# SRI VEDAGIRI LAKSHMI '.'IARASIMHA SWAMI TEMPLE v. INDURL" PAITABHIRAMI REDDY

- **Citation:** [1967] 1 S.C.R. 280
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1966-09-06
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 605 of 1964
- **Bench:** K. SUBBA RAo, J. M. Shelat
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/sri-vedagiri-lakshmi-iarasimha-swami-temple-v-indurl-paitabhirami-reddy-3822
- **Pages:** 13

## Headnote

Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Ac1 ( 19 of 1951 ),
Chaps<r YI/ and s. 93-Ex-lruslees' liability to accoun1-Scope of-Suit
.against ex·trwtees for rendition of accounts-Main1ainabi/ity.
The trustees of a temple filed a suit for rendition of accounts ·against
.the ell·truslces, in respe<;t of their management of the temple.
The trial
court and the first appellate court. in their discretion and having regard
to the circumstances of the case, directed the defendants to render accounts
for about six years prior to the plaintitrs taking poso ... ion of tho temple.
The Higb Court held that the defendams were not obliged to render ac·
counts in the absence of allegations of acts of negligenee or wilful default,
and that, s. 93 of the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitahlc Endow·
me<Jts Act, 1951, was a bar to the maintainability of the suit.
In appeal to this Court,
HELD : ( i) No trustee can get a dischar~ unless be renders account
of his management irrespective of any questton of negligence or wilful
·defaul~ The defendants, therefore, were liable to render accounts of their
management lo the plaintiffs. As regards the period for which they should
ho made liable to re.oder accounts, it would depend upon the facts of eocb
·case, and there was no justification for interfering with the discretion of
the lower courts in that regard.
[284 O.E; 286 CJ

## Text

SRI VEDAGIRI LAKSHMI '.'IARASIMHA SWAMI TEMPLE
A
V.
INDURL" PAITABHIRAMI REDDY
September 6, 1966
(K. SUBBA RAo, C. J. AND J. M. SHELAT, J.J
Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Ac1 ( 19 of 1951 ),
Chaps<r YI/ and s. 93-Ex-lruslees' liability to accoun1-Scope of-Suit
.against ex·trwtees for rendition of accounts-Main1ainabi/ity.
The trustees of a temple filed a suit for rendition of accounts ·against
.the ell·truslces, in respe<;t of their management of the temple.
The trial
court and the first appellate court. in their discretion and having regard
to the circumstances of the case, directed the defendants to render accounts
for about six years prior to the plaintitrs taking poso ... ion of tho temple.
The Higb Court held that the defendams were not obliged to render ac·
counts in the absence of allegations of acts of negligenee or wilful default,
and that, s. 93 of the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitahlc Endow·
me<Jts Act, 1951, was a bar to the maintainability of the suit.
In appeal to this Court,
HELD : ( i) No trustee can get a dischar~ unless be renders account
of his management irrespective of any questton of negligence or wilful
·defaul~ The defendants, therefore, were liable to render accounts of their
management lo the plaintiffs. As regards the period for which they should
ho made liable to re.oder accounts, it would depend upon the facts of eocb
·case, and there was no justification for interfering with the discretion of
the lower courts in that regard.
[284 O.E; 286 CJ
Case law referred to.
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(ii) Section 93 is not a bar to the maintainability of the suit.
(292 Al
The section only imposes a restriction on .suils or other legal p'roceedings in respect of matters for which a provision has been made in the Act.
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The legislative history of the section shows that even in regard to suits
·or other legal proceedings relating to administration or management of
religious institutions. restriction is imposed only in respect of matters
for which a provision is made in the Act. It does not bar suits under
the general law which do not fall within the scope of any of the sections
of the Act. Chapter VII of the Act, on which reliance was placed by the
defendants as providing a complete machinery for deciding disput .. in
regard to accounts, has no bearing on the question of the liability of an
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ex-trustee to render account of his management to the present trustee and
does not provide for determining or deciding a dispute in respect of such
rendition of accounts. [287 F; 289 C; 291 H; 292 A]
Case law referred to.
CivJL APPELLATE JURISDICTION! Civil Appeal No. 605 of 1964.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and decree dated
April 12. 196~ of the Andhra PradPsh High Ccu ·tin S.A. )':o. 124
of 1959.
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VEDAGIRI TEMPLE v. I. P. REDDY (Subba Rao, C.J.)
281
P. Ram Reddy and A. V. V. Nair, for the appellant.
H. R. Gokha/e, S., P. R. Vital Rao, K. Rajendra Chaudhari
and K. R. Chaudhuri, for the respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Sobba Rao, C.J. This appeal by special leave raises the question whether a suit would lie at the instance of ~he present trustees
of a temple for rendition of accounts of the management of the
temple by the ex-trustees.
The appellant is Sri Vedagiri Lakshmi Narasimha Swami
temple situated at Narasimhulykonda, Nellore taluk, in the State
of Andhra Pradesh, represented by its trustees. The respondent
and two others were non-hereditary trustees of the said temple
and functioned as such for a term of five years ending with Janu,
ary 1951. The respondent was the managing trustee during that
period. The new trustees were appointed by order of the Hindu
Religious Endowments Board dr.ted January 21, 1951 ; but they
were able to obtain possession of the temple only on July 21, 1952.
They, representing the temple, filed 0.S. No. 246 of 1953 in the
Court of the Subordinate Judge, Nellore against the respondent
and others for the following three reliefs : (1) to direct all or such
of the defendants as may be found liable to render a true and proper
account of their management of the temple and its properties since
the date of their functioning as trustees and to pay over to the
new trustees such amounts as may be found due ; (2) to assess
the amount due to the temple as a result of the various acts of malfeasanee, misfeasance and non-feasance of the defendants 1 to 3
in respect of their management, and to direct them to pay the same
to the new trustees ; and (3) to direct the defendants 1 to 3 to deliver to the new trustees all documents, accounts, registers, s. 38
register, jewels and movable properties, after rendering a true account thereof and failing such delivery, to pass a decree against
the defendants for their value, or pass such decree against them
for such damages as the temple had sustained. In the plaint, the
new trustees alleged that the defendants were guilty of acts of misfeasance, malfeasance ;md non-fcasance and also.· of gross negligence. The defendants, inter alia, apart from denying the said
allegations made against them, pleaded that the suit was not maintainable in a civil court in view of the provisions of s. 87 of the
Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1951
(Act 19 of 1951), hereinafter called the Act.
The learned Subordinate Judge, hv
his judgment dated
August 12, 1953, held that the suit was maintainable. He also
found that defendants 1 to 3 were liable to render an account of
their management during the period of their trusteeship and to
pay damages for the loss suffered by the temple on.account of their
282
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1967] I S. C.R
acts of misfeasance, malfeasance and non-feasance.
In the result,
he passed a preliminary decree in favour of the new trustees directing the respondent and defendants 2, 5 and 6 the legal representatives of defendant 3, to render a true and proper account of their
management of the temple and its properties for the period commencing from the beginning of 1946 to the date when the plaintiffs
took possession of the temple in July 1952 and to pay such amounts
as may be found due from them on taking accounts. The 1st
defendant, the ex-managing trustee of the temple, preferred an
appeal against the said decree to the court of the District Judge,
Nellore. To that appeal. the plaintiffs were made respondents.
Pending the appeal, the plaint was amended and the words "or
pao;s such decree against them for such. damages as the temple
has sustained thereby" were deleted from prayer 3 of the plaint.
The learned advocate for the plaintiffs made an. endorsement on
the plaint and the appeal memo stated as follows :
"Plaintiffs have given up prayer in respect of the
damages as endorsed by the learned advocate on behalf
of the plaintiffs on the plaint on 20-8-1958."
The learned District Judge also recorded in his judgment that the
appellant (respondent herein) did not press his appeal in respect
of the claim for damages given up by the plaintiffs. Prima facie
this amendment related only to the prayer to deliver to the new
trustees the documents and other movable properties and did not
affect the other prayers for rendition of accounts on the ground
of malfeasance, misfeasance and non-feasance of the defendants.
The learned District Judge understood the finding given by the
learned Subordinate Judge as follows :
"Setting out all these things in detail in paras 13
and 14 of his judgment, the learned Subordinate Judge
came to the conclusion that it was sufficient to say that
there is liability to account in respect of the management
on the part of the ex-trustees, ·;.e., defendants 1 and 3, and
that they are liable to pay to temple whatever damages
it has suffered on account of their acts of misfeasance,
malfeasance and non-feasance."
After considering the relevant evidence and the case law on the
subject, he came to the following conclusion :
"I have no
hesitation to hold that the plaintiffs
have established liability for ex-trustees to render account
of their management to deliver possession of the other
property yet to be delivered and also the records mentioned in the plaint."
The learned District Judge. therefore, agreed with the learned
Subordinate Judge that the defendants had to render accounts
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VEDAGIRI TEMPLE v. I. P. REDDY (Subba Rao, C.1.)
283
of their management of the temple and to pay to the temple damages
suffered by it on account of their acts of misfeasance, malfeasance ·
and non-feasance. In the result the decree of the learned Subordi!lllte Judge was confirmed.
But, on Second Appeal, Jaganmohan Reddy, J., of the Andhra
Pradesh High Court, held that the suit for accounts was not maintainable. The reasoning of the learned Judge· is found in the
following observations :
"It is true that a suit for pack aecounting on the
authority of the decisions cited above does not lie and
unfortunately in this case though the frame of the suit
was for recovery of damages for negligence of the trustees
in not taking leases, in not filing rent suits, in not collecting
rents and generally for other acts of negligence, that plea
was given up by the respondents, probably because they
were not in a position to establish these facts. The learned
advocate· for the respondents admits. that this plea was
given up by the clients and in the circumstances the only
relief that the respondents claim against the appellant
now is one for general accounting relating to the management or administration of the trust property and applying
the principle laid down by the two judgments of this
Coμrt in Venkataratnam v. Narasimha Rao (1) and Sri
Saraveswaraswami Vari temple v.
Veerabhadrayya (•),
I cannot but hold that suit will .not lie and in this view;
the appeal is allowed and· the judgments and the decrees
of the courts below are set aside."
Though, prima facie, as we have said earlier, we are inclined to
hold that what was given ilp oy the appellant was only a part or
the third relief, in view of the unambiguous admission made by
the learned advocate for the appellant and recorded in the judgment of the High court, we have no option but to hold that the
appellant had given up the plea of wilful default against the defendants and confined the relief only to· a rendition of accounts
by them in respect of their nianagement of the temple during their
tenure and to pay the amount that might be found due to the appellant.
Mr. P. Ram Reddy, learned counsel for the appellant-temple
raised before us three points : (1) The suit was for damages for
gross negligence and the learned Judge did not appreciate· .the
correct scope of the concession _made by tJ:te learned advoca~
appearing for the temple before him. (2) Section. 93 of the Act as
not a bar to a suit by the present trustees against the ex-trustees
for rendition of accounts of their management of the temple
-(1) [1960) 2 Andh. W.R. 319.
(2) (1961) I Andh. W.R. 2SJ.
M!SSup.CI/66-S
284
SUPlt.BllB COUltT UPOI. TS
[1967] I s.c.a
properties and recovery of the amounts due from them.
(3) The
learned Judge went wrong in holding that a suit for back-accounting
would not lie.
On the first point we have already expressed our opinion earlier
that, in view of the unambiguous concession made by the learned
advocate for the appellant before the High Court, we must hold
that the suit, after the amendment of the plaint, was confined only
to rendition of accounts, not on account of wilful default or negligence, but only for rendition of accounts by the ex-trustees of their
management and to pay the amounts due to the present trustees.
The question, therefore, is whether the present trustees can
demand a rendition of accounts from the ex-trustees in respect
of their management without alleging against them any acts of
negligence or wilful default and, if so, whether s. 93 of the Act
was a bar to the maintainability of a suit for the relief of rendition
of accounts in a civil court.
It is common place that no trustee can get a discharge unless
he renders accounts of his management. This liability is irrespective of any question of negligence or wilful default. In the
present case, the ex-trustees admittedly did not give an account
of their management though they put the plaintiffs in possession
of the properties in the year 1952 and that too after adopting a
course of obstructive attitude. They are, therefore, liable to render
accounts of their management to the present trustees.
The decisions relied upon by the learned Judge to -not support the view that an ex-trustee need not render accounts in the
ab.sence of allegations of negligence or wilful default. In V. K.
Kelu Acha11 v. C. S. Sivarama Pattar (') one of the questions
raised was whether the I st defendant therein, who was a karnavan
of a tarwad and also the manager of temple properties, should be
made to give a general rendition of accounts of his management
from 1900. It was found in that case that the 1st defendant was
not personally responsible for any loss to the temple, that no
relief for rendition of accounts was asked for against him and
that he was not the person who was maintaining the accounts.
On those facts, the High Court refused to give a decree against
the 1st respondent for back-accounting. In the course of the
judgment the following observations were made :
"It is a general principle also that back accounting
will not be decreed except on proof of dishonesty and
malversation, and we have not found any such proof
here against the present trustee."
These observations do not circumscribe the scope of the court's
discretion, but only lay down a guide for its exercise. They must
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(ll A.l.R. 1928 Madras 879, 887.
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VBDAGIRI TBMPLB v. I. P. RBDDY (Subba Rao, C./.)
285
be read in the context of the facts found in that case. Nor the
decision in The Madura etc. Devasthanams v. Doraiswami Nayudu(1)
lays down any such wide proposition. There, the executive
officer of·a temple sought to recover from its ex-trustee a certain
amount by way of damages on foot of gross negligence. It was
found that the trustee was not guilty of any wilful default and that
he was justified in acting upon the vouchers and accounts furnished
by the Jaw department of the Devasthanam and also that it was
not established that any items were really due to the temple. On
those facts the suit }Vas dismissed. Briefly stated, that was a suit
for rendition of account on the ground of wilful default in the
course of management of the temple affairs and, as no wilful default had been established, the suit for accounts was dismissed.
It is not im authority for the position that unless wilful default is
established an ex-trustee need not account to the present trustee
and ·to pay to him the amount due under the said accounts. In
the case of rendition of accounts by an ex-trustee to a present
trustee, it will necessarily relate to back accounting, for no question of accounting in future arises in his case. The question that
invariably arises in such a context is as to what period he shall be
made liable to render accounts. That depends upon the facts
of each case. Sir Thomas Flumer, M. R., said .in Attorney General
v. Exetor Mayor (2):
"It has, I think, been properly stated on both sides
that there is no fixed limit of time in directing an account
against a trustee of a charity ........ It does not, however, follow that the relief will be given after a great length
of time, it being the constant course. of Courts of Equity
to discourage stale demands ; even in cases ·of fraud, in
which, if recent, there would have been no doubt, lapse of
time has induced the Courts to refuse their interference.
In cases of charities, this principle has often been acted
on .. When there has been a long period, during which a
party has, under an innocent mistake, misapplied a fund,
from the !aches and neglect of others, that fa, from no one
of the public setting him right, and when the accounts
have in consequence become entangled, the Court, under
its general discretion, considering the enormous expense
of the enquiries, the great hardships of calling upon representatives to refund what families have spent, acting
on the notion of its being their property, has been in the
habit, while giving the relief, of fixing a period to the account.''
These observations were followed by a Division Bench of the
Madras High Court in Sanyasayya v. Murthamma ('). Where
(I) (1943) I M.L.J. 144.
(2) (1822) 37 E.R. 918.
(3) A.I.R. 1919 Madras 943.
286
~lt.EMB COUlt.T ·lt.EPOI'fl
(1967] I S.C.1.
a suit was filed for an account for the year 1884 and the !st defendant was asked to account for the management of his father
and grand-father, the learned Judges of the Madras High Court
fixed the period of accounting at 12 years. The said observations were also followed by the Andhra l'ligb Court in Harihmabrahmam v. Janakiramiah (1) and, having regard to the circumstances in that case, the said High Court directed accounts to be
taken for a period of six years prior to 1938.
In the present case the learned subordinate Judge and the
learned District Judge, in exercise of their discretion, having regard to the circumstances of the case, directed the respondent to
render accounts of his management from the beginning of the
year 1946 to the date when the plaintiffs took possession of the
temple in July 1952. We do not see any justification to interfere
\Vith the discretion of the courts in that regard.
The next question is whether s. 93 of the Act is a bar to the
maintainability of the suit. The said section reads :
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"No suit or other legal prooeeding in respect of the
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administration or management of a religious institution
or any other matter or dispute for determining or deciding
which provision is made in this Act shall be instituted in
any Court oflaw, except under, and in conformity with,
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the provisions of this Act."
The learned counsel for the appellant contended that in order to
invoke this section the following conditions shall be complied with:
( 1) The suit shall be in respect of the administration or management of a religious institution ; (2) it shall be in respect of any
other matter in dispute ; and (3) for determining or deciding such a
suit or other legal prooeeding there shall be a provision in the Act ;
if there is such a provision, such a suit or proceeding could not be
instituted in any court of law exoept under, and in conformity with,
the provisions of the Act. The further argument was that the
administration or management referred to in s. 93 related to s. 58
of the Act, and the other matters of dispute related to s. 57 thereof,
and that, as the suit for rendition of accounts did not fall either
under s. 57 or under s. 58 of the Act, the present suit for such a
relief was outside the scope of s. 93 of the Act.
Mr. Gokhale, learned counsel for the respondent, contended
that Ch. VII of the Aci provided for rendition of accounts and a
macliinery for determining or deciding disputes in respect thereof,
and that, therefore, no suit or other legal proceeding could be
taken in any court except under and in conformity with the provisions of that Chapter.
(I} A.LR. 1955 Andhra 18.
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VEDAGllU TBMPLE v. 1. P. lll!DDY (Subba Rao, C.1.)
287
Under s. 9 of the <:ode of Civil Procedure, the courts shall
have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature excepting suits of
which their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred.
It is a well settled principle that a party seeking to oust the jurisdiction of an ordinary civil court shall establish the right to do so.
Section 93 of the Act does not impose a total bar on the maintainability of a suit in a civil court. It states that a suit of the nature
mentioned therein can be instituted only in conformity with the
provisions of the Act; that is to say, a· suit or other legal proceeding
in respect of matters not covered by the section can be instituted
in the ordinary way. It therefore imposes certain statutory restrictions on suits or other legal proceedings relating to matters
mentioned therein. Now, what are those matters ? They are :
(I) administration or management of religious institutions ;· and
(2) any other matter or dispute for determining or deciding which
provision, is made in the Act. The clause "determining or deciding which a provision is made in this Act", on a reasonable construction, cannot be made to qualify "the administration or management" but must be confined only to any other matter or dispute.
Even so, the expression "administration or management" cannot
be CQnstrued widely so as to take in any matter however remotely
connected with the administration or management. The limitation on the said words is found in the phrase "except under and in
conformity with the provisions of this Act." To state it differently,
the said phrase does not impose a total bar on a suit in a civil court
but only imposes a restriction on suits or other legal proceedings in
respect of matters for which a provision is made in the Act. Any
other construction would lead to an incongruity, namely, there
will be a vacuum in many arel!S not covered by the Act and the
general remedies would be displaced without replacing them by
new remedies.
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The history of this provision also supports the said interpretation. Sub-section (2) of s. 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure
says :
"Save as provided by the Religious Endowments Act,
1863, no suit claiming any of the reliefs specified in subsection (I) shall be instituted in respect of any such trust as
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is therein referred to except in conformity with the provisions of that sub-section."
Suits for reliefs mentioned in sub-s.(I) of s. 92 of the Code of Civil
Procedure can only be instituted in special courts and in the manner
mentioned therein. Construing the said sub-section, a F\111 Bench
of the Madras High Court in Appanna v. Narasinga (1) held that
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a suit by a trustee of a public religious trust against a co-trustee for
accounts did not fall within the section, though the relief claimed
(I) (1922) I.L.R. 45 Madras 113.
288
SUPUMJI couaT lll!POllTS
(1967) I S.CK.
was the one specified in sub-s. (!), cl. (d). The reason given was
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that the relief was sought not in the larger interest of the public
but merely for the purpose of vindicating the private rights of one
of the trustees and of enabling him to discharge the duties and liabilities which were imposed upon him by the trust. Another Full
Bench of the Madras High Court in Tirumalai Tirupati Devasthanmz
Committee v. Udiavar Krishnayya Sahnbhaga (1) held that the
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said section did not apply whe;e the general trustees of a public
temple sued the trustees of certain offerings given to the deity, for
accounts, on the ground that in that suit the right of the public
was not sought to be enforced but only the personal rights of the
trustees qua the trustees.
These decisions indicate that s. 92 of the Code of Civil ProceC
dure does not impose a general embargo on filing of a suit in a
civil court, but only directs that suits of the nature mentioned in
sub-s.(l) thereof shall not be instituted in a civil court except i,n
conformity with the provisions of the said sub-section. If a suit
does not fall within the ambit of s. 92(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure, it is not hit also by sub-s.(2) thereof. When the Madras
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Hindu Religious Endowments Act (2 of 1927) was passed, in m;-
pect of the endowments covered by that Act, s. 73 of that Act
replaced s. 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Sub-section (4)
thereof, which was added by Madras Act X of 1946 read :
"No suit or other legal proceeding claiming any relief
provided in this Act in respect of such administration or
management shall be instituted except under and in conformity with the provisions of this Act."
The expression "except under and in conformity with the provisions
of this Act" in the said sub-section is also found in s. 93 of the Act.
The scope of the said sub-section came under judicial scrutiny in
Manjeshwar Srimad Anantheswar Temple v. Vaikunta Bhakta (2)
Therein Horwill, J., summarised the legal position reached in
respect of the construction of that section thus :
"It will be seen therefore that from 54 Mad. IOll (Vythi/inga Pandarasannadhi v. Temple Committee, Tinnevelly)
onwards there was a considerable body of opinion that
the general scope of s. 73, Hindu Religious Endowments
Act, is the same ass. 92, Civil P.C., that the last paragraph
of s. 73 of the Act is meant to refer only to the classes of
cases referred to in s. 73(1) and other sections of the Act,
and that suits which do not fall within the scope of these
sections can be tried under the general law. I have not
come across any case in which these opinions were dissented
from or contrary opinions expressed."
(l) A.l.R. 1943 MadlllS 466.
(2) A.J.R. 1943 Madra! 228, %JO.
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VEDAGIRI TEMPLE v. I. P. REDDY (Subba Rao, C.l.)
289
Sub-.section (4), which corresponds to s. 93 of the Act, was held
not to impose a total bar on a civil suit but only confined to suits
relating to the classes of cases referred to in s. 73(1) and other sections of the Act. Section 93 of the Act enlarges the scope of s.
73( 4) thereof. It bars not only suits or legal proceedings in respect of administration or management of religious institutions
but also in respect of any other matter or dispute for deter.nining
or deciding which provision is made in the Act. By repeating the
phrase "except under and in conformity with the provisions of the
Act" which had received authoritative judicial interpretation when
it remained in s. 73( 4) of the earlier Act, the Legislature must be
held to have accepted the interpretation put upon the phrase by .the
courts. It follows that s. 93 will apply only to matters for which
provision has been made in the Act. It does not bar suits under
the general law which do not fall within the scope of any section
of the Act.
Even so, the learned counsel for the respondent contended
that Ch. VII of the Act provided a complete machinery for deciding disputes in regard to accounts and, therefore, no suit for accounting against an ex-trustee could be filed in a civil court. This interpretation was accepted by two decisions of the Andhra Pradesh
High Court. The decision in Venkataratnam v. Narasimha Rao(1)
dealt with a case of a suit filed with the permission of the Advocate
General for removing the trustee, for framing a scheme for the
management of the trust property, for appointing a new trustee
and for accounts and other incidental reliefs. The contesting defendant pleaded ·inter alia that because of the provisions of the
Madras Act 19 of 1951, the suit could not be entertained by the
civil court, and that s. 93 was a bar to such a suit. The Andhra
Pradesh High Court held that s. 93 of the Act clearly interdicted the
determination of the subject matter of the suit by a civil court.
The reasoning of the decision is summarized thus :
"Now the suit is entirely based on allegations of
breach of trust and every one of the reliefs prayed for in
the plaint can flow from appropriate action that officers
named in the Act may take. The first relief sought in
the present plaint can result from action taken under
section 45 of the Act ; the second and third reliefs from
action under section 58; the fourth from action under
section 60 ; the 6th relief from action under section 57 and
the-relief numbered and lettered as 6(a) from action under
section 87."
The High Court also observed :
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"In our \>Pinion, all these are 'matters or disputes for.
determining or deciding which provision is made' in the Act."
(I) [1960J 2 Andh. W.R. Ji9, 323.
290
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(1967) I S.C.R.
On that basis it held that s. 93 of the Act was a bar to the maintainability of the suit. It may be mentioned that the observation
that the fourth relief could result from action under s. 60 appears
to be a mistake, for s. 60 applies only to a defunct religious institution.
In Sri Sarveswaraswami Vari Temple v. Rudrapaka Veerabhadrayya(,1) Seshachelapati, J., speaking for the court, said thus :
"It will be seen, as correctly observed by the learned
Subordinate Judge, that the section has two limbs. The
first limb interdicts suits or other legal proceedings with
respect to the administration or management of the religious institution. The second limb enacts an embargo
on suits and legal proceedings on any other matter in
dispute for the determination of which a provision had
been made in this Act."
There, the suit was by the present trustees for the recovery of the
temple properties from the hereditary archakas. The High Court
held that such a suit was not one in respect of the administration
or management of the temple and, therefore, it did not attract
the embargo entered in the first limb of the section. This decision,
therefore, held that unless the suit fell within the classes of suits
mentioned in s. 93 of the Act, the provisions of the section were
not attracted.
It leads us to the consider~tion of the scope of Chapter VII
of the Act. If Chapter VII of the Act provides for determining
or deciding a dispute in respect of rendition of accounts, s. 93
of the Act would be attracted. The heading of the said Chapter
is "Budgets, Accounts and Audit". Section 70 provides for the
presentation of budgets and the particulars to be mentioned therein. Section 71 enjoins upon a trustee of every institution to keep
regular accounts of receipts and disbursements. Section 71(4)
prescribes for an audit of the accounts every year. Section 72
directs the 'auditor to send a report of the results of the audit to
the prescribed authorities. Section 73 enumerates the matters in
respect of which the auditor ha$ to send his report. Section 74
directs the prescribed authorities to send the said report to the
trustees for remedying the defects pointed out therein. The Area
Committee, one of the prescribed authorities under s. 74(2) of the
Act, has to forward to the Commissioner the report of the auditor
along with the report of the trustees, if any, and with his remarks.
If the Commissioner thinks that the trustee or any other person is
guilty of misappropriation or wilful waste of funds of the institu-
(1) [t961] I Andh. W.R. 250, 251.
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
VEDAGIRI TEMPLE v. I; P. REDDY (Subba Rao, C;/.)
29 (
tion or of gross neglect resulting in a loss to the institution, after
making the requisite inquiry, eertify the amount so lost arid direct
the trustee or such person to pay within a specified time such
amount personally and not from the funds of the religious institution.
On the receipt of such an order, the trustee can apply to a
court to modify or sef aside the same. Instead of filing an application
to the Court, he has an alternative remedy to file an appeal to the
Government which shall pass such order as it thinks fit. Under
sub-s. (7) of s. 74, an order of surcharge under the section against
a· trustee shall not bar a suit for accounts against him except in
respect of the matter finally dealt with by such order. Sub-section (8)
thereof provides a machinery for collecting the said amounts from
the trustee or other person by way of surcharge.
Relying upon the scheme of this Chapter, it is contended
that it provides an exhaustive and self-contained machinery for
scrutinizing the accounts, for orders of surcharge and to recover the
amount surcharged from the trustee or other persons and for a
suit to set aside such orders or alternatively for an appeal to the
Government· and that, therefore, no suit for rendition of accounts
would lie dehors the provisions of the Act.
We find it difficult to accept this argument. Chapter VII
only provides for a strict supervision of the financial side of the
administration of an institution. The scope of the auditor's investigation is limited. It is only an effective substitute for the trustee
himself furnishing an audited account. It is concerned only with
the current management of a trustee. It does not even exonerate
a trustee of his liability to render accounts except to a limited extent mentioned in sub-s. (7) of s. 74 ; it only facilitates the. rendition of accriunts. Under sub-s. (7) of s. 74, an order of surcharge
under that section against a trustee shall not bar a suit against
him except in matters finally dealt with in such order. This shows
by necessary implication that a suit can be filed for accounts against
a trustee in other respects. In any view, it has nothing to do with
the management of a temple by a previous trustee. It is contended that under sub-s. (5) of s. 74 the trustee or any other person
aggrieved by such order may file a suit in .the civil court or prefer
an appeal to the Government questioning the order of the Commissioner and, therefore, it is open to any member of the public to
file a suit under the Act. "Any person" there only refers to a
person mentioned in sub-s. (3) of s. 74, i.e., a person who is guilty
of misappropriation or wilful waste of the funds of the institution
etc. · It obviously refers to a trustee or some other person in management of the institution who is guilty of misappropriation. We,
therefore, hold that Chapter VII of the Act has no bearing on the
question of liability of an ex-trustee to render account to the present trustee of his management. Chapter VU does not provide for
292
SUl'IUllOI CIOUl.T UPOl.TS
[I 96'1) I S.CJL
ddermining or deciding a dispute in respect of such rendition
of accounts. If so, it follows that s. 93 of the Act is not a bar to
the maintainability of such a suit.
In the result, we set aside the decree of the High Court and
restore that of the learned Subordinate Judge. The respondent
will pay the costs of the appellant throughout.
Y.P.S.
Appeal allowed.
B