personnel the technical 'know-how' and other in·
formati:m necessary for the manufacture of refrigeration materials and that such assistance will itself
be very valuable. It dl3aied that the respondent
No. 6 has established a factory similar to the one
now intended to be establi~hed in Hyderabad as
alleged by the petitionera. It is admitted that
licences have been granted to two other concerns in
India for the manufacture of similar equipment.
Neither of &hose licensees has actually started production, at any rate, so far, and, therefore, it is not
correct to say that similar equipment is already
being manufactured in India. Then it stated "the
products that are to be manufactured. by the
respondent
till
now
were
being
imported
into India from
foreign
countries and goods
worth about Rs. 3,8:~, 70,000 in 1960 and for the
first ten months. in 1961 Rs. 3,55,50,000 were imported by the various licensees holding import licences." It also stated that the respondent No. 6 was
granted "licence to establish a factory in West
Bengal but since no one had been gMnted a licence
to establish a factory of this kind in the Punjab its
licence was tran,sferred . to Punjab. The proposed
factory would employ a large number of persons
and thus help to solye to some extent the exisiting
'problem of unemployment in Punjab. Finally it
stated that the establishment of the factory as such
is in furtherance of the industrial development of
the Punjab State and is, therefore, for a public
purpose.
On behalf of the petitioners Mr. Pathak has
raised the following five· contentions :
( 1) The acquisition is not for a public
purpose either within s.4 or s.6 of the Land
Acquisition Act or for a purpose useful to the
public as contemplated in s.41 and that the
. action of the Government amounted to
1962 -
Samav.n•i
v.
State of Purl}•&
M wiADlkar J.
1~1
--
786
SUPREME CJOURT REPORTS [1963)
acquiring property from one peil!on and giving
it to another.
(2) The alleged contribution of Rs. 100
made by the Government is a colourable
exercise of power, that no such intention was
mentiontld prior to the noti.ficll.tion and that
the amount of Ra. 100 is so unsubstantial a.
sum compared to the va.loe of the propflrty
that it cannot raise an inference of Government participation in the propOl:led activity.
(3) 1hat the property is in fact being
acquired for a company and, therefore, the
provisions of Part VII of the Act should hav.e
been complied with. Non-complia.noe with
those provisions vitiates the acquisition.
(4) The petitioners' proposed paper mill
would be as good an industrial concern. as
the one intended to be established by re1pondent No. 6 and the Government, in prefer·
ring the jatter to the former, has viola.toil
the guarantee of equal protection of. law
provided by Art. 14 of the Constitution.
( 5) That the notification under 88. 4 and
6 could not have been made simultaneously
and are, therefore, without effioa.cy.
We may deal with the third point raised by
Mr. Pathak first, that iR, regarding · non-<'ompliance
of provisions of Part VIL
It is common ground
·~.
that those proviaiona were not complied with. The
reason for that ie, th~t according to tho respondents
the acquisition is not for a company but for a
public purpose, partly at public expense. Indeed,
the respondents at no stage have relied on the
provisions
of Part
VII
of
the
Act
and
therefor.,, the main question to be coQsidered
is whether the acquisition is for a public purpose
..
•
}
I ,.
i
'
~ .
~
I
I
' .··
2 S.C.R
'SUPREME COURT REPORTS
:7g7
•
·pa:rtly. 'a:t •public · expense ur not. If it is ·so,
'then, .·of ·course, ·the petitions ··must succeed.
Therefore, it is ·the, ·first two contentions· raised by
Jnr. 'Pathak which ·primarily ·need ·our considera·
ttion.
. .
·
.
,
.According to learned .counsel , for .the peti·
:tioners. the .statements made in the •.affidavits on
.behalf of .the State .as .well .as .on 'behalf of the
;respondent No, 6.makeiit petfectly clear that the
_land is .being .acquired for the .respondents .No.•6 •
. Reliance ;is placed particularly upon ·.that JJOrtion
.of the .affidavit of•the State where it .is stated that
the land Js acquired far •en.abling the .. respondent
No. 6.to.have·.access to the .main .road.and :for
m&eting their =inimum requirements .far ·establish-
.ing .their .factory. It .is .further .stated. that .the
, .co~pensation for.all the .land which.is .being.acquir- ·
ed.is .to come.out of.the .pockets .not .of ,the State
Government but the. responJent;· .No.·6 ;itself. No
•doubt, the ·Government.has said that it ·has sanctioned the 1payment -of Rs. 100 .towards the •P3iY·
.ment of .compensation.but that.is only an insignifi-
.cant fraction of the .total.amount of.con:ipensation
.that would be payable in respect .{if.these lands,
the,petitioners 'themselves:having paid Rs. 4,5U,OOO
.to.the persons .from whom . they acquired these ·
lands.
·on behalf df the , respondents the 'learned
·Aavocate:General for Pu'rijab ·contended. that 'the
declaration of 'the' Government in the notification
'that the 'Jana is requirer! "Jor a ,pulilic .Pm:pos.e 'is
'Inade conclusive by sub's. 3 of a. '6 of the Act and, .
· therefore, it'is not open·to ·t!iis Court to go 'behind
'it and try ·to satisfy itself ·whether · in, fact .the
acquisition :is for a: pdbliC'purpose.or· not. '.Alternatively 'he contended 'that the :land 'is be~g
acquired '.for a ]>Ulilio ·pu~pose 'because the object
ct.the acquisition is to esta!JliSh a.new indust~y
·S9111a1'anti
.•.
~Stare'of Punja~
1151
s""""""""
••
S ate of PuflJob
788
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS [1963]
and do aw.~y with imports of refrigeration equipment and to tinable technical education to be imparted to Ind fan personne 1 in a new field.
He further
said that the acquisition will not only save foreign
exchange
by lessening imports but will enable
foreign exchange to be earned from the export of
goods manufactured in the proposed factory.
The
new industry is said to be of great economic
importance inasmuch as it will enable the preservation of food which will otherwise be destroyed.
Refrigeration 1>q11ipment also contributes towards
the maintenance of health beca.11se
it enables
storage of medicines such as a.nti·biotics which a.re
liable to be decomposed a.t norma.1 temperatures
prevailing in our country. The industry proposed
to be started will open a new avenue of employment and diminish unemployment and generally
advance the industrial development of the country.
Finally he said that a pa~t of the land is required
for building houses and <iUarters .for the workers
of the factory and to give amenities to them. All
these purposes a.re, therefore, said to be publio
purposes. Reliance was plaood by him on Vol. 19
of Encyclopaedia Britannica,
pp. 49 to 57 for
showing the manifold applications of refrigeration
in various indu"tries and activities.
Reft1rence
was also ma.de to Vol. 18 of Encyclopaedia. Britannica, p. 745 wherein facilities for providing refrigeration ha.ve been grouped under the heading
•publio utility'. Reference wa.s also ma.de to be
next pa.ge where it is stated "Every public utility
must be in poeaellBion of natural resources upon
whioh that industry is based.
Their sites must
have strategic locations.
Limitation in the ohoice
of this agent of production tends to ma.ke the cost
of acquiring or leasing these fa.oilities greater than
it would be if the indUBtry had a wider range of
ohoioo.
Furthermore, utilities must make allowances in advance for probable increase in the required
oapaoit;y.
For the&e reaso1111 utilities are provided
••
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'
2 S.C.R.
Stn>REME COURT :l!.EPO:l!.Ts
789
with the governmental power of eminent 4omain
which · makes possible the compulsory sale of
private' proporty." Relying upon the affidavit of
Mr. Bhagat, to which we have referred earlier, the
learned Advocate-Genoral of Punjab ·said t.hat the
object of the Government in acquiring these lands
is to enable a new industry ·to be· established not
only for saving foreign exchange and earning foreign
excha.ngd but al8J for s0curing the industrial advancement of the cmlntry, en&bling the citizens to
obtain tecbnic'.1.I ·~duc~tion in a new field, relieving to some extent' the pressure of unemployment
and so on.
For a.II the,;e reaqo11s he contends that
the acquisition m11st Im deemed to be for a public
purpose eve_n though the bulk of the compensation
for the aoquisi~ion will come from the· pockets of
respondent No. 6.
In our opinion the question whether any of the
aforesaid purposes falls
within the expression
public purpose woulrl ariAe for consideration only
if the declaration of the Government is not conolusive or if the action of the Government is colourable. If, as contended by the learned Advocate
General, sub-s. 3 of s, 6 concludes the matter-and
the validity of this provision is not challengedand the aotion of the Government is not co!ourable
the other question would not arise for oonsidera.tion.
It is strenuously contended on behalf of the
petitioners that sub-s, 3 of s, 6 does not debar
this Court from considering whether a. purposed
acquisition is for a public purpose or not. It is
said, in the first plaoe, that this provision only
ma.kes the declaration "conclusive evidence'' and
not· "oonulusive proof" and then con'tended tha.t
the declaration is conclusive evidence only of a
need and nothing more.
A distinction is sou~ht to be ma.de b11tween
''oonolusive proof" a.nd ''oonolusive evidence" a.nd
Somavanti
••
St<t .. f Pun.ia/J
M udhol-or J,
. .
I
I
'Somt..aanti
v.
State-uf Punjab
--·
Muihollcar J. \
------
790
SOPREUIECOURT REPORTS '.(l!J63]
it is·contended that where a law ·declares that a
fact shall be conclusive proof of another, the Court
is _precluded from considering other evidence once
such fact is established. Therefore, where the law
- makes ·a fact conclusive proof of another ·the fact
stands proved and 'the Court must ·proceed on that
basis. But, _ the argument proceeds, where the
law does· not -go ·that 'far and makes ·a fact only
••conclusive evidence" · as to the existence of
another 'fact, other evidence ·as to be existence of -
the other 'fact is not shut out.
In support of the
argument· reliance is placed on·s. 4 of the Indian
Evidence Act which in its·third paragraph defines
'conclusive proof' as follows :
"When one fact is declared _.by this Act
to be conclusive proof of another, ·the Court
shall, on proof of the one fact, rl'lgard the
other as proved, and.shall ·not allow evidence
to'be given for the purpose of disproving'it".
This-paragraph thus provides that further evidence
is barred ·where, under the Indian Evidence Act,
one fact.is1regarded as proof •.of .another. But it
says nothing about what other laws may provide.
There.are a number of «laws which •m&ke certain
facts · conclusive •evidence of other ;facts: (see
Companies Act, 1956, s. 132 ; the Indian Snccession Act, 1925, s. 38 l ; Christian Marriages Act,
1872, s; 61 ;
JUadras · 'Revenue Act, .1869, s. 38 ;
Oaths Act, 1873,
s. ll ).
~The question is
whether s:ich provision also bars other evidence
after that which is conclusive evidence is produced.
The object of .adducing evidence is to
prove a . fact.
The
Indian . Evidence Act, --
• deals with the.question.as to what kind of evidence
is permissible to l?e ·adduced for ,that 1purpose .and
· states .in. s. 3 .when a fact is said to ba proved.
'.That section- reads thus :
'
•
I
I
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. ,.
'
2 S.C,R; ·
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS
791
•Evidence' means and includes-
(1) all statements which the court permits or requires to be made befare it
by witnesses, in relation to matters
of fact under inquiry ; such statements are called oral evidPnce ;
(2) all documents produced for the
inspection of the court ; euch documents are called documentary evidence.
A fact is said to be proved when,
after considning the matters before
it, the Court either believes it to exist,
or considers its existence so probable
that a prudent man ought, under the
circumstances of the particu Jar case,
to act upon the supposition that it
exists."
Since evidence means anti includes all statement
which the court permits or requires to be made,
when t1:te law says that a particular kind of evidence
would be conclusive as to the existence of a particular fact it implies that that fact can be proved
either or by evidence or by some other evidence
which the Court permits or requires to be advanced.
Where such other evidence is adduced it
woulrl be open to the Court to consider whether,
upon that evidence, the fact exist . or not. Where
on the other hand, evidence which is made conclusive is adduced, the Court has no option but to hold
that the fact exists. If that were not so, it would be
meaningless to call a particular piece of evidence as
conclusi'f'e evidence. Once the law says that certain
evidence is conclusive it shuts out any other evidence which would detract from the conclusiveness
of that e'f'idence. In substance, therefore, there is
no difference between conclusive evidence . and
196t
Som.:i1Janti
••
Sta" of Punjab
Mudholkar J.
SomatJara#
v,
Sta.I• of Punjab
792
SUPRmnJ COU~T)~·Ji)I'.O:i;tTS [1963]
"
conclusive proof. Statutes may use the e:z;pression
'conclusive proof' where ··the obje9t is to make
a fact non-justiciable. But the le'gislature may use
some other expreBBion such as 'conclusive evidence'
for achieving the same resulk
Th'ere is thus no
difference btitween tho :effect of the expr11ssion
'oonclusiv;e e.vidonce' from that of 'conclusive proof',
thA aim of both being tp give jiuality to ~he establishment of the existen'c<i 'of a. fact from the proof
of another.
1
•
i.
Learned counsel cont.ends that it is open to
tho Court to examine whether the action of th!l
executive, even in the absenoo·nf 1tn allegation that
it is malafide, is related to the section or not and for
th.is purpose to consider whethnr 'the' acquisition is
for rt public purpose. In support of·this contention
he has relied upon the decision in State of Bihar v.
Mahriraja<fhiraja Sir KarneswaKBi1Jgh of Darbhanga(').
There, Mahajan, J. (as h!J
then . was,).
has~
expressed the view that the exorcise of power
to acquire compulsorily iR cnnditional on
the
existence of public purpose and
that. being so
this
condition
is
not an express provision
of Art. 31 (2) but exists aliund in the content
of the power itself.
That,
however,
was not
the view of the other learned Judges who consitituted the Bench. Thus according to Mukherjea,
J., (As he then was), the condition of the exisLence
of a public purpose is implied in Art. :11(2).
(See
pp. 957, 958.). Das. J.· (aR he then was), was also of
the same view.
(See pp. 986 .988).
Similarly
Patanjali Sastri, C.J., has also taken the view that
the existence of public purpose iR an express condition of cl. 2 of Art. 3L
The Constitution permits acquisition by the
State of private property only if it is required for
a public purpose. But can ii; therefore, be said
..
'
( ll c 19S11) s.c.a..• ,113~.
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
793
that tne provisions of a statute must be so construed that the declaration by the Govermn@nt as to
the existence of public purpose is necessarily justiciable ? We are not concerned here with a post
Constitution law but with a pre-Constitution law.
The Act has been in operation since 1894. The
validity of the law was challenged before this Court
in Babu Barkya Thakur v. The State of Bomhay (1)
on the ground that it infringes the provisions
of Arts. 31(2) and 19(l)(f) of the Constitution.
But this C"urt held that the law being a pre-Constitution law is prot3cted· from the operation of
·Art. 31(2) by the provisions of Art. 3l(f))(a}. It
also held, following the decision in the St.ate of
Bomhay v. BIUJnji Munji (') ·and that in Lilavati
Bai v. The St,ate of Bomhay (') that the attack
under Art. 19(l)(f) of the Constitution is futile.
The argument, however, is that the protection
which the Act enjoys is only to this extent that
even though any of its provisions be in conflict
with Art.3 L p) the Act cannot be nballenged on that
ground ; the protection does not however extend to
other provisions of Part III of the Constitution,
such as Art. 19( l)(f). As we understand the decision in Bhanji Munji's case(') what this Court has
held is that for a right under Art. 19(1 l (f) to hold
property to be available to a person, he must have
the· property with respect to which he can assert
such right.
If the right to the possession of
the property is taken away by law protected
by Art. 31 (5) (a), Art. 19 (I) (f) is not attracted. That is the decision of this Court and
it has been followed in two other cases.
All
the decisions a.re binding upon us. It is contended that none of the decisions has considered the
argument advanced before us that a law may be
(ll (1%1) 1 s.c.R.128.
(l) (19SS) I S.C.R. 777.
(!) 0957) S.c.R.. 721.
1981
Bomao1nei
••
Bl•IO of Punjab
Mudllolkar J.
Som<Jtiallti
••
Stal4 of Pu.11jc.b
Mudh.llun J.
794
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS (1963)
protected from an attack under Art. 3 l (2) ·but it
will still be invalid under Art. 13(2) if the reetri<>-
tion placed by it on the right of a person to hold
property is unreasonable. In other words, for the
law before us to regiuded as valid it must also
satisfy the requirements of Art. 19(5) and that only
thereafter oan the property of a person be taken
away.