# SONAPUR TEA CO., LTD v. MUST. MAZIRUNNESSA

- **Citation:** [1962] 1 S.C.R. 724
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1959-01-23
- **Case number:** Civil Appeals Nos. 235 and 236 of 1960
- **Bench:** P. B. Gajendragadkar, A. K. Sarkar, K. N. Wanchoo, K. c. DAS GUPTA, N. Rajagopala Ayyangar
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/sonapur-tea-co-ltd-v-must-mazirunnessa-2072
- **Pages:** 9

## Headnote

(1962)
land Holding-Fixation of ceiling-Enactment, if a colourable
legislation-Constitutional validity-Assam Fixation of Ceiling on
Land Holding Act, r957 (Assam r of r957), ss. 4, 5, r6, r8Assam Land and Revenue Regulation, r886 (Regulation I of r886).
ss. 3(g), 9-Constitution of India, Art. JIA(z)(b).
These appeals arose out of two petitions filed in the High
Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution challenging the constitutional validity of the Assam Fixation of Ceiling on Land
Holding Act, 1957· The High Court in dismissing the petitions
held that the impugned Act was protected by Art. 31A of the
Constitution. The Act was a measure of agrarian reform and
imposed limits on land to be held by persons in order to bring
about its equitable distribution. The Act as originally passed
as also its subsequent amendment received the assent of the
President and this satisfied the requirement of the proviso to
Art. 31A(1)(a) of the Constitution. The question, therefore,
was whether the rights of the appellants which were taken
away or abridged by the impugned Act were "rights" in relation to an estate within the meaning of Art. 31A(2)(b) of the
Constitution.
Held, that the expression" 'rights', in relation to an estate"
in Art. 31A(2)(b) of the Constitution is of a very wide amplitude
and construed liberally, as it must be, and considered in the
light of the provisions of ss. 3(g) and 9 of the Assam Land and
Revenue Regulation, 1886, the existing law relating to tenures,
and the relevant definitions contained in the impugned Act,
there could be no doubt that the rights of the petitioners,
which the impugned Act extinguished, fell within the expression.
Thakur Raghubir Singh v. The State of Ajmer, [1959] Supp.
l S.C.R. 478, Sri Ram Ram Narain Medhi v. The State of Bombay,
[1959] Supp. l S.C.R. 489 and Atma Ram v. The State of P.unjab,
[1959] Supp. l S.C.R. 748, referred to.
A colourable legislation is one in which the Legislature
transgresses the lawful limits of its legislative powers and conceals its real purpose under the cover of apparently legitimate
and reasonable provisions and thus seeks to do indirectly what
it cannot do directly.
K. G. Gajapathi Narayan Deo v. The State of ,Orissa, [1954]
S.C.R. 1, referred to.
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1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
725
It was not correct to say that the impugned Act was a
colourable legislation whose concealed purpose was to make
profit by disposing of land in the manner provided ~y Ch. III or
that by pith and substance it was a profit makmg measure
or that ss. 16 and r8 of the Act were devices to that end.
This is broadly contradicted by the whole object of the Act
which is a measure of agrarian reform, writ large on all its provisions and clearly negatived bys. 4 of the Act which provides
that in no case can the payment made by the tenant m gettrng
the settlement exceed the amount of compensation payable by
the Government in acquiring the land.

## Text

April 4.
724
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
SONAPUR TEA CO., LTD.
v.
MUST. MAZIRUNNESSA
(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, A. K. SARKAR,
K. N. WANCHOO, K. c. DAS GUPTA
and N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR, JJ.)
(1962)
land Holding-Fixation of ceiling-Enactment, if a colourable
legislation-Constitutional validity-Assam Fixation of Ceiling on
Land Holding Act, r957 (Assam r of r957), ss. 4, 5, r6, r8Assam Land and Revenue Regulation, r886 (Regulation I of r886).
ss. 3(g), 9-Constitution of India, Art. JIA(z)(b).
These appeals arose out of two petitions filed in the High
Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution challenging the constitutional validity of the Assam Fixation of Ceiling on Land
Holding Act, 1957· The High Court in dismissing the petitions
held that the impugned Act was protected by Art. 31A of the
Constitution. The Act was a measure of agrarian reform and
imposed limits on land to be held by persons in order to bring
about its equitable distribution. The Act as originally passed
as also its subsequent amendment received the assent of the
President and this satisfied the requirement of the proviso to
Art. 31A(1)(a) of the Constitution. The question, therefore,
was whether the rights of the appellants which were taken
away or abridged by the impugned Act were "rights" in relation to an estate within the meaning of Art. 31A(2)(b) of the
Constitution.
Held, that the expression" 'rights', in relation to an estate"
in Art. 31A(2)(b) of the Constitution is of a very wide amplitude
and construed liberally, as it must be, and considered in the
light of the provisions of ss. 3(g) and 9 of the Assam Land and
Revenue Regulation, 1886, the existing law relating to tenures,
and the relevant definitions contained in the impugned Act,
there could be no doubt that the rights of the petitioners,
which the impugned Act extinguished, fell within the expression.
Thakur Raghubir Singh v. The State of Ajmer, [1959] Supp.
l S.C.R. 478, Sri Ram Ram Narain Medhi v. The State of Bombay,
[1959] Supp. l S.C.R. 489 and Atma Ram v. The State of P.unjab,
[1959] Supp. l S.C.R. 748, referred to.
A colourable legislation is one in which the Legislature
transgresses the lawful limits of its legislative powers and conceals its real purpose under the cover of apparently legitimate
and reasonable provisions and thus seeks to do indirectly what
it cannot do directly.
K. G. Gajapathi Narayan Deo v. The State of ,Orissa, [1954]
S.C.R. 1, referred to.
•
•
I
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•
•
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•
•
1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
725
It was not correct to say that the impugned Act was a
colourable legislation whose concealed purpose was to make
profit by disposing of land in the manner provided ~y Ch. III or
that by pith and substance it was a profit makmg measure
or that ss. 16 and r8 of the Act were devices to that end.
This is broadly contradicted by the whole object of the Act
which is a measure of agrarian reform, writ large on all its provisions and clearly negatived bys. 4 of the Act which provides
that in no case can the payment made by the tenant m gettrng
the settlement exceed the amount of compensation payable by
the Government in acquiring the land.
CIVIL
APPELLATE JURISDICTION:
Civil Appeals
Nos. 235 and 236 of 1960.
Appeals from the judgment and decree dated January 23, 1959 of the Assam High Court at Gauhati in
Civil Rules Nos. 138 and 139 of 1958.
N. C. Chatterjee, Amjad Ali and K. R. Chaudhuri,
for the appellant (in C. A. No. 235 of 1960).
D. N. Mukherjee, for the appellant (In C. A. No.
236 of 1960) .
S. M. Lahiri, Advocate.General, Assam and Naunit
Lal, for the respondents.
1961.
April 4.
The Judgment of the Court was
delivered by
Sonapur Tea
Co., Ltd.
v.
Must.
M azirunnessa
GAJENDRAGADKAR, J.-These two appeals arise out Gajendragadkar ].
of two writ petitions Nos. 138 and 139 of 1958 filed
respectively by the two appellants, Sonapur Tea Co.
Ltd., of 15-D Sambhunath Pandi Street, Calcutta 9,
and Musst. Mazirunnessa, wife of Abdul Gafur of Village Bhoknamari, District Kamrup, in which they
challenged the validity of the Assam Fixation of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act I of 1957 (hereafter called
the Act).
The said writ petitions have been dismissed by the Assam High Court substantially on the
ground that since the impugned Act falls within the
protection of Art. 31A the challenge made by the two
appellants to th"e several provisions of the Act under
Arts. 14, 19(1)(f) and 31(2) cannot be entertained.
Having dismissed the writ petitions principally on
this ground the High Court granted certificates to
both the appellants to come to this Court in appeal,
726
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
'96'
and so it is with the said certificates that the two
appeals have been brought to this Court.
Sonapur Tea
co., Ltd.
It is not necessary to set out the material facts leadv.
ing to the two writ petitions in any detail. It would
Must.
be enough to say that under s. 5 of the impugned Act
Mazfrunnessa
notices had been served on both the appellants by
G . d
dk
1 the respondent Deputy Commissioner and Collector of
a1en raga
ar 'K
ll"
h
t
b .
. .
amrup ca mg upon t em o su m1t a return g1vrng
the particulars of all their lands in the prescribed
form and stating therein their selection of plot or
plots of land (not exceeding in the aggregate the limits
fixed under s. 4) which they desired to retain under
the provisions of the Act. The appellants contended
before the High Court that the impugned Act under
which this notice had been served on them was
invalid and ultra vires and so they wanted the notice
issued under s. 5 to be quashed. That is the only
relevant fact which needs to be stated for deciding
the present appeals.
The Act received the assent of the President on
December 7, 1956, and was published in the official
State Gazette on January 16, 1957. Subsequently it
was amended by the amending Act XVII of 1957 and
assent was obtained to the amendment thus made on
November 8, 1957.
By a notification issued by the
State Government on February 7, 1958, the amended
Act came into force on February 15, 1958.
It is relevant to consider briefly the broad fea.
tures of the Act. It has been passed because the
Legislature deemed it necessary to make provision for
the imposition of limits on the amount of land that
may he held by a person in order to bring about an
equitable distribution of land. That being the object
of the Act the principal provision of the Act imposes
a ceiling on existing holding by s. 4.
The Act extends
to the seven Districts specified in s. 1(2), and from its
opera ti on are excepted the lands specified in els. (a)
to (e) of s. 2.
These clauses refer to !"ands belonging
to any religious or charitable institution of a public
nature, lands held for special cultivation of tea or purposes ancillary thereto and lands exceeding 150 highas
utilised for large scale cultivation of citrus in a. c0mpact block by any person before January 1, 1955, lands
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)
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1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
727
utilised by efficiently managed farms on which heavy
r96r
investments or permanent structural improvements
have been made and whose break np is likely to lead
Sonapu. Tea
to a fall in production, and lands held by a sugar facCo.,vud.
tory or a co-operative farming society for cultivation
Must.
of sugarcane for the purpose of such factory .. It Mazirunnessa
would thus be noticed that the measure of agrarian
. --
reform introduced by the Act has made exceptions in Ga1endragadkar J .
regard to lands which it thought should be left out of
the operation of the Act in the interest of the economy of the State. Section 3 is the definition section.
It defines land as meaning land which is or may be
utilised for agricultural purposes or purposes subservient thereto and includes the sites of buildings appurtenant to such land. Under s. 3(g) the word 'landholder' has the meaning assigned to it in the Assam
Land and Revenue Regulation, 1886 (Regulation I of
1886). 'Landlord' under s. 3(h) is a person immediately
under whom a tenant holds but does not include the
Government; and 'owner' under s. 3(i) includes proprietor, land-holder or settlement-holder as defined in
s. 3 of the Assam Land and Revenue Regulation I of
1886 but it does not include Government. Section 3(o)
defines 'tenant' as meaning a person who holds land
under another person and is, but for a specfal contract
would be, liable to pay rent for that land to the other
person, and includes a person who cultivates the land
of another person on condition of delivering a share
of the produce.
These are the only definitions which
are relevant for our purpose.
Section 4 which is the key section of the Act prescribes ceiling on existing holding. The limit prescribed is 150 bighas in the aggregate subject to its provisos.
Section 5 empowers the appropriate authorities to call for submission of returns by persons holding lands in excess of the ceiling. Section 8 empowers
the State Government to acquire such excess lands by
publishing in the official gazette a notification to the
effect that such lands are required for public purpose,
and such publication shall be conclusive evidence of
the notice of acquisition to the person or persons
holding such lands.
Acquisition of excess lands prescribed by s. 8 is followed by the vesting of the said
728
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
'96'
lands in the State nnder s. 9.
On publication of the
Sonapur Tea
notification under s. 8 all such excess lands ~hall stand
C
transferred to the State Government from the date of
o., Ltd.
v.
the publication of the said notification free from enMust.
cumbrances by their original owner or owners. Under
Mazirunnessa
s. 11 the Collector is authorised to take possession of
G . a--dk 1 the said lands. Section 12 prescribes the principles of
a;en raga
ar .
.
.
compensat10n and provides the manner in which the
said compensation should be apportioned between the
owner and the tenant; and s. 13 provides for the
manner of payment of such compensation. Under
s. 14 ad interim payment of compensation can be
made as specified.
These are the relevant provi~ions
in Chapter II which deals with ceiling on existing
holding and acquisition of excess land.
Chapter III deals with the disposal of excess land.
Under s. 16(1) if there is any cultivating tenant in
occupation of the land acquired from an owner then
he shall have the option of taking settlement of such
land within a prescribed period on the following conditions, namely, (a) that the area of land so settled
together with any other lands held by him or any
member of his family either as tenant or as owner
shall not exceed in the aggregate the limit fixed
under s. 4, and (b) that he shall pay to the State
Government in one or more equal annual instalments
not exceeding five an amount fixed by it but not exceeding the compensation payable by the State
Government for acquisition thereof, provided that he
shall have the right to adjust any amount which he
is entitled to receive as compensation under the provisions of the Act against an equal amount which he
is liable to pay under cl. (b).
Section 16(2) provides
that on payment of full amount under sub-section (1)
above the land shall be settled with a tenant with the
status of a landholder. Under s. 18 it is provided
that if a tenant in occupation of any land acquired
under s. 8 does not take settlement of such land he
shall acquire no right, title and interest in the land
and shall be liable to be ejected. Chapter IV deals
with excess land under annual lease and provides for
its taking over.
Chapter V puts a ceiling on future
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I S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
729
acquisition, and Chapter VI provides for ceiling for
r96r
resumption of land from tenants for personal cul ti val d
C
d
.c
h
Sonapur Tea
tion by the land or .
hapter VII provi es ..:or t e
Co. Ltd.
establishment of a Land Reform Board, and lays
v.
down its functions, while Chapter VIII contains misMust.
cellaneous provisions. That briefly is the scheme of Madnrnnessa
"
the Act.
.
Th
.
h' h
.
c
d . .
.
h
Ga1endrngadka' J
. e quest.ton w 10 arises 1or our e01s10n IS w e-
·
ther this Act is protected under Art. 31A of the Constitution. This Article has been construed by this
Court on several occasions iu dealing with legislative
measures of agrarian reforms. The object of such
reforms generally is to abolish the intermediaries between the State and the cultivator and to help the
actual cultivator by giving him the status of direct
relationship between himself and the State.
Article
31A(l)(a) provides that, notwithstanding anything
contained in Art. 13, no law providing for the acquisition by the State of any estate or of any rights there-
• in'or the extinguishment or modification of any such
rights, shall be deemed to be void on the ground that
it is inconsistent with or takes a way or abridges any
of the rights conferred by Art. 14, Art. 19 or Art. 31,
·'
provided that, where such law is a law made by the
Legislature of a State, the provisions of this Article
shall not apply thereto unless such law, having been
reserved for the consideration of the President, has
received his assent.
We have already seen that the
assent of the President has been obtained both for
the Act as it was originally passed and for the amending Act which subsequently modified some of the
provisions of the original Act, aud so the requirement
prescribed by the proviso to Art. 31A(l)(a) is satisfied.
That raises the question as to whether the rights of
the appellants which are undoubtedly taken away Ql'
abridged constitute rights in relation to an "estate"
as 'aefined by Art. 31A(2)(b).
vVe have already seen the definitions of land, landholder, landlord and tenant prescribed by s. 3(f), (g), (h)
and (o). It is common ground that the lands sought to
be acquired fall within an "estate" as defined by Art. 31
"
A(2). Do the rights vesting in the appellants amount
92
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730
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
r96r
to rights in relation to an "estate"? For deciding this
question it would be necessary to consider the provisonapur Tea
f h
1
1
c
sions o t e existing aw re ating to tenure in iorce in
Co. Ltd.
v.
Assam at the relevant time. The existing law relating
Must.
to land tenure is to be found in the provisions of the
Mazirunnessa
Assam Land and Revenue Regulation, 1886 (Regula-
. --
tion I of 1886). Section 3(g) of the said Regulation
Ga;endragadkar J. provides that a 'landholder' means any person deemed
'
to have acquired the status of a landholder under s. 8.
Now, when we turn to s. 8 we find that it provides
the manner in which the status of a landholder can
be acquired; and s. 9 provides for the rights of such
landholders. Under s. 9 a landholder shall have a
permanent, heritable and transferable right of use
and occupancy in his land subject to the payment of
revenue, taxes, cesses and rates from time to time
legally assessed or imposed in respect of the land.
The remaining two clauses of this section need not be
considered. It would be noticed that the expression
"rights in relation to an estate" is of a very wide •
amplitude and as such the 'context requires that it
must receive a very liberal interpretation. Thus considered there can be no doubt that the rights of the
appellants which have been extinguished undoubtedly
'·
constitute "rights in relation to an estate" as- defined
by Art. 31A (2) (b). Indeed this position is not
seriously disputed by Mr. Chatterjee who fairly conceded that having regard to the decisions of this Court
in Thakur Raghubir Singh v. The State of Ajmer
(Now llajasthan) (1), Sri Ram Ram Narain Medhi v.
The State of Bombay(') and Atma Ram v. The State of
P.unjab (3) he would not be able to contend that the
view taken by the High Court is erroneous.
Faced with this difficulty Mr. Chatterjee attempted
to argue that tho Act is a colourable piece of legislation and should be struck down as such. His argument
is that though ostensibly it purports to be a measure
of agrarian reform its principal object and indeed its
pith and substance is to acquire the property covered
by its provisions and make profit by disposing of the
(1) [1959] Supp. r S.C.R. 478.
(2) [1959] Supp. I S.C.R. 489.
(3) [1959] Supp. r S.C.R. 748.
...
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I S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
731
· same in the manner provided by Chapter III. Mr.
r96r
Chatterjee seemed to suggest that the Legislature
Id
h
d .
f
h
Sonapur Tea
shou
not ave ma e it necessary or t e tenants to
Co. Ltd.
exercise an option for taking settlement under s. 16
v.
because the exercise of the said option involves the
Must.
liability to pay the prescribed amount though in five
Mazirunnessa
instalments, and that, according to Mr. Chatterjee,
.
-
indicates that the State wanted to make profit out of Ga;endragadkar f.
the bargain. Mr. Chatterjee's grievance is against the
provisions of s. 18 also under which a tenant who does
not opt for settlement is liable to be evicted. We are not
impressed by this argument. The doctrine of colourable
legislation really postulates that legislation attempts
to do indirectly what it cannot do directly. In other
words, though the letter of the law is within the limits
of the powers of the Legislature, in substance the law
has transgressed those powers and by doing so it has
taken the precaution of concealing its real purpose
under the cover of apparently legitimate and reasonable provisions (Vide:
K. G. Gajapati Narayan Dea v .
The State of Orissa) (' ).
This position is not and cannot be disputed.
•
Is Mr. Chatterjee, however, right when he contends
that the pith and substance of the Act and indeed its
main object is to acquire property and dispose of it at
a protit? That is the question which calls for our decision. In our opinion the answer to this question must
obviously be against the appellants. The whole object
of the Act which is writ large in all its provisions is
to abolish the intermediaries and leave the lands
either with the tiller or the cultivator. With that
object. ceiling has been prescribed by s. 4, provisions
have been made for the acquisition of excess lands,
and disposal of excess lands in favour of the tenants
have been provided for. It is significant that in settling the lauds upon the tenants it is expressly provided
that the payment which the tenant may have to make
-and that too in one or more easy instalments not
exceeding five-will never exceed the compensation
payable by the State Government for acquisition
(1) [1954] S.C.R. t.
732
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
'96'
thereof. This provision clearly negatives the assumpSbnapur Tea
tion made by Mr. Chatterjee that any profit is intended to be made in the matter of disposal of excess
Co. Ltd.
v.
lands. The State is paying compensation to the per.
Must.
sons dispossessed under the principles prescribed by
Maziruunessa
s. 12; amongst the persons entitled to sunh compensa-
--
tion tena.nts are included, and when the State proGajendra"adkar ].
d
t l ] d
.
h
b
cee s to se t e an s on tenants 1t expects t em to pay
a fair amount of price for the land and puts a ceiling
on this price that it shall never exceed the amount of
compensation payable in respect of the said land. In
our opinion this provision is very fair and reasonable
and it would be idle to attack it as a piece of colour.
able legislation. We have already seen that the
settlement of land on the tenants would make them
landholders and that is the basic idea of the Act. If a
tenant does not agree to take settlement it cannot
be helped and so the land would then have to be
taken from him and given over to somebody else who
would be prepared to take settlement. It is thus clear
that the object of putting ceiling on existing holding
•
is to take over excess lands and settle them on actual
cultivators or tenants and that is the essential feature
of agrarian reform undertaken by several States in
the country. The Act conforms to the pattern usually
followed in that behalf and the attack against its
validity on the ground that it is a colourable piece of
legislation must therefore fail.
In the result we hold that there is no substance
in the two appeals. They are accordingly dismissed
with costs-one set of hearing.
Appeals dismissed.
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