# Sri Ranga Ramanuja Jeer Subba Rao ], April z8. r961 Sivaran1a Sastry v. State of Andhra I'radesh

- **Citation:** [1962] 2 S.C.R. 535
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1962
- **Bench:** P. B. Gajendragadkar, A. Ic Sarkar, K. c. DAS GUPTA, N. Rajagopala Ayyangar, J. R. Mudholkar
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/sri-ranga-ramanuja-jeer-subba-rao-april-z8-r961-sivaran1a-sastry-v-state-of-2272
- **Pages:** 16

## Headnote

Abolition of Estates-Enactment providing for State taking over
estates by notification-Part of estate outside the operation of enactment-Legislation extending its operation-Notifications in respect
of estate, each part separately-Legality-Madras Scheduled Areas
Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Regulation, 1951
(Regulation 4 of 1951), s. 2-M adras Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1948 (Madras 26 of 1948), ss. 1(4), 3, 25,
The areas in question which were parts of two estates
belonging to the appellants, called Gangole A and Gangole C,
were situated in what was known as the Godavari Agency tract
which was governed by the Scheduled Districts Act, 1874, By
s, 92 of the Government of India Act, 1935, no Act of the Provincial Legislature was applicable to certain areas in which the
Godavari Agency was included, unless the Governor by public
Sri Sinna
Ramanuja jeer
v,
Sri Ranga
Ramanuja Jeer
Subba Rao ],
April z8.
r961
Sivaran1a Sastry
v.
State of
Andhra I'radesh
536
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
notification so directed. The Madras Estates (Abolition and
Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1948, was enacted in 1948, and
on August 15, 1950, the Government of Madras issued a notification under s. 1(4) of the Act by which, among other estates,
Gangole A and Gangole C in their entirety were purported to be
taken over, specifying September 7, 1950, as the date on which
the vesting was to take place. But as no action as contemplated
bys. 92 of the Government of India Act, 1935, had been taken
to render the Madras Act of 1948 applicable to the Godavari
Agency tract, only ports of the Gangole estates were within the
operation of that Act, while there were portions of the estates
which were outside its purview and operation. When this legal
situation was noticed another notification was i>Sued on September 5, 1950, by which the areas in question were excluded from
the SCOJ>e of the notification dated August 15, 1950. In exercise
of the power under para 5(2) of the Fifth Schedule to the Constitution, Madras Regulation IV of 1951 was passed on September 8, 1951, by which, inter alia, the Act of 1948 was made
applicable to the areas in which the two Gangole estates were
situate with retrospective effect from April 19, 1949· On January 14, 1953, the Government of Madras issued a notification
vesting those portions of the Gangole estates to which the Act
of 1948 was extended. The appellants challenged the legality of
the notification on the ground that the various provisions of the
Madras Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act,
1948, showed that the Act contemplated the taking over of
estates as a unit and not in parts, while what the Government
had done in the present case was to deal with the two estates of
Gangole A and Gangole C as if each one of them were really two
estates, one that which lay in the G.odavari Agency tract and the
other outside that area, and had issued notifications in respect
of these units separately.
Held, that the first notification dated August 15, 1950, as
modified by that dated September 5, 1950, was valid and effective in law to vest the portion of the estate to which it related
in the State Government.
Held further, that the notification dated January 14, 1953,
was equally valid. The action taken by the Government in
issuing the said notification was in conformity with the scheme
of the Act of 1948 that the entirety of the estate should be
taken over.
CIVIL APPELJ,ATE JURISDICTION:
Civil Appeals
Nos. 646 and 64 7 of 1960.
Appeals by special leave from the judgments and
orders dated January 28, 1958, of the Andhra Pradesh
High Court in Writ Appeals Nos. 149 and 150 of
1957.
2 S.O.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
537
A. V. Viswanatha Sastri and T. Satyanarayana, for
rr.;6r
the appellants.
Siva•ama Sastry
A. Ranganatham Ohetty, S. V. P. Venkatappayya
Sastri and T. M. Sen, for the respondent.
1961. April 28. The Judgment of the Court was
delivered by
AYYANGAR, J.-These two appeals

## Text

'I
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
535
one a part of the other. Two independent institutions
legally cannot, Lxcept in the manner known to law,
be amalgamated into one institution by developing
merely sentimental attachment between them. This
argument was rightly rejected by the learned District
Judge, and the High Court went wrong in accepting
it.
Before we close we must make it, clear that by this
judgment we have not in any way intended to express
our view in the matter of honours that are customa..
rily shown to one or other of the parties in these
appeals in the temple of Athinathalwar.
In the result we hold, agreeing with the District
Judge, that the suits were not maintainable in the
civil court. The appeals are, therefore, allowed with
costs throughout.
Appeals allowed.
ROTA VENKATA SURYA SIVARAMA SASTRY
v.
STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH
(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, A. IC SARKAR,
K. c. DAS GUPTA, N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR
and J. R. MUDHOLKAR, JJ.)
Abolition of Estates-Enactment providing for State taking over
estates by notification-Part of estate outside the operation of enactment-Legislation extending its operation-Notifications in respect
of estate, each part separately-Legality-Madras Scheduled Areas
Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Regulation, 1951
(Regulation 4 of 1951), s. 2-M adras Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1948 (Madras 26 of 1948), ss. 1(4), 3, 25,
The areas in question which were parts of two estates
belonging to the appellants, called Gangole A and Gangole C,
were situated in what was known as the Godavari Agency tract
which was governed by the Scheduled Districts Act, 1874, By
s, 92 of the Government of India Act, 1935, no Act of the Provincial Legislature was applicable to certain areas in which the
Godavari Agency was included, unless the Governor by public
Sri Sinna
Ramanuja jeer
v,
Sri Ranga
Ramanuja Jeer
Subba Rao ],
April z8.
r961
Sivaran1a Sastry
v.
State of
Andhra I'radesh
536
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
notification so directed. The Madras Estates (Abolition and
Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1948, was enacted in 1948, and
on August 15, 1950, the Government of Madras issued a notification under s. 1(4) of the Act by which, among other estates,
Gangole A and Gangole C in their entirety were purported to be
taken over, specifying September 7, 1950, as the date on which
the vesting was to take place. But as no action as contemplated
bys. 92 of the Government of India Act, 1935, had been taken
to render the Madras Act of 1948 applicable to the Godavari
Agency tract, only ports of the Gangole estates were within the
operation of that Act, while there were portions of the estates
which were outside its purview and operation. When this legal
situation was noticed another notification was i>Sued on September 5, 1950, by which the areas in question were excluded from
the SCOJ>e of the notification dated August 15, 1950. In exercise
of the power under para 5(2) of the Fifth Schedule to the Constitution, Madras Regulation IV of 1951 was passed on September 8, 1951, by which, inter alia, the Act of 1948 was made
applicable to the areas in which the two Gangole estates were
situate with retrospective effect from April 19, 1949· On January 14, 1953, the Government of Madras issued a notification
vesting those portions of the Gangole estates to which the Act
of 1948 was extended. The appellants challenged the legality of
the notification on the ground that the various provisions of the
Madras Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act,
1948, showed that the Act contemplated the taking over of
estates as a unit and not in parts, while what the Government
had done in the present case was to deal with the two estates of
Gangole A and Gangole C as if each one of them were really two
estates, one that which lay in the G.odavari Agency tract and the
other outside that area, and had issued notifications in respect
of these units separately.
Held, that the first notification dated August 15, 1950, as
modified by that dated September 5, 1950, was valid and effective in law to vest the portion of the estate to which it related
in the State Government.
Held further, that the notification dated January 14, 1953,
was equally valid. The action taken by the Government in
issuing the said notification was in conformity with the scheme
of the Act of 1948 that the entirety of the estate should be
taken over.
CIVIL APPELJ,ATE JURISDICTION:
Civil Appeals
Nos. 646 and 64 7 of 1960.
Appeals by special leave from the judgments and
orders dated January 28, 1958, of the Andhra Pradesh
High Court in Writ Appeals Nos. 149 and 150 of
1957.
2 S.O.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
537
A. V. Viswanatha Sastri and T. Satyanarayana, for
rr.;6r
the appellants.
Siva•ama Sastry
A. Ranganatham Ohetty, S. V. P. Venkatappayya
Sastri and T. M. Sen, for the respondent.
1961. April 28. The Judgment of the Court was
delivered by
AYYANGAR, J.-These two appeals are by special
leave of this Court and arise out of orders of the High
Court of Andhra Pradesh dismissing two writ petitions filed before it by the respective appellants in the
two appeals.
On January 14, 1953, the Government of Madras
issued a notification reading, to quote only the material words, "in exercise of the powers conforred by
s. 1(4) of the Madras Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act., 1948 (Madras Act XXVI of
1948), read with s. 2 of the Madras Scheduled Areas
Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryot1Yari)
Regulation, 1951:
"The Governor of Madras hereby appoints tho
4th of February 1953, as the date on which the provisions of the said Act .................. shall come into
force in the Estates in the Scheduled Areas of the
West Godavari District which are specified in the
schedule below:-"
and the schedule set out inter alia:
"l. Agency Area of Gangole 'A' Estate, cousisLing of ......................... ..
2 ........................... .
3.
Agency Area of Gangole 'C' Estate, consisting of ..................... "
It is the legality of this notification that is impugned
by the two appellants who are the proprietors respectively of Gangole 'A' and Gangole 'C' estates. The
two writ petitions by the appellants which were numbered respectively 28 and 29 of 1953 were dismissed
by the learned Single-Judge of the Andhra High
Court and appeals under the Letters Patent filed
against this common judgment were also dismised by
the learned Judges of that Court.
An application for
the grant of a certificate was also dismissed but this
v,
State of
Andlita Pradesh
Ayyangar j.
Siva~ama Sastry
v
State of
Andhra Pradesh
Ayyangar ],
538
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
Court having granted special leave to the appellants,
the matter is now before us.
The Madras Estates (Abolition and Conversion into
Iiyotwari) Act, 1948, to which we shall refer as the
Abolition Act, was a piece of legislation of the State
enacted to effect reform in land tenures and landholding by the elimination of intermediaries. In line
with similar legislation in the rest of the country, the
interests of intermediaries-of three categories-the
estates of Zamindars, of undertenure-holders and of
Inamdars were enabled to be vested in Government
on the publication of a notification to that effect, compensation being provided for such taking over. The
entire legal difficulties in the case of the Gangole 'A'
and 'C' estates which were admittedly Zamindaris
arise out of the fact that a small portion of each of
them is situated in what is known as the Godavari
Agency tract. This Agency area was originally included as part of the Scheduled District of the Madras
Presidency under the Scheduled Districts Act XIV
of 1874.
When the Godavari Agency was governed by the
Scheduled Districts Act, 1874, the Madras Legislature
enacted the Madras Estates Land Act (Act 1 of 1908),
which was in force from July 1, 1908. This enactment regulated the rights of, inter alia, the proprietors of zamindari estates and the ryots and tenants
who cultivated the lands included in the estates.
Though, some argument was raised in the High Court,
disputing the operation of the Estates Land Act to
the Godavari Agency tracts, it has not been repeated
before us. That Act on its terms applied to the entire
Presidency of Madras and in view of a catena of
decisions of the Madras High Court starting from the
judgment of Muthuswami Iyer, J. in Ohakrapani v.
Varahalamma ('), on the construction of s. 4 of the
Scheduled Districts Act XIV of 1874, the contention
was hardly tenable and was therefore properly abandoned.
The position therefore was that the entirety
of the lands and villages forming Gangole 'A' and 'C'
were governed by the Madras Estates Land Act, 1908,
(1) (1894) I.L,R. 18 Mad. n7.
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
539
and were "estates" within the meaning of that enactI96I
ment. In this situation the Government of India Act, . --
.
f
A .1 l
937
U d
.
Stvarnma Sas"y
1935, came mto orce on
pn
, 1
.
n er its
v.
provisions the Godavari Agency was included in the
state of
territory classified as
"partially excluded areas" Andhrn Pradesh
under s. 91 of the Act. The laws applicable to the
"partially excluded areas" and their administration
Ayyangar J.
was governed by s. 92 which enacted:
"92( 1) The executive authority of a Province extends to excluded and partially excluded areas
therein, but, notwithstanding anything in this Act,
no Act of the Federal Legislature or of the Provincial Legislature, shall apply to an excluded area or
a partially excluded area, unless the Governor by
public notification so directs; and the Governor
in giving such direction with respect to any Act
may direct that the Act shall in its application to
the area, or to any specified part thereof, have effect
subject to such exceptions or modifications as he
thinks fit.
(2) The Governor may make regulations for the
peace and good government of any area in a Province which is for the time being an excluded area,
or a partially excluded area, and any regulations so
made may repeal or amend any Act of the Federal
Legislature or of the Provincial Legislature, or any
existing Indian law, which is for the time being
applicable to the area in question.
Regulations made under this sub-section shall be
submitted forthwith to the Governor-General and
until assented to by him in his discretion shall have
no effect, and the provisions of this Part of this
Act with respect to the power of His Majesty to
disallow Acts shall apply in relation to any such
regulations assented to by the Governor-General as
they apply in relation to Acts of a Provincial Legislature assented to by him.
(3) The Governor shall, as respects any area in
a Province which is for the time being an excluded
area, exercise his functions in his discretion."
We shall be pointing out a little later, the interconnection between the Estates Land Act, 1908 and
Sivarama Saslty
v.
State of
A ndhra Pradesh
Ayyangar J
540
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962)
the Abolition Act, but for the present narrative it is
sufficient to state that when the Abolition Act was
enacted in 1948, it could not of its own force, apply
to the 'partially excluded areas' and no action as contemplated by s. 92 of the Government of India Act,
1935, was taken to render that Act applicable to that
area. The result was that only a part of Gangole 'A'
and 'C' were within the operation of the Abolition Act,
while there were portions of each of the estates which
were outside its purview and operation.
This legal situation was however not noticed and
under the wrong impression that the Abolition Act
was in operation in the Godavari Agency also, the
Government of Madras issued on August 15, 1950, a
notification under s. 1(4) of the Abolition Act by
which, among othtir estates, the entirety of Gangole
estate 'A' and Gangole estate 'C' were purported to be
taken over, and specifying September 7, 1950, as the
date on which the vesting was to take place. Before
the latter date, however, the error was noticed and in
consequence another notification was issued on the
5th of September by which the villages and hamlets
lying in the "partially excluded areas" of Gangole
estate 'A' and Gangole estate 'C' were excluded from
the scope of the notification dated August 15,1950.
Thereafter the question of the extension of the Abolition Act to the "partially excluded areas" was taken
on hand. By that date, it would be seen, the Constitution had come into force and the law applicable to
areas like the Godavari Agency was provided for by
Art. 244 read with the Sch. V to the Constitution.
Art. 244(1) enacted:
"The provisions of the Fifth Schedule shall apply
to the administration and control of the Scheduled
Areas and Scheduled Tribes in any State other
than the State of Assam."
As regards the law applicable to the Scheduled Areas,
the relevant provision is that contained in paragraph
5 of that Schedule of which the material portions are:
"5. Law applicable to Scheduled Areas.-
(1) Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution, the Governor may by public notification
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
541
direct that any particular Act of Parliament or of
r96r
the Legislature of the State shall not apply to a 5 .
-
S h d I d A
h
f .
h S
ivarama Saslry
c e u e
rea or any part t ereo m t e ta te or
v
shall apply to a Scheduled Area or any part thereof
Stat; of
in the State subject to such exceptions and modifica. Andhra Prndesh
tions as he may specify in the notification and any
direction given under this sub-paragraph may be
Ayya•gar J.
given so as to have retrospective effect.
(2) The Governor may make regulations for the
peace and good government of any area in a State
which is for the time being a Scheduled Area.
(3) In making any such regulation as is referred
to in sub-paragraph (2) of this paragraph, the Gover.
nor may repeal or amend any Act of Parliament or
of the Legislature of the State or any existing law
which is for the time being applicable to the area
in question."
In exercise of the power under paragraph 5(2) of the
Fifth Schedule, Madras Regulation IV of 1951 was
passed on September 8, 1951. The territorial extent
of its operation extended to certain areas specified in
the Schedule, which included the areas in the Godavari
district in which the two Gangole estates were situate
and by its operative provisions the Abolition Act
together with the amendments effected to it, were
made applicable to these areas with retrospective
effect from April 19, 1949. The Abolition Act having
thus been extended to that part of the Gangole 'A'
q,nd Gangole 'C' estates which lay within "the Scheduled area" the Government of Madras issued the
impugned notification vesting those portions of the
estate to which the Act was extended by Regulation
IV of 1951. As stated earlier, it is the validity of
this last notification and the vesting effected there.
under of those portions of Gangole 'A' and Gangole
'C' which lay within the Scheduled area that is alone
nhallenged in the appeals before us.
The notification was impugned on several grounds,
all of which were rejected by the High Court. Several
69
542
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
1961
of them have been put forward before us, though not
S .
--5
1
all of them with equal emphasis. Before however
ivaratna
as ry
.
,
b
.
v.
adverting to them 1t might e convement to set out
state of
the relevant statutory provisions which bear upon the
Andhra Pradesh points urged. The long title of the Abolition Act
states:
Ayyangar f.
"Whereas it is expedient to provide for the repeal
of the Permanent Settlement, the acquisition of the
rights of landholders not permanently settled and
certain other estates in the Province of Madras ..... .
.. .. . .... It is hereby enacted as follows:"
Section 1(3) defining the extent of its application runs:
"It applies to all estates as defined in section 3,
clause (2), of the Madras Estates Land Act, 1908,
except inam villages which became estates by virtue
of the Madras Estates Land (Third Amendment)
Act, 1936."
Section 2 which is the definition section provides by
sub-s. (1):
"( 1) All expressions defined in the Estates Land
Act shall have the same respective meanings as in
that Act with the modifications, if any, made by
this Act."
and sub-s. (3) provides:
"(3) 'estate' means a zamindari or an undertenure or an inam estate."
and sub-s. (4) of this section defines 'Estates Land
Act' to mean "the Madras Estates Land Act, 1908."
Having regard to these provisions it is necessary
to refer to the terms of the Estates Land Act to
which one is directed by s. 1(2) of the Abolition Act.
Section 3 (2) of the Estates Land Act defines "an
estate" as meaning:
"3 (2)(a) any permanently-settled
estate or
temporarily-settled zamindari,
(b) any portion of such permanently-settled
estate or temporarily-settled zamindari which is
separately registered in the office of the Collector;
(c) ......•.••...........
(d) ........... ··········
(e) .................. , .. "
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
543
We shall now proceed to deal with the several
196'
points raised, though except one all the others do not s·
-
5
.
.
"d
.
d h
b
ivarama
aslry
ment any ser10us cons1 eratron an
ave een prov.
perly rejected by the High Court. The first point
state of
urged was that the Polavaram zamindari-the parent Andhra Prad"h
estate from which the Gangole estate was, by successive sub.divisions, separated-was not "a permaAyyangar J.
nently-settled estate" because the Madras PermanentSettlement Regulation XXV of 1802 was excluded
from its application to Scheduled districts by the
Laws Local Extent Act, 1874. In our opinion, the
High Court has rightly rejected this contention,
because even if the Madras Permanent-Settlement
Regulation did not apply, there could be no dispute
that the Polavaram zamindari was "a permanentlysettled estate", because its peishcush was fixed and
from the kabuliyat which was executed by the proprietor it is clear that it conforms to the pattern of
the sanads and kabuliyats issued under the Madras
Permanent-Settlement Regulation.
Though before the High Court it was urged that on
the issue of the notification on August 15, 1950, under
s. 1(4) of the Abolition Act the power of the State
Government was exhausted and that they were thereafter incompetent to issue any further notification
under the same Act, this contention which entirely
lacks substance was not seriously urged.
It was next contended that Regulation IV of 1951
was in valid as having outstepped the limits of the
legislation permitted by paragraphs 5(1) and (2) of the
Fifth Schedule to the Constitution. It was said that
if the Governor desired to enact a law with retrospective effect it must be a Jaw fashioned by himself, but
that if he applied to the Scheduled areas a law
already in force in the State, he could not do so with
retrospective effect.
Reduced to simple terms, the
contention merely amounts to this that the Governor
should have repeated in this Regulation the terms of
the Abolition Act but that if he referred merely to the
title of the Act he could not give retrospective effect
to its provisions over the area to which it was being
applied. It is obvious that this contention was
correctly negatived by the High Court.
Sivarama Sastry
v.
State of
A ndhra Pradesh
Ayyangar ].
544
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
We shall now proceed to deal with the only point
put forward by Mr. Viswanatha Sastri which, we have
said, merits serious consideration, though it must be
Paid that it was not presented in the same form
before the learned Judges of the High Court of
Andhra Pradesh. The argument was as follows: The
Madras Estates Land Act of 1908, admittedly applied
to the entire estate of Gangole-including that portion of the estate which was in the Scheduled area
which, in the phraseology employed by the Government of India Act, was "a partially excluded area."
Gangole 'A', Gaugole 'B' and Gangole 'C' had been subdivided and had been separately registered. Each
one of them was therefore a unit-each one was itself
"an estate" within s. 3(2)(b) of the Estates Land Act,
1908, being "a portion of a permanently-settled estate
..................... which is separately registered in the
office of the Collector." The Abolition Act contemplates the taking over of "estates" as a unit and not
in parts. The entire scheme of the Abolition Act is
based upon this principle which would be upset if it
were held that the Government in issuing notifications
under s. 1(4) of the Abolition Act could take over portions merely of such units. When a notification is
issued under s. 1( 4) its legal consequences are set out
in s. 3 which reads:
"With effect on and from the notified date and
save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act
(the saving does not cover anything material for
the present purpose)-
(a) ............................................... ············ ... .
(b) the entire estate (including all communal
lands; porambokes; other non-ryoti lands; ............. )
shall stand transferred to the Government and vest
in them, free of all encumbrances ............ "
The provisions of the Act determining the amount of
compensation are related to the sum payable in respect of the entirety of the estate, for ss. 24 and 25
enact:
"24. The compensation payable in respect of an
estate shall be determined in accordance with the
following provisions."
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
545
"25. The compensation shall be determined for
r961
the estate as a whole, and not separately for each of 5 .
-
5
1
.
.
ivarama
as ry
the mterests therem."
v.
The mode of computation of the compensation amount
State of
for which provision is made in ss. 27 to 30 all proceed Andh•a p,adesh
on the basis that it is the entire estate that is taken
II
Ayyangar J.
over and not a portion merely of the estate. A these,
taken together, would point to the scheme of the Act
oontem plating the entire estate being taken over. On
that scheme he urged that it would not be possible to
work out the compensation payable for separate portions of an estate, for instance for one village out of
the several which might be comprised in an estate.
The claims by the proprietor against the Government
for compensation, as well as the determination of disputes inter se between claimants to the compensation
amount, he pointed out, all proceed on the basis that
the entire estate as a unit was taken over by notification under s. 1(4).
On these premises Mr. Viswanatha Sastri submitted
that what the Government had done in the present
case wa8 to deal with the two estates of Gangole 'A'
and Gangole 'C' each of which was a unit, as if each
onn of them were really two estates-one that which
lay in the Agency tract, and the other outside that
area-and had issued notifications in res peat of these
units piece-meal which was not contemplated and
therefore not permitted under the Abolition Act. He
further pointed out that if the original notification
dated August 15, 1950, stood without the "denntifioation" effected by the notification dated September 5,
1950, there might be a valid vest.ing by reason of the
retrospective operation of Hegulation IV of 1951.
Similarly if the impugned notification of 1953, had
included not merely that portion of the estate of
Gangole 'A' and Gangole 'C' which were within the
Scheduled areas but the entirety of the two estates,
that notification would not have been open to challenge.
But the point urged was that it was only by
the combined operation of (1) the notification dated
August 15, 1950, as modified by that dated September
5, 1950, and (2) the notification dated January 14,
546
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962)
r96r
1953, that the entirety of the two "estates" was taken
over and that this rendered the second notification
Sivarama Saslry
v.
invalid because it had taken over only a portion of
stat• of
the estate. Learned Counsel, no doubt, conceded that
Andhra Pradesh the taking over of those portions of Gangole 'A' and
Gangole 'C' which were within the operation of the
Ayyangar .f,
Abolition Act before its extension to the Scheduled
areas not having been challenged, he would not be
entitled to any relief in respect of the portion of the
estate covered by the first notification, but his argument was that that would not preclude him from disputing the validity of the last notification vesting
those portions of the two estates which were within
the Scheduled areas in the State.
We shall now proceed to consider the tenability of
these submissions. We might premise the discussion
by observing that learned Counsel is right in his submission that the Abolition Act does not contemplate
or make provision for the taking over of particular
portions only of estates and that if the State Government having power to take over the entirety of an
estate chose, however, to exclude certain portions of
it from the operation of a vesting notification and
took over only defined portions of an estate, this
could be open to serious challenge on the ground that
it was not contemplated by the scheme of the enactment. But the acceptance of this principle does not,
in our opinion, compel us to answer the question propounded by the learned Counsel for the appellants in
his favour.
To start with, it might be pointed out that it looks
somewhat anomalous that learned Counsel who
strongly urges that the scheme of the Aot contemplates the ta.king over only of the entirety of an
estate and not of a portion thereof, should resist a
taking over which, if effective, would result in the
entire estate vesting in the Government and the
compensation being determined according to the
rules laid down by the Act, whereas it is the invalidation of the impugned notification that would result
in a partial or piece-meal taking over, to the disadvantage of the proprietors to which learned Counsel very properly drew our attention.
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COL1!·°!' REPORTS
547
As already pointed out learned Counsel's submission
'96'
was that not merely the notification dated January 5 .
5
1
.
d A
15
ivarama
as ry
14, 1953, but also the earlier one date
ugust
,
v.
1950 (as modified by the one dated September 5, 1950)
State of
was invalid as providing for vesting of parts only of Andhra Pradesh
an "estate" and not of it as a unit. It would also
follow that if the first notification dated· August 15,
Ayyangar J.
1950, was valid, the impugned notification which by
its operation effected the vesting of the entirety of
the estate in the State could not be open to challenge
as violating the princi pie invoked by learned Counsel.
We are necessarily therefore driven to consider the
validity of the first notification dated August 15, 1950,
in dealing with the validity of the impugned notification of January 14, 1953. In considering this matter
it is necessary to recall some of the provisions of
the Abolition Act. Section 2(3) defines "an estate" as
meaning, inter alia, a "zamindari estate". No doubt,
as stated already, where the Abolition Act operates
over the whole of "a zamindari estate", it does not
contemplate the Government taking over a portion
only of such "estate". But in saying this it should
not be assumed that if in respect of a single estate two
notifications were issued, say on the same date which
together vested the entirety of the "estate" in the
State under s. 3, either notification or both together
would be invalid or ineffective. The reason for this
must obviously be that the intention of the Government was to take over the entire estate-though it
was being given effect to by the issue of two notifications. That would not obviously be the same thing
as the Government having the liberty to pick and
choose certain of the villages or certain portions of an
estate leaving out others. If the Abolition Act as
enacted does not extend to the entirety of an "estate"
as defined in the Estates Land Act but only to a portion thereof, the question would be whether that portion of "the estate" which is within the operation of
the Act is "an estate" within the meaning of the Act
or not. On this matter there are two views possible:
(1) that having regard to the Abolition Act referring
to and as it were incorporating the provisions of the
548
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
'9 6'
Madras Estates Land Act, the "estates" to which the
Abolition Act could a.pply are only those which being
Sivarania Sastry
v.
"Estates" within the Estates Land Act, are also
state of
wholly within the operation of the Abolition Act. In
Andhra Pradesh other words, even if a few acres of an "estate" as defined in the Estates Land Act were outside the operaAyyangar J.
tion of the Abolition Aet, it would not be an "estate"
which could be taken over.
(2) The other view attribnting a crucial value to the policy and purpose
underlying the legislation, viz., a reform of land
tenures and landholding by the elimination of intermediaries to treat any land held on the tenures specified and within the territorial operation of the Act as
falling within the category of "estates" liable to be
taken over and vested in Government. We consider
that the latter view is to be preferred as being in
accord with the intention of the law and as subserving
its purposes. In this connection it cannot be overlooked that the entire argument of learned Counsel is
built up on the definitions of an "estate" in s. 2 of the
Abolition Act (read with s. 1(3) of that Act), and that
the definitions contained there could be applied on the
terms of the opening words of that section only
"unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or
context."
The position could possibly be better
explained in these terms: Assume that Regulation IV
of 1951 was not enacted. Could the State Government take over that portion of the "estate" which was
within the operation of the Abolition Act or does the
definition of "an estate" and the reference s. 1(3) to
s. 3(2) of the Madras Estates Land Act of 1908 preclude the State from taking over that portion because
the Act does not extend to the entirety of the
"estate"? It appears to us that this question is capable of being answered only in one way, viz., that the
definition of "an estate" in the Abolition Act must be
limited to that portion of an "estate" which is within
the operation of the Act. Any other construction
would mean that if that Act did not apply to a few
square yards in an estate, it ceases to be an "estate"
governed by the Act, which, in our opinion, would be
plainly contrary to the intention of the enactment as
2 S.C.R. SUPliEME COURT REPORTS
549
gathered from its preamble and operative provisions.
r96z
Let us suppose that instead of the problem created by
a portion of the estate being in a Scheduled area and Sfrarn>:~ Sastry
therefore though within the State outside the normal
state of
legislative power of the State Legislature, a permaAndlua Prndesh
nently settled est.atn had by reason of say the State's
Reorganisation, fell both within the territory of the
Ayyangar J.
Madras and the Andhra States, with the result that
the taking over under the Abolition Act could be
operative only in regard to that portion within the
State of Madras. Could it then be contended that the
portion of the estate within the State of Madras did
not fall within the definition of an estate and so could
not be taken over by notification under s. 1(4) of the
Act. Indeed, the answer of the learned Counsel for
the appellants to such a question was that it could be
taken over but for the reason that in such a case the
portions outside the State territory could not be an
"estate" within the Madras Estates Land Act at all
and.that in consequence the inter-relation between the
unit constituting the estate under the Estates Land
Act and the concept of an "estate" under the Abolition
Act was not disrupted. But this, however, hardly
suffices as a complete answer, for even after a portion
of the "estate" becoming situated in a State other
than Madras the State might still be governed by the
"Madras Estates Land Act'', though applied as the
law of the new State. What is relevant in the illustration is that along with the concept of the unit constituting the "estate" being taken over, there is also
underlying it, another principle, viz., that it is sufficient
if the entirety of the estate over which the State
Legislature has competence is taken over. In such a
taking over the difficulty suggested by learned Counsel
in working out the scheme of the Act, would not arise
because the portion taken over will constitute the
estate and the compensation for that unit will be
worked out on the basis laid down in s. 24 and those
following.
The other portions of the estate which are
!leyond the territorial operation of the enactment
would continue to remain unaffected, so that the State
70
550
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
1961
Government could not be in a position to take
Sivara-;;:;; Saslry them over.
v.
We accordingly consider that the first notification
State of
dated August 15, 1950, apart from its being binding
Andhra Pradesh and not open to challenge in these proceedings by
Ayyanga• J.
the appellants, is valid and effective in law to vest
the portion to which it related in the State Government. We then have Regulation IV of 1951 which
brought the other portion of the estate to which the
Abolition Act did not originally extend within the
operation of that enactment. If, after this change in
the law, the Government did not take over the rest of
the est.ate, it would be open to the objection that the
State Government had artificially split up the estate
into two parts and had taken over or rather retained
in its possession one part, and that notwithstanding
that the Act posited the unit constituting an estate
being taken over, had departed from that principle.
The impugned notification therefore far from being
invalid, was necessary to be issued in order to satisfy
the very principle which learned Counsel for the
appellants submits-as the one underlying the scheme
of the Abolition Act.
We therefore hold that the challenge to the validity
of the impugned notification dated January 14, 1953,
should be repelled.
We have thus reached the same
conclusion as the learned Judges of the High Court,
though by a different line of reasoning.
The appeals fail and are dismissed with costsone set.
Appeals dismissed.