# SREE BANK LID v. SARKAR DUTI ROY AND CO - **Citation:** [1965] 3 S.C.R. 708 - **Court:** Supreme Court of India - **Decided:** 1965-04-09 - **Bench:** A. K. Sarkar, K. N. Wanchoo, Raghubar Dayal - **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/sree-bank-lid-v-sarkar-duti-roy-and-co-3452 - **Pages:** 35 ## Headnote Banking Companies Act (10 of 1949), s. 45-0 and Banking Companies (Amendment) Act (52 of 1953)-Applicabilitl/ to instalment decree. In 1949, the Banking Companies Act was passed with a view to protect and secure the interests of depositors. [n 1953 s. 45-0 was enacted by the Banking Companies (Amendment) Act, in pursuance of the recommendations of the Banking Companies Liquidation Proceedings Committee. Section 45-0 (1) provided that in computing the period of limitation prescribed for an application by a banking company which is being wound up, the period commencing from the date of the presentation of the winding up petition shall be excluded; and s. 45-0 (3) provided that sub-s. (1) shall also apply to a banking company in respect of which the winding-up petition was presented before the commencement of the Amendment Act, that is, 30th December 1953. On 1st May 1947, a decree for a sum of money had been passed in favour of the appellant-Bank, against the res1xmdents. The decree provided that the amount which was due on 30th May shou.ld be paid in 6 annual instalments each payatle on 30th December ftom 1947 to 1952. The decree also provided that if the respondents failed to pay any instalment within 4 months of its becoming due, the appellant shall be entitled to realise all the amounts then due, ty execution. None of the instalments was· paid. On May 11, 1948 a petition for winding up of the appellant was presented and it was ordered to be wound up on August 3, 1948. In August 1956 the liquidator filed an execu,tion application on the original side of the High Court, for realising the amounts. The applicatiOn was allowed, but the High Court, in Letters Patent Appeal, held that the application was barred by time. In appeal to this Court, the appellant contended that in view of s. 45-0 the application was. within time; while the respondents contended that: (1) all the instalments fell due by 1st May 1948 by operation of the default clause, and therefore, the application was barred by Art. 182 (7) of the Limitation Act, 1908, by the time s. 45-0 was brought _on the statute book; (ii) the section has no retrospective operation so as to revive a debt which had become tarred at the date of its enactment; and (iii) if the default clause gave only an option to the appellant so that it could apply for execution as and when an instalment fell due, then, the instalments which fell due in 1947, 1948 and 1949 had become barred before the enactment of the sectioH; and the instalments which fell due during the years 1948 to 1952 were also not saved from the bar of limitation as the section applied only to those cases where the right to execut~ had arisen before the presentation of the winding-up petition. 708 A B c D E F G R A B c D E F G If SH.J.~E H:\XK 1". ltl"l"l' HOY ' HELD: (By full Court): Sc.:tion ~5-0 saved the oxccutim1 appli- ,·ation from the lnH" of limita)ion imposed by. Art."182(7) of the L'mitation Act. [ll~H; 7!9A: 727D: '142A] , (ij Per Sarkar. J: Thc.,right to apply for execution in resp-ect ot' the instaln1ents uncle~· the decree arose on the dates on which they respectively fell due. r113Hl . The default clause was only intended for the benefit 6f the appellant and gave an option to the apP.,llant to sμe for the entire amount or waive the- benefit of the option, and the aμpellant had not taken advantag~ of it. f713D, E, Hl · . Ram Culpo Bhattachar;ij, v. Ram Chunder Shame, (18S7) I.L.R. 14 Cal. 352, referred to. , (ii) Per Sarkar, J: There 'is no reason why a distinction should have been intended between debtors, the claims against w•hom'might have become barred before the section was\ enacted and those. the claims against whom, becazi,ie barred thereafter. In fact, the otject of fhe section would be better achieved by applying it to both classe.-. [715 F-G] , One of the methods by which, the object of the Act which' was lo protect depositors, cQ_uld be achieved is by extending thL period of limitation. for enforceine ## Text _Characters 0–39,893 of 102,282. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39893 for what follows._ SREE BANK LID. v. SARKAR DUTI ROY AND CO. April 9, 1965 (A. K. SARKAR, K. N. WANCHOO AND RAGHUBAR DAYAL, JJ.] Banking Companies Act (10 of 1949), s. 45-0 and Banking Companies (Amendment) Act (52 of 1953)-Applicabilitl/ to instalment decree. In 1949, the Banking Companies Act was passed with a view to protect and secure the interests of depositors. [n 1953 s. 45-0 was enacted by the Banking Companies (Amendment) Act, in pursuance of the recommendations of the Banking Companies Liquidation Proceedings Committee. Section 45-0 (1) provided that in computing the period of limitation prescribed for an application by a banking company which is being wound up, the period commencing from the date of the presentation of the winding up petition shall be excluded; and s. 45-0 (3) provided that sub-s. (1) shall also apply to a banking company in respect of which the winding-up petition was presented before the commencement of the Amendment Act, that is, 30th December 1953. On 1st May 1947, a decree for a sum of money had been passed in favour of the appellant-Bank, against the res1xmdents. The decree provided that the amount which was due on 30th May shou.ld be paid in 6 annual instalments each payatle on 30th December ftom 1947 to 1952. The decree also provided that if the respondents failed to pay any instalment within 4 months of its becoming due, the appellant shall be entitled to realise all the amounts then due, ty execution. None of the instalments was· paid. On May 11, 1948 a petition for winding up of the appellant was presented and it was ordered to be wound up on August 3, 1948. In August 1956 the liquidator filed an execu,tion application on the original side of the High Court, for realising the amounts. The applicatiOn was allowed, but the High Court, in Letters Patent Appeal, held that the application was barred by time. In appeal to this Court, the appellant contended that in view of s. 45-0 the application was. within time; while the respondents contended that: (1) all the instalments fell due by 1st May 1948 by operation of the default clause, and therefore, the application was barred by Art. 182 (7) of the Limitation Act, 1908, by the time s. 45-0 was brought _on the statute book; (ii) the section has no retrospective operation so as to revive a debt which had become tarred at the date of its enactment; and (iii) if the default clause gave only an option to the appellant so that it could apply for execution as and when an instalment fell due, then, the instalments which fell due in 1947, 1948 and 1949 had become barred before the enactment of the sectioH; and the instalments which fell due during the years 1948 to 1952 were also not saved from the bar of limitation as the section applied only to those cases where the right to execut~ had arisen before the presentation of the winding-up petition. 708 A B c D E F G R A B c D E F G If SH.J.~E H:\XK 1". ltl"l"l' HOY ' HELD: (By full Court): Sc.:tion ~5-0 saved the oxccutim1 appli- ,·ation from the lnH" of limita)ion imposed by. Art."182(7) of the L'mitation Act. [ll~H; 7!9A: 727D: '142A] , (ij Per Sarkar. J: Thc.,right to apply for execution in resp-ect ot' the instaln1ents uncle~· the decree arose on the dates on which they respectively fell due. r113Hl . The default clause was only intended for the benefit 6f the appellant and gave an option to the apP.,llant to sμe for the entire amount or waive the- benefit of the option, and the aμpellant had not taken advantag~ of it. f713D, E, Hl · . Ram Culpo Bhattachar;ij, v. Ram Chunder Shame, (18S7) I.L.R. 14 Cal. 352, referred to. , (ii) Per Sarkar, J: There 'is no reason why a distinction should have been intended between debtors, the claims against w•hom'might have become barred before the section was\ enacted and those. the claims against whom, becazi,ie barred thereafter. In fact, the otject of fhe section would be better achieved by applying it to both classe.-. [715 F-G] , One of the methods by which, the object of the Act which' was lo protect depositors, cQ_uld be achieved is by extending thL period of limitation. for enforceineht--0{ the claims of a bank in liquiing company being wo4nd up on a petition pcesented before 30th December 1953 Under s. 45-0(1) and (3) a period which hacl._$tartedto run before that date could be excluded, and, there \s no-hint that. s'.!!Ch exclusion is confined to cases where the right had' not become barred by that date. Sub-s. (3) must have been intended to give full retrospective effect to sub-s. (1), as otherwise. it 'need not have been enacted, beeause, sub-s. (1) would, by its own terms. apply to cases of \\rinding up on a.-petition presented befo:-e the Amending Act, and, considering the intention of the Act, sub-s. (3) could not have been enacted as a surplusage or ex abundanti cautela. Therefore, .s, 45-0(1) applies to applications ty the banking com~anv, even when. ·they had oecome barred before the Amending Act. [716 B-E, H; :zp Cl Per Wa'nchoo, J: The appellant would be entitled to excbde the entire period from Uth May 1948-the date of presentation• of the winding-up application-upto the dat_e Df the execution application and would thus bntitled to execute the decree ior the to~al of the 6 instalments due. f726 El The language bf s. 45-0(1) implies that it was meant to be retrospective and that conclusion becomes inevitable when it 1s read ·.vith sub-s. (3), in the background of the remedy . that the legislature intended to provide for the benefit of deposi,tors, Section 45-0(1) imperatively lavs down that where an application is filed by a banking company which was being wound up on or after 30th December 1953 the CMrt must exclude the .period commencing from the date of presentation of the winding up petition to the date of the application in computing .the period of litnitation. Further by virtue of sub-s (3), sub-s. (1) applies not .€!"iod commencing from the date of the presentation of the winding up petition where the debts became due before that date, and, in cases where the debt became due subsequently such part of that period as commences from the date of the accrual of the debt. [718E; 741F] Per Sarkar, J.: There is no reason why it should have been intended that debts which fell due before the presentation of the winding up ~etition but were not barred by that date• could be A B c D E F G B A B c D E F G H SRBE BANK V. DUTT ROY 711 recovered, and not those which became due thereafter. No doubt, if the sub-section is applied to the case of a debt accruing due to a banking company after the presentation of a winding up petition, such a debt would be completely free from the bar of limitation, tut since it has that effect in the case of debts which accrued due prior to the presentation of the petition and had not become barred on that date, the section must be construed as permitting the whole of the period commencing from the presentation of the petition t<> be excludedwhere in fact it could be done, and a part of that period only where the whole of it could not be excluded. [717F, H; 718C, H] Cortis v. The Kent Water Works Company, 7 B & C 314, referred to. Per Raghubar Dayal, J: The appellant waived its right under the default clause of the decree and sought execution for the realisation of the various instalments. Even so the execution application was within time, beoause, a banking company is entitled to exclude the period from the date ·on which the winding up petition was presented upto the date of the institution of the application, from the period of limitation prescribed, and it would be illogical to hold that it is not entitled to ask that a shorter period, as the case would be, when the cause of action arose subsequent to the presentation of the winding up petition, should be excluded. It may be that this means, the entire period of limitation is abrogated with respect to causes of action arising subsequent to the date of the. winding up petition, tut it would be anomalous to hold that action can be taken with the help of the sub-section with respect to causes of action which had arisen much earlier than the date of the presentation of the winding up petition, but action cannot be taken with respect to causes of action arising subsequent to such a date if it had not been taken within the prescribed period of limitation. [740G, 741C G-H'I , Per Wanchoo J.: The present case is governed by s. 45-0(3) because, the winding up petition was presented before s. 45-0(~) came into force, but by virtue of sub-s. (3), sub-s. (1) would apply, As there was default in the payment of the instalment due on 30th December 1947, the right to execute all the remaining instalments arose on 1st May 1948 and since that right was not waived, limitation for all the instalments began even on 1st May 1948, while the wfoding up application was filed on 11th May 1948, and so, the appellant could take advantage of the section and execute the decree for the entire amount. [726A-E; 727C-D] Exclusion of time cannot take place where time has not begun to run before the date from which the exclusion begins. Therefore, in order that s. 45-0(1) should apply, it is necessary that the period of limitation for the application should have begun to run before the date of winding up petition, but should not have run out. [724-Cl On this interpretation, in the case of instalment decrees without a default clause, the instalments which became due and were not paid before the winding up petition may be recoverable by execution, v.;+hile in the case of instalments which became due after the presentation of the petition, the exclusion provided by the section would not come into play. But if the sub-section is interpreted as stopping limitation in all cases, after the presentation of the winding up petition, it will result in another anomaly, that there would be no limitation at all in a case where the liquidator files a suit and gets a decree. [724H; 725A 1 112 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1965] 3 s.c.R. av1L APPELLATE JurusmrnoN: Civil Appeal No. 76 of A 1962 . • Appeal from the judgment and order dated September 22, 1959 of the Calcutta High Court in Appeal from original order No. 230/1958. A. N. Sinha and P. K. Mukherjee, for the appellant. D. N. Mukherjee, for the respondent. The following judgments were delivered: Sarkar, J. On May 1, 1947, a decree was passed in favour of B the appellant bank against the respondents by consent of parties c for payment of Rs. 31,000 /- in the manner specified. The decree provided that if the respondents failed to pay any of the instalments mentioned in it within four months of the date of its becoming due, the appellant bank "shall deem all . . . instalments in default and shall be entitled to realise all the said amounts by execution". The amounts payable under the decree by May 30, D 1947 were all duly paid. That left a sum of Rs. 21,000/- payable by six annual instalments, each payable on the 30th December of a year, the first instalment being payable in 1947 and the last in 1952. None of these instalments was paid and an application for realising them by execution was made on August 26, 1957. In the meantime a petition for \Yinding up the appellant bank had been E presented on May 11, 1948 and an order for winding up had been made on August 3, 1948. Sin~ then the appellant bank has been in the course of winding up. The application for execution was made by the liquidator in the course of the winding up. Under Art. 182(7) of the First Schedule to the Limitation Act 1908 an application for execution is barred 'if not made within F three years from the date on which the amount sought to be realised was payable under the decree. On December 30, 1953, s. 45-0 was introduced in the Banking Companies Act, 1949 by the Banking Companies (Amendment) Act, 1953. Sub-section (!) of that :section is in these terms: S. 45-0. (1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary conG tained in the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 or in any other Jaw for the time being in force, in computing the period of limitation prescribed for a suit or application by a banking coml'llnY which is being wound up, the period commencing from the date of the presentation B of the petition for the winding up of the banking com- · pany shall be excluded. The appellant bank claims that this section saves its application for execution from the bar of limitation imposed by Art. 182(7). The respondents' answer to this contention is first that s. 45-0 has no retrospective operation; it does not revive a debt ·.vhich was already barred at the date of its enactment. Then they say that A B SREE BANK v. DUTT ROY (Sarkar, J.) 713 all the instalments fell due on April 29, 1948 by the operation of the default clause and therefore, they were all barred under Art 182(7) by December 30, 1953 when s. 45-0 was brought on the statute book. Thirdly they say that if it is held that the default clause gave the appellant bank an option which it had not exercised and the right to apply for execution in respect of the instalments arose on the dates they respectively fell due, the instalments which fell due on December 30 of the years 1947, 1948 and 1949 had become barred before the date of the enactment of s. 45-0 and that section could not revive them and the instalments which fell due in the years 1948, 1949, 1950, 1951 and 1952 were not saved from the bar of limitation by s. 45-0 as it provided for exclusion C of a period commencing from the presentation of the petition for winding and was, therefore, confined to cases where the right had arisen before such presentation, which the right in regard to these instalments had not. D E F First, as to the effect of the default clause, no real difficulty arises. It obviously gave an option to the appellant. · As was said in Ram Cu/po Bhattacharji v. Ram Chunder Shome('), "The proviso by which the whole amount of the decree becomes due upon default in payment of any one instalment is a proviso which, look at it how you will, is put in for the benefit of the creditor, the decree-holder, and his benefit alone; and when a proviso is put into a contract or security, and in 'security'" I include 'decree,' for the benefit of one individual party, he can waive it, if he thinks fit." There is not the least doubt that the default clause in the case in hand was intended for the benefit of the appellant bank; the clause had no operation till the appellant bank wanted to take advantage of it. The High Court took that view and with that I am in full agreement. The High Court further held that the appellant bank had not exercised the option to enforce that clause. Bachawat J. expressly said that the appellant "in fact has waived the benefit of that option." The learned Chief Justice held in view of the option, that "the starting point of ·limitation will be the dates 1 on which each instalment became due." He could have held this only in the view that the option had not been exercised. None G of the parties appears to have contended to the contrary in the High Court. This being a question of fact it cannot be raised for the first time in this Court. On such a question of fact, the High Court's finding is binding on us. Furthermore, undoubtedly if the respondents wished to .contend that the option had been exercised, H it was for them to have given evidence of such exercise but they did not do so. No such evidence has been brought to our notice from the records of the case. It has, therefore, to be held that the right to apply for execution in respect of the instalments under the decree arose on the dates on which they respectively fell due. The next question as to whether s. 45-0 (]) has a retrospective operation is of real difficulty. Having given the matter my 714 SUPREME COURT REPvRTS [l £65] 3 S.C.R most anxious consideration, it seems to me that the better view A would be to hold that it has such an operation. The general rule no doubt is, as was stated by Wright J. in In re. Athlumney,(') "Perhaps no rule of construction is more firmly established than this-that a retrospective operation is not to be given to a statute so as to impair an existing right or obligation, otherwise than as regards matter of procedure, unless that effect cannot be avoided B without doing violence to the language of the enactment. If the enactment is expressed in language which is fairly capable of either interpretation, it ought to be construed as prospective only." It can no doubt be argued with force that no violence will be done to the language used in sub-s. (1) of s. 45-0 if it is read as applying only to cases where the right to apply has not become barC red at the date of its enactments. But there are other considerations. Two reasons have operated on my mind to lead me to the conclusion that the general rule should not be applied in the present case. First, it is recognised that the general rule is not invariable and that it is a sound principle in considering whether the D intention was that the general rule should not be applied, to "look to the general scope and purview of the statute, and at the remedy sought to be applied, and consider what was the former state of the law and what it was that the Legislature contemplated.": see Pardo v. Bingham('). Again in Craies on Statute· Law, 6th ed., it is stated at p. 395, "If a statute is passed for the purpose of protectB ing the public against some evil or abuse, it may be allowed to operate retrospectively, although by such operation it will deprive some person or persons of a vested right." To the same effect is the observation in Halsbury's Laws of England, 3rd ed., vol. 36 p. 425. This seems to ·me to be plain commonsense. I.n ascertaining the intention of the legislature it is certainly relevant to enquire F what the Act aimed to achieve .. In· Pardo v. Bingham(') a statute which took away the benefit of a longer period of limitation for a suit provided by an earlier Act was held to have retrospective operation as otherwise it would not have any operation for fifty years or more in the case of .persons who were at the time of its passing residing beyond the seas. It was thought that G such an extraordinary result could not have been intended. In R. v. Vine(') the words "Every person convicted of felony shall for ever be disqualified from selling spirits by retail.. .... and if any person shall, after having. been so convicted, take out or have any licence to sell spirits by retail, the same shall be void to all intents and purp6ses" were applied to a person who B had been convicted of felony before the Act was passed though by doing so vested rights were affected. Mellor J. observed (pp. 200-201). "It appears to me to be the general object of this statute that there should be restraints as to. the persons who should be. (') (1898) 2 Q.B.D. 647, 66l~M2. (1) (1869) L.R. 4 Ch. A. 735, 7~. (1) (1876) 10 Q.B. 195. A B c SREE BANK v. DUTT ROY (Sarkar, J.) 7lll qualified to hold licences, not as a punishment, but for the public good, upon the ground of character ... A man convicted before the Act passed is quite as much tainted as. a man convicted after; and it appears to me not only the possible but the natural interpretation of the section that any one convicted of felony shall be ipso facto disqualified, and the licences, if granted, void." Now the object of the present Act is beyond doubt. It is well known that prior to 1949 in our country a large number of mushroom banks had come into existence and were in the control of persons not very scrupulous or competent. Many banks came to grief and failed with the result that the depositors largely lost their moneys. It was with the object of giving relief to these innocent depositors that the original Act of 1949 and the Acts amending it were .passed. A few of the sections may be referred to by way of illustration. Section 43 of the Act provides that every depositor shall be deemed to have proved his claim for the amount sht>wn in the books of the bank until the liquidator showed reasons for doubting the correctness of the entry. Section 43A gives a right D to preferential payment upto a sum of Rs. 250 /- to such depositors. Indeed in Joseph Kuruvilla Vellukunnel v. The Reserve Bank of India(') it was observed by this Court at p. 656, "the whole intend (sic.) and purpose of that Act is lo secure the interests of the depositors." There need now be no doubt about the object of the Act. One of the methods by which that object can be achieved clearly E is by extending the period of limitation for the enforcement of the claims of a bank in liquidation so that more money may be collected for payment to the depositors. That is whys. 45-0 and its predecessor s. 45-F had been enacted. Both extended the existing period of limitation in regard to claims by a bank against its F debtors. That being so, it would be natural to think that the largest extension which the language used is capable of giving was intended. Then I find no reason why a distinction should have been intended between debtors the claims against whom might have become barred before the section was enacted and those the claims against whom became barred thereafter. The object would be better achieved by applying the section to both classes. I, thereG fore, think that the Act was intended to have a retrospective operation. H The other reason why I think that sub-s. (]) of s. 45-0 has a retrospective operation is provided by the terms of sub-s. (3) of that section. Retrospective operation is of course a question of. the intention of the legislature and that intention has to be gathered from the whole statute. The two sub-sections have, therefore, to be considered together: see Barber v. Pigden(') and Hutchinson v. Ja11ncey ('). How sub-s. (3) is in these terms: The provisions of this section, in so far as they relate to banking. companies being wound up, shall also apply to a banking company in respect of which a petition ---- (1) [In'>?l S11n1.1. :i. Rn.R. 632. (2) (1937) 1 K.B. 664. (3) (1950) 1 K.B. 574. J,/P(JJ)iS r 7 '116 SUPREME COURT REpOllTS (1965] 3 S.C.R. for the winding up has been presented before the A commencement of the Banking Companies (Amendment) Act, 1953. It expressly makes sub-s. (!) applicable to a banking company being wound \IP on a petition presented before the amendnig Act. That would indicate that the first sub-section was intended to B apply to suits and applications by a banking company in liquidation even where the winding up petition had been filed before 1he amending Act. It should, therefore, apply to all such suits or applications even when they had become barred before the amending Act. Again it is indubitable that as a result of ti1e third subsection a period which had started to run before the amending c· Act is to be excluded under the first sub-section. The third subsection gives no hint that such exclusion is to be confined to cases where the right had not become barred before that Act. It expressly gives the first sub-sectiOlt a retrospective operation by permitting exclusion of an antecedent period. All this is strong indication that sub-s. (!) is to have a retrospective operation. n If that is not the intention. then it is clear to me that sub-s. (3) need not have been enacted at all for clearly the first sub-section would by its own terms have applied to cases of winding up on a petition presented before the amending Act. It applies to all banking companies being wound up and, therefore, also to such companies as are being wound up on a petition presented before that Act. It could be said that even then the first sub-section would not have a retrospective operation but would only apply prospectively to a banking company peing wound up on a petition presented before the Act. This may be illustrated by two cases. In R. v. St. Mary, Whitechapel (Inhabitants)(') Lord Denman C. J. said that a statute "is not properly called a retrospective statute because a part of the requisites for its action is drawn from iime antecedent to its passing." Again in Master Ladies Tailors Organisation v. Minister of Labour and National Service(') it was observed, "The fact that a prospective benefit is in certain cases ID be measured by or depends on antecedent facts does not necessarily ...... make ,the provision retrospective." E F G Why then was sub-s. (3) enacted? It must have been to give sub-s. (!) full retrospective operation, to make it affect vested rights, If it were not so, sub-s. (3) would have been a mere surplusage or enacted ex abundanti cautela. A statute is not to be so read unless that reading is compelled by the words used. There B are no such words and I do not think that that reading is justified by the rule of presumption that a statute is not intended to have a retrospective operation. In this case particularly because of the clear intention of the Act to protect a sizeable section of the public consisting of the depositors, I feel that a reading of sub-s. (') (1848) 12 Q.B. 120 at p. 127. (") (1950) 2 All. F.R. 525, 527. I A B c D E F a H ~HF.E BA:\'K 1'. Dl"TT ROY (Sarkar, J.) il7 (3) as a surplusage or ex ab1111danti cautela would be unwarranted. Furthermore, if that sub-section was enacted merely ex abundanti cautela, then why did it not also say that the provisions of s. 45-0 would apply to a case where the winding up order bad been made before the Act'! Why was it not thought that caution was necessary to provide for such a case also? I am not saying that sub-s. (3) does not make the section apply to a case where the winding up order had been made before the amending Act. All that I am saying is that the omission of a reforence to the case of a winding up under such an order shows that sub-s. (3) was not ex abundanti cautela. It must have been intended to give full retro&pective effect to s. 45c0 including sub-s. (I) of that section. It remains now to deal with the last point. It is said that since sub-s. (!) allows the period commencing from the date of the presentation of the petition for winding up to be excluded in the computation of the period of limitation, it can only apply to a case where the period of limitation had commenced to run before that date. The contention is, unless it did so, the whole of the period cannot be excluded and the section permits exclusion of the whole or none. It is, therefore, said that even if the first subsection had a retrospective operation, it could result in saving the bar of limitation only so far as the application concemed the instalment which fell due on December 30, 1947 for the petition for the winding up of the appellant bank had been presented on May 11, 1948 and. hence, before the other instalments became