# SRI RAM PASRICHA v. JAGANNATH & ORS

- **Citation:** [1977] 1 S.C.R. 395
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1976-08-24
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/sri-ram-pasricha-v-jagannath-ors-6926
- **Pages:** 8

## Headnote

'(.·
/
J
395
SRI RAM PASRICHA
v.
JAGANNATH & ORS.
August 24, 1976.
[Y. v. CHANDRACHUD, P. K. GOSWAMI AND A. c. GUPTA, J.T.]
Indian Evidence Act 1872 Sec. 116-Whether tenant can deny the landlord's
title.
West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act 1956-Sec. l3(1Hf)-Whet/1er one of the
co-owners can file a suit for eviction without impleadinr: other co-owners-Whet'
lier a co-owner, an owner for the purpose of an eviction suit-Stage for raising
objection about frame of suit.
A
B
The pla,intiff respondent is one of the co-owners of the premises which were
C
let out to the appellant tenant. The plaintiff filed a suit for eviction under s.
13(1)(f) of the West Bengal Premises T,enancy Act 1956.
The grounds for
eviction were the non-payment of the rent and the reasonable requirement of
the premises for the landlord. The trial court held that the plaintiff being only
a co-sharer cannot be said to be the owner within the meaning of s. 13(1) (f).
The trial court, however, held that the plaintiff succeeded in proving the reasonableness of the requirement of the members of the family fur whose benefit the
premises were held by him and, therefore, granted a decree for eviction. An
D
appeal filed by the appellants failed. In the s.econd appeal filed by the appellants it was contended that although reasonable requirement of the premises were
established, the respondent was not entitl'ed to a decree for eviction since he
was only a co-sharer and, therefore, not the owner of the premises.
The single
Judge of the High Court held that it will not be sufficient if the reasonable
requirement is of all the members of the family of the co-owners but such coowners must again be the landlords who only are entitled to a decree for recovery
of the possession under s. 13(l)(f). A Division Bench set aside the decision of
the Single Judge on the ground that a co-owner is as much as absolute owner as
E
a sole owner. In appeal by special\ leave, the appellant contended :
A landlord to be able to evict a tenant under Section 13 (1 )(f)
must be an absolute owner of the premises from which eviction is
sought.
Dismissing the appeal,
HELD : The contention of the appellant that the co-sharer plaintiff m4st be
the absolute owner and a co-owner cannot without impleading all the owners
of the premises ask for eviction cannot be accepted because the plea pertaining
to the domain of the frame of the suit 5hould have been raised at the earliest
opportunity and it was not done.
Secondly, the relation ·between the parties
being that of landlord and tenant only the landlord could terminate the tenancy
and institute the suit for eviction.
The tenant in such a suit is estopped from
questioning the title of the landlord under s. 116 of the Evidence Act. Under
the general law, in a suit between the landlord and tenant, the question oi title
to the lease property is irrelevant. The plaintiff is one of the co-owners of the
premises. The other co-sha•rers being his mother and married brother who
reside in the same premises along with him. Jurisprudentially, it is not correct
to say that a co-owner of a property is not an owner.
He owns every part of
the composite property along with others and it cannot be said that he is only a
part owner or a fractional owner of the property.
The position will change
when pa<rtition take• place.
It is, therefore, not po·ssible to accept the submission that the plaintiff· who is admittedly the landlord and co-owner of the premises is not the owner of the premises within the meaning of s.
13(1)(£).
f399 A-C. 401 B & 402 A-Bl
Bollye Salee and' Anr. v. Akram Ally and Anr. (1879] ILR (4) Calcutta 961;
Kattusheri Pishareth Kanna Pisharody v. Vallotil Manakel Narayan Somayaiipad
and Ors., [1878] 81 ILR (3) Madras 234; ]Jaikrishna Sakharam v. Moro Krishna
F
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396
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1977] 1 S.C.R.
A
Dabholkar [1897] ILR (21) Bombay 154; and Dwarka Nath Mitter and Ors. v.
Tara Prosunna Roy & Ors. [1890) ILR (27) Calcutta 160, distinguished.
B
c
D
E
Mcintyre

## Text

'(.·
/
J
395
SRI RAM PASRICHA
v.
JAGANNATH & ORS.
August 24, 1976.
[Y. v. CHANDRACHUD, P. K. GOSWAMI AND A. c. GUPTA, J.T.]
Indian Evidence Act 1872 Sec. 116-Whether tenant can deny the landlord's
title.
West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act 1956-Sec. l3(1Hf)-Whet/1er one of the
co-owners can file a suit for eviction without impleadinr: other co-owners-Whet'
lier a co-owner, an owner for the purpose of an eviction suit-Stage for raising
objection about frame of suit.
A
B
The pla,intiff respondent is one of the co-owners of the premises which were
C
let out to the appellant tenant. The plaintiff filed a suit for eviction under s.
13(1)(f) of the West Bengal Premises T,enancy Act 1956.
The grounds for
eviction were the non-payment of the rent and the reasonable requirement of
the premises for the landlord. The trial court held that the plaintiff being only
a co-sharer cannot be said to be the owner within the meaning of s. 13(1) (f).
The trial court, however, held that the plaintiff succeeded in proving the reasonableness of the requirement of the members of the family fur whose benefit the
premises were held by him and, therefore, granted a decree for eviction. An
D
appeal filed by the appellants failed. In the s.econd appeal filed by the appellants it was contended that although reasonable requirement of the premises were
established, the respondent was not entitl'ed to a decree for eviction since he
was only a co-sharer and, therefore, not the owner of the premises.
The single
Judge of the High Court held that it will not be sufficient if the reasonable
requirement is of all the members of the family of the co-owners but such coowners must again be the landlords who only are entitled to a decree for recovery
of the possession under s. 13(l)(f). A Division Bench set aside the decision of
the Single Judge on the ground that a co-owner is as much as absolute owner as
E
a sole owner. In appeal by special\ leave, the appellant contended :
A landlord to be able to evict a tenant under Section 13 (1 )(f)
must be an absolute owner of the premises from which eviction is
sought.
Dismissing the appeal,
HELD : The contention of the appellant that the co-sharer plaintiff m4st be
the absolute owner and a co-owner cannot without impleading all the owners
of the premises ask for eviction cannot be accepted because the plea pertaining
to the domain of the frame of the suit 5hould have been raised at the earliest
opportunity and it was not done.
Secondly, the relation ·between the parties
being that of landlord and tenant only the landlord could terminate the tenancy
and institute the suit for eviction.
The tenant in such a suit is estopped from
questioning the title of the landlord under s. 116 of the Evidence Act. Under
the general law, in a suit between the landlord and tenant, the question oi title
to the lease property is irrelevant. The plaintiff is one of the co-owners of the
premises. The other co-sha•rers being his mother and married brother who
reside in the same premises along with him. Jurisprudentially, it is not correct
to say that a co-owner of a property is not an owner.
He owns every part of
the composite property along with others and it cannot be said that he is only a
part owner or a fractional owner of the property.
The position will change
when pa<rtition take• place.
It is, therefore, not po·ssible to accept the submission that the plaintiff· who is admittedly the landlord and co-owner of the premises is not the owner of the premises within the meaning of s.
13(1)(£).
f399 A-C. 401 B & 402 A-Bl
Bollye Salee and' Anr. v. Akram Ally and Anr. (1879] ILR (4) Calcutta 961;
Kattusheri Pishareth Kanna Pisharody v. Vallotil Manakel Narayan Somayaiipad
and Ors., [1878] 81 ILR (3) Madras 234; ]Jaikrishna Sakharam v. Moro Krishna
F
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396
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1977] 1 S.C.R.
A
Dabholkar [1897] ILR (21) Bombay 154; and Dwarka Nath Mitter and Ors. v.
Tara Prosunna Roy & Ors. [1890) ILR (27) Calcutta 160, distinguished.
B
c
D
E
Mcintyre and Anr. v. Hardca.rtle; [1848] (!) All England Law Reports 696;
followed.
Kanika Devi and Ors. v. Amarendra /l{ath Roy Choudhury and Ors.; 65
Calcutta Weekly Notes 1078; Tarak Chandra Mukherjee v. Ratanlal Ghosal; 1959
CLJ 136; Ttflzerbhai Hebtullabhai and Anr. v. Ambalal Harilal Shah and Anr.;
1966(7) Guiarat 963 ILR; and Deb Ranjan Chatterjee v. Swamarani Biswas &
Anr. 78 Calcutta Weekly Notes 1034; approved.
Nana/al GirdharltA and Anr. v. Gulamnabhi Jwnalbhai Motorwala and Ors.
A.LR. 1973 Gujarat 131; distinguished.
\_
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil
Appeal No.
1223
to
l
1975.
From the Judgment and Order dated 4-3-75 of the Calcutta High
Court in LP.A. No. 74/74.
V. N. Tarkunde, and H. K. Puri, for the appellant.
V S. Desai, D. N. Mukherjee and N. R. Choudhary, for respondent No. 1.
A. K. Sen and S. P. Nayar, for respondent No. 2.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
GOSWAMI, J.
This is an appeal by
the defendant-tenant
by
certificate from the judgment of the Calcutta High Court.
The question that arises for decision is whether a landlord who is a co-owner
of the premises with others is "the owner" within the meaning of
section 13(1) (f) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act,
1956
(briefly the Act). It will turn on the interpretation of the expression
"if he is the owner" under section 13(1) (f) of the Act.
Briefly the facts are as follows :-
r
The plaintiff-respondent (hereinafter to be referred to as the plainJ
tiff)
is admiitedly the landlord of one late Bhagat Ram Pasricha
predecessor-in-interest of the present appellant and respondents 2 and
F
3 (hereinafter to be referred to as the defendants). The tenancy was
~
in respect of a part of the premises No. 221/1, Rash Behari Avenue,
• ,
Calcutta, being the entire second fio<;>r of the building.
The tenancy
commenced some time in 1946 and' Bhagat Ram Pasricha promised
to vacate the said premises within March 31, 194 7 and positively after
March 31, 1948. Bhagat Ram Pasricha, however, did not vacate
and died on February 18, 1960, leaving behind the defendants as his
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heirs.
The plaintiff is only a co-sharer owner of the suit premises
being one of the heirs of his father late Motilal Sen who originally
owned the property.
H
The plaintiff instituted a suit for eviction of the defendants
in
December 1962 on the twin pleas of default in payment of rent and
reasonable requirement
of the premises
for his
own
occupation
as
well
as
for the
occupation ' of the
members
of
the joint family
consisting of his
mother and
his
married
brother.
The suit was contested by the defendants.
The trial court
decreed the suit on both the grounds.
On the question of reasonable
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SRI RAM PASRICHA v. JAGANNATH (Goswami, J.)
397
requirement the trial court held that the plaintiff being only a coA
sharer owner cannot be said to be the owner within the meaning of
section 13(1) (f) of ~he Act.
The trial court, however, held that
the plaintiff succeeded in proving the case of reasonable requirement
of the members of the family "for whose benefit the premises were
held by him" within the meaning of the second part of section
13(1) (f).
On appeal by the defendants the lower appellate court did not
accept the plea of default but affirmed the finding
of
reasonable
ret1uirement although the learned Judge was not specific as to which
of the two material parts of section 13 (1) (f) would
govern
the
case.
B
fn the second appeal by the defendants before the learned single
C
Judge of the High Court the question of factual existence of reasonable
requirement was
not disputed. It was, however, contended before
the learned single Judge that even though
the
actual
reasonable
requirement of the premises was established the plaintiff
was
not
entitled to a decree for eviction being only a co-sharer and as such
not "the owner'' of the premises within the
meaning
of
section
13 ( 1) (f). It was submitted that a co-owner was only a part-owner
D
and was not entitled to an order of eviction under section 13 ( 1) (f)
of the Act.
The learned single Judge accepted the contention
of
the defendants and_ dismissed the suit observing:-
"it will not be sufficient if the reasonable requirement is of
all meri1bers of the family of the co-owners but such coowners must again be the landlords who only are made
E
entitled to a decree for recovery of the possession under
section 13 (l) (f).
In the letters patent appeal before the Division Bench the High
Court did not agree with the single judge and set aside the decision
and decreed the suit for eviction.
The Division Bench held :
"In our opinion a co-Owner is as much an absolute owner
F
as a sole owner is with reference to the interest held by
him".
·
Mr. Tarkunde, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of
the
appellant sub1hits that the decision of the Division Bench is erroneous
and we should accept the views of the single Judge.
He submits
that a landlord in order to be able to evict a tenant under section
G
13(1) (f) must be an absolute owner of the premises from
which
eviction is sought.
A co-owner landlord without impleading all the
owners of the premises is not entitled to ask . for
eviction under
section 13 ( l) (f) of the Act.
Mr. A. K. Sen, who appears on behalf
of the sisters o{ the appellant (respondents 2 and 3) also emphasised
upon this part of the case while adopting the arguments
of Mr.
Tarkunde.
H
Mr. Desai, on the other hand, contests this proposition and submits that the decision of the Division Bench is correct.
A
B
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398
SUPREME COUR,T REPORTS
[1977] 1 S.C.R.
Mr. Tarkunde referred to certain decisions in oupport
of
the
submission that a suit by one of the co-sharers for eviction
of
a
tenant has always been held to be incompetent.
Counsel
relied
upon the decision in Bo/lye Satee and another v. Akram Ally anci
other.(')
This was a case in which it was held that a lessee of a
jalkar cannot be ejected by a suit brought by one only of the several
proprietors all of whom had granted the lease.
This case, with its
own facts, is, therefore, of no aid in the present controversy.
ln Kattusheri Pishareth Kanna Pisharody
v.
Val/otil Manakel
Nara.\·anan Somayajipad and others,(2) the suit was brought by the
plaintiffs on behalf of an association (sabha) to recover certain lands
demised by the sabha.
It was held that all the co-owners must join
in a suit to recowr property unless the law otherwise provides.
This
decision will again be of no assistance to the appellant.
In Balakrishna Sakharam v. Moro Krishna Dabholkar(8) it was
a case of one of the co-sharer-jagirdars who as a manager filed a
suit for recovery of Rs. 99/- being the balance due to him on
account of the highest rate of assessment for the three years preceding the suit.
The defendant disputed the plaintifI's right to demand
the highest rate of assessment and contended that the plaintiff
had
no right to sue alone as he and his co-sharers owned the jagir and
the defendant cultivated the land in that village by paying the jagirdars
something less than the full assessment prior to the years in the suit.
It was in that context that the following observation appears in the
judgment which is relied upon by counsel :
"We must, therefore, treat it as settled law that a co-sharer
who is manager even with the consent of his co-sharers cannot maintain a suit by himself and in his own name
to
eject a tenant who has failed to comply with
a
notice
calling on him to pay enhanced rent".
This proposition of law also purports to be in line v/ith the two
earlier decisions relied upon by counsel and is of little aid to him.
In Dwarka Nath Mitter and others vs. Tara Prosunna Roy and
others,( 4 ) the objection of the defendant was to the form of the suit
and it was pressed from the very commencement by the defendant.
This was a suit bv the plaintiffs for balance of arrears of rent making
other co-sharers as defendants.
The court held
that
unless
the
co-sharers had refused to join in the suit or had otherwise acted prejudicially to their interests the plaintiffs were not .entitled to sue alone.
In this view of the matter the suit was dismissed.
We do not see
how this decision can come to the assistance of the appellant.
It is strenuously submitted by Mr. Tarkunde that
unless
the
landlord is also the absolute owner of the premises, he cannot evict
the tenant under section 13(1)(f). Landlord means landlords under
the appropriate General Clauses Act and, therefore, since there are
(1) (1879) I.L.R. 4 Cal. 961.
. (2) (1878-81) I.L.R, 3 Mad. 234.
(3) (1897) I.L.R. 21 Born. 154.
(4) (1890) I.L.R. 17 Cal. 160.
\
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f
SRI RAM PASRICHA v. JAGANNATH (Goswami, J.)
3-99
other co-sharers the plaintiff alone could not file the suit for
evicA
tion.
There are two reasons for our not being able to accept the above
submission.
firstly, the plea pertains to the domain 01 the frame
of the suit as if the suit is bad for non-joinder of
other plaintiffs.
Such a plea should have been raised, for what it is worth,
at the
earliest opportunity.
It was not
done.
Secondly,
the
rclation
between the parties being that of landlord ·and tenant,
only the
landlord could terminate the tenancy and institute the suit for evic-·
tion.
The tenant in such a suit it estopped from
questioning the
title of the landlord under section 116 of the Evidc:nce
Act.
The
tenai1t cannot deny that the landlord had title to the premises at the
commencement of the tenancy.
Under the general law, in a
suit
between landlord and tenant the question of title to the leased
property is irrelevant.
It is, therefore, inconceivable to throw out the
suit on account of non-pleading of oilier co-owners as such.
Being faced with this position counsel submits
that
since
the
requirements are found to be of the co-owners, th~ suit cannot be
decreed in their absence.
This is a repetition of the first submission
in a different form.
Counsel relied upon Mcintyre and another v.
Hardcastle('). The English rule lai'<i down in that decision · is that
if two or more landlords institute a. suit for possession on the ground
that a dwelling house is required for occupation of one of them as
a residence the suit would fail.
The requirement, according to the
decision, must be of all the landlords.
The High Courts of Calcutta and Gujarat have dissented
from
the rule of English law in Mcintyre's case (supra) (See Kanika Devi
and Ors. v. Amarendra Nath Roy Chaudhuri and Ors.,( 2)
Tarak
Chandra vs.
Ratanlal
Ghosal;( 3 )
Taherbhai
Hebtu/labhai
and
another v. Ambalal Harilal Shah & Anr.(4 ). Deb Ranjan Chatterjee
v. Swaranarani Biswas & another( 5 ).
Indeed the rule in Mcintyre's case (supra) is abhorrent to
the
Indian conception and structure of social life of our country with its
benign sensitivity and ties, which is not based 6n pure individualism.
A widowed sister, suddenly shipwrecked in the mid-stream of married
life, with no other help, returns to parental home or to. her brothers'
where sympathetic and affectionate shelter is readily available to her.
In such a case. the additional requirement of the widowed sister and
her children may furnish a reasonable requirement of the father or
the brothers for the purpose of eviction of their tenant.
It is enough
if the requirements are of any one of the members of the family or
of dependents to furnish a reasonable plea for eviction on the ground
of personal requirement.
We endorse the parting of the ways from
the English rule on this aspect of the matter by the High Courts.
This is in accord with healthy Indian tradition.
----
(!) (1848) I All E.R. 696.
(2) 65 C.W.N. 1076.
(3) 1959 C.L.J. 136.
(4) I.L.R. [1966] 7 Guj.-963
(5) 78 C.W.N. 1034.
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400
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1977) 1 S.C.R.
Keeping in the forefront the observations of the Bombay High
Court in Vagha jesing v. Mani/al Bhagi/al Desai(1)
(at page 252)
where reference has been made to the landlords' rights
belonging
jointly to several persons and hence warranting a suit by all the coowners, Mr. Tarkunde drew our attention to the admi'ssion of the
plaintiff in his deposition regarding the death of his father in 1949
and that Bhagat Ram Pasricha was inducted by him as instructed by
his father to do so.
From this he submitted that all the heirs of
late Motilal Sen were the landlords and, therefore, they should have
been impleaded as plaintiffs in the suit. We are unable to give effect
10 this submission taken for the first time in this Court in view of the
clear acknowledgement and admission of the defendants and
concurrent findings of the courts that the plaintiff is their landlord.
Mr. Tarkunde also relied upon a Full Bench decision
of
the
Gujarat High Court in Nanalal Girdharlal and another v.
Gu/amnabi
Jamalbhai Motorwa/a and others(2) and read to us the
following
passage at page 146 :
"ft is, therefore, clear that the rule that a co-owner may
maintain an action to eject a trespasser
without
joining
other co-owners in such action can have no
application
where a co-owner seeks to evict a tenant who is in possession of the property after determination of the lease.
Such
a tenant can be evicted only by an action taken by all coowners"
But this rule is not applicable in the present case as would appear
from the decision itself.
The Gujarat decision at para 10 of the
judgment excludes two categories described therein and the rule of
estoppel applies
to these two categories.
The present case, even
according to this decision, fails under the excepted category. · .
Before we come to the real quystion at issue we may turn to
section 13 ( 1) (f) of the Act as it was at the material time
Sec. 13. Protection of tenant against eviction -
(1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in
any
other law, no order or decree for the recovery of
possession of any premises shall be made by any
Court in favour of the landlord against
a
tenant
except on one or more of the following grounds,
namely-
(f) where the premises are reasonably required by
the landlord either for purposes of building or
rebuilding or for making
thereto
substantial
additions or alterations or for his own occupation if he is the owner or for the occupation of
any person for whose benefit the premises are
held".
1) 37 Born. L.R. 249.
(2) A.J.R.1973 Guj. 131.
I
J.
SRI RAM PASRICHA v. JAGANNATH (Goswami, J.)
40 I
This is not a case attracting the second, part of section 13(1) (f),
A
that is to say, the clause providing for the occupatio_n of any person
for whose benefit the premises are held.
We will not,
therefore,
refer to the submission of the appellant and to the decisions relied
upon by him with reference to t]rnt clause.
-
The present case, on the facts found, is covered by the first part
of section 13 (1) ( f), namely, where the premises are reasonably reB
quired by the landlord for his own occupation if he is the owner.
There is no dispute that the plaintiff is the landlord.
It is, how-
. ever, found that he is one of the. co-owners of the premises-the
other" co-sharers being his mother and married brother, who reside
in the same premises along with him.
The premises in suit, namely,
the second floor of the building in occupation of the tenant is required
C
by the plaintiff for occupation of, the members of the joint family and
for their benefit.
A major portion of the ground floor of the building accommodates the joint family business and the first
floor
is
found by the court to be inadequate to the requirements of the large
family of eighteen members including the widowed mother.
That the particular requirement is reasonable is no
longer
in
D
controversy.
The only question is whether a decree can
still
be
passed in favour of the plaintiff since he is not the absolute and full
owner of the premises, sharing, as he does, the interest in the premises
along with other co-sharers.
The principal question, therefore, is whether the plaintiff
being
a co-owner landlord can be said to reasonably require the premises
E
for his own occupation withi•n the expression "if he is the owner" in
section 13 (1) (f) .
Mr. V. S. Desai reads to us from 'Salmond on Jurisprudence'
(13th edition) and relies on the following
passage in Chapter 8
{Ownership), paragraph 46 at page 254:
"As a general rule a thing is owned by one person only
at a time, but duplicate ownership is
perfectly
possible.
Two or more persons may at the same time have ownership
of the same thing vested in them.
This may happen in
several distinct ways, but the simplest and most
obvious
case is that of co-ownership.
Partners, for example,
are
co-owners of the chattels which constitute their stock-in
trade of the lease of the premiseS< on which their business
is conducted, and of the debts owing to them by their customers.
It is
not correct to say that property owned by
co-owners is divided between them, each of them owning a
separate part. It is an undivided unity, which
is vested
at the same time in more than one person. . . . . .
The
several ownership of a part is a· different thing from
the
co-ownership of the whole.
So soon as each of two coowners begins to own a part of the thing instead of the
whole of it, the co-ownership has been dissolved into sole
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1977] 1 S.C.R.
ownership by the process known as partition.
Co-ownership involves the undivided integrity of what is owned".
Jurisprudentially it is not correct to say that a co-owner of
a
property is not' its owner.
He owns every part of the composite
property along with others and it cannot be said that he is only a
part-owner or a fractional owner of the property.
The position will,
change only when partition takes place. It is, therefore, not possible
to accept the submission that the plaintiff who
is
admittedly
the
landlord and co-owner of the premises is not the owner of the premises within the meaning of section 13 ( 1 ) ( f) . It is not necessary
to establish that the plaintiff is the only owner of the property for the
purpose of section 13 (1) (f) as long as he is a co-owner of the
property being at the same time the acknowledged landlord of the
defendants.
Mr. Tarkunde also submitted that since the Calcutta High Court
has held in Y ogamaya Pakhira v. Santi Subha Bose (1)
that a
permanent lessee is not an owner within the meaning of secti'on
13(1) (f) a co-owner would not be ii). a better position.
We are of
opinion that a co-owner is as muc~ an owner of the entire property
as any sole owner of a property is.
We, however, express no opinion
about the case of a permanent lessee as this point does not arise in
this appeal.
As all the submissions of the appellant fail, the appeal is
dismissed.
We will, however, make uo order as to costs.
P.H.P.
Appeal dismissed.
(I) I.L.R. (1968) 2 Cal. 70.