# SRI SARANGADEVAR PERIA MATAM AND ANOTHER v. RAMASWAMY GOUNDER (DEAD) BY LEGAL ltEPRESENTA TIVES

- **Citation:** [1966] 1 S.C.R. 908
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1965-09-23
- **Bench:** K. Suhba Rao, J. R. MVDllOLKAR, R. S. Bachawat
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/sri-sarangadevar-peria-matam-and-another-v-ramaswamy-gounder-dead-by-legal-3664
- **Pages:** 7

## Headnote

Indian Limitafwn Act (9 of 1908), s. 28 and Art. 144--Absence of
legally appointed mathadhipathi-Right of mL:.th to recover e1klowed
property--Slarting point of litni!al..ion.
The mathadhipathi of the apj)C!lant nu1h granted a perpetual lease of
the math properties, at a fixed rent to the predecessor of the respondent
jo 1883,
but \vithout any legal ncccso;;ity,
lbe malhaJipalhi died in
1915.
From
1~15 there w:!s only a de facto manager of the moith for
20 years.
In 1939, the present mathadhipatlu was elected and in 1950
the math obtained possession of the properiics.
Since 1915 the respondent
and his predecessors did not pay any rent to the math.
In 1954, the
respondent filed the suit against the m~th rcpresen1ed by the mathadhipathi,
for recovery of pos~s'.on of the properties claiming title by adverse posr
ses:,ion.
'Ilic trial court decreed the suit.
On appeal, the decree w<ls set
a!ide, but was rC";tored by the High Court on further appeal.
In the appeal to this Court the appellants
contended
that
adverse
possession could not run till !he machadhip•lthi was appointed. because,
the right to sue for the recover)· of the math properties vested only io
the lcgaJJy appointed
mathadhipathi;
and before
posses\ion cou!d be
:1dvcrse iherc rn~t be a con1pctitor who, hy due vigilance, could avoid
the running of time..
HELD: In the absence of legal neccosity, the lease of 1883 endured
only during the Jife time of rhe previous mathadhipathi and terminated on
his <lcath in 1915, and possession thereafter of the respondent and his
predecessor wa.'\ adverse to the math.
Therefore, the time under Art.
144 of 1he Limitation Act. 1908, commenced to run in 1915 and the
absence of a legally appointed mathadhipathi did not prevent the running
of time.
Thus, the title of the. math to the suit properties became extinguished in 1927 and the respondent acquired title by prescription, by
operation of s. 28 and art. 144. [910 E; 913 H; 914 C]
B
c
D
E
F
A math is the O\vner of endowed property and like an idol is a juristic person having the power of acquiring, owning and possessing propl!rties
and having the capacity of suing and heing sued.
It may acquire prc>-
perty by prescription and likewise lose it
by adverse
possession.
A
legally appointed mathadhipathi .has 1arge heneficial intc.re<>t~ in the m.alh
properties and he may sue on Its. beh~lf for recovery of its properties.
G
In his absence. a de facto mathadh1path1 may do so, and where i:iec~sa.ry.
a disciple or other beneficiary of the n1ath may take .steps .• for Y1a~1cat1ng
its lc,!Zal rights.
Therefore. if before the
mathad~1path1 s appo1n1ment
]imitation under art. 144 had commenced to run against the math, the a:>-
pointment does not give citl~cr the. math ?T. th7 malbadhipa.thi a n.ew
•
right of suit or a fresh srart1~g po;nt ~1f !Jm11a11on, and so, 1f. the tJtle
of the math to any propertv 1s e"ttl~gtt1shcd by adverse 'Posscs.~1on,. the
rights of aU bene.Jiciarieco of the math 1n the property are also cx!1ngu1shed.
H
[912 A·D; 912 H-913 BJ
Jagadindra Nath Ruy v. Hemerrta Kunwi Debi,
(1904) 1.1..R. 32
Cal. i29, distin~uished.
SARANGADEVAR V. R. GOUNDER (Bachawat, I.)
909
A

## Text

SRI SARANGADEVAR PERIA MATAM AND ANOTHER
A
v.
RAMASWAMY GOUNDER (DEAD) BY LEGAL
ltEPRESENTA TIVES
September 23, 1965
[K. SUHBA RAO, J. R. MVDllOLKAR AND R. S. BACHAWAT, JJ.]
Indian Limitafwn Act (9 of 1908), s. 28 and Art. 144--Absence of
legally appointed mathadhipathi-Right of mL:.th to recover e1klowed
property--Slarting point of litni!al..ion.
The mathadhipathi of the apj)C!lant nu1h granted a perpetual lease of
the math properties, at a fixed rent to the predecessor of the respondent
jo 1883,
but \vithout any legal ncccso;;ity,
lbe malhaJipalhi died in
1915.
From
1~15 there w:!s only a de facto manager of the moith for
20 years.
In 1939, the present mathadhipatlu was elected and in 1950
the math obtained possession of the properiics.
Since 1915 the respondent
and his predecessors did not pay any rent to the math.
In 1954, the
respondent filed the suit against the m~th rcpresen1ed by the mathadhipathi,
for recovery of pos~s'.on of the properties claiming title by adverse posr
ses:,ion.
'Ilic trial court decreed the suit.
On appeal, the decree w<ls set
a!ide, but was rC";tored by the High Court on further appeal.
In the appeal to this Court the appellants
contended
that
adverse
possession could not run till !he machadhip•lthi was appointed. because,
the right to sue for the recover)· of the math properties vested only io
the lcgaJJy appointed
mathadhipathi;
and before
posses\ion cou!d be
:1dvcrse iherc rn~t be a con1pctitor who, hy due vigilance, could avoid
the running of time..
HELD: In the absence of legal neccosity, the lease of 1883 endured
only during the Jife time of rhe previous mathadhipathi and terminated on
his <lcath in 1915, and possession thereafter of the respondent and his
predecessor wa.'\ adverse to the math.
Therefore, the time under Art.
144 of 1he Limitation Act. 1908, commenced to run in 1915 and the
absence of a legally appointed mathadhipathi did not prevent the running
of time.
Thus, the title of the. math to the suit properties became extinguished in 1927 and the respondent acquired title by prescription, by
operation of s. 28 and art. 144. [910 E; 913 H; 914 C]
B
c
D
E
F
A math is the O\vner of endowed property and like an idol is a juristic person having the power of acquiring, owning and possessing propl!rties
and having the capacity of suing and heing sued.
It may acquire prc>-
perty by prescription and likewise lose it
by adverse
possession.
A
legally appointed mathadhipathi .has 1arge heneficial intc.re<>t~ in the m.alh
properties and he may sue on Its. beh~lf for recovery of its properties.
G
In his absence. a de facto mathadh1path1 may do so, and where i:iec~sa.ry.
a disciple or other beneficiary of the n1ath may take .steps .• for Y1a~1cat1ng
its lc,!Zal rights.
Therefore. if before the
mathad~1path1 s appo1n1ment
]imitation under art. 144 had commenced to run against the math, the a:>-
pointment does not give citl~cr the. math ?T. th7 malbadhipa.thi a n.ew
•
right of suit or a fresh srart1~g po;nt ~1f !Jm11a11on, and so, 1f. the tJtle
of the math to any propertv 1s e"ttl~gtt1shcd by adverse 'Posscs.~1on,. the
rights of aU bene.Jiciarieco of the math 1n the property are also cx!1ngu1shed.
H
[912 A·D; 912 H-913 BJ
Jagadindra Nath Ruy v. Hemerrta Kunwi Debi,
(1904) 1.1..R. 32
Cal. i29, distin~uished.
SARANGADEVAR V. R. GOUNDER (Bachawat, I.)
909
A
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 544 of
B
1963.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and decree dated
July 16, 1959 of Madras High Court in Second Appeal No. 513
of 1957.
A. V. Viswanatha Sastri, s: S. Javali and Ganapathi Iyer, for
the appellants.
R. K. Garg. S. C. Agarwal, D. P. Singh and M. K. Ramamurthi, for the respondents.
c
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Bachawat, J. Sri Sarangadevar Peria Matam of Kumbakonam was the inamholder of lands in Kannibada Zamin, Dindigul
Taluk, Madurai District. In 1883, the then mathadhipathi
granted a perpetual lease of the melwaram and kudiwaram interest
n
in a portion of the in am lands to one Chinn a Gopiya Goundar,
the grandfather of the plaintiff-respondent on an annual rent of
Rs. 70.
The demised lands are the subject-matter of the present suit.
Since 1883 until January 1950 Chinna Gopiya Goundar and his descendants were in uninterrupted possession and
•
enjoyment of the suit lands.
In 1915, the mathadhipathi died
E without nominating a successor. Since 1915, the descendants of
Chinna Gopia Goundar did not pay any rent to the math.
Between 1915 and 1939 there was no mathadhipathi.
One
Basavan Chetti was in management of the math for a period of
20 years from 1915. The present mathadhipathi was elected by
the disciples of the Math in 1939. In 1928, the Collector of
F
Madurai passed an order resuming the inam lands, and directing
full assessment of the lands and payment of the assessment to the
math for its upkeep. After resumption, the lands were transferred
from the "B" Register of inam lands to the "A" Register of
ryotwari lands and a joint patta was issued in the name of the
plaintiff and other persons in possession of the lands. The plainG tiff continued to possess the suit lands until January, 1950 when
the math obtained possession of the lands.
On February 18,
1954, the plaintiff instituted a suit against the math represented
bv its present mathadhipathi and an agent of the math claiming
recovery of possession of the suit lands. The plainfll' claimed that
he acquired title to the lands by adverse possession and by the
H issue of a ryotwari patta in his favour on the resumption of the
inam. The Subordinate Judge of Dindigul accepted the plaintiff's
contention, and decreed the suit.
On appeal, the District Judge
910
SL i'REME
LOU RT
RE.PORTS
li %LJ ; S.C.R.
of Madurai sd aside We decree and dismissed the suit. On second
appeal, the High Court of Madras restored the
judgm~nt and
decree of the Subordinate Judge. 'file deien'1ants now appeal to
this Court by special leave.
During the pendcncy of the appeal,
the piaintiff-respondent died and his legal representatives have
boen substituted in his place.
The plaintiff claimed titie to the suit lands on the 1olh.n.mg
grounds : ( 1) Since l ') 15 he and his predecessors-in-interest were
in adverse possession of the lands, and on the expiry of 12 years
in 1927 he acquired prescriptive title to the lands under s. 28
read with Art. 144 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908; t2) by
the resumption proceeJings amt the grant \lf the ryoiwari patta
a new tenure was created in his favour and he acquired full
ownership in the lands; and (3) in any event, he was in adverse
possession of the lands since 1928, and on the expiry of 12 years
in 1940 he acquired prescriptive title to the lands under s. 28
read with Art. 134-B of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908.
We
are of the opinion that the first contention of the plaintiff should
be accepted, and it is. therefore, not necessary to consider the
other two grounds of his claim.
In the absence of legal necessity, the previous mathadhipathi
had no power to grant a perpetual lease of the math p[Jlpecties at
a fixed rent.
Legal necessity is neither alleged nor proved.
l3ut
the mathadhipathi had power to grant a lease "hich could endure
for his lifetime.
The lease of 1883, therefore, endured during
the lifetime of the previous mathadhlpathi and terminated on hi<
death in 1915.
Since 1915, the plair1iff and his predecessorsin-interest did not pay any rent to the math, and they possessed
the lands on their own behalf adversely to the math. Before the
insertion of Art. 134-B in the Indian Limilation Act, 1908 hy
Act I of 1929, the suit for recovery of the lands from the defendants would have been governed by Art. 144. The contro,·ersy i'
about the st~rting point of limitation of a suit for the recoverv
of the math properties under Art. 144.
Did the limitation commence on the date of the death of the previous mathadhipathi, or
did it commence on the dat~ of election of the present mathadhipathi"
On behalf of the appellants. Mr. Ganapathy Iyer wntended
that the right to sue for the recovery of the math-properties vests
in the legally appointed mathadhipathi and adverse possession
against him cannot run until his appointment. Jn support of his
contention. he relied upon the minority judgment of a Full Bench
A
B
c
D
•
E
F
G
II
•
•
•
•
SARANGADEVAR v. R. GOUNDER (Bachawat, !.)
911
A of the Madras High Court in Venkateswara v.
Venka1esa(1),
Kameswara Rao v. Somanna(") and Manikkam Pillai v. Thanikachalam Pillai (3). He argued that this view has received legislative sanction in Art. 96 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963. He
relied upon the following observations in Jagadindra Nath Roy
v. Hemanta Kumari Debi(') "the possession and management of
B the dedicated property belongs to the sebait. And this carries with
it the right to bring whatever suits are necessary for the protection of the property. Every such right of suit is vested in the
sebait and not in the idol." Relying on Murray v. The East India
Company(') and Meyappa Chetty
v.
Subramanian Chetty( 6 )
and several decisions under Arts. 120 and 110 of the Indian LimiC talion Act, 1910, he submitted that the cause of action does not
accrue and time does not co=ence to run unless there is someone who can institute the suit.
Relying on Radhamoni Devi v.
Collector of Khulna(') and Srischandra Nandy v.
Baijnath
fugal Kishore( 8 ) he contended that before possession can
be
D
adverse there must be a competitor who by due vigilance could
avoid the running of time .
Mr. Garg on behalf of the respondents contended that adverse
possession commenced to run against the math on the death of
the mathadhlpathi who granted the lease and the operation of the
Limitation Act is not affected by the fact that there was no legal
E
manager of the math.
In support of his contention, he
relied
upon the majority judgment of the Full Bench of the Madras
High Court in Venkateswara's case('), Monmohan Haldar
v.
Dibbendu Prasad Ray Chaudhuri(") and Administrator-General
of Bengal v. Balkissen Misser('').
Relying on Pramatha Nath
Mullick v. Pradyumna Kumar Mullick("), he submitted that a
F
math, like an idol, has a juridical status with the power of suing
and being sued.
He argued that in the absence of a legally
appointed mathadhipathi, a de facto manager could institute a
suit for recovery of the math properties, and the beneficiaries of
the endowment could take appropriate steps for the recovery, and,
in any event, the mere absence of machinery for the institution of
G the suit would not suspend the running of limitation.
H
We are inclined to accept the respondents' contention. Under
Art. 144 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, limitation for a suit
by a math or by any person representing it for possession of irn-
(I) I. L. R. 1941 Mad. 599.
(3) A. I. R. 1917 Mad. 706.
(S) (1821) 5 B. & Aid. 204,217.
(/) (1900) L. R. 27 I. A. 136.
(9) (1949) I. L. R. 2 Cal. 263.
(11) (1925) L.
(2) A. I. R. 1955 Andhra Pradesh. 212.
(4) (1904) I. L. R. 32 Cal. 129,141.
(6) (1916) L. R. 43 I. A. 113,120 .
(8) I. L. R. 14 Patna. 327 P. C.
(10) (1924) I. L. R. 51 Cal. 953, 957-960.
R. 52 I. A. 245, 250.
912
SUPREME
COURT
REPORTS
[ 1966) I S.C.R.
movable properties belonging to it runs from the time when the
A
possession of the defendant becomes adverse to the plaintiff. ·111e
math is the owner of the endowed property.
Like an idol, the
math is a juristic person having the power of acquiring, owning
and possessing properties and having the capacity of suing and
being sued.
Being an ideal person, it must of necessity act in
relation to its temporal
affairs through
human agency.
Sec
BabajirQQ v. Laxmandas( 1 ). It may acquire property by prescription and may likewise lose property by adverse possession.
If
the math while in possession of its property is dispossessed or if
the possession of a stranger becomes adverse, it suffers an injury
and has the right to sue for the recovery of the property. If there
is a legally appointed mathadhipathi, he may institute the suit on
its behalf; if not, the de facto mathadhipathi may do so, see
Mahadeo Prasad Singh v. Karia Rharri('); and where, necessary,
B
c
a disciple or other beneficiary of the math may take steps for
vindicating its legal rights by the appointment of a receiver
having authority to sue on its behalf, or by the institution of a
D
suit in its name by a next friend appointed by the Court. With
due diligence, the math or those interested in it may avoid the
running of time.
The running of limitation against the
math
under Art. 144 is not suspended by the absence of a legally
appointed mathadhipathi; clearly, limitation would run ag3inst
it where it is managed by a de facto mathadhipathi. See Virhalbowa v. Narayan Daji Thire('), and we think it would run equally if there is neither a de jure nor a de facto mathadhipathi.
A mathadhipathi is Che manager and custodian of the institution. See Vidya Varuthi Thirtha v. Balusami A.war(').
The
office carries with it the right to manage and possess the endowed
properties on behalf of the math and the right to st1e on its behalf
E
F
for the protection of those properties.
During the tenure of his
office, the mathadhipathi has also large beneficial interests in the
math properties, see The Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Srirur
Mutt('). But by virtue of his office, he can possess and enioy
G
onlv such properties as belonl( to the math. If the title of the
math to any property is extinguished by adverse possession, the
rights of all beneficiaries of the math in the property are also
extinguished.
On his app~intment, the mathadhipathi acquires
no right to recover property which no lonj!er belongs to the math.
If before his appointment limitation under Art.
144 has
(1) o91i4l I. L. R. 28 Born. 215.223.
(2) (1934) L. R. 621. A. 47. St.
(3) (1893)1. L. R. 18 'lorn. Sfl7. St t.
(4) L. R. 481. A. 302 at 311,315.
(S) (1954} S. C.R. 1005, 1018-1020.
H
•
..
• •
•
'
SARANGADEVAR v. R. GOUNDER (Bachaivat, J.)
913
A commenced to run against the math, the appoiritment does not
give either the math or the mathadhipathi a new. right of suit or
a fresh starting point of limitation under that Article for rec?very
of the property.
In the instant case, the present matha~path1
was elected in 1939 when the title of the math to the smt lands
was already extinguished by adverse possession. By his election
B in 1939 the present mathadhipathi could not acquire the right to
possess and enjoy or to recover properties which no longer belonged to 'the math.
In Jagadindra Nath Roy's case('), the dispossession of the
idol's lands took place in April, 1876. The only sheb_ait of the idol ·
c was then a minor, and he sued for recovery of the lands in October, 1889 within three years of his attaining majority. The Privy
Council held that the plaintiff being a minor at the commencement of the period of limitation was entitled to the benefit of s. 7
of the Indian Limitation Act, 1877 (Act XV of 1877) corresponding to s. 6 of the Indian Limitation Act 1908,
and
D was entitled to institute the suit within three years of
his
coming of age. This decision created an anomaly, for, as pointed
out by Page, J. in Administrator-General of Bengal v. Balkissen
Misser(2) at p. 958, in giving the benefit of s. 7 of the Indian
Limitation Act, 1877 to the shebait, the Privy Council proceeded
on the footing that the right to sue for possession is to be divorced
E from the proprietary right to the property which is vested in the
idol. We do not express any opinion one way or the other on
the correctness of Jagadindra Nath Roy's case(1). For the purposes of this case, it is sufficient to say that we are not inclined
to extend the principle of that case.
In that case, at the commencement of the period of limitation there was a shebait in
F existence entitled to sue on behalf of the idol, and on the institution of the suit he successfully claimed that as the person entitled to
in~titute the suit at the time from which the period is to be reckoned he should get the benefit of s. 7 of the Indian Limitation Act
1877. Jn the present case, there was no mathadhipathi in existence in 1915 when limitation commenced to run. Nor is there
G
any question of the minority of a mathadhipathi entitled to sue
in 1915 or of applying s. 6 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908.
For these reasons, we hold that the time under Art. 144 of
the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 commenced to run in 1915 on
the death of the mathadhipathi, who granted the lease, and the
H
absence of a legally appointed
mathadhipathi
did
not
prevent the running of time under Art. 144. We, therefore, agree
(I) (1904) I.LR. 32 Cal. 129.
(2) (1924) I.LR. 51 Cal. 953.
L8Sup. C. 1/65-15
914
Sl!PREME COURT
REPORTS
[1966] I S.C.R.
with the answer given by the inajurity of the Judges to the third
A
question referred to the Full Bench of the Madras High Court
in Venkatesivara's case(') at pp. 614-615, 633-634. We express
no opinion on the interpretation of Art. 134-B of the Indian
Limitation Act, 1908 or Art. 96 of the Indian Limitation Act,
1963. Under Art. 96 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963, the
starting point of limitation in such a case would be the date of B
the appointment of the plaintiff as manager of the endowment,
but this Article cannot be considered to be a legislative recognition of the law existing before 1929.
We hold that by the operation of Art. 144 read with s. 28 of
the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 the title of the math to the suit
C
lands became extinguished in 1927, and the plaintiff acquired title
to the lands by prescription.
He continued in possession of the
lands until January, 1950.
It has been found that in January,
1950 he voluntarily delivered possession of the lands to the math,
but such delivery of possession did not transfer any title to the
math. The suit was instituted in 1954 and is well within time.
D
In the result, the appeal is dismissed with costs.
Appeal dismissed.
(!) I. L. R. 1941 Mad. 599
J