# SRI RAMA VILAS SERVICE (P) LTD v. C. CHANDRASEKARAN & ORS

- **Citation:** [1964] 5 S.C.R. 869
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1962-09-17
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 1015 of 1963
- **Bench:** P.B. Gajendragadkar, K.C. Das Gupta1
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/sri-rama-vilas-service-p-ltd-v-c-chandrasekaran-ors-3050
- **Pages:** 12

## Headnote

December 9
Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (4of1939) s. 47(1) (a) and Constitution of India, Art. 226.-Consideration in granting permit-Meaning of Public interest-if writ of certiorari can be issued on questions
of fact.
.
The Regional Transport Authority granted one stage carriage
permit to the appellant. On appeal, the State Transport Appel-
870
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
1963
late Tribunal took the view that the appellant was a monopolist
over a distance .of 18 miles which was a part of the route in quesSri Rama Vilas tion and so, it rejected the application for a permit made by the
Service (P) Ltd. appell.ant an~ grankd th~ pern;iit to respondent no. I over the
route m quest10n. It 1s agamst this order of the Appellate Tnbunal
Y·
that the appellant preferred· a writ petition before the High Court.
,C.
The single Judge, who heard the ·writ petition, quashed the order
Chandrasekaran of the Appellate Tribunal.
This order was
challeng~d by
. &: Ors.
respondent no. I by preferring an appeal under the Letters Patent
before a Division Bench of the said High Court. The Division
Bench affirmed the order of the· Appellate Tribunal and set
aside the order of the single Judge on the ground that the single
Judge was not justified in issuing a writ of certiorari under Art.
226 of the Constitution oflndia. Hence this appeal.
Held: (i) In granting a permit, the appropriate authorities
under the. Motor Vehicles Act are required to consider the interests
of the public generally under s. 47(1)(a) of the Act.
In dealing
with this aspect of the matter, it would not be irrelevant for the
appropriate authority to hold that if any applicant is or would
be in the position of a monopolist if a permit was granted to him,
he would be liable to neglect the interests of the public and may
not be very keen on taking all steps to keep his service in good
and efficient order. Therefore, it cannot be said that in taking
into account the fact that the appellant was a monopolist on
a part of the route, the Appellate Tribunal has been influenced
by any irrelevant fact.
R.K. Ayyaswami Gounder v. M/s. Sundambigai Motor Service,
Dharampura. C.A. No. 198 of 1962 decided on 17th September,
1962 relied on. '·
(ii) It is true that the administrative directions issued by the
Government under s. 43(a) have no force of statutory rules and
are; therefore, not binding; but that does not mean that the consideration that the granting of a. monopoly to a bus-operator
may be prejudicial to public interest, becomes irrelevant only
because it bas been included or is implied in the administrative
instructions. The said consideration has to be taken into account
not because it bas been included in the administrative instructions,
but because, by itself, it is a relevant consideration under s. 47(1)
(a) of the Act.
,
M/s. Raman & Raman Ltd. v. The State of Madras, [1959]
>
Suppl. 2 S.C.R. 227, relied on.
(iii) In dealing with the applications under Art. 226 in cases
of this kind, it is necessary to bear in mind that the High Court
is not exercising the jurisdiction of an Appellate court in the matter.
In entertaining writ petitions, the High Court must not lose sight A
of the fact that decisions of questions of fact under the Motor
Vehi.cles Act have been left fo the appropriate authorities which
.
.
i" · 5 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
871
have been constituted into quasi judicial Tribunals in that behalf,
1963
and so, decisions rendered by them on all questions of fact should
not be interfered with under the special jurisdiction conferred Sri Ran;a Vilas
on the High Courts under Art. 226, unless the well recognised Service (P)Ltd
tests in that behalf are satisfied. If the order passed by the Appe·
·
!late Tribunal which is challenged in writ proceedings suffers from
v.
infirmities which would justify the issue of a writ under the well
C.
recognised principles laid down by judicial decisions in that Chandrasekaran
behalf, the High Court should and ought to interfere but the
& Ors.
wr

## Text

-
,
5 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
869
latdar would declare the transfer to be invalid in case
1963
the transferee failed to pay the penalty. The pro-
-
visions of s. 84A brought the matter of validity or
Bai Achhuba ·
invalidity of a transfer deed within the jurisdiction · Amar Singh
of the Mamlatdar. It was in the exercise of this
v.
jurisdiction that the Mamlatdar issued a notice on
Sri Kit/idas
October 7, 1957 to the respondent for paying the liarnath OJha
penalty of Rs. 100 calculated at the rate of 5 °fo on the
and Others
consideration of the sale deed. On December 9,
-
1957 the Mamlatdar issued the necessary certificate Raghubar Dayal
validating the sale deed on the respondent's paying
J.
Rs. 35. I consider the certificate to be good in law.
It is not necessary to express an opinion in this
case whether the Mamlatdar could certify a transfer
to be valid in case it had been legally declared invalid
by a competent Court previously.
I am therefore of opinion that the order of the
High Court under appeal is correct and that this
appeal be dismissed.
ORDER
In view of the judgment of the majority, the
Order of the High Court is set aside and that of the
,.
Revenue Tribunal restored. The costs throughout
will be borne by Respondent No. I.
·
SRI RAMA VILAS SERVICE (P) LTD.
v.
C. CHANDRASEKARAN & ORS.
1963
(P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR AND K.C. DAS GUPTA1 JJ.)
December 9
Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (4of1939) s. 47(1) (a) and Constitution of India, Art. 226.-Consideration in granting permit-Meaning of Public interest-if writ of certiorari can be issued on questions
of fact.
.
The Regional Transport Authority granted one stage carriage
permit to the appellant. On appeal, the State Transport Appel-
870
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
1963
late Tribunal took the view that the appellant was a monopolist
over a distance .of 18 miles which was a part of the route in quesSri Rama Vilas tion and so, it rejected the application for a permit made by the
Service (P) Ltd. appell.ant an~ grankd th~ pern;iit to respondent no. I over the
route m quest10n. It 1s agamst this order of the Appellate Tnbunal
Y·
that the appellant preferred· a writ petition before the High Court.
,C.
The single Judge, who heard the ·writ petition, quashed the order
Chandrasekaran of the Appellate Tribunal.
This order was
challeng~d by
. &: Ors.
respondent no. I by preferring an appeal under the Letters Patent
before a Division Bench of the said High Court. The Division
Bench affirmed the order of the· Appellate Tribunal and set
aside the order of the single Judge on the ground that the single
Judge was not justified in issuing a writ of certiorari under Art.
226 of the Constitution oflndia. Hence this appeal.
Held: (i) In granting a permit, the appropriate authorities
under the. Motor Vehicles Act are required to consider the interests
of the public generally under s. 47(1)(a) of the Act.
In dealing
with this aspect of the matter, it would not be irrelevant for the
appropriate authority to hold that if any applicant is or would
be in the position of a monopolist if a permit was granted to him,
he would be liable to neglect the interests of the public and may
not be very keen on taking all steps to keep his service in good
and efficient order. Therefore, it cannot be said that in taking
into account the fact that the appellant was a monopolist on
a part of the route, the Appellate Tribunal has been influenced
by any irrelevant fact.
R.K. Ayyaswami Gounder v. M/s. Sundambigai Motor Service,
Dharampura. C.A. No. 198 of 1962 decided on 17th September,
1962 relied on. '·
(ii) It is true that the administrative directions issued by the
Government under s. 43(a) have no force of statutory rules and
are; therefore, not binding; but that does not mean that the consideration that the granting of a. monopoly to a bus-operator
may be prejudicial to public interest, becomes irrelevant only
because it bas been included or is implied in the administrative
instructions. The said consideration has to be taken into account
not because it bas been included in the administrative instructions,
but because, by itself, it is a relevant consideration under s. 47(1)
(a) of the Act.
,
M/s. Raman & Raman Ltd. v. The State of Madras, [1959]
>
Suppl. 2 S.C.R. 227, relied on.
(iii) In dealing with the applications under Art. 226 in cases
of this kind, it is necessary to bear in mind that the High Court
is not exercising the jurisdiction of an Appellate court in the matter.
In entertaining writ petitions, the High Court must not lose sight A
of the fact that decisions of questions of fact under the Motor
Vehi.cles Act have been left fo the appropriate authorities which
.
.
i" · 5 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
871
have been constituted into quasi judicial Tribunals in that behalf,
1963
and so, decisions rendered by them on all questions of fact should
not be interfered with under the special jurisdiction conferred Sri Ran;a Vilas
on the High Courts under Art. 226, unless the well recognised Service (P)Ltd
tests in that behalf are satisfied. If the order passed by the Appe·
·
!late Tribunal which is challenged in writ proceedings suffers from
v.
infirmities which would justify the issue of a writ under the well
C.
recognised principles laid down by judicial decisions in that Chandrasekaran
behalf, the High Court should and ought to interfere but the
& Ors.
writs of certiorari should not be issued merely on the ground
that all relevant reasons have not been set out in the judgment of the Appellate Tribunal or that the High Court would
have taken a different view on the evidence adduced in the pro·
ceedings.
(iv) There can be little doubt that if a decision of a quasi•
judicial Tribunal is challenged before the High Court under Art.
226 and it is shown that the said decision is based on irrelevant
considerations or on considerations which are invalid in law,
a writ will undoubtedly be issued under Art. 226. But the order
passed by the Appellate Tribunal in the case does not suffer
from any such infirmity. In the present case, the Division
Bench was right in holding that the Single Judge should not have
issued a writ in favour of the appellant.
R. v. Agricultural Land Tribunal for the Eastern Province
of England, Ex parte Grant, relied on.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal
No. 1015 of 1963.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment
and order dated September 26, 1963, of the Madras
High Court in Writ Appeal No. 20 of 1962.
· G.S. Pathak, K.K. Venugopal and R. Gopalakrishnan,
for the appellant.
M.C. Setalvad, J.B. Dadachanji,
O.C. Mathur
and RavindO?r Narain, for the respondent No. 1.
December 9, 1963. The Judgment of the Court
was delivered by
GAJENDRAGADKAR J.-This appeal
has
been
brought to this Court by special leave and it has been
filed against the decision of the Division Bench of
the Madras High Court by which the order passed
by a learned single Judge of the said High Court
directing the issue of a writ of certiorari in favour
of the appellant Sri Rama Vilas Service (P) Ltd.
Gajendragadkar
J.
872
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1964]
J96J
has been reversed. . It appears that the Regional
.
Transport Authority, Thanjavur called for applica-
.. Sri Rama Vilas tions for the grant of one stage carriage permit beService (P) Ltd. tween Mannargucli and Nagapattinam. The distance
v;
between these two places is 34 miles. Four applicants
C.
applied for a permit on this route. They were the
Chandrasekaran appellant, Raman & Raman (P) Ltd., Balasu-
& Ors.
brahmanya Udayar, and respondent No. 1 C. Chandra-
--
sekaran. The Regional Transport Authority conGafendragadkar sidered the merits of these four applicants and assigned
J.
them marks as a result of which a permit was granted
to the appellant on the ground that it got the highest
number of marks.
This order was challenged by the three applicants whose applications for permit had been rejected
by the Regional Transport Authority. The State
Transport Appellate Tribunal,· Madras (hereinafter
called the 'Appellate Tribunal') considered the merits
of the four applicants for itself, assigned them marks
and ultimately came to the conclusion that the appellant was not entitled to a permit. The judgment
of the Appellate . Tribunal shows that though as a
resqlt of the marks assigned by it to the respective
applicants, the appellant and Raman and Raman
(P) Ltd. secured 4 marks each and the two other
competitors 3~ and 3! marks respectively, the Appellate
Tribunal took the view that the appellant was a monopolist over a distance of 18 miles which was a part
of the route in question, whereas Raman & Raman
(P) Ltd. had a near monopoly or predominant influence over the remaining part of the distance which
was 16 miles, and so, it rejected the application for
a permit made by the appellant and Raman &Raman
(P) Ltd. and granted the permit to respondent No.
I over the route in question. It is against this order
of the Appellate Tribunal that the appellant preferred
a writ petition before the Madras High Court (No.
25 of 1959). Srinivasan .J. who heard the writ petition came to the conclusion that the Appellate Tribunal had signally failed to consider the relevant
evidence, and so, this order needed to be corrected
•
'i
- '
t
~I
5 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
873
by a writ of certiorari. Accordingly, a writ of cer1963
tiorari was ordered to be issued as prayed for by the
appellant.
Rama Vilas
This order was challenged by respondent No. 1 Service (P) Ltd.
by preferrin_g. ?n appeal under the . Lett~rs Patent
~-
before a D1v1S1on Bench of the said High Court.
·
The Division Bench has taken the view that having Chandrasekaran
regard to the reasons given by the Appellate Tribunal
& Orso
in support of its conclusion that the appellant was not Gajendragadkar
entitled to a permit, Srinivasan J. was not justified
in issuing a writ of certiorari under Art. 226 of the
J.
Constitution. In the result, the order passed by
Srinivasan J. was reversed and the writ petition filed
by the appellant was dismissed. It is against this
order that the appellant has come to this Court in
appeal. Respondents 2 and 3 are State Transport
Appellate Tribunal, and the Regional Transport Authority respectively and they have been impleaded because the order passed by respondent No. 2 was
questioned in the writ proceedings and is the subjectrnatter of the present appeal.
It is common ground that over a distance of
J 8 miles in the first sector of the route in question,
the appellant runs seven buses and no other bus
runs on that sector of the route, so that in respect
of this sector, the appellant is a monopolist. It
is also common ground that over the second sector
of the route consisting of 16 miles Raman & Raman
(P) Ltd. runs nine buses, whereas two buses are run
by two other permit-holders; and that means that
Raman & Raman (P) Ltd. can be described as a
near monopolist on that par~ of the route. It is
in the light of these two admitted facts that the Appellate Tribunal took the view that the monopolist and the
near monopolist should not be given permits, because
granting them permits would not be in the interests
of the public. That is how respondent No. 1 came
to be given a permit by the Appellate Tribunal.
Before dealing with the points raised by Mr.
Pathak in this Court on behalf of the appellant,
it is necessary to indicate briefly the findings recorded
874
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
1963
by Srinivasan J. and the Division Bench which heard
--
the appeal against his decision.
Srinivasan J. agreed
Sri Rama Vilas with the contention of respondent No. 1
that
Service (P) Ltd; the question as to whether any applicant for a permit
v.
is a monopolist is not irrelevant having regard to
C;
the provisions of s. 47(l)(a) of the Motor Vehicles
Chandrasekaran Act (No. 4 of 1939). He, however, took the view
& Ors·
that in assessing the value of the said consideration,
. -
the Appellate Tribunal had failed to consider the
Ga1endragadkar fact that between the monopolist appellant and the
J.
near monopolist Raman & Raman (P) . Ltd. there
would be keen competition on the route in question,
and so, the argument that a monopolist would tend
to ignore the public interest for want of competition
with anybody else was not valid in the present case.
In the opinion of the learned Judge, the Appellate
Tribunal had also failed to take into account the
fact that between Tiruvarur and Nagapattinam there
is a parallel railway which also offers some competition to the bus-operators. In the result, the learned
Judge was satisfied that in rejecting the application
for a permit made by the appellant, the Appellate
Tribunal had been influenced mainly by the abstract
concept of monopoly and its adverse effect on public
interest. That, in brief, is the basis of the order passed
by the learned Judge quashing the decision of the
Appellate Tribunal.
On the other hand, when. the matter went before
the Division Bench in ·the Letters Patent Appeal, the
Division Bench took the view that the Appellate
Tribunal had referred to the existence of the amenity
of the railway service parallel to the route and it
observed foat merely because the Appellate Tribunal
had not marshalled all the reasons in support of its
conclusion, it would not be appropriate for the High
Court to exercise its special jurisdiction under Art.
226. It noticed the fact that in support of the view
taken by the Appellate Tribunal there were other
valid reasons. which the judgment indicated, and
so, it was held that the learned Judge was in error
in issuing a writ of certiorari in the present case;
•.
'
I
5 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
875
Mr. Pathak contends that the Division Bench was
1963
in error in reversing the conclusion of the learned
single Judge.
Sri Rama Vilas
.
.
.
Service (P) Ltd.
There can be no doubt that m grantmg a permit,
the appropriate authorities under the Motor Vehicles
~-
Act are required to consider the interests of the public Ch
d · k
generally under s. 47(1) (a), and in assessing the merits
a~r~~:.aran
of an individual applicant for a permit 01,1 any route,
it would be open to the appropriate authority to Gajendragadkar
enquire whether the service which the individual appliJ.
cant would render to the public if he is given a permit
would be efficient and satisfactory or not. in dealing with this aspect of the matter, it would not be
irrelevant for the appropriate authority to hold that
if any applicant is or would be in the position of a
monopolist if a permit was granted to him, he would
be liable to neglect the interests of the public and may
not be very keen on taking all steps to keep his service
in good and efficient order. Absence of any competition from another bus-operator on the route is likely
to develop a feeling of complacence in the monopolist
and that is a factor which the appropriate authority
can certainly take into account. Therefore, it cannot
be urged that in taking into account the fact that the
appellant was a monopolist on a part of the route,
the Appellate Tribunal has been influenced by any
irrelevant fact, vide R.K. Ayyaswami Gounder v.
M/s. Soudambigai Motor Service,
Dharampura &
Others(l).
In this connection, Mr. Pathak has invited our
attention to the fact that the Madras Government
has issued certain administrative directions under
s. 43(a) of the Motor Vehicles Act and it has been
held by this Court in Mjs. Raman & Raman Ltd. v.
The State of Madras & Ors. (2) that the said administrative directions have no legal force and cannot be
said to be binding on the appropriate authorities.
The argument is that in the relevant administrative
orders in regard to the assignment of marks in respect
(I) C.A.No. 198of1962 decided on 17.9.1962.
(2)
[1959] Suppl. 2 S .C.R. 227.
876
SUPREME COURT REPORTS'
[1964)
1963
of the merits of the several applicants for permit,
--
it seems to have been assumed that a person owning
Sri Rama Vilas m re than five buses may not get more marks though
Service (P) Ltd. up to five buses owned by a single applicant approv.
priate marks are assigned; and Mr. Pathak urges
C. ·
that the policy underlying this administrative rule
Chandrasekaran appears to be to discourage monopoly in road trans-
& Ors·
port; but this policy is enunciated by an administra-
. --
tive rule which has no legal or binding force, and
Ga1endragadkar so, it is urged that the Appellate Tribunal was in error
1·
in referring to the consideration that the appellant
was a monopolist on a part of the route. This argument is entirely misconceived. It is true that the
administrative directions issued by the Government
under s. 43la) have no force of statutory rules and
are, therefore, not binding; but that does not mean
that the consideration that the granting of a monopoly
to a bus-operator may be prejudicial to public interest,
becomes irrelevant only because it has been included
or is implied, · in the administrative instructions.
If on the merits, the said consideration 1s relevant,
and we have already held . that it is relevant, we do
not see how the fact that the said consideration has
also been included in the administrative directions
would make it irrelevant. The said consideration
has to be taken into account not because it has been
included in the administrative instructions, but because,
by
itself, it is a relevant consideration under
s. 47 {lJ (a).
In dealing with applications for writs of certiorari under Art. 226 in cases of this kind, it is necessary
to bear in mind that the High Court is not exercising
the jurisdiction of an Appellate Court in the matter.
There is no doubt that in granting or refusing permits
to applicants, the appropriate authorities are discharging a very important and a very onerous quasi-judicial
function.
Large stakes are generally involved in
these applications, and so, it is of utmost importance
that the appropriate authority should consider all
the relevant facts carefully and in its order should
set out concisely and clearly the reasons in support
...
.,
,•
-
5 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
877
of its conclusions. It is hardly necessary to emphasise
1963
that applicants for permits whose applications are
-
rejected should be satisfied that all points urged by Sri Rama Vilas
them in support of their respective claims have been Service (P) Ltd.
duly considered before the matter was decided. Even
v.
so, it would, we think, be inappropriate for the High
C.
Court to issue a writ of certiorari mainly or solely Chandrasekaran
on the ground that all reasons have not been set out
& Ors.
in the judgment of the appropriate authonty. In
.
entertaining writ petitions, the High Court must Ga;endragadkar
not lose sight of the fact that decisions of questions
1·
of fact under the Motor Vehicles Act have been left
to the appropriate authorities which have been constituted into quasi-judicial Tribunals in that behalf,
and so, decisions rendered by them on all. questions
of fact should not be interfered with under the special
jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Art.
226, unless the well-recognised tests in that behalf
are satisfied. In the present case, we have no doubt
that the Division Bench was right in holding that
Srinivasan J. should not have issued a wnt in favour
of the appellant.
We have carefully considered the order delivered
by the Appellate Tribunal and we see no justification for the criticism made against that order that the
decision of the. Appellate Tribunal proceeded solely
on the ground of the abstract concept of the evil
effects of monopoly. The order has referred to the
railway which runs parallel to the route and the order
has taken into account the fact that the appellant
is a monopolist on a part of the route and Raman
& Raman lP) Ltd. is a near monopolist on the remaining part of the route.
Srinivasan J. thought
~hat in dealing with the matter, the Appellate Tribunal
ignored the fact that there was bound to be some kind
of competition between the monopolist and the near
monopolist. On the merits, we find some difficulty
in acceding that a theoretically possible competition
between the monopolist and the near monopolist
can have any relevance or validity in the present case. ·
A passenger who wants to travel more than 18 miles
878
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[ 1964]
1963
of. the route which is covered by the monopoly of
. --
.
the appellant would naturally prefer to go by the
Sn Rama Vilas appellant's bus all the way, because in trying to take
Service (P) Ltd. advantage of the near monopolist's service on the
v.
second sector of the route he would have to face
C.
the risk of not having a continuous journey. A
Chandrasekaran competition between the monopolist on the first sector
& Ors·
of the route who would have run his buses on the
. --
whole distance if he was granted the permit, and the
Ga1endragadkar near monopolist so far as the second sector of the
J.
route is concerned, is itself a matter of a purely theoretical character. There would be obvious difficulties and causes of inconvenience for through passengers
to take advantage of this hypothetical competition.
If the argument as to the competition between the
two powerful operators has to be factual and effective,
it must mean that. permits should have been granted
to both of them over the whole route, and that clearly
would mean that smaller operators would be excluded.
We are not suggesting that this consideration itself
is decisive; we are only pointing out that the ultimate
decision of the Appellate Tribunal must have been
the result of a proper assessment of all the relevant
factors, and so, it would not be safe to issue a writ
of certiorari against its decision because some reasons
which were urged before the High Court had not
been expressly considered by the Appellate Tribunal.
Speaking generally and in a _broad way, we do
not think it could b-: seriously denied that encouraging bus-operators who do not own a fleet of buses
and discouraging monopoly on the route is consistent
with the interests of the general public which is of
paramount importance under s. 47(l)la), of the Motor
Vehicles Act. Besides, the Division Bench has also
referred to some other aspects of the matter which
would indicate that the Appellate Tribunal was right
in not granting a permit to the appellant. In cases
of this kind, the High Court should naturally be slow
in exercising its jurisdiction under Art. 226.. If
the order passed by the Appellate Tribunal which
is challenged in writ proceedings suffers from infirmities which would justify the issue of a writ under
.,
-
r
... -.·~
'
L
I
5 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
879
the well-recognised principles laid down by judicial
1963
decisions in that behalf, the High Court should and
.
.
ought to interfere but the writs of certiorari should Sn R_ama Vilas
not be issued merely on the ground that all relevant Service (P) Ltd.
reasons have not been set out in the judgment of the
v.
Appellate Tribunal or that the High Court would
c.
have taken a different view on the evidence adduced Chandrasekaran
in the proceedings.
& Ors:
In support of his case that the impugned order
was properly set aside by Srinivasan J., Mr. Pathak
has relied upon the decision of the Court of Appeal
in R. v. Agricultural Land Trihunal for the Eastern
Province of England, Ex parte Grant. (I)
In that
case the Court of Appeal was called upon to consider
whether the discretion vested in the Tribunal under
s. 25(1) (a) of the Agricultural Holdings Act, 1948,
had been validly exercised. The test prescribed by
s. 25(1J(a) was that the landlord should show that
the carrying out of the purpose for which he proposed
to terminate the tenancy in question is desirable
in the interests of efficient farming, whether as respects
good estate management or good husbandry or otherwise. In coming to the conclusion that the said
requirement had not been satisfied, the Tribunal
appears to have relied substantially on the fact that
the tenants sought to be dispossessed had been in
possession of the lands for many years. It appears
that the Court of Appeal took the view that the real
grounds for the Tribunal's decision on the section
25 point which appeared from paragraphs 5 and 6
of the statement were ambiguous and to some extent
in conflict with each other. Besides, the effect which
would result if the landlord's request was granted
on the tenants' other land which had influenced the
Tribunal was, in the opinion of the Court of Appeal,
irrelevant in considering the applicability of s. 25(1 )(a).
In other words, the Court of Appeal held that the
decision of the Tribunal was vitiated by the fact that
it rested at least on some invalid and irrelevant grounds,
and that is why a writ of certiorari was ordered to be
(1) [1956] 3 All E.R. 321:
Gajendragadkar
J.
880
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1964]
1963
issued. There can be little doubt that if a decision
--
of a quasi-judicial Tribunal is challenged before the
Sri Rama Vilas High Court under Art. 226 and it is shown that the
Service (P) Ltd. said decision is based on irrelevant considerations
v.
or on considerations which are invalid in law, a writ
C.
will undoubtedly be issued under Art. 226. But
Chandrasekaran the order passed by the Appellate Tribunal in the
& Ors.
present case does not suffer from any suchdnfirmity .
. --
Therefore, we are satisfied that the decision in the
Ga1endragadkar case of ex parte Grant on which Mr. Pathak relies,
1'
does not assist his case.
The result is, the appeal fails and is dismissed
with costs.
Appeal dismissed.
1963
LIFE INSURANCE CORPORATION LTD.
December 9
v.
COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, DELHI &
RAJASTHAN
(A.K. SARKAR, M. HIDAYATULLAH AND
J.C. SHAH, JJ.)
Income Tax Act (XI of 1922), .s. i0(7) and Schedule rr. 2(b) and
3(b)-Direction for readjustment by income tax ojficer-·lf o/ficer has
potver.
The appellant tran~ferred a certain amonnt from its Consolidated Revenue Account to the Investment Reserve Fund which it
was entitled to do; By this transfer the appellant's surplus on
which tax has to be assessed was reduced. The Income-tax Officer
directed the appellant to reduce the transfer by a certain amount.
The appellant challenged this direction.
Held: (per Sarkar and Shah, JJ.) The assessment of the
profits of an insurance business is bys. 10(7) of the Act completely
governed by the rules in the Schedule to the Act and there is no
general power in the Income-tax Officer to correct any error apart
from these rules.
Of these rules, rr. 2(b) and 3(b) were relevant
to the present case.
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'