# SRI RATNAVARAMARAJA v. SMT. VIMLA

- **Citation:** [1961] 3 S.C.R. 1015
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1961
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 624of1960
- **Bench:** J. L. Kapur, M. Hidayatullah, J. C. Shah
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/sri-ratnavaramaraja-v-smt-vimla-1936
- **Pages:** 5

## Headnote

Court Fees-Question of adequacy-If could be raised by defendant in appeal-Madras Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, r955
(Mad. r4 of I955), s. ra(2)-Code of Civil Procedure (Act V of r908),
S. II5.
The question was whether the defendant was entitled to
raise a grievance and contest the valuation of the properties in
dispute as if it were a matter in issue between the plain tiff and
himself and could seek to invoke the High Court in its revisional
jurisdiction against the order adjudging court fees payable on the
plaint.
Held, that the Court Fees Act is enacted to collect revenue
and not to be used as a technical weapon by the defendant for
obstructing the progress of the suit by approaching the High
Court in its revisional jurisdiction against the order determining
and adjudging court fees payable on the plaint.
That section 12(2) of the Madras Court Fees Act, r955, only
enabled the defendant to assist the court in arriving at a just
decision on the question of court fees payable on the plaint.
That in the instant case the High Court grievously erred in
entertaining revision application on the question of court fees at
the instance of the defendant when no question of jurisdiction
was involved.

## Text

-
,
;
•
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1015
SRI RATNAVARAMARAJA
v.
SMT. VIMLA.
(J. L. KAPUR, M. HIDAYATULLAH and J. C. SHAH, JJ.)
Court Fees-Question of adequacy-If could be raised by defendant in appeal-Madras Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, r955
(Mad. r4 of I955), s. ra(2)-Code of Civil Procedure (Act V of r908),
S. II5.
The question was whether the defendant was entitled to
raise a grievance and contest the valuation of the properties in
dispute as if it were a matter in issue between the plain tiff and
himself and could seek to invoke the High Court in its revisional
jurisdiction against the order adjudging court fees payable on the
plaint.
Held, that the Court Fees Act is enacted to collect revenue
and not to be used as a technical weapon by the defendant for
obstructing the progress of the suit by approaching the High
Court in its revisional jurisdiction against the order determining
and adjudging court fees payable on the plaint.
That section 12(2) of the Madras Court Fees Act, r955, only
enabled the defendant to assist the court in arriving at a just
decision on the question of court fees payable on the plaint.
That in the instant case the High Court grievously erred in
entertaining revision application on the question of court fees at
the instance of the defendant when no question of jurisdiction
was involved.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No.
624of1960.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order
dated Ma.} 30, 1960 of the Mysore High Court in Civil
Revision Petition No. 1098 of 1959.
K. R. Karanth
and
R. Gopalakrishnan, for the
appellant.
A. V. Viswanatha Sastri, R. Ganapathy Iyer and
G. Gopalakrishnan, for the respondent.
B. R. L. Iyengar and T. M. Sen, for the State of
Mysore (On Notice issued by the Court).
1961. February 27. The Judgment of the Court was
delivered by
SHAH, J .-Smt. Virola-hereinafter referred to as the
plaintiff-filed suit No. 73 of 1956 in the court of the
Subordinate Judge, South Kanara, for a. decree for
1016
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1961]
r96i
possession of lands, buildings, house-site.~ described
~
in sch. A and movable properties described in sch. B
Ratn•v•;;,,,.,0i• and for mcsne profits in respect of properties desv.
cribed in sch. A and for a decree for possession and
SmJ. Vim/a
management and for accou;it of the properties described in sch. C and institutions alleged to he the
private family religious endowments in sch. D. The
plaintiff claimed that on the death of her father Shri
Dharmasthala Manjayya Heggade on August 31, 1955,
she became entitled to the properties in suit but the
defendant wrongfully possessed himself of those
properties. The plaintiff valued the properties in
schs. C and D under s. 28 of the Madras Court-fees
and Suits Valuation Act, 1955 at Ri. 21,000/- and
paid a court.fee of Rs. 275/-. She valued the lands
in schednle A for purposes of jurisdiction at 30 times
the assessment and separately valued the buildings
and paid court-fee on that footing. On June 28, 1956,
the Subordinate Judge ordered on an objection raised
by his office that the amount of Rs. 34,577/- paid as
court-fee by the plaintiff was adequate. Then followed a course of proceedings for which not many
precedents may be found. On September G, 1950, the
defendant filed his written statement raising an
objection inter alia to the valuation of the properties
in suit and the court-fee exigible on the claim. The
trial court then raised an issue about the adequacy
of the court-fee, paid by the plaintiff. On February 13,
1957, the defendant applied for the appointment of a
Commissioner to value the properties. The court
dismissed the application and declared that the court.
fee paid was adequate. In Revision Petition 272 of
195i preferred by the defendant to the High Court
of Judicature at Bangalore, the order passed by the
Subordinate Judge was set aside and it was directed
that the trial court do " ascertain the value of the
properties for purposes of court-fee in accordance with
law after giving full opportunity to the parties and
if need be by appointing a Commissioner to ascertii.in
the present market value of the suit Schedule properties and decide the issue a.fresh on merits." Pursuant
to this direction, a Commissioner was appointed by
Shah].
•
'· •
•
•
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1017
the Subordinate Judge. The Commissioner submitted
his report as to valuation of the properties. Objections
were raised by the defendant to that report and a
further report was submitted by the Commissioner.
On the direction of the Subordinate Judge, a supplemental report was submitted by the Commissioner.
After hearing the parties, the Subordinate Judge held
that the properties described in sch. D were " extra
commercium " and fixed court-fee was exigible in
respect of the claim for possession thereof, that properties described in sch. D were "trust properties"
and s. 28 of the Madras Court-fees and Suits Valuation Act applied thereto as the dispute related to the
right of management between persons claiming to be
rival trustees, that the houses built on revenue paying
lands had to be valued according to their market
value and not at 30 times the land assessment and
that the lands in sch. A were worth Rs. 7, 74,665( and
the house-sites were worth Rs. 27,625/-. The plaintiff
paid the additional court-fee as directed by the court.
Against the order passed by the Subordinate Judge,
the plaintiff and the defendant applied by separate
petitions in revision to the High Court of Mysore.
The High Court heard the Advocate-General of the
State and substantially confirmed the order passed by
the Subordinate Judge except as to an institution
.. d.escribed.as '.' Nelliyadi Beedu '', in respect of which
the High Court directed the trial court to determine
whether the institution was "extra commercium"
after giving an opportunity to both parties to put
forth their contentions and to lead evidence in that
behalf. Against that order of the High Court, this
appeal has been preferred by the defendant with
special leave under Art. 136 of the Constitution.
The Court-fees Act was enacted to collect revenue
for the benefit of the State and not to arm a contesting party with a weapon of defence to obstruct the
trial of an action. By recognising that the defendant
~as _entitled t_o ?on test the valuation of the properties
m dispute as 1f 1t were a matter in issue between him
and the plaintiff and by entertaining petitions preferred by the defendant to the High Court in exercise of
Sri
Rcitnavaramaroja
v.
Snit. V imla
Shah].
1018
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961]
~
z96z
its revisonal jurisdiction against the order adjudging
s .
court-fee payable on the plaint, all progress in the
Ratnava;:maraja suit f?r the trial of the dispute on the merits has been
v.
effectively frustrated for nearly five years. We fail
Smt. Vimla
to appreciate what grievance the defendant can make
by seeking to invoke the revisional jurisdiction of the
Shah J.
High Court on the question whether the plaintiff has
paid adequate court-fee on his plaint. Whether
proper court-fee is paid on a plaint is primarily a
question between the plaintiff and the State. Hpw by
an order relating to the adequacy of the court-fee paid
by the plaintiff, the defendant may feel aggrieved, it
is difficult to appreciate. Again, the jurisdiction in
revision exercised by the High Court under s. 115 of
the Code of Civil Procedure is strictly conditioned by
els. (a) to (c) thereof and may be invoked on the
-ground of refusal to exercise jurisdiction vested in the
Subordinate Court or assumption of jurisdiction which
the court does not possess or on the ground that the
court has acted illegally or with .uiaterial irregularity
in the exercise of its jurisdiction. The defendant who
may believe and even honestly that proper court-fee
has not been paid by the plaintiff has still no right to
move the superior court by appeal or in revision
against the order adjudging payment of court-fee
payable on the plaint. But counsel for the defendant
says that by Act 14 of 1955 enacted by the Madras
Legislature which applied to the suit in question, the
defendant has been invested with a right not only to
contest in the trial court the issue whether adequate
courtcfee has been paid by the plaintiff, but also to
move the High Court in revision if an order contrary
to his submission is passed by the court. Reliance in
support of that contention is placed upon sub-s. (2) of
s. 12. That sub-section, in so far as it is material,
provides:
" Any defendant may, by his written statement
filed before the first hearing of the suit or before
evidence is recorded on the merits of the claim ......
plead that the subject-matter of the suit has not
been properly valued or that the fee paid is not
sufficient. All questions arising on such pleas shall
'
•
•
•
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1019
be heard and decided before evidence is recorded
x961
affecting such defendant, on the merits of the claim.
.
If the court decides that the subject-matter of the R
5"
.
. h
b
l
l d
h
atnavaramaraJa
smt as not
een proper y va ue
or t at the fee
v.
paid is not sufficient, the court shall fix a date before
sm1. Viml•
which the plaint shall be amended in accordance
with the court's decision and the deficit fee shall be
Shah J.
"d
,,
pa1 ...... .
But this section only enables the defendant to raise
a contention as to the proper court-fee payable on a
plaint and to assist the court in arriving at a just
decision on that question. Our attention has not been
invited to any provision of the Madras Court-fees Act
or any other statute which enables the defendant to
move the Righ Court in revision against the decision
of the court of first instance on the matter of courtfee payable on a plaint. The Act, it is true by s. 19,
provides that for the purpose of deciding whether the
subject-matter of the suit or other proceeding has been
properly valued or whether the fee paid is sufficient,
the court may hold such enquiry as it considers
proper and issue a commission to any other person
directing him to make such local or other investigation as may be necessary and report thereon. The
anxiety of the Legislature to collect court-fee due from
the litigant is manifest from the detailed provisions
made in ch. III of the Act, but those 'provisions do
not arm the defendant with a weapon of technicality
to obstruct the progress of the suit by approaching the
High Court in revision, against an order determining
the court-fee payable. In our view, the High Court
grievously erred in entertaining revision applications
on questions of court-fee at the instance of the defendant, when no question of jurisdiction was involved.
The appeal therefore fails and is dismissed with
costs.
Appeal dismissed.
130