# ST ATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH v. RAYAVARAPU PUNNAYYA & ANOTHER

- **Citation:** [1977] 1 S.C.R. 601
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1977
- **Case number:** Criminal Appeal No. 214 of 1971
- **Bench:** R. S. Sarkaria, S. Murtaza Fazal Ali
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/st-ate-of-andhra-pradesh-v-rayavarapu-punnayya-another-6964
- **Pages:** 15

## Headnote

Penal Code--Ss. 299 an4 300-Cu/pable homicide not amo1111ti11g to murder
and Murder-Disti11ctio11-Tests to be applied in each case-s. 300,
Thirdly
i.P.C.-Scope of
Jn the scheme of the Penal Code, 'culpable homicide' is genus and 'murder'
1'.ts specie.
All 'murder' is 'culpable homicide' but not vice-versa.
Speakinr
.ienerally, 'culpable homicide' sans 'special characteristics of murder', is 'culpable
A
B
.homicide not amounting to murder'. For the purpose of fixing punishment, proC
portionate to the gravity of this generic offence, the Code practically recognises
three degrees of culpable homicide. The first is, what may be called, culpable
·homicide of the first degree.
This is the gravest form of culpable homicide,
·which is defined in s_. 300 as 'murder'. The second may be termed as 'culpable
.homicide of the second degree'. This is punishable under the Ist part of s. 304.
Then there is 'culpable homicide of the third degree'. This is the lowest type
.of culpable homicide and the punishment provided for it is, also, the lowest
_among the punishments provided for the three grades.
Culpable homicide of
•his degree is punishable under the second Part of s. 304.
[606B-D]
D
Clause (b) of s. 299 corresponds with ell. (2) and (3) of s.
300. The
distinguishing feature of the mens rea requisite under clause (2) is the knowledge possessed by the offender regarding the particular victim being in such a
peculiar condition or state of health that the intentional harm caused to him is
)ikely to be fatal, notwithstanding the fact that such harm would not m the
ordinary way of p.ature be sufficient to cause death of a person in normal health
-0r condition.
The 'intention to cause death' is not an essential requirement of
E
~lause (2). Only the intention of causing the bodily injury coupled with the
.offender's knowledge of the likelihood of such injury causing the death of the
particular victim, is sufficient to bring the killing within the ambit of this clause
This aspect of clause (2) is borne out by illustration (b) appended to s. 300.
[607C-DJ
Instances of cases falling under clause (2) of s. 300 can be where the·
assailant causes death by a first blow intentionally given
knowing that the
victim is suffering from an enlarged liver, or enlarged spleen or diseased heart
and such blow is likely to cause death of that particular person oo a result
<1f the rupture of the liver, or spleen or the failure of the heart, as the case
may be. If the assailant had no such knowledge about the disease or special
frnilty of the victim, nor an intention to cause death or bodily injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, the offence will not be
murder, even if the injury which caused the death, was intentionally given.
Clause (b) of s. 299 does not postulate any such knowledge on the part of the
offender.
(607£-F]
In Clause (3) of s. 300, instead of the words 'likely to cause death' occurring tn the corresponding clause (b) of
s.
299,
the
words
"sufficient
ia the ordinary course
of
nature"
have
been
used.
The
distinction
between a
bodily
injury likely to cause death and
a bodily
injury
.sufficient in the. ordinary course
of
nature
to
cause
death,
is
fine
but real, &nd, if overlooked, may result in miscarriage of justice.
The difference is one of the degree of probability of death resulting from the intended bodily injury.
The word "likely" in s. 299(b) conveys
the
sense
of
of 'probable' as distinguished from a mere possibility. The words bodily injury
...... sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death' mean
th:it
dcatb will be the 'most probable' result of the injury, having regard to the
prdinary course of nature. [607G-HJ
F
G
H
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
602
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1977) 1 S.C.R.
.
For cases to fall within clause (3 ), it is not necessary that the offender"
!n!ended t? .ca~se deat~, so long as death ensues from the intentional bodily
m1ury or m1unes sufficient
to
cause
death
in the
ordinary course of
nature

## Text

_Characters 0–39,945 of 46,369. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39945 for what follows._

~·
•
601
ST ATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH
v.
RAYAVARAPU PUNNAYYA & ANOTHER
September 15. 1976
[R. S. SARKARIA AND S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI, .IJ.J
Penal Code--Ss. 299 an4 300-Cu/pable homicide not amo1111ti11g to murder
and Murder-Disti11ctio11-Tests to be applied in each case-s. 300,
Thirdly
i.P.C.-Scope of
Jn the scheme of the Penal Code, 'culpable homicide' is genus and 'murder'
1'.ts specie.
All 'murder' is 'culpable homicide' but not vice-versa.
Speakinr
.ienerally, 'culpable homicide' sans 'special characteristics of murder', is 'culpable
A
B
.homicide not amounting to murder'. For the purpose of fixing punishment, proC
portionate to the gravity of this generic offence, the Code practically recognises
three degrees of culpable homicide. The first is, what may be called, culpable
·homicide of the first degree.
This is the gravest form of culpable homicide,
·which is defined in s_. 300 as 'murder'. The second may be termed as 'culpable
.homicide of the second degree'. This is punishable under the Ist part of s. 304.
Then there is 'culpable homicide of the third degree'. This is the lowest type
.of culpable homicide and the punishment provided for it is, also, the lowest
_among the punishments provided for the three grades.
Culpable homicide of
•his degree is punishable under the second Part of s. 304.
[606B-D]
D
Clause (b) of s. 299 corresponds with ell. (2) and (3) of s.
300. The
distinguishing feature of the mens rea requisite under clause (2) is the knowledge possessed by the offender regarding the particular victim being in such a
peculiar condition or state of health that the intentional harm caused to him is
)ikely to be fatal, notwithstanding the fact that such harm would not m the
ordinary way of p.ature be sufficient to cause death of a person in normal health
-0r condition.
The 'intention to cause death' is not an essential requirement of
E
~lause (2). Only the intention of causing the bodily injury coupled with the
.offender's knowledge of the likelihood of such injury causing the death of the
particular victim, is sufficient to bring the killing within the ambit of this clause
This aspect of clause (2) is borne out by illustration (b) appended to s. 300.
[607C-DJ
Instances of cases falling under clause (2) of s. 300 can be where the·
assailant causes death by a first blow intentionally given
knowing that the
victim is suffering from an enlarged liver, or enlarged spleen or diseased heart
and such blow is likely to cause death of that particular person oo a result
<1f the rupture of the liver, or spleen or the failure of the heart, as the case
may be. If the assailant had no such knowledge about the disease or special
frnilty of the victim, nor an intention to cause death or bodily injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, the offence will not be
murder, even if the injury which caused the death, was intentionally given.
Clause (b) of s. 299 does not postulate any such knowledge on the part of the
offender.
(607£-F]
In Clause (3) of s. 300, instead of the words 'likely to cause death' occurring tn the corresponding clause (b) of
s.
299,
the
words
"sufficient
ia the ordinary course
of
nature"
have
been
used.
The
distinction
between a
bodily
injury likely to cause death and
a bodily
injury
.sufficient in the. ordinary course
of
nature
to
cause
death,
is
fine
but real, &nd, if overlooked, may result in miscarriage of justice.
The difference is one of the degree of probability of death resulting from the intended bodily injury.
The word "likely" in s. 299(b) conveys
the
sense
of
of 'probable' as distinguished from a mere possibility. The words bodily injury
...... sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death' mean
th:it
dcatb will be the 'most probable' result of the injury, having regard to the
prdinary course of nature. [607G-HJ
F
G
H
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
602
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1977) 1 S.C.R.
.
For cases to fall within clause (3 ), it is not necessary that the offender"
!n!ended t? .ca~se deat~, so long as death ensues from the intentional bodily
m1ury or m1unes sufficient
to
cause
death
in the
ordinary course of
nature.
[608B]
Clause (c) of s. 299 and clause (4) of s. 300 both require knowledge of
the probability of the act causing death.
Clause ( 4) of s. 300 would be
applica·ble where the knowledge of the offender as to the probability of death
of a person or persons in general-as distinguished from a particular person
or persons-being caused from his imminently dangerous act, approximates to
a practical certainity.
Such knowledge on the part of .the offender must
be
of the highest degree of probability, the act having been committed by the
offender without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such
injury as aforesaid. [608F-Gl
Whenever a court is confronted with the question whether the vlfencc is
'murder' or 'culpable homicide not amounting to murder', on the facts of a
case, it will be convenient for it to approach the problem in three stages.
The question to be considered at the first stage would be, whether the ~ccuscd
has done an a-ct by doing which he has caused the death of another.
Proof
of such casual connection between the act of the accused and the death.
leads to the second stage for considering whether that act of the ::iccused
amounts to 'culpable homicide' as defined in s. 299. lf the answer to this
question is prtma facie found in the affirmative, the stage for considering the
operation of s. 300, Penal Code. is reached.
This is the stage at which the
Court should determine whether the fa-cts proved by the prosecution bring
the case within the ambit of any of the four clauses of
the
Jefinition
of
'murder' containd in s. 300.
If the answer to this question is in the negative
the offence would be 'culpable homicide not amounting to murder', punishable under the first or the second part of s. 304, depending. respectively, 011
whether the second or the third clause of s. 299 is applicable.
If this question is found in the positive, but the case comes within any of the Exceptions enumerated in s. 300, the offence would still be 'culpable homicide not
a-mounting to murder', punishable under the
First Part of s. 304.
Penal
Code.
[608H; 609A-C]
•
) ...
f--
_:
y
Rajwant and anr. v. Slate of Kera/a AlR 1966 SC 1874.
Virsa
Si111;/1.
v.
r·
The State of Punjab [1958] SCR 1495 and Anda v. State of Raja.11/ian AIR
•
1966 S.C. 148 followed.
In the instant case the prosecution i:·lleged that in furtherance of political
feuds of the village the accused followed the deceased in the bus when he
went tn a neighbouring place, chased him when he got off the bus, an<l indiscriminately nnunded the legs and arms of the deceased, who was 55 years
ol<l, with heavy sticks.
The deceased succumbed to his injuries on the following n1orning.
The trial court held that the ca>e was covered by clause 'thirdly' of '· 300
and convicted them under s. 302 and s. 302 read with s. 34.
Indian
Pcm1l
Code.
In appeal, the High Court altered the conviction. to. one. under s. 304
Pait II, on the grounds that (i) there was no premedttnl!'?n m the attack;
(ii) injuries were not on any vital part of the body;
(111) there WZ.'3 no
compound fracture resulting in heavy haemorrhage; (iv) death occurred due
to shock and not due to haemorrhage and (v) though the accused had kf'.owledge while inflicting injuries that they were likely to cause death, they might
not have had the knowledge that they were so imminently d~n~erous that in
all probability their acts would result in such injuries as are likely to cause
the death.
•
In appeal to this Court the appellant-State contended that t~e case fell unde;
1,__
s. 300(3) I.P.C., while the accused sought to support the 1udgmcnt of the
High Court.
•
ANDHRA PRAD'SH V, RAYAVARAPU PUNNAYYA
603
Allowing the apper..f.
HELD : ( l) It. is not corre~t to say that the attack was not premeditated
or pre-planned.
The High Court itself .found that the injuries were
caused
in furtherance of the common intention of the respondents, and that therefore section 34 was applicable.
[61 !B]
(2) The High Court may be right in its finding that
since the injuries
ware not on vital p<:.·rts, the accused had no intention to cause death but
that finding-assuming it to be correct---Ooes not necessarily take the case
out of the definition of 'murder'.
The crux of the matter is whether the
facts established bring the case within clause 'thirdly' of s. 300.
This question further narrows down into a consideration of the two-fold issue; (i)
whether the bodily injuries found on the deceased were intentionally inflicted
by the accused ? and (ii) If so, were they sufficient to cause death in the
ordinary course of nature ? If both these elements are satisfactorily estab-
.Jished, the offence will be 'murder', irrespective of the fact whether an mtention on the part of the accused
to
cause
death,
had or had
not been
proved. [612 C-E]
Jn the instant case, the formidable weapons used by the accused in the
beating the savage ma-nner of its execution, the helpless state of the unarmed
victim, the intensity of the violence caused, the callous conduct of the accused
in persisting in th() assault even against the protest of feeling bystandersall, viewed against the background of previous animosity between the parties,
irresistibly lead to the conclusion tha.t the injuries caused by the accused to
the deceased were intentionally inflicted, and were not accidental.
Thus the
presence of the first element of clause 'thirdly' of s. 300 had been cogently
aMd convincingly established. [613 B-C]
I·
(3) The medical evidence shows that there were compound fractures and
that there was heavy haemorrha-ge requiring blood transfusion.
Such injuries
a•e ordinarily danl!erous.
f613Dl
c
D
(4) The medical evidence clearly establishes that the c3use of death was
E
shock and haemorrhage due to multiple injuries which were cumulatviely
sufficient to c&use d""th in the ordinary course of nature.
[612B-Cj
(5) The mere fact that the beating was designedly confined by the assailants to the legs and arms or that none of the multiple injuries inflicted was
individually sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, will
not exclude the applica.tion of clause 'thirdly' of s. 300.
The expression
'bodily injury' in clause 'thirdly' includes also its plural, so that the clause
would cover a case where all the injuries intentionally caused by the accused are
F
c11mulatively sufficient to cause the death in the ordinary course of na.ture,
even if no"e of those injuries
individually
measures upto such sufficiency.
The sufficiency spoken of in this clause, is the high probability of death in
the ordinary course of nature, and if such sufficiency exists and death is caused
and the injury causing it is intentional, the case would fall under clause 'thirdly'
ef s. 300.
All the conditions which are a pre-requisite for the applicability
ef this clause have been established a.nd the offence committed by accused in
the instant case was 'murder'. [614G-HJ
~
There is no escape from the conclusion that the offence committed by the
acc>1sed was murder notwithstanding the fact that the intention of the accused
to cause death has not been shown beyond doubt. [613F]
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No.
214
of 1971.
(Appeal by Special Leave from the judgment and Order dated
27-7· 1970 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Criminal Appeals
Nos. 26 and 27 /69).
7 -1234SCI/76
A
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604
·SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1977] 1 S.C.R.
P. Plirmeswara Rao and G. Narayana Rao for the Appel'lant.
A. Subba Rao for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
SARKARIA, J.
This appeal by special leave is directed against a
judgment of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh. It arises out of these
facts.
l n Rompicherla village, there were factions
belonging to three
major communities viz., Reddys, Kammas and Bhatrajus.
Rayavarapu
(Respondent No. 1 herein) was the leader of Karnma faction,
w~ile
Chopparapu Subbareddi was the leader of the Reddys.
In politics, the
Reddys were supporting the Congress Party, while Kammas were supporters of Swataatra Party.
There was bad blood between the two
factions which were proceeded against under s. 107, Cr. P. C. In the
Panchyat elections of 1954, a clash took place between the two parties.
A member of the Kamma faction was murdered.
Consequently, nine
persons belonging to the Reddy faction were prosecuted for that murder.
Other incidents also took place in which these warring factions
were involved.
So much so, a punitive police force was stationed in
this village to keep the peace during the period from March 1966 to
September 1967.
Sarikonda Kotamrajn, the deceased person in the
instant case, was the leader of Bhatrajus.
In order to devise protective measures against the onslaughts of their opponents, the Bhatrajus
held a meeting at the house of the deceased, wherein they resolved to
defend themselves against the aggressive actions of the respondents· and
their party-men.
PW 1, a ·member of Bhatrajus faction has a cattle
shed. · The passage to this cattle-shed was blocked by the other party.
The deceased took PW 1 to Police Station Nekarikal and got a report
lodged there.
On July 22, 1968, the Sub-Inspector of Police came
to the village and inspected the disputed wall in the presence of the
parties.
The Sub-Inspector went away directing both the parties to
come to the Police Station on the following morning so that a compromise might be effected ..
Another case arising out of a report made to the police by one
Kallam Kotireddi against Accused 2 and 3 and another in respect of
offences under ss. 324, 323 and 325, Penal Code was pending before
a Magistrate at Narasaraopet and the neJ(t date for hearing fixed in that
case was July 23, 1968.
On the morning of July 23, 1968, at about 6-30 a.m., PWs 1, 2
and the dece•ased boarded Bus No. AP 22607 at Rompicherla for
going to Nekarikal.
Some minutes later, Accused 1 to 5 (hereinafter
referred to as A-1, A2, A3, A4 and AS) also got into the same bus.
The accused had obtained tickets for proceeding to Narasaraopet.
When the bus stopped at Nekarikal Cross Roads, at about 7-30 a.m.,
the deceased and his companions al\ghted for going to the Police
Station.
The five accused also got down.
The deceased and PW 1
went towards a Choultry run by PW 4, While PW 2 went to the roadside to ease himself.
A-1 and A2 went towards the Coffee Hotel
situate near the Choultry.
From there, they picked up heavy sticks
and went after the deceased into the Choultrv.
On seeing the accused, PW 1 ran away towards a hut nearby. -The deceased stood up.
. f.
•
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•
•
_ANVHRA il'RADESH v. RAYAVARAPU PUNNAYYA (Sarkaria, J.) 60 5
}fe was an old man of 55 years. He was not allowed to run.
Despite the entreaties made by the deceased with folded hands, A-1 and
A -2 indiscriminately pounded the legs and arms of the deceased .
. One of the by-standers, PW 6, asked the assailants as to why they were
mercilessly beating a human being, as if he were a buffalo. The assai-
·1ants angrily retorted that the witness was nobody to question them
and continued the beating till the deceased became unconscious.
Tho
accused then threw their sticks at the spot, boarded another vehicle,
and went away. The occurrence was witnessed by PWs 1 to 7. The
victim was removed by PW 8 to Narasaraopet Hospital in a temporar.
There, at about 8.45 a.m., Doctor Konda Reddy examined him
.;md found 19 injuries, out of which, no less than 9 were (internally)
.found to be grievous.
They were :
1. Dislocation of distal end of proximal
phalanx
of
left
middle finger.
2. Fracture of right radius in its middle.
3. Dislocation of lower end of right ulna.
4. Fracture of lower end of right femur.
5. Fracture of medial malleolus of right tibia.
6. Fracturn of lower 1/3 of right fibula.
7. Dislocation of lower end of left ulna.
:8. Fracture of upper end of left tibia.
· 9. Fracture of right patella.
Finding the condition of the injured serious,
the Doctor sent
information to the Judicial Magistrate for getting his dying declaration
-recorded.
On Dr. K. Reddy's advice, the deceased was immediately
:-removed to the Guntur Hospital where he was examined and given
medical aid by Dr. Sastri.
His dying declaration, Ex. P-5, was also
recorded there by a Magistrate (PW 10) at about 8.05 p.m.
The
.deceased, however, succumbed to his injuries at about 4.40 a.m. on
July 24, 1968, despite medical aid.
The autopsy was conducted by Dr. P. S. Sarojini
(PW 12)
in
-whose opinion, the injuries found on the deceased were cummulatively
sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature.
The cause
.of death, according to the Doctor, was· shock and haemorrhage result-
.jng from multiple injuries.
The trial iudge convicted A-1 and A-2 under s. 302 as well as
under s. 302 read with s .. 34, Penal Code arid sentenced each of them
·to imprisonment for life.
On appeal by the convicts, the High Court altered their conviction
--to one under s. 304, Pt. II, Penal Code and reduced their sentence to
'five years rigorous imprisonment, each.
Aggrieved by the judgment of the High Court, the State has come
A
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G
in appeal to this. Court after obtaining special leave.
H
J
A-1, Rayavarappu Punnayya (Respondent 1) has, as reported by
·his Counsel, died during the pendency of this appeal.
This informa-
-tion is not contradicted by the Counsel appearing for the State. This
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
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606
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
L 1977) I S.C.IL
appeal therefore, in so far as it relates to A-1, abates.
The appeal
against A-2 (Respondent 2), however, survives for decision.
The principal question that falls to be considered in this appeal is,
whether the offence disclosed by the facts and circumstances established by the prosecution against the respondent, is 'murder' or 'culpable
homicide not amounting to murder'.
In the scheme of the Penal Code, 'culpable homicide' is genus and
'murder' its specie.
All 'murder' is 'culpable homicide' but not vicevcrsa.
Speaking generally, 'culpable homicide' sans 'special characteristics of murder', is 'culpable homicide not amounting to murder'.
For the purpose of fixing punishment, proportionate to the gravity of
this generic offence, the Code practically recognises three degress of culpable homicide. The first is, what may be called, culpable homicide of
the first degree. This is the gravest form of culpable homicide which is
defined ins. 300 as 'murder'. The second may be termed as 'culpable
homicide of the second degree'.
This is punishable under the
1 gt
part of s. 304. Then, there is 'culpable homicide of the third .degree.'
This is the lowest type of culpable homicide and the punishment provided for it is, also, the lowest among the punishme;its provided for
the three grades.
Culpable homicide of this degree
is
punishable
under the second Part of s. 304.
The academic distinction between 'murder' and 'culpable homicide
not amounting to murder' has vexed the courts for more than a century.
The confusion is caused, if courts losing sight of the true scope
and meaning of the terms used by the legislature in
these sections,
allow themselves to be drawn into minutae abstractions.
The safest
way of approach to the interpretation and application of these provisions seems to be to keep in focus the key words used in the various
clauses of ss. 299 and 300.
The following comparative table will be
helpful in appreciating the points of distinction between the two
offences.
Section 299
Section 300
•
{
.,,
I
,{._
A person commits culpable homici~e if the Sub1ect. lo . certain e;rceptions culpa(>/~
,__
act by which the death IS caused IS done
homicde Is murdenf the act by wh1c\i
the death ce.used is doneINTENTION
(a) with the intention of causing dec,th;
or
(b) with the intention of causing such
bodily injury as is likely to cause
death; or
(I) with the intention of causing death;
or
(2) wiih to<:. intention of causing such
bodily injury as the ojjender knows
to be likely to cause
the death
of the person to whom the harm
is caused; or
(3) with the intention of
causing
bodily injury to any person and
the bodily injury intended to be
inflicted is su}jicient in the ordinary
course of nature to cause death;
Or
•
) ....
;;
ANDHRA PRADESH v. RAYAVARAPU PUNNAYYA (Sarkc.ria, J.)
60 7
A
KNOWLEDGE
(c) with the knowledge th1t the act is (4) with the knowledge that the act
likely to cause death.
is so imminently dangerous
that
it must in all probability cause
death or such bodily injury as is
'likely to cause death, and without
B
any excuse for incurring the risk
of c1using death or such injury as
is mentioned above.
Clause (b) of s. 299 corresponds with els. (2) and (3) of s. 300.
The distinguishing feature of the mens rea requisite under cl. (2) is the
knowledge possessed by the offender regarding the particular victim c
being in such a peculiar condition or state of health that the intentional
!harm caused to him is likely to be fatal, notwithstanding the fact that
such harm would not in the ordinary way of nature be sufficient to
.cause death of a person jn normal health or condition. It is noteworthy
that the 'intention to cause death' is not an essential requirement of
cl. (2).
Only the intention of causing the bodily injury coupled with
the offender's knowledge of the likelihood of such injury causing the
D
death of the particular victim, is sufficient to bring the killing within
·the ambit of this clause. This aspect of cl. (2) is b01•11e out by illustration (b) appended to s. 300.
Clause (b) of s. 299 does not postulate any such knowledge on
the part of the offender.
Instances of cases falling under cl. (2) of
·s. 300 can be where the assailant causes death by a fist blow intentionally given knowing that the victim is suffering from an enlarged
liver, or enlarged spleen or diseased heart and such blow is likely to
cause death of that particular person as a result of the rupture of the
liver, or spleen or the failure of the he•art, as the case may be. If the
assailant had no such knowledge about the disease or special frailty. of
the victim, nor an intention to cause death or bodily injury sufficient
"in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, the offence wilJ not be
murder, even if the injury which caused the death, was intentionally
:given.
In clause (3) of s.
300, instead of the words
'likely to cause
death' occurring in the corresponding cl. (b) of s. 299, the words
"sufficient in the ordinary course of nature" have been used. Obviously, the distinction lies between a bodily injury likely to cause death
:and a bodily injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause
death.
The distinction is fine but real, and, if overlooked, may result
in miscarriage of1 justice.
The difference between cl. (b) of s. 299
and cl. (3) of s. 300 is one of the degree of probability of death
resulting from the intended bodily injury.
To put it more broadly, it
\s the degree of probability of death which determines whether a culpable homicide is of the gravest, medium or the lowest degree.
The
word "likely" in cl. (b) of s. 299 conveys the sense of 'probable' as
,distinguished from a mere possibility.
The words "bodily injury ...
sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death" mean that
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death w!ll be the "most probable" result of the injury having regard to·
the ordmary course of nature.
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For cases to fall within cl. ( 3), it is not necessary that the offendermtended to cause death, so long as death ensues from the intentional..
bodily injury or injurie's sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course.
of nature.
Rajwant and anr. v. State of Kera/a(') is an apt illustra-·
tion of this point.
In Virsa Singh v. The State of Punjab, (2) Vivian Bose J. speaking
for this Court, explained the meaning· and scope of Clause (3), thus
(at p. 1500) :
'
"The prosecution must prove the following facts before·
it can bring a case under s. 300, 3rdly'. First, it must establish, quite objectively, that a
bodily injury
1s
present;.
secondly the nature of the injury must be proved.
These
are purely objective investigations. It must be proved that
there was an intention to inflict that particular injury, that
is to say, that it was not accidental or unintentional or that
some other kind of injury was intended.
Once these three
elements are proved to be> present, the enquiry proceeds further, and, fourthly it must be ,proved that the injury of the
type just described made up of the three elements set out
above was sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of
nature.
This part of the enquiry is purely objective
and
inferential and has nothing to do with thd intention of the
offender."
Thus according to the rule laid down in Virsa Sing Ii' s case (supra)
even if the intention of accused was limited to the infliction of a bodily
injury sufficient to cau'se death in the ordinary course of nature and
did not extend to the intention of causing death, the offence would be
murder.
Illustration ( c) appended to s. 300 clearly brings out this
point.
Clause ( c) of s. 299 and cl. ( 4) of s. 300 both require knowledge
of the probability of the causing death.
It is not necessary for the
purpose of this case to dilate much on the distinction between these
corresponding clauses. It will be sufficient to say that cl. ( 4) of s. 300
would be applicable where the knowledge of the offender as to the
probability of death of a person or persons in general-as distinguished
from a particular person or persons-being caused from his imminently
daflgerous act, approximates to a practical certainty.
Such lmowledge on the part of the offender must be of the highest degree of proba.
bility, the act having been committed by the offender without any
excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such injury as
aforesaid.
From the above conspectus, it emerges that whenever a court is
confronted with the question whether the offence is 'murder' or 'culpable homicide not amounting to murder,' on 1the facts of a case, it will'
(I) A.l.R. 1966 S.C. 1874.
(2) [1958) S.C.R. 1495.
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' fANDHRA PRADESH v. RAYAVARAPU PUNNAYYA (Sarkaria, J.) 609
be convenient for it to approach the problem in
three stages.
The
A
question to be considered at the first stage would be,
whether the
accused has done an act by doing which he has caused the death of
another.
Proof of such causal connection between the act of the
accused and the death, leads to the
second stage for considering
whether that act of the accused amounts to "culpable homicide" as
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9efined in s. 299. If the answer to thi~ question is prim a f acie found
111 the affinnative, the stage for considering the operation of s. 300,
Penal Code is reached. This is ~he stage at which the Court should
d}!t$'.rrnip£ wh~th~r the facts proved by the prosecution bring the case
within the ambit of any of the four Clauses
of the definition
of
murder' contained in s. 300.
If the answer to this question is in the
negative the offence would be 'culpab:e homiCide not amounting to
C
murder', punishable under the first or the second part of .s .. 304, depending, respectively, on whether the second or the third Clause of s. 299
is applicable.
If this question is found in the positive, but the case
comes, within any of the Exceptions enumerated in s. 300, the offence
would still be 'culpable homicide not amounting to murder', punishable
under the First Part of s. 304, Penal Code.
.
The. above are only broad guidelines and hot cast-iron imperatives.
In m.ost , cases, their observance will facilitate the
task of the court.
But sometimes the facts are so inter-twined and the second and the
third stages i;o telescoped into each other, that it may not be convenient ·to give a separate treatment to the
matters involved
in the
second and third stages.
Now let us consider the problem before us in the light of the above
enunciation.
It is not disputed that the death of the deceased was caused by the
accused, there being a direct causal connection between the beating
administered by Ac 1 and A-2 to the deceased and his death.
The
accused confined the beating to the legs and arms of the deceased, and
therefore, it can be said that they perhaps had no "intention to cause
death" within the contemplation clause (a) of s. 299 or cl. ( 1) of
s. 300.
It is nobody's case that the instant case falls within cl. ( 4)
of s. 300.
This clause, as already noticed, is designed for that class of
cases where the act of the offender is not directed against any particular individual but there is in his act that recklessness and risk of imminent danger, knowingly and unjustifiably incurred, which is
directed
against the man in general, and places the lives of many in jeopardy.
Indeed, in all fairness, Counsel for the appellant has not contended
that the case would f::ill under cl. ( 4) of s. 300.
His sole contention
is that. even if the accused had no intention to cause death, the facts
established fully bring the case within the purview of cl. (3) of 5. 300
and as such the offence committed is murder and nothing less.
Jn support of this contention reference has been made to Anda v.
State .of Rajasthan(') and Rajwani Singh v. State of Kera/a (supra).
As against this, Counsel for the respondent subJpits that since the
accused 'selected only non-vital parts of the body· of the deceased, for
0) A.J.R. 1966 S.C. 148.
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inflicting the injuries, they could not be attributed the mens rea requisite for bringing the case under clause (3) of s. 300; at the most, it
could be said· that they had knowledge that the injuries inflicted by
them were likely to cause death and as such the case falls within the
third clause of s. 299, and the offence committed was only "culpable
homicide not amounting to murder", punishable under s. 304, Part II.
Couns~I has thus tried to support the reasonin·g of the High Colll1.
The trial Court, 'JS already noticed, had convicted the respondent of
the offence of murder. It applied the rule in Virsa Singlt's ca'c
(supra). and the ratio of Anda v. State and held that the case was
clearly covered by clause Thirdly of s. 300. The High Court has disagreed with the trail Court and held that the offence was not murder
but one under s. 304, Pt. IL
The High Co.mt reached this conclusion on the following reason-
.ing :
(a) "There was no premeditation in the attack.
It was
almost an impulsive act".
( b) "Though there were 21 injuries, they were all on the
arms and legs and not on the head or other vital parts
of the body."
( c) "There was no compound fracture to result in heavy
haemorrhage; there must have been some bleeding".
(which) "according to
PWI might have stoppl:d
with in about half an hour to one hour."
( d) "Death that had occurred 21 hours later, could have
been only due to shock and not due to haemorrhage
al3o, as stated by PW 12. . .
who
conducted the
autopsy.
This reference is strengthened by the evidence of PW 26 who says that the patient was under
shock and he was treating him for shock by sending
fluids through his vein.
From the injuries inflicted
the accused therefore could not have intended
to
cause death."
( e) "A I and A2 had beaten the deceased
with
heavy
sticks. These beatings had resulted in fracture of the
right radius, right femur, right tibia, right fibula, right
patalla and left tibia and dislocation of .... , therefore considerable force must have been used white
inflicting the blows.
Accused l and 2 should have
therefore inflicted these injuries with the knowled.ge
that they are likely, by so beating, to cause the death
of the deceased, though they might not have had the
knowled11:e that they were so imminently dangerous
·that in all probability their acts would result in such
injuries as are likely to cause the death. The offence
... is therefore culpable homicide falling under ....
s. 299, I.P.C. punishable under s. 304 Part II and not
murder."
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ANDI-IRA PRADESH v. RAYAVARAPU PUNNAYYA (Sarkaria, 1.) 611
With respect, we are unable to appreciate and accept thi.s reas:m~ng.
Jt .appears to us to be inconsistent, erroneous and largely specuiatlve.
To say that the attack was not premeditated or preplann~d is ~ot
'°1ily factually incorrect but also at war with High Court's own findmg
:that the injuries were caused to the deceased in furtherance
of the
,common intention of A-1 and A-2 and therefore, s. 34, I.P.C. was
.applicable.
Further, the finding that there was no compound fractur~,
.no heavy haemorrhage and the cause of the death was shock, only, 1s
.not in accord with the evidence on the record.
The best person to
speak about haemorrhage and the cause of the death was Dr. P. S .
. Sarojini (PW 12) who had conducted the autopsy.
She testified that
:the cause of death of the deceased was "shock and haemorrhage due
to multiple injuries".
This categorical opinion of the Doctor was not
assailed in cross-examination. In the post-mortem examination report
Ex. P-8, the Doctor noted that the heart of the deceased was found
full of dotted blood. Again in injury No. 6, which also was an internal
fracture, the bone was visible through the wound.
Dr. D. A. Sastri,
PW 26, had testified that he was treating Kotamraju injured of shock,
not only by sending fluids through his vein, but also blood.
This part
,of his statement wherein he spoke about the giving of blood transfusion
ito the deceased, appears to have been overlooked by the High Court.
Dr. Kondareddy, PW 11, who was the first Medical Officer to examine
the injuries_ of the deceased, had noted that there was
bleedi11g
and
swelling around injury No. 6 which was located on the left leg 3 inches
above the ankle. Dr. Sarojini, PW 12, found fracture of the left tibia
underneath this injury.
There could therefore, be no doubt that this
was a compound fracture.
P.W. 11 found bleeding from the other
.-abraded injuries, a.Jso.
He however found the condition of the injured
grave and immediately sent an information
to the
Magistrate for
recording his dying declaration.
PW l l also advised immediate removal of the deceased to the bigger Hospital at Guntur.
There, also,
Dr. Sastri finding that life in the patient was ebbing fast, took immediate two-fold action.
First, he put the patient on blood transfusion.
Second, he sent an intimation for recording his dying declaration.
A
Magistrate (PW 10) came there and recorded the statement.
These
are all tell-tale circumstances which unerring by show that there was
substantial haemorrhage from some of the injuries involving compound
fractures.
This being the case, there was absolutely no reason to
doubt the sworn word of the Doctor, (PW 12) that the c:rnse of the
death was shock and haemorrhage.
Although the learned Judges of the High Court have not specifically referred to the quotation from page 289, of Modi's book on
Medical ?.U!i~prudence an~ T<?xicology (1961 Edn.) which was put to
Dr. SaroJ!ru m cross-exammat10n, they appear to have derived support
from the s•ame for the argument that fractures of such bones "are not
ordinarily dangerous"; therefore, the accused could not have intended
to cause death but had only knowledge that they were likely by such
beating to cause the death of the deceased.
It wiJ!l be worthwhile to extract that quotation from
Mody a.s a
reference to the same was made by Mr. Subba Rao before us,' also.
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According to Mody : "Fractures are not ordinarily dangerous unless.
't
they are compound, when death may occur from foss of blood, if a.
big vessel is wounded by the split end of a fractured bone."
It may be noted, in the first place, that this opinion of the learned·
author is couched in too general and wide language. Fractures of some
vital bones. such as those of the skull and the vertebral column are
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generally ki1own to be dangerous to life.
Secondly, even this general
•
statement has been qualified by the learned author, by saying that
compound fractures involving haemorrhage, are ordinarily dangerous.
We have seen, that some of the fractures underneath the injuries oi the
deceased, were compound
fractures
accompanied by substantial
haemorrhage. In the face of this finding, Mady's opinion, far from
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advancing the contention of the defence, discounts it.
The High Court hus held that the accused had no intention to
cause death because they deliberately avoided to hit any vital part of
the body, and confined the beating to the legs and arms of the deceased. There is much that can be said in support of this particular finding. But that finding-assuming it to be correct--does not necessarily
take the case out of the definition of 'murder'.. The crux of the matter
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is, whether the facts established bring the case within Clans·e Thirdly
of s. 300.
This question further narrows down into a consideration
of the two-fold issue :
(i) Whether the bodily injuries found on the deceased were
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intentionally inflicted by the accused ?
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(ii) If so, were they sufficient !lO cause death in the ordinary
course of nature? If both these elements are satisfactorily
established, the offence will be 'murder', irrespective of the
fact whether an intention on the part of the accused to
cause death, had or had not been proved.
In the instant case, the existence of both these elements was clearly
established by the prosecution. There was bitter hostility between the
warring factions to which the accused and the
decea~ed belonged.
Criminal litigation was going on between these factions since long. Both
the factions had been proceeded against under s. 107, Cr. P.C. The
accused had therefore a motive to beat the deceased. The attack was
premeditated and pre-planned, although the interval between the conception and execution of the plan was not very long;
The accused
had purchased tickets for going further to Narasaraopet, but on seeing
the deceased, their bete noir, alighting at Nekarikal, they designedly
got down there and trailed him.
They selected heavy sticks about 3·
inches in diameter, each, and with those lethal weapons, despite the
entreaties of the deceased, mercilessly pounded his legs and arms
causing no less than 19 or 20 injuries, smashing at least seven bones,.
mostly major bones, and dislocating two more.
The beating was
administered in a brutal and reckless manner. It was pressed home
with an unusually fierce, cruel and sadistic determination.
When the
human conscience of one of the shocked bystanders spontaneously
cried out in protest as to why the accused were beating a human being
as if he were a buffalo, the only echo it could draw from the assailants,
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ANDHRA PRADESH v. RAYAVARAi'V PUNNAYYA (Sarkaria, ].)
613
was a 'rninacious retort, who
callously continued their
malevolent
action, and did not stop the beating till the deceased became unconscious.
May be, the intention of the accused was to cause death and
they stopped the beating under the impression th~t the _dece~sed was
dead.
But this lone circumstance cannot take this poss1bl~ mference
to the plane of positive proof. Nevertheless, the formidable weaI>ons
' used by the accused in the beating, the savage manner of its execution,
the helpless state of the unarmed victim, the intensity of the violence
caused the caHous conduct of the accused in persisting in the assault
even ag;iinst the protest of feeling bystanders-all, viewed against the
background of previous animosity between the parties, irresistibly lead
to the conclusion that the injuries caused by the accused to the deceased were intentionally inflicted, and were not' accidental.
Thus the
presence of the first element of Clause Thirdly of s. 300 had been
cogently and convincingly established.
This takes us to the second element of Clause ( 3). Dr.