# SOORARAM PRATAP REDDY & ORS v. DISTRICT COLLECTOR, RANGA REDDY DISTT. & ORS

- **Citation:** [2008] 13 S.C.R. 126
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 2008-09-05
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 5509 of 2008
- **Bench:** C.K. Thakker, D.K. Jain
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/sooraram-pratap-reddy-ors-v-district-collector-ranga-reddy-distt-ors-23706
- **Pages:** 75

## Headnote

Land Acquisition Act, 1894 - Part II, ss. 4 and 6 - Land
acquisition - For development of infrastructure of city - The
c project for the development was integrated involving State
agency as well as private company - Acquisition challenged
as illegal, malafide and not meant for 'public purpose' - Held:
Land acquisition proceedings were not illegal, or in colourable
exercise of power - Government was right in forming an opinion
0 as to public purpose - Development of infrastructure is legal
and legitimate 'public purpose' for exercising power of eminent
~
domain - An integrated and indivisible project has to be
considered as a whole for determining whether it is a larger
public interest - Involvement of a private company for the
purpose, would not make the exercise of power of acquisition
E bad or malafide - Government is the best judge to decide as
to what constitutes 'public purpose' - The Court, in exercise of
jurisdiction under Articles 32, 136 or 226 cannot substitute its
own judgment for the judgment of the Government in this
regard - Constitution of India, 1950 -Articles 32, 136 and 226
F - Andhra Pradesh Infrastructure Development Enabling Act,
2001.
Words and Phrases - 'Eminent domain' and 'Public
purpose' - Meaning of in the context of Land acquisition act,
G 1894.
The State Government, in the background of 'World
Tourism Organization Report' and 'Vision 2020
Documents' took a policy decision for the development
of the city of Hyderabad, and decided to establish an
H
126
SOORARAM PRATAP REDDY & ORS. v. DISTRICT 127
>
COLLECTOR, RANGA REDDY DISTT. & ORS.
Integrated Project to be implemented through its nodal A
agency Andhra Pradesh Infrastructure and Investment
'
. Corporation (APllC) to make the city a world class
business destination. The State Government acquired
land for the purported development of 'Financial District
·1
and Allied Projects'. It also invoked urgency clause u/s 17 B
of Land Acquisition Act dispensing with procedure u/s
5A of the Act.
)
Appellants filed writ petitions challenging the
acquisition on the grounds that the acquisition was not
for public purpose, but the same was with ma/afide c
intention to transfer the same to a foreign company and
:i
few persons with vested interest; that the action has been
1
taken in colourable exercise of power and in violation cf
~
the Act as well as several other statutes. High Court
~ft(
upheld the acquisition. However, it held the urgency 0
clause as illegal and hence directed to proceed by
following the procedure u/s 5A. Wirt appeals were also
filed which was dismissed by Division Bench of High
Court. Hence the present appeals .
...
E
'
Dismissing the appeals, the Court
HELD: 1.1. The proceedings initiated by the State for
acquisition of land under the Lc:md Acquisition Act, 1894
are not illegal, unlawful, unwarranted, ma/a fide, fraud on
....
statute or taken in colourable exercise of power. On the
...
'
facts and in the circumstances of the present case, the
Government was right in forming an opinion and reaching
a satisfaction as to 'public purpose' and in initiating
proceedings u/s 4 and 6 and in invoking Part II of the Act.
[Paras 166 and 167] [198 C-F]
G
1.2 Section 4 of the Act expressly authorizes the
appropriate Government to issue preliminary notification
for acquisition of land likely to be needed for any public
purpose or 'for a company'. Likewise, Section 6 declares
that when the appropriate Government is satisfied that a H
128
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2008] 13 S.C.R.
A particular land is needed for a public puipose or 'for a
company', a declaration shall be made to that effect. It is
thus clear that appropriate Government may acquire land
if such land is needed for any public purpose or 'for a
company'. If it is so, acquisition will be governed by Part
B II of the Act and the procedure laid down in the said Part
has to be followed. Part VII, on the other hand, deals with
acquisition of land for companies. [Para 106] [176-C-E]
Babu Barkya Thakur v.

## Text

_Characters 0–39,997 of 146,975. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39997 for what follows._

A
B
[2008] 13 S.C.R. 126
SOORARAM PRATAP REDDY & ORS.
v.
DISTRICT COLLECTOR, RANGA REDDY DISTT. & ORS.
(Civil Appeal No. 5509 of 2008)
SEPTEMBER 5, 2008
[C.K. THAKKER AND D.K. JAIN, JJ.]
Land Acquisition Act, 1894 - Part II, ss. 4 and 6 - Land
acquisition - For development of infrastructure of city - The
c project for the development was integrated involving State
agency as well as private company - Acquisition challenged
as illegal, malafide and not meant for 'public purpose' - Held:
Land acquisition proceedings were not illegal, or in colourable
exercise of power - Government was right in forming an opinion
0 as to public purpose - Development of infrastructure is legal
and legitimate 'public purpose' for exercising power of eminent
~
domain - An integrated and indivisible project has to be
considered as a whole for determining whether it is a larger
public interest - Involvement of a private company for the
purpose, would not make the exercise of power of acquisition
E bad or malafide - Government is the best judge to decide as
to what constitutes 'public purpose' - The Court, in exercise of
jurisdiction under Articles 32, 136 or 226 cannot substitute its
own judgment for the judgment of the Government in this
regard - Constitution of India, 1950 -Articles 32, 136 and 226
F - Andhra Pradesh Infrastructure Development Enabling Act,
2001.
Words and Phrases - 'Eminent domain' and 'Public
purpose' - Meaning of in the context of Land acquisition act,
G 1894.
The State Government, in the background of 'World
Tourism Organization Report' and 'Vision 2020
Documents' took a policy decision for the development
of the city of Hyderabad, and decided to establish an
H
126
SOORARAM PRATAP REDDY & ORS. v. DISTRICT 127
>
COLLECTOR, RANGA REDDY DISTT. & ORS.
Integrated Project to be implemented through its nodal A
agency Andhra Pradesh Infrastructure and Investment
'
. Corporation (APllC) to make the city a world class
business destination. The State Government acquired
land for the purported development of 'Financial District
·1
and Allied Projects'. It also invoked urgency clause u/s 17 B
of Land Acquisition Act dispensing with procedure u/s
5A of the Act.
)
Appellants filed writ petitions challenging the
acquisition on the grounds that the acquisition was not
for public purpose, but the same was with ma/afide c
intention to transfer the same to a foreign company and
:i
few persons with vested interest; that the action has been
1
taken in colourable exercise of power and in violation cf
~
the Act as well as several other statutes. High Court
~ft(
upheld the acquisition. However, it held the urgency 0
clause as illegal and hence directed to proceed by
following the procedure u/s 5A. Wirt appeals were also
filed which was dismissed by Division Bench of High
Court. Hence the present appeals .
...
E
'
Dismissing the appeals, the Court
HELD: 1.1. The proceedings initiated by the State for
acquisition of land under the Lc:md Acquisition Act, 1894
are not illegal, unlawful, unwarranted, ma/a fide, fraud on
....
statute or taken in colourable exercise of power. On the
...
'
facts and in the circumstances of the present case, the
Government was right in forming an opinion and reaching
a satisfaction as to 'public purpose' and in initiating
proceedings u/s 4 and 6 and in invoking Part II of the Act.
[Paras 166 and 167] [198 C-F]
G
1.2 Section 4 of the Act expressly authorizes the
appropriate Government to issue preliminary notification
for acquisition of land likely to be needed for any public
purpose or 'for a company'. Likewise, Section 6 declares
that when the appropriate Government is satisfied that a H
128
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2008] 13 S.C.R.
A particular land is needed for a public puipose or 'for a
company', a declaration shall be made to that effect. It is
thus clear that appropriate Government may acquire land
if such land is needed for any public purpose or 'for a
company'. If it is so, acquisition will be governed by Part
B II of the Act and the procedure laid down in the said Part
has to be followed. Part VII, on the other hand, deals with
acquisition of land for companies. [Para 106] [176-C-E]
Babu Barkya Thakur v. State of Bombay (now Maharashtra)
and Ors., 1961 (1) SCR 128; Pandit Jhandulal and Ors. v.
C State of Punjab and Ors. 1961 (2) SCR 459; R.L. Arora (I) v.
State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors., 1962 Supp (2) SCR 149;
R.L. Arora (II) v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors., 1964 (6)
SCR 784; Arnold Rodricks vs. State of Maharashtra 1966 (3)
SCR 885; Jage Ram and Ors. v. State of Haryana and Ors.
D 1971 (1) SCC 671; Aflatoon and Ors. v. Lieutenant Governor
of Delhi and Ors. 1975 (4) SCC 285 Ajay Krishan Singhal 1/.
Union of India, 1996 (10) SCC 721; S.S. Darshan v. State of
Karnataka and Ors. 1996 (7) SC 302; WB. Housing Board
Etc. v. Brijendra Prasad Gupta (1997) 6 SCC 207; Pratibha
E Nema and Ors. v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Ors. 2003
(10) SCC 626; State of Karnataka amd Anr v. All India
Manufacturers Organisation and Ors. 2006 (4) SCC 683;
Srinivasa Cooperative House Building Society Ltd. v. Madam
Gurumurthy Sastry and Ors. 1994 (4) sec 675 - relied on.
F
Motibhai Vithalbhai Patel and Anr. v State of Gujarat
G
H
and Anr AIR 1961 Guj 931 Amarnath Ashram Trust Society
and Anr v. Governor of UP and Ors., 1998 (1) sec 591;
Oevinder Singh and Ors., v. State of Punjab and Ors. 2008 (1)
sec 728 - referred to.
1.3 The expression 'public purpose' is of very wide
amplitude. It is merely illustrative and not exhaustive. The
inclusive definition does not restrict its ambit and scope.
The expression is incapable of precise and comprehensive
definition. And it is neither desirable nor advisable to attempt
>
SOORARAM PRATAP REDDY & ORS. v. DISTRICT 129
COLLECTOR, RANGA REDDY DISTT. & ORS.
· to define it. It is used in a generic sense of including any A
purpose wherein even a fraction of the community may be
interested or by which it may be benefited. A 'public
purpose' is thus wider than a 'public necessity'. Purpose
"1
is more pervasive than urgency. That which one sets
'
before him to accomplish, an end, intention, aim, object, B
plan or project, is purpose. A need or necessity, on the
other hand, is urgent, unavoidable, compulsive. Public
purpose should be liberally construed, not whittled down
by logomachy. [Paras 67, 86] [163-H; 164-A-B 169-A-B]
-,
State of Bombay v. Bhanji Munji 1955 (1) SCR 777 - c
followed.
State of Bihar v. Kameshwar Singh 1952 SCR 889; State
of Bombay v. Ali Gu/shan 1955 (2) SCR 867; State of Bombay
--.•
v. R.S. Nanji 1956 SCR 18; Somawanti (Smt.) and Ors. v.
D
State of Punjab and Ors. 1963 (2) SCR 77 4; Arnold Rodricks
v. State o Maharashtra 1966 (3) SCR 885; Bhim Singhji v.
Union of India and Ors. 1981 (1) SCC 166; Dau/at Singh
Surana v. First Land Acquisition Collector 2007 (1) SCC 641;
State of Kamataka and Anr. v. Ranganatha Reddy and Anr.
E
1977 (4) SCC 471; National Textile Workers' Union and Ors.
v. PR. Ramakrishnan and Ors. 1983 (1) SCC 228 ·relied on.
Hamabai Framjee Petit v. Secretary of State 1911
-
(13)Bom LR 1097; Veeraraghavachartar v. Secretary of State
1926 (49) Mad 237 : AIR 1925 Mad 837; Hamabai Framjee
F
Petit v. Secretary of State 1914 (42) IA 44 : AIR 1914 PC 20
- referred to.
Tenth Report of the Law Commission of India on "The
~
Law of Acquisition and Requisitioning of Land" - referred to.
1.4 It is inherent power of a governmental entity to G
)o.
take privately owned property, especially land and convert
it to pubHc ·use, subject to reasonable compensation for
the taking. 'Eminent domain' may be defined as the right
or power of a sovereign State to take private property for H
130
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2008] 13 S.C.R.
...
A public use without the owner's consent upon the payment
of just compensation. It means nothing more or less than
an inherent political right, founded on a common necessity
and interest of appropriating the property of individual
members of the community to the great necessities and
B common good of the whole society. The power of eminent
domain is merely a means to an end; viz. larger public
interest. The power does not depend for its existence on
a specific grant. It is inherent and exists in every sovereign
State without any recognition thereof in the Constitution
c or in any statute. It is founded on the law of necessity.
The power is inalienable. No Legislature can bind itself or
its successors not to exercise this power when public
necessity demands it. Nor it can be abridged or restricted
by agreement or contract. [Paras 36, 37, 40 and 41] [153D C-F 154-D-F]
.,,.
Charanjit Lal Chowdhury v. Union of India and Ors. 1950 (1)
SCR 869; Deputy Commissioner and Collector Kamrup and Ors.
v. Durganath Sarma (1968) 1 SCR 561; Coffee Board, Kamataka,
Bangalore v. Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Kamataka
E and Ors. 1988 (3) SCC 263; Scindia Employees' Union v. State
of Maharashtra and Ors. 1996 (10) SCC 150; Sharda Devi v.
State of Bihar and Anr. 2003 (3) sec 128 - relied on.
Faflbrook Irrigation District v. Bradley 1896 (164) U.S.
112 : 41 Law Ed. 369; Rindge Co. v. Los Angles County
'r
F 1923 (262) US 700: 67; Law Ed 1186; New York City Housing
Authority v. Muller, 270 NYP 333: 105 ALR 905; Muray v. La
Guardia, 291 NY 320; Samuel Berman v Andrew Parker 1954
(348) US 26 : 99 L Ed 27 : 75 S Ct 98; Hawaii Housing
Authority v. Midkiff 467 US 229 : 81 L Ed 2d 186 : 104 S Ct
G 2321; Susette Keio v. City of New London 2005 (545) US 469
: 125 S Ct 2655 : 162 L Ed 439 - referred to.
American Jurisprudence, 2d, Volume 26, pp. 638-39,
para 1; Corpus Juris Secundum, Volume 29, p. 776, para 1;
H Words & Phrases, Permanent Edition, Volume 14, pp. 468-
SOORARAM PRATAP REDDY & ORS. v. DISTRICT 131
COLLECTOR, RANGA REDDY DISTT & ORS.
70; Advanced Law Lexicon by P Ramanatha Aiyar Volume A
2, page 1575; 'De Jure, Belli et Pacis' by Grotius; 'Eminent
Domain' by Nichols; 'Constitutional Limitations' by Cooley;
'Constitutional Law' by Willis - referred to.
1.5 Development· of infrastructure is legal and
legitimate 'public purpose' for exercising power of eminent B
domain. Simply because a Company has been chosen
for fulfillment of such public purpose does not mean that
the larger public interest has been sacrificed, ignored or
disregarded. It will also not make exercise of power bad,
ma/a fide or for collateral purpose vitiating the C
proceedings. [Para 168] [199-B-C]
1.6 In case of integrated and indivisible project, the
project has to be taken as a whole and must be judged
whether it is in the larger public interest. It cannot be split 0
into different components and to consider whether each
and every component will serve public good. A holistic
approach has to be adopted in such matters. If the project
taken as a whole is an attempt in the direction of bringing
foreign exchange, generating employment opportunities
and securing economic benefits to the State and the public E
at large, it will serve public. purpose. [Para 169] [199-C-E]
1.7 It is established in this case that the present
Infrastructure Development Project conceived by the
State and executed under the auspices of its F
instrumentality (APllC) is one covered by the Act. The
Joint Venture Mechanism for implementing the policy,
executing the project and achieving lawful public purpose
for realizing the goal of larger public good would neither
destroy the object nor vitiate the exercise of power of G
public purpose for development of infrastructure. [Para
170] [199-E-F]
2. Normally, a writ Court will not propel into the
unchartered ocean of Governmental Policy. In the instant
case, in deciding whether acquisition is for 'public H
132
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2008] 13 S.C.R.
A purpose' or not, prima facie, Government is the best judge.
The entire amount of compensation is to be paid by State
agency (APllC) which also works as nodal agency for
execution of the project. It is primarily for the State to
decide whether there exists public purpose or not.
B Undoubtedly, the decision of the State is not beyond
judicial scrutiny. In appropriate cases, where such power
is exercised ma/a fide or for collateral purposes or the
purported action is de hors the Act, irrational or otherwise
unreasonable or the so-called purpose is 'no public
c purpose' at all and fraud on statute is apparent, a writcourt can undoubtedly interfere. But except in such cases,
the declaration of the Government is not subject to judicial
review. A writ court, while exercising powers under Articles
32, 226 or 136 of the Constitution, cannot substitute its
0 own judgment for the judgment of the Government as to
what constitutes 'public purpose'.[Paras 99, 153 and 171]
[174-A-B; 194-E, 199-H 200-A-C]
Bennett Coleman and Co. v. Union of India 1972 (2)
SCC 788; Dhampur Sugar (Kashipur) Ltd. v. State of
E Uttaranchal and Ors. 2007 (8) SCC 418; Hamabai Framjee
Petit v. Secretary of State 1914 (42) IA 44 : AIR 1914 PC 20;
State of Bombay vs. R.S. Nanji 1956 SCR 18; Bajirao T. Kate
(dead) by LRs. and Anr. v. State of Maharashtra and Ors.
1995 (2) SCC 442; Laxman Rao Bapurao Jadhav v. State of
F Maharashtra 1997 (3) sec 493; Dau/at Singh surana vs.
G
H
First Land Acquisition Collector 2007(1) SCC 641 - relied on.
Somawanti (Smt.) and Ors. vs. state of Punjab and Ors.
1963 (2) SCR 774 - referred to.
Case Law Reference
1896 (164) U.S. 112
(1923) 262 us 700
270 NYP 333
291 NY 320
Referred to
Para 45
Referred to
Para 47 ·
Referred to
Para 48
Referred to
Para 49
,
SOORARAM PRATAP REDDY & ORS. v. DISTRICT 133
~
COLLECTOR, RANGA REDDY DISTT. & ORS.
1954 (348) us 26
Referred to
Para 51
A
467 us 229
Referred to
Para 54
2005 (545) us 469
Referred to
Para 55
1950 (1) SCR 869
Relied on
Para 60
~.
1968 (1) SCR 561
Relied on
Para 62
B
1988 (3) sec 263
Relied on
Para 63
1996 (10) sec 150
Relied on
Para 64
2003 (3) sec 128
Relied on
Para 65
(1911) 13 Born LR 1097 Referred to
Para 69
c
(1914) 42 IA 44
Referred to
Paras 71
and 154
1926 (49) Mad 237
Referred to
Para 72
1952 SCR 889
Relied on
Para 73
D
1955 (2) SCR 867
Relied on
Para 76
1955 (1) SCR 777
followed
Para 77
1956 SCR 18
Relied on
Paras 77
and 155
E
1963 (2) SCR 77 4
Relied on
Paras 79
and 156
1966 (3) SCR 885
Relied on
Para 82
1981 (1) SCC.166
Relied on
Para 83
F
2001 (1) sec 641
Relied on
Paras 84
and 164
1977 (4) sec 471
Relied on
Para 87
1983 (1) sec 228
Relied on
Para 88
1972 (2) sec 788
Relied on
Para 99
G
2001 (8) sec 418
Relied on
Para 100
>-'
1961 (1) SCR 128
Relied
on Para 109
1961 (2) SCR 459
Relied on
Para 112
H
134
A
B
c
D
SUPREME COURT r-<EPORTS
1962 Supp (2) SCR 149 Relied on
1964 (6) seR 784
Relied on
Referred to
Relied on
Relied on
Relied on
Relied on
Relied on
Relied on
[2008] 13 S.C.R.
Para ·116
Para 121
Para 123
Para 130
Para 132
Para 134
Para 136
Para 140
Para 144
AIR 1961 Guj 93
1911 (1) sec 671
1975 (4) sec 285
1996 (1 O) sec 121
1996 (7) SC 302
1997 (6) sec 201
2003 (10) sec 626
2006 (4) sec 683
1998 (1) sec 591
2008 (1) sec 728
1994 (4) sec 675
1995 (2) sec 442
1997 (3) sec 493
Relied on
Para 146
Referred to
Para 148
Referred to
Para 150
Relied on
Relied on
Relied on
Para 160
Para 161
Para 163
CIVILAPPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 5509
E of 2008
F
From the final Judgment and Order dated 1.2.2005 of the
High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad in Writ Appeal No.
44 of 2005
WITH
C.A. Nos. 5510-5515 of 2008
Goolam E. Vahanwati, SG., Harish N. Salve, Ranjit Kumar,
P.S. Patwalia, Mahindra Anand, ATM Rangaramanujan, M.N.
G Rao, 1.V. Narayana, P.P. Rao, K.K. Veenugopal and RF Nariman,
G. Ramakrishna Prasad, Suyodhan Byrapaneni, G. Arun,
Siddharth Patnaik, Neelam Jain, ,;nna D.N. Rao, Rita Kumari
Gupta, Manjeet Kirpal, Paramjeet Singh (forT.N. Rao), V. Sridhar
Reddy, V.N. Raghupathy, Kcimal Gupta, S. Udaya Kumar Sagar,
H Nupur, Bina Madhuvan (for Mis. Lawyer's Knit & Co.), A.
SOORARAM PRATAP REDDY & ORS. v. DISTRICT 135
/
COLLECTOR, RANGA REDDY DISTI. & ORS.
j
Ramesh, Anushman Ashok, K. Rajeev, P.S. Narasimha, Guntur A
Prabhakar, Devdath Karnath, G. Maloji Rao, M. Rao, Nikhil
Nayyar, Ankit Singhal, TVS Raghavendra Sreyas, Manoj
Saxena, Rahul Shukla, Ranjneesh Kr. Singh, TV. George,
Shireen Sethna Bana, Rahul Ravindran, R. Sudhinder, Nikhil
Shrivastava, S. Sravanthi, Ankur, Gaurav Srivastava, Ashok
B
Mathur, P.S. Narasimha, M. Gireesh Kumar and K.H. Nobin
Singh for the appearing parties.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
C.K. THAKKER, J. 1. Leave granted.
c
2. All these appeals are filed by the appellants being
aggrieved and dissatisfied with the judgment and order passed
by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in various Letters Patent
Appeals as also in Writ Petitions. By the said orders, the High
Court rejected the prayer of the appellants for quashing D
proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter
referred to as 'the Act') for acquisition of land being illegal, unlawful,
mala fide and in colourable exercise of power by the State.
Factual background
E
3. To appreciate the controversy in the present appeals,
it is appropriate to refer to the facts in the first matter i.e. Civil
Appeal arising out of SLP(C) No. 2239 of 2006 (Sooraram
Pratap Reddy & Ors. v Deputy Collector, Ranga Reddy &
Ors.). It was the case of the appellants before the High Court
F
.-....,
that the Government of Andhra Pradesh sought to acquire a
large chunk of land in the name of 'public purpose' for the
purported development of 'Financial District and Allied Projects'.
Accordi~g to the appellants, the action has been taken in
colourable exercise of power and in total violation of the Land G
Acqusition Act, 1894 as well as several other statutes in force
in the State of Andhra Pradesh; such as, Andhra Pradesh Urban
Area Development Act, 1975; Zoning Regulations; Environment
(Protection) Act, 1986; Water (Prevention and Control of
Pollution) Act, 1974 etc. The action has been taken. alleged the
H
136
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2008] 13 S.C.R .
. A.
appellants, with mala fide intention and oblique motive to transfer
valuable land of small farmers to a foreign company and few
selected persons with vested interest.
4. A notification under Section 4 of the Act was published
in the State Government Gazette on July 17, 2002. The said
8
action was challenged and the validity of notification was
questioned in a writ petition in the High Court of Andhra Pradesh.
The High Court dismissed the petition following an earlier
decision in Writ Petition No. 21712 of 2002 by observing that
the writ petition involved similar issues. The High Court, however,
C directed that 'urgency clause' sought to be invoked by the
Government under Section 17 of the Act was illegal, unlawful
and unwarranted. That part of the notification was, therefore,
set aside and the Authorities were directed to proceed to hear
objections of the owners/interested persons by following
D procedure under Section 5A of the Act. According to the
appellants, the High Court was wholly wrong in dismissing the
writ petition relying on the judgment in Writ Petition No. 21712
of 2002 since in that case, the Court has considered only one
issue; viz. the acquisition was or was not for public purpose as
E the beneficiary was Andhra Pradesh Industrial Infrastructure
Corporation Limited ('APllC' for short). Really, the property has
been given in bounty to a foreign Company which was not lawful.
The High Court failed to consider and decide several important
and crucial issues raised by the small landowners.
F
5. Being aggrieved by the order passed in the writ petition,
the appellants preferred Writ Appeal which was also dismissed.
The appellants have, therefore, approached this Court by filing
the present appeal. Initially, notice was issued. Several matters
raising similar issues were also filed and all were ordered to be
G placed for hearing together.
H
6. We have heard learned counsel for thP. parties.
Submissions of appellants
7. The !earned counsel for the appellant;; contended that
SOORARAM PRATAP REDDY & ORS. v. DISTRICT 137
~
COLLECTOR, RANGA REDDY DISTI. & ORS. [C.K. THAKKER, J.]
the High Court was wholly wrong in dismissing writ-petitions as A
also writ appeals. According to the appellants, land acquisition
proceedings were clearly unlawful, illegal, mala fide and violative
of the fundamental rights of the appellants. They were taken in
colourable exercise of power by the authorities. The appellants
are small land-holders and their only livelihood was dependant B
~.
on land attempted to be acquired by the respondents. According
to the appellants, there was no 'public purpose' as defined in
the Act and the land is acquired for a private foreign company.
The acquisition was, therefore, bad in law and for a collateral
purpose, It was also submitted that even if it is assumed for the c
sake of argument that the land could be acquired for a public
purpose by a private Company, the procedure for acquisition of
land by a private company under Part VII of the Act ought to
have been followed and not the procedure under Part II providing
for acquisition of land by the State Authorities. It was urged that D
in the era of globalization, if a foreign company wanted to
-y"
establish its business, it was required to follow the prescribed
procedure and parties must be left to settle their deal by entering
into mutual agreement for sale and purchase of properties. In
other words, according to the appellants, power of 'eminent
E
domain' has no application to such cases. The provisions of
the Act must be strictly construed and judicial scrutiny in such
matters i.e. in the matters of acquisition of land by the State or
its instrumentality for a private party, namely, for use and
occupation of land by a foreign company should be very strict:
It was further submitted that proceedings were totally mala fide
F
-(
which was clear from the fact that huge land owned and
possessed by influential persons such as, Smt. Vijay Nirmala,
a well-known actress and other persons in public life had been
excluded. Thus, rich landlords and politically patronage persons
have been excluded from acquisition of land and appellants G
and other persons who were small or marginal farmers earning
their bread were deprived of their property. Malicious action on
,._
the part of the State Authorities was also clear from the fact that
though the land was sought to be acquired for industrial policy
of the Government, initially, 'urgency clause' was applied and
H
138
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2008] 13 S.C.R.
A
Section 17 was pressed in service. It was because of the High
Court's intervention that urgency clause was quashed and
authorities were directed to take action in accordance with law
and only thereafter notices were issued and procedure under
Section 5A of the Act was followed. On all these grounds, it was
B submitted that proceedings are liable to be quashed.
Submissions of respondents
8. The learned counsel for the respondents, on the other hand,
supported the orders passed by the High Courts. They submitted
C that the land was acquired under the Act for 'public purpose' after
following procedure laid down in the Act and the acquisition was
legal, lawful and in consonance with law and no interference is called
for by this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution.
9. Affidavits were filed by the contesting respondents. So
o far as the State Authorities are concerned, a counter-affidavit
was filed by Special Deputy Collector, Land Acquisition
(Industries), Hyderabad. In the said affidavit, it was, inter a/ia,
contended that appellants were not small land-holders or
marginal farmers. Most of them have converted agricultural lands
E unauthorizedly into housing plots and sold them to various
builders/ developers/property dealers/estate agents and they
were not cultivating the land. No doubt, there were certain small
land-owners/farmers also. But, it was contended by the State,
that because of industrial policy of the State Government, a
decision was taken to construct 'Information Technology Park',
F
under the Information Technology and Hardware Industrial Policy
2005-10 and for the said purpose land was sought to be
acquired under the provisions of the Act. Proceedings were,
therefore, initiated and necessary notification was issued. There
was no illegality in the procedure contemplated under the Act
G for acquisition of land. APllC is an instrumentality of State which
was to pay the entire amount of compensation and such action
could not be said to be illegal or contrary to law. It was, therefore,
submitted that the appeals are liable to be dismissed.
H
10. APllC in its affidavit filed by the General Manager
SOORARAM PRATAP REDDY & ORS. v. DISTRICT 139
~-
COLLECTOR, RANGA REDDY DISTI. & ORS. [CK THAKKER, J.]
(Law), contended that it was wholly owned undertaking of the A
Government of State of Andhra Pradesh and has been
developing infrastructural projects in the State to facilitate socioeconomic progress. According to the deponent, large extent of
Government land in various villages of Ranga Reddy District in
the periphery of Hyderabad were handed over to_ the Corporation
B
for the development of special projects like Software Lay Out,
Indian School of Business, Indian Institute of Information
Technology, Hitech City, National Games Village, Sports Stadia,
Integrated International Convention Centre, Golf Course,
Financial District, etc. Some of the projects have already taken c
shape and others are in various stages of development. It was
submitted that time was a critical factor for implementation of
those projects. In view of development of these special projects,
the respondent-Corporation would be improving facilities in the
round-about areas. It was for fulfillment of this industrial policy D
-.,
and completion of several projects that notifications under the
Act were issued by the State. The High Court was satisfied
about public purpose and hence rejected the ground put forward
by land-owners that acquisition was not for public purpose.
According to the High Court, however, the procedure laid down
in the Act was required to be follow~d by issuing notices under
E
Section 5A and urgency clause under Section 17 of the Act
could not have been invoked. In several cases, awards were
made and possession of the land was also taken over. In some
-~
other cases, award is not passed and the land is still in the
F
possession of the land-owners. That, however, dbes not mean
that proceedings under the Act were illegal or unlawful.
11. According toAPllC, the Government of Andhra Pradesh
introduced Tourism Department which established a transparent
framework of enabling private sector and tourism sector in the G
State. The State had undertaken such projects under the name
and style of "Establishment of Hyderabad as a Business-cumr
Liaison Destination" with a goal of transforming into world class
business destination, to be the leader in knowledge sector.
Pursuant to such project, Integrated Convention Centre Complex
H
140
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(2008] 13 S.C.R.
A (ICCC) is being developed by the State Govem:nent on the
basis of "Public Private Partnership" (PPP) format. Under the
said project, International Convention Centre and business hotel
adjoining Hi-tech Business Centre were already established.
Similarly, International Golf Champion Course with multiuse
B development was sought to be set up.
12. The Government of Andhra Pradesh designated APllC
as Nodal Agency for development of Integrated Project. Emaar
Properties, PJSC, Dubai was selected in internation::'
competitive bidding for implementation of the project. The
C Government issued orders approving structure and
implementation of the project. A collaboration agreement was
entered into between APllC and Emaar Properties, Dubai to
implement the project. APllC was having 26% share while Emaar
Properties is having 7 4% share capital. Joint Venture companies
D were incorporated with the Registrar of Companies, Andhra
Pradesh, Hyderabad with registered office at Hyderabad for
taking different components of integrated project. Several
projects are about to be over. Some projects are going on and
some are to be undertaken. Total cost according to APllC
E excluding operating and financial course of the integrated project
is more than Rs.550 crores. It was submitted that considering
the project in its entirety, the High Court was wholly right and
fully justified in dismissing the petition and not interfering with
the land acquisition proceedings.
F
13. Emaar had also filed an afiid<ivit through General
Manager, denying allegations and controverting averments
made by the writ-petitioners contending that the petitions are
misconceived and ill-founded and the petitioners were not
entitled to any relief. It was stated that the Special Deputy
G Collector, Land Acquisition in its affidavit has rightly stated that
land-owners were not small farm2rs, small owners/marginal
farmers but they have illegally r::on•1erted agrjr;ultural land into
non-agricultural land and have ::;oic/ transferred/ allotted to
H builders/ developers/ real estate owners of properties.
SOORARAM PRATAP REDDY & ORS. v. DISTRICT 141
COLLECTOR, RANGA REDDY DISTT & ORS. [C.K. THAKKER, J.]
Acquisition was for industrial policy of State and APllC was the
A
\
Nodal Agency which was an 'instrumentality' of the 'State'. The
(
amount of compensation was to be paid by APllC and
acquisition was under power of 'eminent domain'. Acquisition
-1
is not for foreign company or private party and the High Court
was right in not insisting for following procedure laid down in
B
Part VII of the Act as the case is covered by procedure
prescribed in Part II of the Act. Public purpose was precise,
perfect and lawful and the land was acquired in consonance
~
with the procedure laid down in the Act. It was only with a view
to delay the proceedings that petitions were filed by the c
petitioners which has resulted in gross injustice to Emaar which
has made large investments.
14. According to Emaar, the City of Hyderabad was sought
to be transformed into Business-cum-Liaison Destination as
"f
envisaged 1by the Government and public and private sectors'
D
participation investment had been thought proper through
Integrated Project under Industrial Policy of the State 2005-10.
Through APllC, the State undertook the Integrated Project for
establishing Hyderabad into world class business destination
and a leader in the knowledge sector. Such project would indeed
E
develop the State which would be in the larger interest of general
public. It would enhance the value of Hyderabad into a Touristcum-Business Destination for domestic as well as international
travellers. It was, therefore, submitted that the land acquisition
proceedings were in consonance with the law and no case has
F
been made out for interference with such proceedings and the
appeals are liable to be dismissed.
Notifications
15. As already noted earlier, proceedings had been
G
initiated by the authorities in 2002. A notification under Section
,i>-
4 of the Act was issued by the State Government on July 10,
2002 which was published in the Government Gazette on July
17, 2002. The said notification read as under;
H
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
142
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2008] 13 S.C.R.
THE ANDHRA PRADESH GAZETTE
EXTRAORDINARY
PUBLISHED BY AUTHORITY
R.R. No. 25 HYDERABAD WEDNESDAY 17TH JULY2002
No.G1/7180/2000
Dated : 10-07-2002
FORM - 2 A
DRAFT NOTIFICATION UNDER SECTION 4 OF 1894
IAS AMENDED BY ACT XXXVlll OF 1923
Whereas it appears to the
Government of Andhra
Pradesh that the land
specified in the Schedule
below and situated at
Nanakram Guda Village,
Serilingampally Manda!,
Ranga Reddy District is
needed for Public purpose,
to wit for Development of
New Projects by APllC Ltd.,
notice to that effect as
hereby given to all whom it
may
concern
in
accordance
with
the
provisions of section 4(1)
of the Land Acquisition Act,
1 of 1894, as amended by
the
Land
Acquisition
Amendment made by the
LandAcquisitionActXXXlll of
1923, and the Governor of
Andhra Pradesh hereby
authorized Spl. Deputy
Collector, LA(lnd), Hyderabad,
and his staff and workmen
to exercise the powers
conferred by section 4(2) of
the Act. Under sub-section
( 4) of Section 17 of the Act,
the Governor of Andhra
Pradesh directs that in view
of the urgency of the case,
the provisions of Section 5A of the Act, shall not apply
to this case.
SCHEDULE
16. It is thus clear that the land was proposed to be acquired
for a public purpose, viz. for development of new projects by
APllC. It is also apparent that urgency clause under Section 17
of the Act was applied and inquiry under Section 5-A was
H dispensed with.
SOORARAM PRATAP REDDY & ORS. v. DISTRICT 143
COLLECTOR, RANGA REDDY DISTI. & ORS. [C.K. THAKKER, J]
17. A notification under Section 6 of the Act was also A
issued on the same day which was published in the Government
Gazette on July 18, 2002. The said notification read as under;
THE ANDHRA PRADESH GAZETTE
EXTRAORDINARY
PUBLISHED BY AUTHORITY
B
R.R. No. 26 HYDERABAD
Thursday 181h July 2002
No.G1/7180/2000 ·
Dated : 10-07-2002
FORM - 5-A
c
DRAFT DECLARATION UNDER SECTION 6 OF THE
LA ACT
Under Sec. (6) of the Land
Acquisition
Act,
the
Governor
of
Andhra
Pradesh hereby declares
that the land specified below
and measuring Ac.80-35
gts/acre be the same a little
more or less is needed for
public purpose, wit for
Development of New
Projects by APllC Limited.
Under Sections 3 and 7 of
the same Act, the Special
Deputy Collector, L.A.
(Ind.),
Hyderabad,
is
appointed to perform the
functions of Collector under
the Act and directed to take
Order for the acquisition of D
the land under Sub-Section
( 1 )(2) of Section 17 of the
Act, the Governor of Andhra
Pradesh further directs that
the possession of the said
E
land may be taken on the
expiry of 15 days from the
date of the publication of the
notice mentioned in section
9(1) of the Act. A plan of the ·
land is kept in the Special
F
Deputy Collector, L.A. (Ind),
Hyderabad, and may be
inspected at any time during
the office hours.
SCHEDULE
G
Writ petitions in High Court
18. The validity of notifications under Sections 4 and 6 of H
144
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2008] 13 S.C.R.
A the Act was challenged by some of the land owners by filing
Writ Petition No. 21712 of 2002 in the High Court of Andhra
Pradesh at Hyderabad. The learned Single Judge, vide a
judgment and order dated April 25, 2003 partly allowed the
petition. He held that in view of counter-affidavit filed by the
B authorities, it could not be said that the acquisition was illegal
or unlawful and, therefore, was not sustainable. Acquisition of
land was in exercise of power of eminent domain and was
intended for public purpose, to wit, for development of New
Projects by APllC Ltd. The acquisition was to enable the
c activities of APllC, which was an instrumentality of State
operating in the area of industrial infrastructure. The purposes
of APllC were demonstrably public purposes. It was also held
that the claim of the petitioners as being small farmers was not
well-founded as no agricultural operations were being pursued
0
by them as asserted by the authorities in the counter-affidavit
which was not denied. The availability of alternative land as
pleaded by the petitioners was also not correct since the lands
available were not contiguous to the existing developed areas
and hence could not be said to be 'alternative'.
E
19. The Court, however, held that invocation of urgency
clause under Section 17 of the Act and dispensing with enquiry
as contemplated by Section 5-A of the Act was not legal. Section
5-A of the Act is a salutary provision which enables the persons
whose land is proposed to be acquired to urge all grounds that
F
may be available against the proposed acquisition at the enquiry.
Unless real urgency is demonstrated, dispensing with the enquiry
and invocation of urgency clause was irrational and arbitrary
exercise of power by the State. By such process, an enquiry
under Section 5-A of the Act cannot be jettisoned on jejune grounds
G of irrational and unsubstantiated urgency. Since no such urgency
could be demonstrated by the State, the action to the extent of
dispensing with the enquiry was held to be bad. The petition
was, therefore, partly allowed directing the authorities to issue
notice to the landowners under Section 5-A of the Act and to take
H further proceedings in accordance with law.
~
SOORARAM PRATAP REDDY & ORS. v. DISTRICT 145
COLLECTOR, RANGA REDDY DISTI. & ORS. [C.K. THAKKER, J.]
-{
20. The Court finally stated;
A
"However, it is clarified that the notice under section 4(1)
of the Act is not interfered with".
I
~
21. Other petitions filed by other land owners were also
partly allowed relying upon the decision in Writ Petition No.
B
-i
'
21712 of 2002.
I .
Writ appeals
22. Being aggrieved by the orders passed by the learned
Single Judge, Writ Appeals were instituted by both landowners as c
also by APllC. The Division Bench dismissed all the appeals holding
that the land was needed for public purpose and the acquisition
--4
could not be said to be contrary to law. Similarly, the learned single
-1.
Judge was also right in coming to the conclusion that on the facts
'II
and in the circumstances of the case, urgency clause could not D
have been applied under Section 17 of the Act and enquiry could
not have been dispensed with under Section 5-A of the Act.
23. The Division Bench stated;
"The Financial District is a unique project being developed
E
by the Corporation wherein the reputed financial institutions
like Banks, Insurance etc., set up their offices to serve the
needs of the trade, commerce and industry. The
--J.
Corporation has already allotted land in the Financial
F
District for Insurance Regulatory and Development
__.,
Authority of India (IRDA) and also to SBH Staff Training
1.
Academy etc. It is stated that in order to ensure
compactness of the Financial District, the lands in question
i
are under acquisition for public purpose and to utilize them G
for new projects being developed by the Corporation.
>-'
The lands in question were identified and notified for
acquisition after examining the matter carefully. The lands
in question are essential so as to ensure compactness of
the Financial District Project being developed by the
H
A
B
c
D
146
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2008] 13 S. C R.
Corporation. It is stated that there is no prohibition to
acquire lands belonging to small farmers under the due
process of law, if it is inevitable .. The allegation of the
appellants that there are vast extents of Government lands
in the nearby villages and that there is absolutely no reason
to acquire private patta lands is denied. The Government
lands situated in the adjoining villages would not facilitate
compactness of the Financial District Project being
developed by the Corporation. It is stated that the lands in
question are under acquisition following the due process
of law for utilizing the same for public purpose, i.e.
development of Financial District Project and other projects
being development by the Corporation. The development
works for the proposed works wouid be taken up as soon
as the lands are acquired under the Land Acquisition Act".
24. In pursuance of the order passed by the learned single
Judge and confirmed by the Division Bench of the High Court,
enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act had been held. Notices
were issued to the land owners and persons interested,
E objections were invited, hearing was afforded and finally
notification under Section 6 was issued on April 26, 2005 which
was published on the next day, 1.e. April 27, 2005 in the
Government Gazette. The said notification reads thus;
F
G
H
THE ANDHRA PRADESH GAZETTE
EXTRAORDINARY
PUBLISHED BY AUTHORITY
R.R. No. 85HYDERABAD WEDNESDAY 27th April 2005
No.G1 /7180/2000
Dated : 26-04-2005
FORM - 5-A
DRAFT DECLARATION UNDER SECTION 6 OF THE
LAND ACQUISITION ACT
t •
SOORARAM PRATAP REDDY & ORS. v. DISTRICT 147
COLLECTOR, RANGA REDDY DISTI. & ORS. [C.K. THAKKER, J.]
Under Sec.