# Sri M.V. Ramachandrasa Since Deceased Represented by Legal Heirs v. M/s Mahendra Watch Company Represented by its Partners & Ors

- **Citation:** 2026 INSC 348
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 2026-04-10
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 4353 of 2026
- **Bench:** Ahsanuddin Amanullah, R. Mahadevan
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/sri-m-v-ramachandrasa-since-deceased-represented-by-legal-heirs-v-m-s-mahendra-39188
- **Pages:** 42

## Headnote

Whether the High Court was justified in interfering with the findings
of fact recorded by the trial Court while exercising its revisional
jurisdiction u/s.46 of the Karnataka Rent Act, 1999; whether the
burden of proving unlawful sub-letting lies upon the landlord, and if
so, whether such burden was duly discharged in the present case;
whether the alleged retirement of the original tenant-partner and
continuation of business by Respondent Nos. 2 and 3 constituted
a mere reconstitution of partnership or amounts to unlawful
sub-letting / assignment u/ss.27(2)(b)(ii) and 27(2)(p) of the
Karnataka Rent Act, 1999.
Headnotes†
Karnataka Rent Act, 1999 - s.46 - Revisional jurisdiction
under - Exercise of - When not sustainable - Respondent
No.1-Company, a partnership firm was a tenant under the
appellant's predecessor-landlord (since deceased) - However,
Respondent No.1 had unlawfully sublet the premises and
parted with possession in favour of third parties (Respondent
Nos.2 and 3) who were not parties to the lease agreement,
without the consent of the landlord - Eviction petition allowed
by trial Court inter alia holding that that Respondent Nos.2
and 3 in actual occupation of the premises were strangers to
the original tenancy and the tenant had unlawfully parted with
possession in their favour - High Court allowed the revision
petition filed by respondents - Whether the High Court was
justified in interfering with the findings of fact recorded by the
trial Court while exercising its revisional jurisdiction u/s.46:
* Author
[2026] 4 S.C.R.
509
Sri M.V. Ramachandrasa Since Deceased Represented by Legal Heirs v.
M/s Mahendra Watch Company Represented by its Partners & Ors.
Held: No - Findings recorded by the trial Court were pure
findings of fact based on proper appreciation of evidence - No
perversity, illegality, or jurisdictional error was demonstrated -
High Court transgressed the limits of its revisional jurisdiction by
reassessing the evidence and substituting its own conclusions -
Therefore, impugned interference u/s.46 is unsustainable in law
as it effectively converted revisional jurisdiction into appellate
jurisdiction - Impugned order set aside - Order of the trial Court
directing eviction of the respondents, restored. [Paras 12.8, 12.9]
Karnataka Rent Act, 1999 - Respondent No.1-Company,
a partnership firm was a tenant under the appellant's
predecessor-landlord (since deceased) through its partnerRespondent No.4 - However, Respondent No.1 unlawfully
sublet the premises and parted with possession in favour of
third parties (Respondent Nos.2 and 3) who were not parties
to the lease agreement, without the consent of the landlord -
Landlord filed eviction petition, allowed by trial Court - High
Court allowed the revision petition filed by respondents -
Whether the burden of proving unlawful sub-letting lies
upon the landlord, and if so, whether such burden was duly
discharged in the present case:
Held: The lease deed recognized only Respondent No.4 as the
tenant - Respondent Nos.2 and 3 were not parties to the lease
and therefore, cannot claim any independent tenancy rights - The
burden of proving unlawful subletting initially lay upon the landlord,
which was duly discharged by establishing exclusive possession
of third parties and absence of the original tenant - The burden
thereafter shifted to the respondents, who failed to rebut the
presumption by adducing cogent evidence - Consequently, unlawful
sub-letting stands proved. [Paras 13.6, 13.8]
Karnataka Rent Act, 1999 - ss.27(2)(b)(ii) and 27(2)(p) - Subletting through the device of partnership - Respondents' case
rested on an alleged reconstitution of the partnership firm -
Whether the alleged retirement of the original tenant-partner
and continuation of business by Respondent Nos.2 and 3
constituted a mere reconstitution of partnership or amounts to
unlawful sub-letting / assignment u/ss.27(2)(b)(ii) and 27(2)(p):
Held: Sub-letting requires parting with legal possession,

## Text

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[2026] 4 S.C.R. 508 : 2026 INSC 348
Sri M.V. Ramachandrasa Since Deceased
Represented by Legal Heirs
v.
M/s Mahendra Watch Company
Represented by its Partners & Ors.
(Civil Appeal No. 4353 of 2026)
10 April 2026
[Ahsanuddin Amanullah and R. Mahadevan,* JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
Whether the High Court was justified in interfering with the findings
of fact recorded by the trial Court while exercising its revisional
jurisdiction u/s.46 of the Karnataka Rent Act, 1999; whether the
burden of proving unlawful sub-letting lies upon the landlord, and if
so, whether such burden was duly discharged in the present case;
whether the alleged retirement of the original tenant-partner and
continuation of business by Respondent Nos. 2 and 3 constituted
a mere reconstitution of partnership or amounts to unlawful
sub-letting / assignment u/ss.27(2)(b)(ii) and 27(2)(p) of the
Karnataka Rent Act, 1999.
Headnotes†
Karnataka Rent Act, 1999 - s.46 - Revisional jurisdiction
under - Exercise of - When not sustainable - Respondent
No.1-Company, a partnership firm was a tenant under the
appellant's predecessor-landlord (since deceased) - However,
Respondent No.1 had unlawfully sublet the premises and
parted with possession in favour of third parties (Respondent
Nos.2 and 3) who were not parties to the lease agreement,
without the consent of the landlord - Eviction petition allowed
by trial Court inter alia holding that that Respondent Nos.2
and 3 in actual occupation of the premises were strangers to
the original tenancy and the tenant had unlawfully parted with
possession in their favour - High Court allowed the revision
petition filed by respondents - Whether the High Court was
justified in interfering with the findings of fact recorded by the
trial Court while exercising its revisional jurisdiction u/s.46:
* Author
[2026] 4 S.C.R.
509
Sri M.V. Ramachandrasa Since Deceased Represented by Legal Heirs v.
M/s Mahendra Watch Company Represented by its Partners & Ors.
Held: No - Findings recorded by the trial Court were pure
findings of fact based on proper appreciation of evidence - No
perversity, illegality, or jurisdictional error was demonstrated -
High Court transgressed the limits of its revisional jurisdiction by
reassessing the evidence and substituting its own conclusions -
Therefore, impugned interference u/s.46 is unsustainable in law
as it effectively converted revisional jurisdiction into appellate
jurisdiction - Impugned order set aside - Order of the trial Court
directing eviction of the respondents, restored. [Paras 12.8, 12.9]
Karnataka Rent Act, 1999 - Respondent No.1-Company,
a partnership firm was a tenant under the appellant's
predecessor-landlord (since deceased) through its partnerRespondent No.4 - However, Respondent No.1 unlawfully
sublet the premises and parted with possession in favour of
third parties (Respondent Nos.2 and 3) who were not parties
to the lease agreement, without the consent of the landlord -
Landlord filed eviction petition, allowed by trial Court - High
Court allowed the revision petition filed by respondents -
Whether the burden of proving unlawful sub-letting lies
upon the landlord, and if so, whether such burden was duly
discharged in the present case:
Held: The lease deed recognized only Respondent No.4 as the
tenant - Respondent Nos.2 and 3 were not parties to the lease
and therefore, cannot claim any independent tenancy rights - The
burden of proving unlawful subletting initially lay upon the landlord,
which was duly discharged by establishing exclusive possession
of third parties and absence of the original tenant - The burden
thereafter shifted to the respondents, who failed to rebut the
presumption by adducing cogent evidence - Consequently, unlawful
sub-letting stands proved. [Paras 13.6, 13.8]
Karnataka Rent Act, 1999 - ss.27(2)(b)(ii) and 27(2)(p) - Subletting through the device of partnership - Respondents' case
rested on an alleged reconstitution of the partnership firm -
Whether the alleged retirement of the original tenant-partner
and continuation of business by Respondent Nos.2 and 3
constituted a mere reconstitution of partnership or amounts to
unlawful sub-letting / assignment u/ss.27(2)(b)(ii) and 27(2)(p):
Held: Sub-letting requires parting with legal possession, i.e., transfer
of the right to exclusive possession - Mere induction or retirement
510
[2026] 4 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
of partners does not amount to sub-letting so long as the tenant
retains control and legal possession - Courts are entitled to lift
the veil of partnership where it is used as a device to conceal an
impermissible transfer - Once exclusive possession of a third party
is established, the burden shifts to the tenant to prove that the
arrangement is bona fide - Thus, the determinative test is whether
the original tenant continues to retain legal possession and control
over the premises - Original tenant ceased to have any role in
the business or the premises and Respondent Nos. 2 and 3 are in
exclusive possession and control - Once such exclusive possession
by third parties is established, the burden shifts to the respondents
to prove that the arrangement is a genuine partnership and not a
device to conceal sub-letting - Respondents failed to discharge
this burden by producing any cogent or reliable evidence - They
failed to produce the original partnership deed, any duly proved
retirement deed, or any document evidencing continuity of the
original tenant firm - No material to show that Respondent Nos.2
and 3 were partners in the original tenant firm - Their induction
into possession is, therefore not traceable to the original tenancy
- Original tenant divested himself of legal possession, and
Respondent Nos.2 and 3, who are strangers to the tenancy, are
in exclusive occupation of the premises without the consent of
the landlord - The so-called reconstitution is nothing but a cloak
to conceal an unlawful transfer of possession, warranting lifting
of the veil - The arrangement cannot be regarded as a bona fide
reconstitution of partnership and amounts to unlawful sub-letting
/ assignment within the meaning of s.27(2)(b)(ii) - Further, the
continued occupation by Respondent Nos.2 and 3 without any
lawful right, attracts s.27(2)(p) also - Therefore, respondents are
liable to eviction - Impugned order set aside - Order of the trial
Court directing eviction of the respondents, restored. [Paras 14.3,
14.6, 14.7, 14.9, 14.10, 15]
Tenancy - Eviction proceedings on ground of sub-letting -
Burden of proof:
Held: Burden of proof lies upon the party asserting a fact - In
eviction proceedings founded on the ground of sub-letting, the
initial onus rests upon the landlord to establish that the tenant
has parted with possession of the tenanted premises in favour of
a third party without authority - The landlord discharges the initial
burden by establishing (i) exclusive possession of a third party,
[2026] 4 S.C.R.
511
Sri M.V. Ramachandrasa Since Deceased Represented by Legal Heirs v.
M/s Mahendra Watch Company Represented by its Partners & Ors.
and (ii) absence of the original tenant from possession - Upon
such proof, a presumption of sub-letting arises, and the onus
shifts to the tenant to demonstrate that such possession is lawful
and not in the nature of sub-tenancy - It is established that the
original tenant was no longer in possession, and Respondent
Nos.2 and 3 were in exclusive occupation of the premises - Thus,
the landlord successfully proved exclusive possession of third
parties thereby discharging the initial burden and giving rise to a
presumption of unlawful sub-letting - The burden, therefore, shifted
upon the respondents to rebut the said presumption - However,
the respondents failed to discharge this burden - No cogent or
reliable evidence was adduced to establish the existence of a valid
partnership, reconstitution deed, lawful induction, or consent of the
landlord to such arrangement - In the absence of such evidence,
the possession of Respondent Nos.2 and 3 remains unexplained
and unlawful. [Paras 13.1, 13.5-13.7]
Karnataka Rent Act, 1999 - s.46 - Revisional jurisdiction
under - Scope:
Held: Is narrowly circumscribed - It empowers the High Court to
examine the legality, correctness or propriety of an order however,
it does not confer appellate powers permitting re-appreciation of
evidence or substitution of factual findings. [Paras 12.1-12.3]
Karnataka Rent Act, 1999 - ss.46, 26 - High Court allowed the
revision petition preferred by Respondents and set aside the
eviction order - Respondents had inter alia placed reliance
upon rent receipts:
Held: High Court while exercising jurisdiction u/s.46, undertook
a fresh analysis of the evidence, including depositions of PW-1
and RW-1, partnership documents, and rent receipts, and arrived
at independent factual conclusions - Such an exercise clearly
amounts to reappreciation of evidence, which is impermissible
in revisional jurisdiction - The statutory scheme provides for an
appeal u/s.26 where the legislature has consciously created a
separate appellate remedy, the revisional jurisdiction cannot be
expanded so as to substitute or bypass the appellate mechanism -
Furthermore, mere fact that rent receipts may continue in the
name of the original tenant does not advance the respondents'
case, as it is legal possession and control and not the formality
of rent payment, which is determinative. [Paras 12.6, 12.7, 14.8]
512
[2026] 4 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
Case Law Cited
Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited v. Dilbahar Singh [2014]
14 SCR 1379 : (2014) 9 SCC 78 - followed.
S.R. Radhakrishnan v. Neelamegam [2003] Supp. 1 SCR 987 :
(2003) 10 SCC 705; Associated Hotels of India Ltd v. S.B. Sardar
Ranjit Singh [1968] SCR 548 : AIR 1968 SC 933; Jagan Nath (D)
through LRs v. Chander Bhan and Another [1988] Supp. 1 SCR
325 : (1988) 3 SCC 57; Mahendra Saree Emporium (II) v. G.V.
Srinivasa Murthy [2004] Supp. 3 SCR 931 : (2005) 1 SCC 481;
Rukmini Amma Saradamma v. Kallyani Sulochana and Others
[1992] Supp. 3 SCR 579 : (1993) 1 SCC 499; Thankamony Amma
and Others v. Omana Amma N. and Others [2019] 10 SCR 125 :
(2020) 19 SCC 254; Joginder Singh Sodhi v. Amar Kaur [2004]
Supp. 5 SCR 303 : (2005) 1 SCC 31; Ram Murti Devi v. Pushpa
Devi and Others [2017] 7 SCR 872 : (2017) 15 SCC 230; Amar
Nath Agarwalla v. Dhillon Transport Agency [2007] 3 SCR 442 :
(2007) 4 SCC 306; Celina Coelho Pereira (Ms) and Others v.
Ulhas Mahabaleshwar Kholkar and Others [2009] 15 SCR 558 :
(2010) 1 SCC 217 - referred to.
List of Acts
Karnataka Rent Act, 1999.
List of Keywords
Revisional jurisdiction under Section 46 of the Karnataka Rent Act,
1999; Unlawful sub-letting; Unlawful sub-letting stands proved;
Eviction proceedings on ground of sub-letting; Onus in eviction
proceedings on ground of sub-letting; Original tenant no longer in
possession; Exclusive possession of third parties; Initial burden
discharged; Presumption of unlawful sub-letting; Onus shifted to
tenant; Sub-letting through partnership; Strangers to tenancy; In
exclusive occupation of premises without the consent of landlord;
Induction into possession not traceable to the original tenancy;
Reconstitution of partnership; Cloak to conceal unlawful transfer
of possession; Lifting of veil; Lifting of the veil warranted; Original
tenant divested of legal possession; Not a bona fide reconstitution
of partnership; Section 27(2)(b)(ii) of the Karnataka Rent Act,
1999; Section 27(2)(p) of the Karnataka Rent Act, 1999; Revisional
jurisdiction converted into appellate jurisdiction; Burden of proving
unlawful sub-letting; Tenant unlawfully parted with possession in
favour of a third party.
[2026] 4 S.C.R.
513
Sri M.V. Ramachandrasa Since Deceased Represented by Legal Heirs v.
M/s Mahendra Watch Company Represented by its Partners & Ors.
Case Arising From
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 4353 of 2026
From the Judgment and Order dated 23.05.2023 of the High Court
of Karnataka at Bengaluru in HRRP No. 56 of 2017.
Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Appellant(s):
Devashish Bharuka, Sr. Adv., H.S. Somnath, Ms. Sarvshree,
Ms. Soumya Sandilaya, Ms. Yashaswi Agrawal.
Advs. for the Respondent(s):
Paras Jain, T. Harish Kumar, Shubham Kothari, Mrs. Aiyushi Daga,
Shubham P. Chopra.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Judgment
R. Mahadevan, J.
1.
Leave granted.
2.
This Civil Appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated
23.05.2023 passed by the High Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru1
in House Rent Revision Petition No. 56 of 2017, whereby the High
Court allowed the revision petition preferred by Respondent Nos. 1
to 3 and set aside the order dated 14.07.2017 passed by the Chief
Judge, Court of Small Causes, Bengaluru2 in H.R.C. No. 63 of 2016.
By the said order, the trial Court had allowed the eviction petition
and directed the respondents to vacate the schedule premises and
hand over vacant possession to the appellant (since deceased),
within a period of three months.
3.
The appellants are the legal representatives of late Sri M.V.
Ramachandrasa, who originally initiated the rent control proceedings
before the trial Court. It is their case that the deceased appellant
now represented through his legal representatives, was a long-term
1
 Hereinafter referred to as "the High Court"
2
 Hereinafter referred to as "the trial Court"
514
[2026] 4 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
lessee in respect of immovable properties bearing Municipal New
Nos. 22 to 33, situated at Uttaradhi Mutt Lane, Chickpet, Bengaluru.
The said lease was created by virtue of a registered lease deed
dated 02.02.1983 for a period of 55 years. Under the terms of the
lease, the deceased appellant was duly authorised to sub-lease the
whole or any portion of the property.
4.
It is the further case of the appellants that Respondent No. 1, M/s.
Mahendra Watch Company, a partnership firm, became a tenant
under the deceased appellant3 through its partner, Rajesh Kumar,
Respondent No. 4, in respect of premises viz., Shop No.1, Ground
Floor, Maruthi Plaza, Block C, U.M. Lane, Chickpet, Bangalure, by
virtue of a lease deed dated 22.02.1985 registered as Document
No. 3669 / 1985. Subsequently, the landlord came to be aware
that Respondent Nos. 1 and 4 were no longer in possession of the
premises and that the business therein was being carried on by
Respondent Nos. 2 and 3, namely Ashish M. Jain and Atul M. Jain,
who were not parties to the said lease agreement. Upon issuance
of notice in this regard, the landlord instituted H.R.C. No. 63 of 2016
under Sections 27(b)(ii), 27(d)(i)(ii) and 27(p) of the Karnataka Rent
Act, 1999, seeking eviction on the ground that Respondent No. 1
had unlawfully sublet the premises and parted with possession in
favour of third parties without the consent of the landlord.
5.
The trial Court, upon consideration of the pleadings and the oral as
well as documentary evidence on record, concluded that the persons
in actual occupation of the premises were strangers to the original
tenancy and that the tenant had unlawfully parted with possession in
their favour. Pointing out that the lease deed expressly prohibited subletting or parting with possession without the consent of the landlord,
the trial Court held that the respondents had rendered themselves
liable for eviction. Accordingly, by order dated 14.07.2017, the eviction
petition was allowed and the respondents were directed to vacate
the premises and hand over vacant possession to the landlord.
6.
Aggrieved thereby, the respondents preferred House Rent Revision
Petition No. 56 of 2017 under Section 46 of the Karnataka Rent Act,
1999 against the appellants herein, who are the legal representatives
of the deceased appellant / landlord. The High Court, by its impugned
3
 Hereinafter referred to "the landlord"
[2026] 4 S.C.R.
515
Sri M.V. Ramachandrasa Since Deceased Represented by Legal Heirs v.
M/s Mahendra Watch Company Represented by its Partners & Ors.
judgment dated 23.05.2023, allowed the revision petition and set
aside the eviction order passed by the trial Court. It is in these
circumstances that the appellants have approached this Court by
way of the present appeal.
7.
The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants submitted
that the High Court has clearly transgressed the well-settled limits
of its revisional jurisdiction under Section 46 of the Karnataka Rent
Act, 1999. The revisional power is supervisory in nature and does
not confer upon the High Court the status of a court of first appeal.
It was submitted that the High Court, instead of confining itself to
examining jurisdictional error, illegality, or perversity, has proceeded
to reappreciate the entire oral and documentary evidence and
substituted its own findings in place of those recorded by the trial
Court. Such an exercise is wholly impermissible in law.
7.1. Reliance was placed on the judgment of this Court in Hindustan
Petroleum Corporation Limited v. Dilbahar Singh4, wherein,
it was categorically held that revisional jurisdiction under rent
control statutes is limited and cannot be equated with appellate
jurisdiction. Interference is warranted only where findings are
perverse, based on no evidence, or suffer from manifest illegality.
7.2. It was submitted that the trial Court, upon a comprehensive
appreciation of the evidence on record, returned well-reasoned
findings of fact, and categorically held that Respondent Nos. 2
and 3 failed to establish their status as partners of the original
tenant firm namely M/s. Mahendra Watch Company. The
documentary evidence relied upon by the respondents was found
unreliable, and significantly, no partnership deed or credible
material was produced to substantiate the claim that Respondent
Nos. 2 and 3 were partners of the original tenant firm. These are
pure findings of fact and could not have been interfered with by
the High Court in the absence of perversity or patent illegality,
which is conspicuously absent in the present case.
7.3. It was further submitted that Clause 19 of the registered lease
deed dated 22.02.1985 (Ex. P4) expressly prohibits sub-letting
or transfer of the tenancy rights, including sale of the business,
4
(2014) 9 SCC 78
516
[2026] 4 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
without prior written consent of the landlord. The respondents
have failed to produce any document evidencing such consent.
The material on record clearly establishes that persons presently
in occupation, namely Respondent Nos. 2 and 3 have no lawful
nexus with the original tenancy. Their claim of deriving rights
through an alleged partnership is unsupported by any legally
admissible document.
7.4. It was submitted that the respondents' case rests on an alleged
reconstitution of the partnership firm. However, the so-called
reconstitution deed is unregistered and legally untenable; no
original partnership deed was produced; there is no documentary
evidence to establish that Mohanlal, claimed to be the father of
Respondent Nos. 2 and 3, was ever a partner; RW-1 (Mohanlal)
himself admitted that at the time of execution of the lease deed
in 1985, there were five partners, yet, only Respondent No. 4
signed the lease deed. As such, the trial Court rightly concluded
that the respondents failed to prove any valid induction into the
partnership with the consent of the landlord.
7.5. It was further submitted that the reliance placed by the
respondents on Ex. R2 series (rent receipts) is wholly misplaced.
The said receipts stand in the name of the original tenant firm
and do not confer any independent right upon Respondent Nos.
2 and 3. In this regard, reference was made to the decision
in S.R. Radhakrishnan v. Neelamegam5, wherein, this Court
held that mere payment of rent or continuance in possession
does not ipso facto confer the status of a tenant.
7.6. It was submitted that the appellants have clearly established
grounds for eviction under Sections 27(2)(b)(ii) and 27(2)(p)
of the Karnataka Rent Act, 1999 inasmuch as there has been
unauthorised sub-letting / transfer of possession; the terms of
the lease deed have been violated; and the respondents are in
unlawful occupation without any legal right or privity of contract.
7.7. It was submitted that the High Court, without adverting to
the above material aspects and settled principles of law, has
erroneously reversed the well-reasoned judgment of the trial
5
(2003) 10 SCC 705
[2026] 4 S.C.R.
517
Sri M.V. Ramachandrasa Since Deceased Represented by Legal Heirs v.
M/s Mahendra Watch Company Represented by its Partners & Ors.
Court and set aside the eviction order. Therefore, the impugned
judgment suffers from serious legal infirmity and warrants
interference by this court.
8.
Per contra, the learned counsel appearing for the respondents at
the out, submitted that the present appeal is liable to be dismissed
in limine as the appellants have not approached this Court with
clean hands and have in fact, suppressed material particulars in the
list of dates and events. It was contended that the appellants have
failed to place true and correct facts and therefore are not entitled
to any relief much less the discretionary relief under Article 136 of
the Constitution of India.
8.1. The learned counsel further submitted that the respondent firm,
represented by its partners, has been a lawful tenant in respect
of the suit shop since the year 1978, having acquired tenancy
rights upon payment of goodwill to the original owner, namely
Shrimad Jagadguru Madhav Acharya Moola Mahasamsthane,
Uttaradhi Math, Bengaluru. It was submitted that subsequently,
the landlord obtained a long-term lease of the larger property
under a registered lease deed dated 02.02.1983 for a period of
55 years, taking symbolic possession of tenanted portions and
physical possession of vacant portions. Upon such acquisition,
he proposed redevelopment of the property and assured all
existing tenants, including the respondent firm, that they would
be accommodated in the newly constructed complex, while also
offering temporary alternate accommodation.
8.2. It was submitted that acting upon such assurance, the tenants
vacated the old premises, following which the landlord
demolished the existing structure and constructed a new
shopping complex. Upon completion, the respondent firm
was allotted a shop measuring 95 sq.ft. in place of the earlier
164 sq.ft. and a registered lease deed dated 22.02.1985 was
executed for a period of 53 years, expiring on 22.02.2038. The
agreed rent was fixed at Rs. 275/- per month with a provision
for periodic enhancement. Since then, the respondent firm
has been in continuous possession and has been carrying on
business in the said premises without interruption.
8.3. The learned counsel emphasised that the lease deed confers
valuable and enduring rights upon the respondent firm, including
518
[2026] 4 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
heritability, transferability among partners and their heirs,
and liberty to carry on business in partnership. It was further
submitted that the lease deed does not contain any forfeiture
clause attracting Section 111(g) of the Transfer of Property
Act, 1882, and therefore, the tenancy cannot be prematurely
terminated. It was contended that the respondent firm is entitled
to peaceful possession and enjoyment of the premises for the
entire duration of the lease, and the eviction proceedings initiated
during the subsistence of such lease are wholly misconceived
and not maintainable in law.
8.4. The learned counsel further submitted that the allegation of
subletting, which forms the foundation of the eviction petition,
is entirely baseless. It was contended that the respondent firm
has at no point sublet, assigned, or parted with possession of
the premises. The business has continuously been carried on
by the partners of the firm, and any change in the constitution of
the partnership does not amount to subletting. It was submitted
that a partnership firm is not a separate legal entity distinct
from its partners, and the firm name is merely a compendious
description of the partners who carry on the business.
8.5. Reliance was placed on the judgments of this Court in
Associated Hotels of India Ltd v. S.B. Sardar Ranjit Singh6,
Jagan Nath (D) through LRs v. Chander Bhan and another7,
and Mahendra Saree Emporium (II) v. G.V. Srinivasa Murthy8,
wherein it was held that subletting necessarily requires parting
with legal possession in favour of a third party and the mere use
of premises by others, including partners, does not constitute
subletting so long as the tenant retains legal possession. It
was submitted that in the present case, there is no evidence
whatsoever to show that any third party has been put in exclusive
possession of the premises.
8.6. The learned counsel further contended that the burden of proving
subletting squarely lies upon the landlord, which burden has
not been discharged in the present case. In the absence of any
6
AIR 1968 SC 933
7
(1988) 3 SCC 57
8
(2005) 1 SCC 481
[2026] 4 S.C.R.
519
Sri M.V. Ramachandrasa Since Deceased Represented by Legal Heirs v.
M/s Mahendra Watch Company Represented by its Partners & Ors.
material to establish exclusive possession by a third party for
consideration, no presumption of subletting can arise. It was
submitted that the High Court rightly appreciated the evidence
on record and applied the settled principles of law in setting
aside the eviction order.
8.7. It was also submitted that the partnership firm was reconstituted
on 01.07.2000, prior to the coming into force of the Karnataka
Rent Act, 1999, and that the continuing partners, including
Ashish M. Jain, have been carrying on business in the suit
premises before 31.12.2001. The appellants were fully aware
of the same, as rent was being regularly collected from the
respondent firm. It was contended that mere reconstitution of
a partnership firm or induction of partners does not amount to
assignment or subletting, particularly when the firm continues
to retain possession and control over the premises.
8.8. The learned counsel submitted that the eviction petition is
based on a wholly illusory cause of action and has been
filed by suppressing the existence of the registered lease
deed dated 22.02.1985. A meaningful reading of the petition
would demonstrate that the appellants have attempted to
mischaracterise the partners of the firm as sub-tenants, which is
impermissible in law. It was thus contended that the proceedings
are an abuse of the process of court and liable to be dismissed.
9.
We have carefully considered the rival submissions and perused the
material available on record.
10. The admitted position is that the appellants are the legal heirs of the
deceased appellant, Sri M.V. Ramachandrasa, who himself acquired
leasehold rights in respect of the property bearing Nos. 22 to 33
under a lease deed dated 02.02.1983 executed by Uttaradi Math
represented by its Presiding Swamiji through its power of attorney,
for a period of 55 years with liberty to sub-let the properties. It is
not in dispute that after obtaining the said lease, the landlord leased
the premises to Respondent No. 1 represented by Respondent
No. 4, under a registered lease deed dated 22.02.1985 (Document
No. 3669/1985) for a period of 53 years. Clause 19 of the lease
deed expressly restricts subletting without prior written consent of
the landlord. Since the actual and original partner of Respondent
No. 1 firm was not in occupation and possession of the premises,
520
[2026] 4 S.C.R.
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the landlord preferred eviction petition before the trial Court. After
examining the oral and documentary evidence, the trial Court allowed
the petition and directed the respondents to vacate and hand over
the possession of the premises within a period of three months.
However, the High Court allowed the revision petition and set aside
the eviction order. Therefore, the present appeal at the instance of
the appellants, who are the legal representatives of the deceased
appellant / landlord.
11. On the basis of the pleadings, the following issues arise for
consideration in the present appeal:
(i)
Whether the High Court was justified in interfering with the
findings of fact recorded by the trial Court while exercising its
revisional jurisdiction under Section 46 of the Karnataka Rent
Act, 1999?
(ii)
Whether the burden of proving unlawful sub-letting lies upon
the landlord, and if so, whether such burden has been duly
discharged in the present case?
(iii) Whether the alleged retirement of the original tenant - partner
and continuation of business by Respondent Nos. 2 and 3
constitutes a mere reconstitution of partnership or amounts to
unlawful sub-letting / assignment under Sections 27(2)(b)(ii)
and 27(2)(p) of the Karnataka Rent Act, 1999?
Issue No. 1
12. Whether the High Court was justified in interfering with the
findings of fact recorded by the trial Court while exercising its
revisional jurisdiction under Section 46 of the Karnataka Rent
Act, 1999?
12.1. At the outset, it must be noted that the scope of revisional
jurisdiction under Section 46 is well-settled and narrowly
circumscribed. The provision empowers the High Court to
examine the legality, correctness or propriety of an order;
however, it does not confer appellate powers permitting
reappreciation of evidence or substitution of factual findings.
For ease of reference, the said provision reads as under:
"46. Revision.- (1) The High Court may, at any time
call for and examine any order passed or proceeding
[2026] 4 S.C.R.
521
Sri M.V. Ramachandrasa Since Deceased Represented by Legal Heirs v.
M/s Mahendra Watch Company Represented by its Partners & Ors.
taken by the Court of Small Causes or the Court
of Civil Judge Senior Division referred to in items
(i) and (ii) of clause (c) of section 3 for the purpose
satisfying itself as to the legality or correctness
of such order or proceeding and may pass such
order in reference thereto as it thinks fit.
(2) The District Judge may at any time call for and
examine any order passed or proceeding taken by
the Court of Civil Judge Junior Division referred to in
item (iii) of clause (c) of section 3 for the purpose of
such order or proceeding and may pass such order
in reference thereto as he thinks fit.
(3) The costs incidental to all proceedings before
the High Court or the District Judge shall be in the
discretion of the High Court or the District Judge as
the case may be.
12.2. In Rukmini Amma Saradamma v. Kallyani Sulochana and
others9, this Court held that even where the statutory language
appears wide, the revisional court cannot act as a court of
appeal and undertake a fresh evaluation of evidence. It was
categorically observed that the High Court cannot reappreciate
oral and documentary evidence under the guise of examining
"propriety" as doing so would obliterate the distinction between
appellate and revisional jurisdiction. The following paragraphs
are pertinent:
"9. Notwithstanding the fact that Section 20 of the
Act conferring revisional jurisdiction of the High
Court is widely worded, such a jurisdiction cannot be
converted into an appellate jurisdiction. This Court
in Rai Chand Jain v. Chandra Kanta Khosla10 has
clearly pointed out the scope of such revisional
jurisdiction and has held that it cannot act as a
second court of appeal. Therefore, the impugned
order is liable to be set aside. Without prejudice to
9
(1993) 1 SCC 499
10
(1991) 1 SCC 422
522
[2026] 4 S.C.R.
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the above, it is submitted that this Court in Aundal
Ammal v. Sadasivan Pillai11 has held that no second
revision is permissible to the High Court either under
Section 115 of the Code or under Section 20 of the
Act. The District Court has exercised the revisional
jurisdiction. Hence, the remit order in C.R.P. No.
1719 of 1985 is void and is illegal. If that remit order
goes, what remains is only the revisional order of the
District Court, Kollam, confirming the appellate order
directing revision on the ground of bona fide need.
Hence, the impugned order calls for interference."
"20. We are afraid this approach of the High Court
is wrong. Even the wider language of Section 20
of the Act cannot enable the High Court to act
as a first or a second court of appeal. Otherwise,
the distinction between appellate and revisional
jurisdiction will get obliterated. Hence, the High
Court was not right in re-appreciating the entire
evidence both oral or documentary in the light
of the Commissioner's report (Exts. C-1 and C-2
mahazar). In our considered view, the High Court
had travelled far beyond the revisional jurisdiction.
Even by the presence of the word "propriety" it
cannot mean that there could be a re-appreciation of
evidence. Of course, the revisional court can come
to a different conclusion but not on a re-appreciation
of evidence; on the contrary, by confining itself to
legality, regularity and propriety of the order impugned
before it. Therefore, we are unable to agree with the
reasoning of the High Court with reference to the
exercise of revisional jurisdiction."
12.3. The legal position stands conclusively settled by the Constitution
Bench of this Court in Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd
(supra), wherein it was held that revisional jurisdiction, though
wider than that under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code,
1908, remains qualitatively distinct from appellate jurisdiction.
11
(1987) 1 SCC 183 : AIR 1987 SC 203
[2026] 4 S.C.R.
523
Sri M.V. Ramachandrasa Since Deceased Represented by Legal Heirs v.
M/s Mahendra Watch Company Represented by its Partners & Ors.
The High Court cannot reassess or reanalyse evidence to
arrive at a different conclusion merely because another view
is possible. Interference with findings of fact is permissible
only when such findings are perverse, based on no evidence,
suffer from misreading of evidence, or result in a miscarriage
of justice. The following paragraphs are apposite:
"28. Before we consider the matter further to find
out the scope and extent of revisional jurisdiction
under the above three Rent Control Acts, a quick
observation about the "appellate jurisdiction" and
"revisional jurisdiction" is necessary. Conceptually,
revisional jurisdiction is a part of appellate
jurisdiction, but it is not vice versa. Both, appellate
jurisdiction and revisional jurisdiction are creatures of
statutes. No party to the proceeding has an inherent
right of appeal or revision. An appeal is continuation
of suit or original proceeding, as the case may be.
The power of the appellate court is coextensive
with that of the trial court. Ordinarily, appellate
jurisdiction involves rehearing on facts and law but
such jurisdiction may be limited by the statute itself
that provides for the appellate jurisdiction. On the
other hand, revisional jurisdiction, though, is a part
of appellate jurisdiction but ordinarily it cannot be
equated with that of a full-fledged appeal. In other
words, revision is not continuation of suit or of original
proceeding. When the aid of Revisional Court is
invoked on the revisional side, it can interfere within
the permissible parameters provided in the statute.
It goes without saying that if a revision is provided
against an order passed by the Tribunal/appellate
authority, the decision of the Revisional Court is the
operative decision in law. In our view, as regards the
extent of appellate or revisional jurisdiction, much
would, however, depend on the language employed
by the statute conferring appellate jurisdiction and
revisional jurisdiction."
"31. We are in full agreement with the view expressed
in Sri Raja Lakshmi Dyeing Works v. Rangaswamy
524
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Chettiar12 that where both expressions "appeal"
and "revision" are employed in a statute,
obviously, the expression "revision" is meant to
convey the idea of a much narrower jurisdiction
than that conveyed by the expression "appeal".
The use of two expressions "appeal" and
"revision" when used in one statute conferring
appellate power and revisional power, we think, is
not without purpose and significance. Ordinarily,
appellate jurisdiction involves a rehearing while it
is not so in the case of revisional jurisdiction when
the same statute provides the remedy by way of
an "appeal" and so also of a "revision". If that were
so, the revisional power would become coextensive
with that of the trial court or the subordinate tribunal
which is never the case. The classic statement in
Dattonpant Gopalvarao Devakate v. Vithalrao
Maruthirao Janagaval13 that revisional power under
the Rent Control Act may not be as narrow as the
revisional power under Section 115 of the Code but,
at the same time, it is not wide enough to make the
High Court a second court of first appeal, commends
to us and we approve the same. We are of the view
that in the garb of revisional jurisdiction under the
above three rent control statutes, the High Court is
not conferred a status of second court of first appeal
and the High Court should not enlarge the scope of
revisional jurisdiction to that extent."
"33. Rai Chand Jain v. Chandra Kanta Khosla14
that follows Ram Dass v. Ishwar Chander15, also
does not lay down that the High Court in exercise
of its power under the Rent Control Act may
reverse the findings of fact merely because on
reappreciation of the evidence it has a different
12
(1980) 4 SCC 259
13
(1975) 2 SCC 246
14
(1991) 1 SCC 422
15
(1988) 3 SCC 131
[2026] 4 S.C.R.
525
Sri M.V. Ramachandrasa Since Deceased Represented by Legal Heirs v.
M/s Mahendra Watch Company Represented by its Partners & Ors.
view on the findings of fact. The observations made
by this Court in Rai Chand Jain must also be read
in the context we have explained Ram Dass"
"36. The statement in M.S. Zahed v. K. Raghavan16
that under Section 50 of the Karnataka Rent Control
Act, the High Court is entitled to reappreciate the
evidence with a view to find out whether the order
of Small Cause Court is legal and correct must be
understood in the light of the observations made
therein, namely, that revisional power cannot be
equated with the power of reconsideration of all
questions of fact as a court of first appeal."
"43. We hold, as we must, that none of the above Rent
Control Acts entitles the High Court to interfere with
the findings of fact recorded by the first appellate court/
first appellate authority because on reappreciation of
the evidence, its view is different from the court/
authority below. The consideration or examination
of the evidence by the High Court in revisional
jurisdiction under these Acts is confined to find
out that finding of facts recorded by the court/
authority below is according to law and does
not suffer from any error of law. A finding of fact
recorded by court/authority below, if perverse or
has been arrived at without consideration of the
material evidence or such finding is based on
no evidence or misreading of the evidence or
is grossly erroneous that, if allowed to stand, it
would result in gross miscarriage of justice, is
open to correction because it is not treated as
a finding according to law. In that event, the High
Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction under
the above Rent Control Acts shall be entitled to set
aside the impugned order as being not legal or proper.
The High Court is entitled to satisfy itself as to
the correctness or legality or propriety of any
16
(1999) 1 SCC 439
526
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decision or order impugned before it as indicated
above. However, to satisfy itself to the regularity,
correctness, legality or propriety of the impugned
decision or the order, the High Court shall not
exercise its power as an appellate power to
reappreciate or reassess the evidence for coming
to a different finding on facts.