# SOM NAm v. UNION OF INDIA & ANR

- **Citation:** [1971] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 848
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1969-04-09
- **Case number:** Criminal Appeal No. 102 of 1969
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/som-nam-v-union-of-india-anr-5447
- **Pages:** 17

## Headnote

848
A
SOM NAm
v.
UNION OF INDIA & ANR.
May 25, 1.171
•
[G. K. M!TJ'ER, c. A. .VAID!ALINGAM AND P. JAGANMOHAN
c
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G
H
REDDY 11.)
Preventio". of Corruption Act (2 of 1941), •· 5(1)(c}--Scope of.
Sanction for pr0Jecution-Principle1 for granting.
Practice and Procedure-Duty of prosecution to examine all Witne.JJesScope of.
Tho appellant who was a Major in the Military Engineering Service,
was in charge of the expansion work of an air strip and was given po5session of the land acquired for that purpose, along with valuable crops standing on the land. He postponed giving delivery of the land to the contractor for the extension work. Instead, he allowed one of the owner,s cf the
land to cut the crop and take it away without in any way accounting fer
it. A charge-sheet was filed against the appellant under s. 5(1) (c) and s. 5
(l)(d) read withs. 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. He was
acquitted of the offence under s. 5(1) (d) but was convicted for the offence
under •. 5(1)(c) and the conviction was confirmed by the High Court.
In appeal to this Court, it was contended inter alia (1) that the .;anction
&iTen by the Government or bis prosecution did not cover the trial of the
char10 under 1. 5(1) (c); and (2) the prosecution did not examine all tht
witn...,.. necessary to unfold the story of the prosecution.
HELD: (I) For a sanction to be valid it must be established that the
sanction waa aiven in respect of the facts constituting the offence with
which tho accused is proposed to be charged. It is desirable that the facts
1hould be referred to in the sanction itself. If they do not appear on th•
face of it, tho prosecution must establish aliunde by evidence that tho ..
tacts were placed before the sanctioning authority.
The sanction must
disclose that the sanctionin11 authority bad fully applied its mind to the•
and the sanction should be correlated to the particular offence or offencH
witll which tho accused io cbaried or convicted. [8S2B-F)
In the present cue, the facts which the Government considered for
tho purpose of grantinll sanction were :(a) that the appellant "'"' a public
servant entrusted with crops standing on tho land acquired for !be exsion of an air field, (b) that by abnsing bis position as a public servant he
allowed standing crop to be cut from the said land, (c) that by corrupt
or IDegal means and by abusing his position as a public servant be obtained pecuniary advantage of about Rs. 2,000 as the value of the crops that
were cut from the land and that he dishonestly or fraudulently misappropriated the same by converting it into his own use. Under s. S(I) (c) of
the Act a public servant shall be said to have committed the offence of
misconduct in bis duties if he dishonestly allows any other person to convert to his own use property which is entrusted to the said public servant.
The facts which have been set out in the order granting th• sanction are
sufficient to indicate that tho authorities granting the sanction had tho
SOJ.I NATH v. UNION (Jaganmohan Reddy, J.)
849
offence under s. 5(1)(c) in their contemplation. In fact, the order specifiA
cally mentions that provision while granting sanction. Even if there was
an inference or implication that the persons cutting the crops were abetting
the appellant in the offence the sanction could not be held to be bad on that
account. [854D, 855DJ
Bhagat Ram v. State of Puniab, A.l.R. 1954 S.C. 621, Madan Mohan
Singh v. State of U.P. A.l.R. 1954 S.C. 637, Goku/ Chand Dwarkadas Morarka v. The King, A.l.R., [1948] P.C. 82 and .Jaswant Singh v. State of
B
Puniab, [1958] S.C.R. 762, referred to.
(2) With reference to each one of the person who, according to the
appellant, should have, been called as witnesses there was alerady evidence
relating to the particular matter about which those persons would have
given evidence.
In the circumstances the non-examination of other witnesses, without anything more, could not be treated as a defect in the prosecution. [863G

## Text

_Characters 0–39,874 of 44,560. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39874 for what follows._

848
A
SOM NAm
v.
UNION OF INDIA & ANR.
May 25, 1.171
•
[G. K. M!TJ'ER, c. A. .VAID!ALINGAM AND P. JAGANMOHAN
c
D
E
G
H
REDDY 11.)
Preventio". of Corruption Act (2 of 1941), •· 5(1)(c}--Scope of.
Sanction for pr0Jecution-Principle1 for granting.
Practice and Procedure-Duty of prosecution to examine all Witne.JJesScope of.
Tho appellant who was a Major in the Military Engineering Service,
was in charge of the expansion work of an air strip and was given po5session of the land acquired for that purpose, along with valuable crops standing on the land. He postponed giving delivery of the land to the contractor for the extension work. Instead, he allowed one of the owner,s cf the
land to cut the crop and take it away without in any way accounting fer
it. A charge-sheet was filed against the appellant under s. 5(1) (c) and s. 5
(l)(d) read withs. 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. He was
acquitted of the offence under s. 5(1) (d) but was convicted for the offence
under •. 5(1)(c) and the conviction was confirmed by the High Court.
In appeal to this Court, it was contended inter alia (1) that the .;anction
&iTen by the Government or bis prosecution did not cover the trial of the
char10 under 1. 5(1) (c); and (2) the prosecution did not examine all tht
witn...,.. necessary to unfold the story of the prosecution.
HELD: (I) For a sanction to be valid it must be established that the
sanction waa aiven in respect of the facts constituting the offence with
which tho accused is proposed to be charged. It is desirable that the facts
1hould be referred to in the sanction itself. If they do not appear on th•
face of it, tho prosecution must establish aliunde by evidence that tho ..
tacts were placed before the sanctioning authority.
The sanction must
disclose that the sanctionin11 authority bad fully applied its mind to the•
and the sanction should be correlated to the particular offence or offencH
witll which tho accused io cbaried or convicted. [8S2B-F)
In the present cue, the facts which the Government considered for
tho purpose of grantinll sanction were :(a) that the appellant "'"' a public
servant entrusted with crops standing on tho land acquired for !be exsion of an air field, (b) that by abnsing bis position as a public servant he
allowed standing crop to be cut from the said land, (c) that by corrupt
or IDegal means and by abusing his position as a public servant be obtained pecuniary advantage of about Rs. 2,000 as the value of the crops that
were cut from the land and that he dishonestly or fraudulently misappropriated the same by converting it into his own use. Under s. S(I) (c) of
the Act a public servant shall be said to have committed the offence of
misconduct in bis duties if he dishonestly allows any other person to convert to his own use property which is entrusted to the said public servant.
The facts which have been set out in the order granting th• sanction are
sufficient to indicate that tho authorities granting the sanction had tho
SOJ.I NATH v. UNION (Jaganmohan Reddy, J.)
849
offence under s. 5(1)(c) in their contemplation. In fact, the order specifiA
cally mentions that provision while granting sanction. Even if there was
an inference or implication that the persons cutting the crops were abetting
the appellant in the offence the sanction could not be held to be bad on that
account. [854D, 855DJ
Bhagat Ram v. State of Puniab, A.l.R. 1954 S.C. 621, Madan Mohan
Singh v. State of U.P. A.l.R. 1954 S.C. 637, Goku/ Chand Dwarkadas Morarka v. The King, A.l.R., [1948] P.C. 82 and .Jaswant Singh v. State of
B
Puniab, [1958] S.C.R. 762, referred to.
(2) With reference to each one of the person who, according to the
appellant, should have, been called as witnesses there was alerady evidence
relating to the particular matter about which those persons would have
given evidence.
In the circumstances the non-examination of other witnesses, without anything more, could not be treated as a defect in the prosecution. [863G]
C
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No.
102 of 1969.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated
April 9, 1969 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Criminal
Appeal No. 1055 of 1966.
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Frank Anthony and K. B. Rohatgi, for the appellant.
H. R. Khanna and R. N. SachJhey, for the respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Jaganmohan Reddy, J.-This Appeal is by Special leave
against the Judgment of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana
confirming the conviction of the accused under Section 5(l)(c) of
the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947
as also Ille
sentence
awarded by the Sessions Judge of orie year's Rig';3lmprisonment and a fine of Rs. 2500, in default sl1r m
Rigorous
Imprisonment.
The facts of the case in lirief are that in view of the Chinese
invasion Air Field at Sirsa required to be extended for which
purpose the Ministry of Defence, Govt. of India took steps to
acquire some lands of agriculturists pursuant to which a Notification dated November 27, 1962 was issued under Section 4 of the
Land Acquisition Act 1884 for acquiring 51.79 acres
of land
situated in the State of Ahmedpur. On the next day another
Notification was issued under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition
Act on November 28, 1962 and in view of the emergency action
under Section 17 was taken for obtaining possession of the land
W'ith a view to ·its development. The lands which were acquired
belonged to several land holders including Moti Ram and P.W. 12
Kewal Chand. The Collector gave his award on 26-2-63
(Ex.
P. 26) in respect of these lands, which actually' measured 49.47
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acres, at. Rs. 1350 per acre ~ounting to Rs. 66,784.50 np. Apart
from this amount compensation was also awarded for standing
crop amounting to Rs. 11,073.13 np.
Before the land was actually acquired the Appellant who
was a Major in the Military Engineering Service was working as
a Garrison Engineer and. was incharge of the extension. He had
in anticipation of acquisition and execμtion of the work appointed
A. B. Ranadive, P.W. ~4 as Assistant Garrison Engineer who was
to be responsible for all the matters connected with the acquisition
of land, demarcation of boundaries as an Engineer Incharge for
execution of the contract and responsible for the maintenance of
the Air Field. The work of the extension of Aerodrome was entrusted to one Telu Ram, P.W. 8 Contractor, with
whom the
M.E.S. Department entered into an agreement on December 3,
1962.
This agreement was Signed both by the Appellant and
P.W. 14. The work according to that agreement was to be done
in 2 phases-first phase was to commence on 10th January 1963
and was to be completed by 9th October 1963. After the completion of the first phase the second phase was to start on 10th
October 1963 and completed by 9th May 1964. Pursuant to this
agreement it is said that symbolic possession of the land which
was acquired was taken over by the Tehsildar on !st February
1963, after which at any rate it appears from Ex. P. 24 that actual
possession of this land was handed over by the said Tehsildar on
13th February 1963 to the Appellant. The receipt Ex. P. 24
bears the signature of N .. L. Handa, the Tehsildar and of Sukhchain Lal Jain, P.W. 11 on behalf of the Military Estate Officer
and the Appellant. From this receipt it is evident that possession
of 50.12 acres was handed over by the Tehsildar and taken over
by the Appellant and the Military Estate Officer Sukhchain Lal
Jain.
The case of the prosecution initially was that after the land
so acquired with the standing crop was taken possession of by
the Appellant he sold the crop to Moti Ram and Kewal Chand
for Rs. 2500 and facilitated the cutting and taking away of the
crop by postponing the handing over of the possession to the contractor till die 5th Aprfi 1963 and misappropriated the money. In
respect of this allegation the First Information Report (Ex. P. 29)
was issued on 14-1-64 in whkh the following statement is
rele·
vant:-
"lt is alleged that Major Som. Nath ace.used who is
a Garrison Engineer Sirsa Air Field s'ubsequently sometime in the months of March and April 1963 permitted
the .removal of the sta,nding crop val11ed at Rs. 11073'-13
by Sbri Moti Ram an_d KCW!!l Chand etc., after ~ptltig
illegal gratification of Rs. 3000 from them. Ma1or Som
SOid NATH v. UNION (Jaganmohan Reddy, J.)
Nath did not account for this amount in the Govt. Revenues. He thus abused his position as a public servant
and caused pecuniary advantage to said Shri Moti Ram
and Kewal Cliand by giving them standing crops ivorth
Rs. 13,000 for a consideration of Rs. 3,000 only, which
amount he accepted for his personal use and thereby
also abused his official position and obtained pecuniary
advantage for himself in a sum of Rs. 3000.
The facts disclose the commission of the offence, of
criminal misconduct as defined in Section 5(1)(d) · read
with Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act
1947 by Major Som Nath accused. A regular case is
therefore registered and entrusted to Inspector Baldev
Raj Handa for investigation."
After this F.I.R. certain statements were recorded l)y the Military
authorities being DA to DE, OM, DM/l, ON & DL of Mani
Ram, Mulkb Raj, Ganpat Ram, Tetu Ram, Kewal Chand and
Sukhchain Lal Jain. A chargesheet was filed against the Appel·
]ant under Section 5(1)(c) and 5(1)(d) read with 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act on 5-8,1966 after obtaining sanction
from the Govt. of India, Ministry of Hlome Affairs on 11th April,
1966 as per Ex. P.23. The Special Judge acquitted the Appellant
of the second charge namely that being a public servant he had by
corrupt or illegal means or by otherwise abusing bis position as
a public servant obtained for himself a sum of Rs. 2,500 from
Moti Ram of Sirsa for cutting the crops and thereby committed
offence under Section' 5(1)(d) punishable under Section 5(2). The
accused was however convicted under the first charge for
an
offence under Section 5(1)(c) in that he being a Garrison Engi·
neer incharge of the Air Field Sirsa and in that capacity entrust·
ed with standing crops of Sarson, Gram and Lusan on 30 acres of
land a part of 49 acres of land acquired by the Govt. and which
had been valued at Rs. 11.073.13 by the Revenue authorities, dis-
, honestly or fraudulently allowed Moti Ram of Sirsa to mi8appro·
priate the said standing crop and thereby contravened Section
S(l)(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act punishable with Section 5(2) of that Act. Against that conviction and sentence he
appealed to the High Court which maintained the conviction and
sentence.
The learned Advocate for the Appellant has meticulously
taken us through the entire documentary and oral evidence and
commented at length upon the various contradictions ahd · incon·
gruities. in .the case of the prosecution "".Ith a ·view to establishing
that when. the Appellant took possession of the land there was
no cro" standing on it:...-Otat the po5session ·of the land was in
fact delivered to Tetu Ram, O,ntractor on I 0.1-1963 : that the
sai!f <".Ontractor bad admitted that possession of the entfte land
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was received by him ; that he carried on the construction work in
extending the Aerodrome; that 200/250 donkeys were also used
for doin2 the work by reason of wb.ich the crop was damaged before Tehsildar had put the Appellant in possession of the land
and as a matter of fact there was no crop thereon when he got
the possession of the land. It was also contended that the High
Court had not considered the contradictions in the earlier statement made by some of the witnesses to the Military authorities
and that it relied on many of the documents for affirming the
conviction of the Appellant without their actually being put to
him under Section 342.
Before we consider these contentions it is necessary to deter·
mine another submission of the learned Advocate for the Appellant which goes to the root of the jurisdiction of the Court to try
the offence, under Section 5(l)(c). H this contention is valid
then the conviction of the accused cannot stand and therefore it
is necessary to deal with this matter first. It may be mentioned
that though a complaint was made in the application for a certi·
ficate for leave to appeal to this Court that tbe learned Single
Judge of the High Court should have acquitted the Appellant on
the sole ground that there was no proper sanction for the prosecution of the Appellant under Section 5(1) (c) of the Prevention of the Corruption Act, this question does not seem to have
been urged before the High Court. In any case we do not think
that there is any validity in the submission that the sanction given
by the Govt. of India does not cover the trial of the charge under
Section 5(!)(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. For a sanction to be valid it must be established that the sanction was given
in respect of the facts constituting the offence with which the ac- .
cused is proposed to be charged. Though it is desirable that the
facts should be referred to in the sanction itself, nonetheless if they
do not appear on the face of it, the prosecution must establish
aliunde by evidence that those facts were placed before the sanctioning authorities. It is therefore necessary to first examine the
order of sanction to ascertain on what facts it has been accorded.~
The sanction that has been accorded is in the following
terms:
11th April 1966.
"Whereas it is alleged that Major Som Nath ......
while functioning as Garrison Engineer, M.E.S., Air
Field at Sirsa from 13-2-63 to 5-4-1963 by corrupt or illegal means or by otherwise abusing his position, as such
public mervant, obtained pecuniary advantage of Rs. 2500
for alfoWiq the standing crops to be cut from the land
acqullied for the extension of Air Field Sirsa ; and or he
dishoneltly or fraudulently realised and misappropriated
Rs. 2SOO during the aforesaid period as the value of the
SOM NATH'· UNION (Jaganmohan Rtddy,J.)
853
crops cut from the land acquired for the extension of
Air Field Sirsa, which crops had been entrusted to him
as a public servant and he instead of depositing the said
sale price into the Govt. Treasury converted it to his own
use;
And whereas the said acts of Major Som Nath ... ; ..
constituted offences punishable under Section 5(2) of the
Prevention of Corruption Act, read with Section 5(1) (c)
and (d) (Act No. II of 1947) of the said Act and Sec·
tion 409 of the I.P.C.
And whereas the Central Govt. after fully and carefully examining the materials before it in regard to the
said allegations and circumstances of the case, consider
that Major Som Nath ...... should be prosecuted in a
court of law for the said offences.
Now therefore, the Central Govt. doth hereby accord sanction under Section 197-Code of Criminal Procedure (Act No. 5 of 1898) and Section 6(!)(a) of tire
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 (Act U of 1947) for
the prosecution of Maj. Som Nath for the said offences
and for any other offences punishable under the provi·
sion of law in respect of the afor~tiaid acts by the Court
of competent jurisdiction.
By order and in the name of the President.
Sd/- (A, P. Veera Raghavan)
Deputy Secretary to the Govt. of India."
From the above order it is apparent that the facts which the
Central Govt. considered for the purposes of according sanction
were (a) that the Appellant as a public servant was entrusted
with crops situated on the land acquired for the extension of Air
Field, Sirsa;
(b) that by abusing his position as a public servant he allowed the standing crops to be cut from the said land ;
(c) that by corrupt or illegal means and by abusing his position as a public servant he obtained pecuniary advantage of
Rs. 2500 as the value of the crops to be cut from the land and/or
he dishonestly or fraudulently misappropriated that sum by con·
verting It into his own use instead of depositing the said sale price
in the Govt. Treasury.
On these facts and after applying its mind as spoken to by
P.W. 10 Kalra the Government accorded its sanction for prosecution of the offences punishable under Section 5(2) read with
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Section 5(1)(c) and 5(1)(d).
The question therefore would be
whether these facts were sufficient to sustain the sanction wider
5(1)(c) even if the charge under 5(1)(d) had failed. This question
in turn will depend upon what are the ingredients of the offences
under 5(l)(c) and (d) read with Section 5(2). Under 5(1)(c)-A
Public servant is said to commit the offence of misconduct in the
discharge of his duty if he dishonestly or fraudulently misappro·
priates or otherwise converts for his own use any property en·
trusted to him or under his coi;itrol as a public servant or allows
any other person so to do, and tinder (d) if he by corrupt or illegal
means or by otherwise abusing his position as a public servant.
obtains for himself or for any other person any valuable thing
or pecuniary advantage.
It would be seen therefore that under Section 5(1)(c) a public
servant will be said to commit the offence of misconduct in his
duties if he dishonestly allows any other persons to convert te>
his own use property which is entrusted to the said public servant
The facts which have been set out in the order granting the sanc·
tion certainly are sufficient to indicate that the authorities grant·
ing the sanction had the offence under Section 5(l)(c) also in
their contemplation. In fact the order specifically mentions thisprovision while granting sanction.
We should have thought this was an obvious conclusion but
the learned Advocate for the Appellant strenuously contendeO'
that the charge against the Appellant was of a motiveless offence
and in any case the facts as disclosed show that not only at the
time when the First Information Report was given but even at
the time when sanction was accorded that the prosecution wa~
merely concerned with th" charge that the appellant had allowed
the crops to be cut on the condition that Rs. 2500 will be paid
and received the monpy and misappropriated or converted it t<>
his own use by not paying it into the Govt. treasury. There I!
therefore no basis for sanction for a charge under Section 5(1)(c).
It is further contended that the stand taken by the prosecutioa
was that the persons who were permitted to cut the crops had
not commiited any offence. If so a charge under Section 5(1) (c)
would implicate those persons also in the commission of an
offence which certainly would not have been in the contemplation
of the authorities granting the sanction. In support of this contention three decisions have been cited before us namely BM€at
Ram v. State of Punjab('), Madan Mohan Singh v. State of
U. P. ('), and Gokulchand Dw(ll'kadas Morarka v.
The Kini (')
(1) A. I. R.. 1954 S. C. 621.
(2) A. I. R.. 1954 S. C. 637.
(3) A. I. R,. 1948 Privy Council 82.
SOM NATH v. UNION (Jaganmohall Reddy, J.)
Bhagat Ram's case was not concerned with the sanction but only
with the question, whether the offence could be altered to one of
abetment of an offence of Section 409 I.P.C. from one under Sec·
tion 409 simpliciter. It was held that an alteration of the Appel·
!ant's conviction under Section 409 I.P.C. into one of abetment
thereof would imply a definite finding against the subordinate
Judge who is not before the Court and as such it would be unfair to make such an alteration. We do not see how this case
can assist the appellant because in the first place there is no question of an alteration of the charge and secondly the circumstance
that someone who is not a public s~rvant abetted the appellant is
hardly relevant. But even so the offence with which the appel·
!ant is charged under Section 5(l)(c) does not necessarily involve
an abetment with the person whom he had dishonestly allowed
to cut and take away the crop. For instance it is quite possible
that the person whom he allowed to cut the crop may be his own
relation or friend in whom he may be interested and who may,
however, not know that the accused was doing something dis·
honest in permitting him to cut the crop. In any case the facts
which have been stated in the sanction clearly indicate that the
appellant has dishonestly allowed the crops to be cut so that there
is no question of any inference or implication that the peri<ms
cutting the crops were abetting him in the offence. Even if it
were so the sanction cannot be held to be bad on that account.
Gokulchand Dwarkadas's case also is of no assistance to the
appellant because in that case the sanction did not disclose the
facts on which it was given but merely sanctioned the prosecution for a breach of certain provisions, Sir John Beamon! delive·
ring the Judgement of the Judicial Committee, observed at pag~
84:
"But if the facts constituting the offence charged are
not shown on the face of the sanction, the prosecution
must prove by extraneous evidence that. those facts were
placed before the sanctioning authority ...... Nor, in their
Lordships' view, is a sanction given without reference to
the facts a11nstituting tile offence a compliance with the
actual terms of cl. 23. Under that clause sanction has
to be given to a prosecution for the .contravention of any
of the provisions of the Order. A person could not be
charged merely with the breach of a particular provision
of the Order ; he must be charged with the commission
of certain acts which. constitute a breach. and it is to
that prosecution-that iS, for having done acts which
constitute a breach of the Order-that the sanction is
required. In the present case there is nothing on the face
of the sanction, and no extraneous evidence, to show
that the sanctioning authority knew the facts alleged to
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constitute a breach of the Order, and the sanction is
invalid"
The case of Jaswant Singh v. The State of Punjab(') was
also cited by the Respondent's advocate in support of the contention that the trial of two offences requiring sanction was not valid.
In that case sanction was given under Section 6 of the Prevention of Corruption Act 47 for the prosecution of the appellant for
having received illegal gratification from one Pal Singh. He was
charged with and tried for two offences under Section 5 (I) (a) of
the Act for habitually accepting or obtaining illegal gratification
and under Section 5(1)(d) for receiving illegal gratification from
Pal Singh. The Session Judge had found that both charges were
proved. While in Appeal the High Court held that the Appellant could neither be tried nor convicted of the offence under
S(l)(a) as no sanction had been given in respect of it but up~ld.
the conviction under Section 5(1)(d) for which sanction had been
given. A perusal of the sanction would show that the sanctioning authority had applied their mind to only one instance but
the prosecution were seeking to make the sanction cover
the
offence of a habitual bribe taker which clearly implies that the
sanctioning authorities must consider the number of instances
when the accused took bribes and on what occasions as would
justify a charge of his being a habitual bribe taker. Sinha, J, as
he then was while dismissing the appeal observed at page 766:-
"In the present case the sanction strictly construed
indicates the consideration by the sanctioning authority
of the facts relating to the receiving of the illegal gratification from Pal Singh and therefore the appellant could
only be validly tried for that offence. The contention
that a trial for two offences requiring sanction is wholly
void. where the sanction is granted for one offence and
not for the other, is in our opinion unsustainable. Section 6(1) of the Act bars the jurisdiction of the Court
to take cognizance of an offence for which previous
sanction Is required and has not been given. The pro- ·
secution for offence under S. 5(1) (d)
therefore is not
barred because the proceedings are not without previous
sanction which was validly given for the offence of receiving a bribe from Pal Singh, but the offence of habitually
receiving illegal gratification could not be taken cogm·
zance of and the prosecution and trial for that offence
was void for want of sanction which is a condition precedent for the Courts taking cognizance of the offence
alleged to be committed and therefore the High Court
has rightly set aside the conviction for that offence."
(I) [1958] S. C. R. 762.
sou: NATI! v. UNION (Jaganmohan Reddy, J.)
157
1'bae cases instead of supporting the contention of the lear·
A
ned Advocate amply demonstrate that the facts which formed
-the basis of the sanction and which was accorded after the
mnctioning authority had fully applied its mind to them, should
be correlated to the particular offence or offences with which the
accused .is charged or convicted.
In our view there is no justification for holding that the con·
viction under Section S(l)(c) read with 5(2) is bad for want of the
requisite sanction.
Now on the merits of the case as we said earlier the learned
Advocate for the appellant has referred to the evidence in meticu·
lous detail and has commented thereon at length but this Court
ordinarily does not reappreciate the evidence with a view to
arriving at its own finding as if it was a Court of fact and does
not ordinarily upset the findings of the High Court which has on
an evaluation of the evidence affirmed the trial court's conviction
and sentenre. It· has been contended firstly that the High Court
was in error in relying on certain evidence for convicting the
accused which was not put to him. Secondly the evidence that
was necessary to unfold the story of the prosecution has not been
produced by the prosecution but the Trial Court and the High
Court ignored this lacuna in the prosecution case. Thirdly the
Judgments show that there was utter confusion in respect of the
date on which possession of the acquired land was given to the
Appellant and the date on which it was given to the Contractor
for carrying on the work, as also in respect of the fact whether
there was any crop standing when the Appellant took possession
Qf the land and at what period of time the crop was cut and the
work commenced.
Before we deal with the contentions urged on behalf of the
Appellant it is necessary to have a clear picture of certain broad
features of the case. The Air strip which was being extended is
in one straight line with Taxi-ways.
P.W.14 Ranadive tells us
that if one were to go from the entrance of Air Field to the
acquired land one would have to pass through RD 4500 to 1200.
The acquired land extended from RD 1200 to RD 00. Accord·
ing to P.W. 8 Telu Ram, he acquired possession of the land of the
length from RD 4500 to RD 1200 on 10th January 1963 and that
the possession of the acquired land was not delivered to him as
it had not been acquired by that time. Ex. DQ review report
which is headed Technical Administration Contract shows that
the date of review was 9th February 1963. In this document the
date of the conclusion of the contract is given as 3rd December'62
and date of commencement of work as 10th January'63, date of
completion of 1st phase 9th October '63 and second phase 9th
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May 1964. To the Question "Have all sites been handed over on
due date" the answer shown was an affirmative 'yes'. There is
however nothing in this d~oument to show what is the site of
which possession was handed over to and taken by Telu Ram on
10th January '63. It is not the case of the Appellant that acquisition of the land on which the crop was standing had taken place
nor could possession of it been handed over to him because he
denies that there was any crop on the land when the possession of
the land was handed over to him. That there was crop on the land
is amply born out by a letter of the Appellant dated 12th Febru·
ary 1963 addressed to Mr. G. L. Nagpal, Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Sirsa. In this letter he says:-
"12th Feb. 1963.
My dear Mr. Nagpal,
I am writing to you with regard to acquisition of
land for Sirsa Airfield.
As you know, the Additional
Deputy Commissioner Hissar will ~e visiting this location on 13th Feb. 1963. The Military Estates Officer,
Delhi, Mr. K. K. Gamkhar will also be here on 13th
morning._ It is desirable that entire proceedings with
regard to acquisition of land and determining compensation for standing crops for the total area of 39.58 acres
in Mirpur and Ahmadpur villages are finalised on this
date. As I have told you personally, we are keen to
finalise the proceedings for the total area to be acquired
by us and not by phases. This is in the interest of the
project. I therefore request you to Issue suitable instructions to your staff so that all the relevant papers may
be suitably prepared."
Even If Exhibit DO gave a correct picture, it could be in relation
to the airstrip already in existence, as this would be necesiary
for a contractor who is charged with duty to carry out extension
work to go on the site collect materials and get everything ready
to execute his contract. In fact as we have noticed earlier this
is what Telu Ram says in his evidence, namely that on 10th
January'63 no delivery of possession of the remaining land other
than RD 4500 to 1200 (the land in which there is the existing
run-way) was given. It was then that he wrote on 23-1-1963
as per Ex. 8 to the Assistant Garrison Engineer complainin!l that
the possession of ti?e ~hole of the land had no! been d~Uvered ~
him. A copy of this letter was sent to. the Garrison Engmeer-the
Appellant. This letter shows two thmgs (a) that complete liW
_.SOO to 0 ft. has not yet been handed over "is it was presumed
SOM NATH v. UNION (Jaganmohan Reddy,J.)
that the possession of the land could not he had so far" and (b)
that as levels have not been given, the final excavation of the
foundation cannot be done and all subsequent operations are
therefore withheld.
This letter clearly indicates that some excavation was being
done as otherwise there is no meaning in saying that final exca vation cannot be done. This Is also consistent with the other evidence
that some work was in progress which again is in accord with
the evidence of Telu Ram P.W .. 8 that he got the possession of
RD 4500 to RD 1200. The extension of the Airstrip would mean
that the existing Airstrip is being extended, so that the initial work
can be started and continued on the existing Airstrip. It is not
as if the existing Airstrip ends at the boundary of RD 4500 to RD
1200, so that the work of extension can go on in the existing Air·
strip even before possession of the acquired land was given. This
is further confirmed by a perusal of the letter written by the Appellant to Telu Ram P.W. 8 in reply to his Jetter dated 28th February'63 (not produced) that "Necessary possession of the runway
and taxi track has already been given to you. You are therefore
requested to set out the work and get the same approved by the
Engineer-in-charge before starting the work".
This shows that
no work had in fact been undertaken on the land acquired and also
that possession of the existing runway and track had already
been given.
Nothing is specifically mentioned about possession .
of the acquired land being given to him on that. date. The work
on that land is only at the stage of getting approval.
Now the next question is when was the possession of the
acquired land obtained by the Appellant and when did he deliver
it to P.W. 8. P.W. 14, says that symbolic possession was delivered
to him in respect of the acquired land on the 1st February'63.
It would how~ver appear from Exh. P. 24 that actual possession
was delivered to the Appellant on 13th February '63 as per the
delivery receipt executed by him, the Tehsildar and P.W.11, a
representative of the Military Estate office and that even acc~rd
ing to his letter already referred to Ex. P.13 there was standing
crop on the land as otherwise there is no meaning in the Appellant saying therein that it is desirable that entire
proceedi~gs
with regard to acquisition of land and determining compensation
for standing crops for the total area of 39.58 acres are finalised
on the 13th February.
There is also <:redible evidence that possession of. the acquired
land was not handed over to the contractor till late ill March '63
though it was handed over to and taken over by the Appellant on
13-2-63 .. The Khasra Girdawari. Ex. P.3 would show that there
was a crop of Sarson (Mustard), Gram and Lusan, at any rate on
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20th March '63 at a time when the land has been shown therein
to have been
in possession of the
Military
authorities.
Ex.
P. 2
is a
certified copy by
the Tehsildar
dated
18-9-63
which
shows
that
as
per
the
Girdawari
on
20-3-63 crops were standing on the lands in the village
Ahmedpur acquired
by the Military authorities for
Sirsa
Airfield construction, the details of which were that the total
land acquired for Airfield 49 acres, the land on which crops were
standing in good condition 23 acres and the land on which crops
were standing in damaged condition 7 acres and uncultivated
land 19 acres.
Mani Ram Patwari had stated that by the 20th March 1963
some ground had been cleared. Sukhchain Lal Jain P.W. 11
who had also come to obtain possession on behalf of the Military
Estate Officer had said that he had seen some part of the crops
had been cut by 13-2-1963, but was not aware who had cut them.
This evidence, however, does not assist the accused. At the most
it shows that a small portion of the crops were cut but it is apparent that that has not been taken into account by the Collector
in assessing the value of the crop because it iS on that day that
crops were inspected for that purpose and subsequently the Agricultural Officer also had in his letter dated 18-2-63, which has
been cited in the award Ex. P. 26 intimated that on inspection
the crops were found to be very good. He had also given the
approximate yield and the rate at which the crop can be valued
with which the Collector agreed and awarded compensation. It
is therefore clear that in estimating the crop, the small portion of
the land where crops were stated to have been cut by the 13-2-63
even if true could not have been taken Into account. It may also
be stated that the Contractor had written to the Garrison Engineer on 28-2-63 requesting him to hand over immediately the
possession of the remaining portion of the land so that excavation work is not held up. He also informs in that letter that the
excavation in all available portions of the taxi track and runway
has been completed. This again does not specifically refer to the
land which is being acquired. At any rate on the 23rd March,
1963 P.W. 8 has again written to the Garrison Engineer namely
the Appellant that the excavation of the taxi track could not be
proceeded with for want of alignment to be given whkh was
pending for want (because) of standing crops, in the land, the
possession of which has not been given so far.
Thereafter the
following pertinent statement appears namely-
"Now, today I find that the crops have been completely cut and as such it is requested that further necessary action in the matter of giving the alignment and
possession of land may please be taken at your end."
•
SOM NATH v. UNION (Jaganmohan Reddy. J.)
861
On the 6th April, 1963 he has again written to the Garrison
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Engineer saying as follows :-
"You have verbally asked me now to take the site
after the crop is cut and the necessary marking of the
alignment has been taken in hand but this handing over
has not been shown on the site order book by the A.G.E.
(BIR) despite my request.
B·
He may please be asked to complete this formality
without any loss of time."
In reply the Appellant states in hls letter Ex. P. 12 dated the
10th April "The matter has already been discussed with you
and finalised. No further action Is required to be taken".
C
It can be seen from the above that the appellant is reluctant
to reply in writing as to what he is asking the contractor to do
under verbal orders while the contractor for safeguarding his
position is insisting on having it in writing.
The Trial Court as well as the High Court are in our view,
justified in holding that crops of Sarson, gram and lusan were
standing on the land acquired by the Military for extension of
the Aerodrome. It will also justify the conclusion that they were
there at any rate till the 20th March 1963 and according to the
letter of the contractor (J'. W. 8) on 23-3-63 they were completely
cut. In so far as handing over of the possession of the land to
the Contractor (P.W. 8) is concerned, the Trial Court and the
High Court are equally justified in coming to the conclusion
that the accused had not delivered the possession of the land to
the contractor till quite late as would appear from the letter of
P.W. 8 dated the 5th April, 1963.
We are aware of the argument addressed before us that
some of the witnesses had said that the water channels had been
closed in Febiiiary 1963 and therefore no crop could thereafter
have been standing on the land and must have been destroyed.
There is also the further argument that some of the statements
recorded by the Military authorities were not taken into account,
as the High Court had thought that since the deponents denied
the contents the officers who recorded the statement might have
been called to show that they were properly recorded.
The
learned advocate for the respondent also tried to support the stand
taken by the High Court. It is true that when a witness has
admitted having signed his previous statements that is enough to
prove that some statement of his was recorded and he had appen·
ded his signature thereto. The only question is, what use can
be made of such statements even where the witness admits having
signed the statements made before the Military Authorities. They
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can at best be used to contradict in tbe cross-examination of such
a witness when be gives evidence at the Trial Court of tbe accuied
in the manner provided under Section 145 of the Evidence Act.
If it is intended to contradict the witness by tbe writing, the atten·
tion of the witness should be called before the writing can be
proved to those parts of it which are to be used for the purpose
of contradicting him. If this is not done, the evidence of the
witnesses cannot be assailed in respect of those statements by
merely proving that the witness had signed the document. When
the witnesses are contradicted by their previous statements in the
manner aforesaid, then that part of the
statements which has
been put to the witness will be considered along with the evidence
to assess the worth of the witness in determining his veracity.
The whole of the previous statement however cannot be treated
as substantive evidence.
We do not find that tbe assessment of the evidence by the
Trial Court and the High Court even in the light of such of those
previous statements that have been put to the witnesses in the
manner stated above is in any way unjustified.
It is said that
some of the documents i.e. Ex. 8, IO and 11 have not been put
to the witnesses even though the Court relied upon them. Ex. P.8
as already noticed is the letter of Telu Ram Jain to the Assistant
Garrison Engineer and P. IO is the letter of Telu Ram Jain to
to the Garrison Engineer.
Both these related to possession of
the acquired land not being given to him.