# Srimati OramlitJ Sundari Dasi v. Sri Sri Iswar Gopal .7itu. Mukhtlj1a ]

- **Citation:** [1954] 1 S.C.R. 996
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1951-12-11
- **Case number:** CIVIL APPELLATE JuRismcnoN : Civil Appeal No. 143 of 1952
- **Bench:** Mehr Chand Mahajan C. J, MuKHJ'.RJEA, S. R. DAs, VIVIAN BosE, Ghulam Hasan
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/srimati-oramlitj-sundari-dasi-v-sri-sri-iswar-gopal-7itu-mukhtlj1a-291
- **Pages:** 10

## Headnote

Constitution
of India, art.
14-Section 8-A of Rajasthan
Ordinance XXV/l of 1948 as amended-Whether ultra vim the
Const£tutiQn.
Held, that s. 8-A inserted in Rajasthan Ordinance XXVII of
1948 by s. 4 of Rajasthan Ordinance X of 1949 and as amended by
s. 3 of Rajasthan Ordinance XV of 1949 is void under art. 14 of
the Constitution.
Frank f. Bowman v. Edward A. Lewis (101 U.S. 22; 25 Law.
Ed. 989), Ramjilal v. Income Tax Officer, Mohindargarh ([1951]
S.C.R. 127), The State of Punjab v. Ajaib Singh ([1953] S.C.R.
254) and Thakur Madan Singh v. Collector of Sikar (Rajasthan
Law Weekly, 1954, p. 1), referred to.
CIVIL
APPELLATE
JuRismcnoN :
Civil
Appeal
No. 143 of 1952.
Appeal under article 132(1)
of the Constitution
of
India
from the Judgment and Order, dated
the
S.C.R.
. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
997 '
11th December, 1951, of the High Court of Judicature,
Rajasthan at Jodhpur
in D. B. Civil Miscellaneous
Case No. 1 of 1951.
M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General
for
India and
K. S. Hajela, Advocate-General of Rajasthan, (Porus
A. Mehta, with them) for the appellant.
N. C. Chatterjee and U. M. Trivedi (Jiwan
Sinha
Chandra and
Ganpat .Rai,
with
them)
for
the
respondent.
1954. March
15.
The Judgment of the Court was
delivered by
GHULAM HASAN J.-This appeal filed on a certificate granted by the High Court
of Rajasthan under
article 132(1) of the Constitution
arises
from the
judgment and order of the said High Court (Wanchoo
C.J. and Bapna J.) in a petition under article 226 of
the Constitution, whereby the High Court held
that
section
8-A
inserted, in Rajasthan Ordinance
No.
XXVII of 1948
by section 4 of
Rajasthan Ordinance
No. X of 1949, and the amendment to section 8-A by
section 3 of Rajasthan Ordinance XV of 1949 are void
under article 14 of the Constitution and issued a writ
restrammg
the
State of
Rajasthan from collecting
rents from the tenants of lands comprising the J agir
of Bedla held by the respondent.
The respondent Rao Manohar Singhji is the owner
of the Jagir of Bedla situate in the former State
of
Mewar, now included in the State of Rajasthan.
The
former State of Mewar was integrated in April, 1948,
to -form what was known as the former United State
of Rajasthan.
In
April and May, 1949, the latter
State was amalgamated with the former States of
Bikaner, Jaipur, Jaisalmer and Jodhpur and the former
Union of Matsya to form the present United State of
Rajasthan. Three Ordinances, No. XXVII of 1948 and
Nos.
X and XV of 1949,
were issued by the former
State of Rajasthan in connection with State
Jagirs.
The management of the Jagirs including the Jagir of
Bedla was assumed by the former State of Rajasthan
in virtue of the powers under these Ordinances. After
the final formation of the State of Rajasthan in May,
!954
Till Stat• qf
Rajas than
v.
Rao Manohar
Singhji.
195~
Tm Stale •f
RajtJSlhan
...
Rao ManohM
SU.ghji.
Ghulam Hasan J.
998
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[19541
l949, the Ordinances remained in force in a part of
the present
area
of Rajasthan
with the result that
while jagirs in a part of the area were managed by the
State in that area, the J agirs in the rest of the State
were left untouched and remained with the Jagirdars.
On 4th January, 1951, the respondent filed a petition
under article 226 of the Constitution contending that
the said Ordinances were ultra vires the Constitution
and that they became void under article 13 (1) of the
Constitution of
India, read with articles 14 and 31. The
respondent
challenged
the Ordinances firstly because
they constitute an infringement of articles
14,
19 and
31 of the Constitution and secondly because the Jagirrlars only of the former State of Rajasthan which was
formed in 1948 are prejudicially affected, while Jagirdars of the States which integrated later on are not at
all affected (Para 9, K and L).
It was alleged that
there was a denial
of equality before the law and the
equal protection of the laws by reason of
these Ordinances and further that the State had taken possession
of the propert

## Text

1954
Srimati OramlitJ
Sundari Dasi
v.
Sri Sri Iswar
Gopal .7itu.
Mukhtlj1a ].
1954
March 15.
996
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954]
Schedule
properties,
however,
Oramba Sundari was
the purchaser
at
the execution sale and whether or
not the
money
for such purchase
was paid by her
husband becomes
immaterial.
This was not the property
purchased by the decreeholders and there
is no
proof of the decreeholders being
in possession of the
same either by themselves or through Oramba Sundari.
In these circumstances, clause (c) of section 36(2) cannot be attracted in favour of judgment-debtors
so far
as this property is concerned and the possession
of it
must
remain
with the appellant. We, therefore, allow
the appeal
in part and set aside the order for restoration of possession made by the courts below in respect
to the Ga Schedule property.
The rest of the decision
of the High Court will stand.
We make no order as
to costs of these appeals.
A pp(a/ partly allo1ud.
THE STATE OF RAJASTHAN
v.
RAO MANOHAR SINGHJL
[MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN C. J., MuKHJ'.RJEA, S. R. DAs,
VIVIAN BosE and GHULAM HASAN JJ.]
Constitution
of India, art.
14-Section 8-A of Rajasthan
Ordinance XXV/l of 1948 as amended-Whether ultra vim the
Const£tutiQn.
Held, that s. 8-A inserted in Rajasthan Ordinance XXVII of
1948 by s. 4 of Rajasthan Ordinance X of 1949 and as amended by
s. 3 of Rajasthan Ordinance XV of 1949 is void under art. 14 of
the Constitution.
Frank f. Bowman v. Edward A. Lewis (101 U.S. 22; 25 Law.
Ed. 989), Ramjilal v. Income Tax Officer, Mohindargarh ([1951]
S.C.R. 127), The State of Punjab v. Ajaib Singh ([1953] S.C.R.
254) and Thakur Madan Singh v. Collector of Sikar (Rajasthan
Law Weekly, 1954, p. 1), referred to.
CIVIL
APPELLATE
JuRismcnoN :
Civil
Appeal
No. 143 of 1952.
Appeal under article 132(1)
of the Constitution
of
India
from the Judgment and Order, dated
the
S.C.R.
. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
997 '
11th December, 1951, of the High Court of Judicature,
Rajasthan at Jodhpur
in D. B. Civil Miscellaneous
Case No. 1 of 1951.
M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General
for
India and
K. S. Hajela, Advocate-General of Rajasthan, (Porus
A. Mehta, with them) for the appellant.
N. C. Chatterjee and U. M. Trivedi (Jiwan
Sinha
Chandra and
Ganpat .Rai,
with
them)
for
the
respondent.
1954. March
15.
The Judgment of the Court was
delivered by
GHULAM HASAN J.-This appeal filed on a certificate granted by the High Court
of Rajasthan under
article 132(1) of the Constitution
arises
from the
judgment and order of the said High Court (Wanchoo
C.J. and Bapna J.) in a petition under article 226 of
the Constitution, whereby the High Court held
that
section
8-A
inserted, in Rajasthan Ordinance
No.
XXVII of 1948
by section 4 of
Rajasthan Ordinance
No. X of 1949, and the amendment to section 8-A by
section 3 of Rajasthan Ordinance XV of 1949 are void
under article 14 of the Constitution and issued a writ
restrammg
the
State of
Rajasthan from collecting
rents from the tenants of lands comprising the J agir
of Bedla held by the respondent.
The respondent Rao Manohar Singhji is the owner
of the Jagir of Bedla situate in the former State
of
Mewar, now included in the State of Rajasthan.
The
former State of Mewar was integrated in April, 1948,
to -form what was known as the former United State
of Rajasthan.
In
April and May, 1949, the latter
State was amalgamated with the former States of
Bikaner, Jaipur, Jaisalmer and Jodhpur and the former
Union of Matsya to form the present United State of
Rajasthan. Three Ordinances, No. XXVII of 1948 and
Nos.
X and XV of 1949,
were issued by the former
State of Rajasthan in connection with State
Jagirs.
The management of the Jagirs including the Jagir of
Bedla was assumed by the former State of Rajasthan
in virtue of the powers under these Ordinances. After
the final formation of the State of Rajasthan in May,
!954
Till Stat• qf
Rajas than
v.
Rao Manohar
Singhji.
195~
Tm Stale •f
RajtJSlhan
...
Rao ManohM
SU.ghji.
Ghulam Hasan J.
998
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[19541
l949, the Ordinances remained in force in a part of
the present
area
of Rajasthan
with the result that
while jagirs in a part of the area were managed by the
State in that area, the J agirs in the rest of the State
were left untouched and remained with the Jagirdars.
On 4th January, 1951, the respondent filed a petition
under article 226 of the Constitution contending that
the said Ordinances were ultra vires the Constitution
and that they became void under article 13 (1) of the
Constitution of
India, read with articles 14 and 31. The
respondent
challenged
the Ordinances firstly because
they constitute an infringement of articles
14,
19 and
31 of the Constitution and secondly because the Jagirrlars only of the former State of Rajasthan which was
formed in 1948 are prejudicially affected, while Jagirdars of the States which integrated later on are not at
all affected (Para 9, K and L).
It was alleged that
there was a denial
of equality before the law and the
equal protection of the laws by reason of
these Ordinances and further that the State had taken possession
of the property of
the respondent without providing
for compensation.
The reply of the State was that
the fagir was a State grant
held at the pleasure of the
Ruler and that it reverted to the Ruler on the death
of the holder of the Jagir and
was regranted to his
successor after the Ruler had recognized the succession.
The rights of the Jagirdars were non-heritable and nontransferable and the J agirs could not be partitioned
amongst
the
heirs
of
the Jagirdar. It was pleaded
therefore that even if the State took possession of the
J agir, the J agirdar was not entitled to compensation
under article 31 (2).
It was also alleged that the
impugned
Ordinances had merelv the effect of transferring
the
management of the Jagirs to the
Government and did not deprive the Jagirdars
of their property and they were consequently not
hit by article
31 (2).
It was denied
that there was any discrimination
under
article 14 of the Constitution.
The High
Court held on the first question that the provisions of
Ordinances
Nos.
X ancl XV of 1949 are not void
under article 31 (2) or 19 (1) (f). On the second point
they recorded the conclusion that section 8-A which was
introduced in Ordinance No. XXVII of 1948, by section
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
999
4
of
Ordinance No. X of 1949,
and the amendment
to section 8-A by section 3 of'Rajasthan Ordinance. No.
XV of 1949, are void under article 13(1) of the. Constitution, read
with article 14.
The High Court according! y allowed the petition and prohibited the State
from collecting rents from the tenants
of the land
comprising the J agir of Bedla
held by the respondent.
This judgment
was
given on 11th December, 1951,
but we understand that since then the State has passed Acts abolishing J agirs throughout the State. The
question however is of some importatice to the respondent inasmuch as it affects his 'right of collecting the
rents even though for a short period.
In appeal it is contended by the learned AttorneyGeneral on behalf
of the State of Rajasthan that the
decision of the High Court that the impugned section
8-A as amended was hit by article 14 of the Constitution is erroneous. Before deciding
the validity of this
contention it will be nec·cssary to refer briefly to the
relative provisions of
the Ordinances.
Ordinance No.
I of 1948 (the United State of Rajasthan Administration
Ordinance, 1948) was made and promulgated on
April 28,
1948, by the Rajprarqukh
of Rajasthan
to provide for the administration of the United
State
of Rajasthan after the latter came into existence.
On
July 26,
1948, Ordinance No. XXVII of 1948, [the
United State
of Rajasthan
Jagirdars
(Abolition of
Powers) Ordinance, 1948] was made and promulgated
by
the
Rajpramukh providing for the abolition of
judicial powers of J agirdars and executive
powers in
connection with the judiciary and vesting them in the
Government.
Section
8 of this Ordinance authorised
the Government to make orders with a view to carrying out and giving
effect to the provisions and purpose~ of the Ordinance and the various powers enumerated
in that section.
Then came section 8-A which
was introduced
by Ordinance X of 1949
[the United
State
of Rajasthan Jagirdars
(Abolition of Powers)
(Amendment)
Ordinance, 1949].
It reads thus:-
"Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing provisions, it is hereby ' enacted that the revenue
y.rhich
was
heretofore
collected
by Jagirdars shall
1954
Th. Sute of
Rajasth111}
v.
Rao Manohar
Singhji.
Ghwla( Hasan J.
'
1954
The Sta" ef
Rajasthan
v.
Rao Manohar
Singhji.
Ghulam Hasan J.
1000
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
f 19541
henceforward be collected by and paid to · the Government; the Goverrurient will' after deducting the collection
and other expenses pay it to the J agirdar concerned."
It was amended by section 3 of Ordinance No. XV
of
1949
[the United State of Rajasthan Jagirdars
(Abolition of Powers)
(2nd Amendment) Ordinance,
1949] by adding
to
section 8-A
after
the word
'Revenue' the following :
"Including taxes,
cesses and other revenue from
forests."
It is not denied · that when the State of Rajasthan
was formed in April and May, 1949, the Jagirdars of
only a part of the present State of Rajasthan could
not collect their rents while Jagirdars in other areas
which were covered by Jaipur, Bikaner, J aisalmer and
Jodhpur and Matsya Union were under no snch disability.
It appears that in the former State of Rajasthan provisions regarding the management by Government of Jagirs and the right to collect rents already
existed, whereas
there was· no such provision in the
former States of Jaipur, Bikaner, Jaisalmer and Jodhpur
and Matsya Union, but when the integration
took
place in April and May, 1949, the discrimination exhibited itself not by virtue of anything inherent in the
impugned Ordinances but by reason of the fact that
Jagirdars of one part of the present State of Rajasthan
were already subjected to a disability in the matter of
management of their Jagirs while the other parts wer"
wholly
unaffected.
This
discrimination,
however
m1desirable,
was
not open to any exception until the
Constitution
came into force on January 26,
1950,
when article
13 of the Constitution declared that "all
laws in force in the territory of India immediately
before the commencement of this Constitution, in so far
as
they
are
inconsistent with provisions of
this
Part, shall,
to
the extent of such inconsistency, be
void." It becomes therefore necessary to see whether
the impugned provision which is discriminatory on the
face
of
it is hit by article 14 which declares that "the
State shall not deny to an); person equality before the
law
or
the equal
protection of the laws within the
territory of India."
Such an obvious discrimination
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1001
can be supported on! y
on the ground that it was based
upon a reasonable classification.
It is now well settled
by the decision of this court that a proper classification
must always bear a reasonable and just relation to the
things in respect of which it is proposed. Judged by
this criterion it seems to us that the discrimination is
based
on
no classification
at all and is manifestly unreasonable and arbitrary. The classification might have
been justified if the State had shown that it was based
upon a substantial distinction, namely that the
J agirdars
of
the area subjected to the disability were in
some way different
to those of the other area of Rajas..
tl1an who were
not similarly situated. It was perfectly possible for the
State to have raised a specific
ground
in order to get out of the mischief of article 14,
that the discrimination was based upon what the learned
Attorney-General
called geographical consideration,
that
the Jagirs of the partiCular area were governed
by different laws of tenure and thus constituted a class
by itself and that that was a good ground for differentiation.
No such ground was ever put forward before
the High Court, much less was any, attempt made to
substantiate
such a ground.
In the absence of any
allegation supported
by evidence we are unable to find
in favour of the State that the J agirdars of the particular area to which category the respondent belongs
were differently situated to other Jagirdars.
The preambles of the Ordinances do not purport to
show tl1at the conditions in the former State of Rajasthan were such as to justify
the imposition of the
disability
on
the Jagirdars of that State while the
conditions
prevailing in the other States forbade
such
a course.
The High Court held that the Ordinance
abolishing the
Police and the Judicial powers and the
administrative powers of the Jagirdars in respect to
revenue in forests was open to no objection but there
was no reason
for taking away from the Jagirdars by
section 8-A the power to collect rents to which they
were entitled.
We agree with the High Court in holding that there
was no real
and
substantial distinction why the
J agirdars of a particular area should , continue to be
•
195+
Thi State of
Raj'asthan
v.
Ra1J Manohar'
Singhji.
lihulam Hasan J ..
195f
The State of
Rojasthan
v.
Rao Manohar
Singhji.
Ghulam Hasan J.
1002
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954]
treated with inequality as compared with the Jagirdars
in another
area of Rajasthan. We hold therefore that
no rational basis for any classification or differentiation
has been made out.
Section 8-A of the impugned
Ordinance as amended is a clear contravention of the
respondent's right under article 14 of the Constitutior.
and must be declared void.
The case of Frank J. Bowman v. Edward A Let11is( 1 )
relied upon by the learned Attorney-General on behalf
of the State is inapplicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case.
By the Constitution and
laws of Missouri the
citizens residing in one hundred
and nine
counties
of the State
of Missouri had the
right
and privilege
of an unrestricted appeal to the
Supreme Court of the State, while at the same time the
right of appeal was denied to the citizens of the State
residing in four of the counties in the easterly portion
of the State, as also
to those residing
in
the Citv of
St.
Louis.
It
was
contended
that this feature
of the judicial
system of Missouri was in conflict with
the 14th Amendment of the Constitution of tbe United
States.
Bradley J. held that the equality clause in
the 14th Amendment contemplates the protection of it
persons
against unjust discriminations by
a State; it
has no reference to territorial or
municipal
arrangements made for different portions of a State.
He went
on to say :-"If a Mexican State should be acquired by
treaty
and
added to an adjoining State or part of a
State, in the United
States, and the two should be
erected into a new State, it cannot be doubted that
such new
State might
allow the Mexican laws and
judicature to continue
unchanged in the one portion,
and the common law and its corresponding judicature
in the other portion.
Such an arrangement would not
be prohibited by any fair construction of
the
14th
Amendment.
It would not be based on any respect of
persons
or
classes, but on municipal considerations
alone,
and a regard
to
the welfare
of
all classes
within the particular territory or jurisdiction."
This passage . which was strongly relied upon by the
learned Attorney-General
does
not advance his
case
(1) 101 U.S. 22; 25 La,v. Ed. 989 .
•
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1003
for in the present case there is no question of continu- 1
ing unchanged the old laws and judicature in one
portion and a different law in the other. As we have
already said there is nothing to show that there was
any peculiarity or any special feature in the J agirs of
the former State of Rajasthan to justify differentiation
from the Jagirs comprised in the States which subsequently integrated
into
the present United State of
Rajasthan.
After the new State was formed, there
was no occasion
to take away the powers of Jagirdars
of a disfavoured area and to leave them intact in the
rest of the area.
The case
in
Ramjilal
v.
Income-tax
. Officer
Mohindargarh(') is distinguishable on the ground that,
that case proceeded upon the principle that "pending
proceedings should he concluded according to the law
applicable
at
the time when the rights
or liabilities
accrued and the proceeding commenced was a reason1able law
founded upon a reasonable classification of
the assessees
which is permissible
under the equal
protection
clause."
Such is however not the case
here.
Reliance was also placed on the case of The State of
Punjab v. Ajaib Singh and Another(')-
In that case
the Abducted Persons (Recovery and Restoration) Act
·of 1949
was
not
held to be unconstitutional under
article
14 upon the ground that it extended only to
the several States mentioned in section 1 (2), for in the
·opinion of the court
clas~ification could well be made
-0n a geographical basis. There the
Muslim abducted
persons found in those States were held to form one
class having
similar
interests
to
protect
and
their
1nclusion in the definition of abducted persons could
not be called discriminatory.
. The learned Attorney-General referred to two cases
decided by
the same Bench of the Rajasthan High
·Court, Thakur Madan Singh v. Collector of Sikar(')
and an unreported judgment delivered on November 10,
1953, In re, Raja Hari Singh v. Rajasthan and argued
(1) [1951] S.C.R. 127.
(2) [1953] S.C.R. 254.
(3) Rajasthan Law \Veekly, 1954, p. I.
1954
Thi StaU of
Rajas than
v.
RM Manohar
Singhji.
Ghulam Hasan].
1954
The State of
Rajasthan
v.
Rao Manohar
Singhji.
Ghulam Hasan J.
1004
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1954}
that the Bench
had not stuck to its view expressed in
the judgment under appeal.
A careful perusal of the
judgments in these cases will show that this is far from
being
the
case.
The former case was distinguished
from the case under appeal on the ground that there
was a reasonable
basis for classification in that case,
while
no such basis existed in the case before us. It
appears that
before Jaipur State merged into the
present United State of Rajasthan there were District
Boards existing in that State.
They were continued on
the formation of the new State but there were no District
Boards in
the other States.
The argument that the
Jaipur District Boards
Act was invalid under article 14
of the Constitution was repelled it being held that the
existence of District Boards in Jaipur was for the welfare of all classes within Jaipur, that Jaipur had reached
a higher stage of development
than many of the
other States and it would have been a retrograde step•
to deprive the people living in the former Jaipur State
of the benefits of Local Self Government conferred · by
the District Boards Act.
Reliance was placed on the
observations of Bradley
J. in Frank J.
Bot,/Jman v.
Edward A. Lewis(') in connection with the illustration
of the Mexican State
and
the learned Chief Justice
referred with
approval to the decision under appeal
before us.
In the secono case the attack was on the
alleged.
discriminatory
prov1S1on
contained in
the
Mewar
Tenancy
Act
and
the Land Revenue Act.
Under these Acts the rent rates had been approved
by
the
Board
of Revenue and the Government and
they were alleged to be detrimental to the interests of
the
Jagirdars.
The Jagirdars had challenged those
Acts by a petition under article 226.
It appears that
no such laws existed in the other parts of Rajasthan.
The
decision
of
the High Court proceeded on the
ground that it was not shown that there were no similar tenancy and Land Revenue laws in other parts of
Rajasthan
and the impugned
Acts
being ameliorative
legislation designed to raise the economic status of the
agriculturists in' Mcwar could not be ,-,aid to constitute
any discrimination merely because no such legislatiol1l
(1) 101 U.S. 22; ~5 La'\'. Ed. 989.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT i,EPORTS
1005
existed in the other parts of Rajasthan. This difference
between the two parts did not justify that such progressive and ameliorative measures for the welfare of
the people existing in a particular area should be done
away with and the State be brought down to the level
of the unprogressive States.
The judgment shows that
the
Bench far from going back on its previous view
adhered
to
it and expressly
distinguished
the case
under appeal before us on its special facts.
As a result
of the foregoing discussion
we hold
that the view taken by the High Court is correct. We
accordingly dismiss the appeal with costs.
Appeal dismissed.
Agent for the appellant :
R. H. Dhebar.
THE COMMISSIONER, HINDU RELIGIOUS
ENDOWMENTS, MADRAS
ti.
SRI LAKSHMINDRA THIRTHA SW AMIAR
OF SRI SHIRUR MUTT.
[MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN C. J., MuKHERJEA,
S. R. DAs, VIVIAN BosE, GHULAM HASAN,
BHAGW~TI and VENKATARAMA AYYAR JJ.]
Constitution
of India,
arts. 19(1)(f), 25,
26, 27-Madras
Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1951 (Madras Act
XIX of 1951), ss. 21, 30(2), 31, 55, 56 and 63 to 69, 76--Whether
ultra vires the Constitution-Work "property" in art 19(1) (f)
meaning of-Tax and fee, meaning of-Distinction bet1vcen.
Held, that ss. 21, 30(2), 31, 55, 56 and 63 to 69 of the Madras
Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1951 (Madras
Act XIX of 1951) are ultra vires arts. 19(\)(f), 25 and 26 of the
Constitution cf India.
Section 76( I) of the Act is void as the provision relating to tlie
payment of annual contribution contained in it is a tax and not a
fee and so it was beyond the legislative competence of the Madras
Sta~c Legislature to enact such a provision.
That on the facts of the present case the imposition under
s. 76( I) of the Act, although it is a tax, does not come within the
hitter part of art. 27 because the t>bject of the contribution under
the section is not the fostering or preservation of the Hindu reli·
gion or any denomination under it but the proper administration
ot rc.li<i;iam. tnms and institutions wherever they exist.
1954
TheStateof
RaJasthan
v.
Rao Manohcr
Sinthji.
Ghulam Hasan] •.
•
1954
March 16.