# St•!t ~· "" 1f1utlt.a11 v. Ratn-Sartlll

- **Citation:** [1964] 2 S.C.R. 982
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1964
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 453 of 1962
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/st-t-1f1utlt-a11-v-ratn-sartlll-2866
- **Pages:** 15

## Headnote

2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
983
affecting his continuance in such post or office" have been
specifically preserved by s. 116 (2) of the Act. Tliere is no
legal right in an officer to hold an officiating post and he cannot
claim that he cannot be reverted except for proper reasons.
Parshotam Lal Dhingra v. Union of India, (1958) S. C. R.
•
823, referred to.
C1v1L APPELLATE JumsmcTION : Civil Appeal
No. 453 of 1962.
Appeal from the judgment and order dated
November 18, 1U60, of the Rajasthan High Court in
D. B. Civil Writ No. 264 of 1959.
S. K. Kapur, K. ][. Jain and P. D. Menon,
for the appellant.
·
B. D. Sharma, for the respondent.
1963. April 10.
The Judgment of the Court
was delivered by
AY\'ANGARJ.-The State of Rajasthan is the
appellant in this appeal which has been filed pursuant
to a certificate of fitness granted by the High Court
of Rajasthan under Art. 133 (1) (c) of the constitution and it challenges the correctness of a judgment
of the High Court allowing a petition under Art.
226 of the Constitution filed by the respondent.
The respondent, Ram Saran, was appointed a
Constable in 1947 in the Ajmer district police force.
Two years th'ereafter he was promoted to the rank of ·
Head Constable and was confirmed in that post. On
June 29, Hl5G he was appointed to officiate as a SubInspector. At that stage. the states Reorganisation
•
t
Act (XXXVII of 1956), hereinafter referred to as the
Act, was enacted which became operative from
November l, 1956,-referred to in the Act as the
appointed date, and by virtue of its provisions the
1965
Stat1 of Raj411i14n
y.
Ram Saran
Apanzar J.
1953
St•!t ~· "" 1f1utlt.a11
v.
Ratn-Sartlll
:I ~;·on:ar J.
984
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL
former State of Ajmrr was merged in the State df
Rajasthan and under its terms again the respondent
was absorbed in the Police Service of the Rajasthan
State. To give ·effect to this provision a formal
order appointing the respondent as an officiating
Sub-Inspector in the Rajasthan State police force
was also passed dated the same day.
Subsequent thereto, on April 6, Hlf>7 the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Ajmer Range ordered the reversion of the respondent to his substantive
post of Head Constable in the District Police Force.
The respondent was dissatisfied with this order and
his complaint was that it was not one passed in the
normal course of posting since there were, nn that
date, officiating Sub.Inspectors in the State police
force who were junior to him but who continued to
hole! their officiating posts and that such a reversion
to his substantive post was in effect an order of
supersession.
He
made
representations to
the
authorities to set the matter right. \Vhen he did not
>uccced iu his efforts, he filed, on July 22, 1959, a
petition under Art. 226 of the constitution for quashing
the order of reversion dated April 6, 1957, and for
a direction to restore him to the rank of officiating
Sub·lnspector according to his seniority. The State
as well as the Inspector.General of Police and the
Deputy Inspector-General of Police were implcaded
as parties to the petition and the learned Judges of
the High Court allowed it princip~lly on the ground
that this order of reversion wa> in violation of the
provisions of s. l l 5 of the ,\r,t.
It is the correctness
of this order that is challenged in this appeal
before us.
In order to appreciate the contentions raised .
it is necessary briefly to advert to the statutory
provisions on which the judgment of the High
Court in the main rests.
Those material in this
r
,
- ..
•
•.
..
2 s:c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
985
context . ar~ ss. 115 to 117 of the. Act- occurring in
Part X headed 'Provisions as to Services':
"115. (1). Every person
who
immediately
before the appointed day is serving in
connection with the affairs of the Union
under
the administrative_ control of the
Lieutenant Governor or Chief Commiss·
ioner in any of the existing States of Ajmer,
Bhopal,
Coorg, Kutch
and
Vindhya
Pradesh, or
is servin

## Text

2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
983
affecting his continuance in such post or office" have been
specifically preserved by s. 116 (2) of the Act. Tliere is no
legal right in an officer to hold an officiating post and he cannot
claim that he cannot be reverted except for proper reasons.
Parshotam Lal Dhingra v. Union of India, (1958) S. C. R.
•
823, referred to.
C1v1L APPELLATE JumsmcTION : Civil Appeal
No. 453 of 1962.
Appeal from the judgment and order dated
November 18, 1U60, of the Rajasthan High Court in
D. B. Civil Writ No. 264 of 1959.
S. K. Kapur, K. ][. Jain and P. D. Menon,
for the appellant.
·
B. D. Sharma, for the respondent.
1963. April 10.
The Judgment of the Court
was delivered by
AY\'ANGARJ.-The State of Rajasthan is the
appellant in this appeal which has been filed pursuant
to a certificate of fitness granted by the High Court
of Rajasthan under Art. 133 (1) (c) of the constitution and it challenges the correctness of a judgment
of the High Court allowing a petition under Art.
226 of the Constitution filed by the respondent.
The respondent, Ram Saran, was appointed a
Constable in 1947 in the Ajmer district police force.
Two years th'ereafter he was promoted to the rank of ·
Head Constable and was confirmed in that post. On
June 29, Hl5G he was appointed to officiate as a SubInspector. At that stage. the states Reorganisation
•
t
Act (XXXVII of 1956), hereinafter referred to as the
Act, was enacted which became operative from
November l, 1956,-referred to in the Act as the
appointed date, and by virtue of its provisions the
1965
Stat1 of Raj411i14n
y.
Ram Saran
Apanzar J.
1953
St•!t ~· "" 1f1utlt.a11
v.
Ratn-Sartlll
:I ~;·on:ar J.
984
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL
former State of Ajmrr was merged in the State df
Rajasthan and under its terms again the respondent
was absorbed in the Police Service of the Rajasthan
State. To give ·effect to this provision a formal
order appointing the respondent as an officiating
Sub-Inspector in the Rajasthan State police force
was also passed dated the same day.
Subsequent thereto, on April 6, Hlf>7 the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Ajmer Range ordered the reversion of the respondent to his substantive
post of Head Constable in the District Police Force.
The respondent was dissatisfied with this order and
his complaint was that it was not one passed in the
normal course of posting since there were, nn that
date, officiating Sub.Inspectors in the State police
force who were junior to him but who continued to
hole! their officiating posts and that such a reversion
to his substantive post was in effect an order of
supersession.
He
made
representations to
the
authorities to set the matter right. \Vhen he did not
>uccced iu his efforts, he filed, on July 22, 1959, a
petition under Art. 226 of the constitution for quashing
the order of reversion dated April 6, 1957, and for
a direction to restore him to the rank of officiating
Sub·lnspector according to his seniority. The State
as well as the Inspector.General of Police and the
Deputy Inspector-General of Police were implcaded
as parties to the petition and the learned Judges of
the High Court allowed it princip~lly on the ground
that this order of reversion wa> in violation of the
provisions of s. l l 5 of the ,\r,t.
It is the correctness
of this order that is challenged in this appeal
before us.
In order to appreciate the contentions raised .
it is necessary briefly to advert to the statutory
provisions on which the judgment of the High
Court in the main rests.
Those material in this
r
,
- ..
•
•.
..
2 s:c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
985
context . ar~ ss. 115 to 117 of the. Act- occurring in
Part X headed 'Provisions as to Services':
"115. (1). Every person
who
immediately
before the appointed day is serving in
connection with the affairs of the Union
under
the administrative_ control of the
Lieutenant Governor or Chief Commiss·
ioner in any of the existing States of Ajmer,
Bhopal,
Coorg, Kutch
and
Vindhya
Pradesh, or
is serving in connection with
the affairs of any of the existing States
GJf Mysore,
Punjab, Patiala and East
Punjab States Union and Saurashtra shall,
as from that day, be deemed to have
been allotted to serve in connectiou with
· the affairs of the successor State to that
existing State.
(2) ....................... : ........................... .
( 3) ................................................... .
(4) ....................................... : ........... .
(5) The Central Government may by order
establish one or more Advisory Committees for the purpose of assisting it in regard
to-
(a) the division and integration of the
services among the new States
and the States of Andhra Pradesh
and Madras; and
(b) the ensuring of fair and equitable
treatment to all persons affected
by the provisions of this section
and the proper consideration of
any representations made by such
persons.
196~.
Statt of .Raj«$t/z~·
•.
.
Ram Saran
Ayyang'I,. J.
Slat1-oj R1j1.Sll1tm
v.
ltna S.r•n
986 SUPREME COUR1 REPORTS [1964] VOL.
(6) The foregoing provisions of this section
shall not apply in relation to any person
to whom the provisions of section
114
apply.
r
•
(7) Nothing in this section shall be deemed
•
to affect after the appointed day the
operation of the provisions of Chapter I
of Part XIV of the Constitution in relation to the determination of the conditions
•
of service of persons serving in connection
with the affairs of the Union or any State :
Provided that the conditions of service
applicable immediately before the appointed day to the case of any person referred
to in sub-section ( 1) or sub-section (2) shall
not be varied to· his disadvantage except
with the previous approval of the Central
Government.
116.
(1). Every person who immediately before
,.
the appointed day is holding or discharging
the duties of any post or office in connection with the affairs ........ of an existing
State in any area ......... shall be deemed as
from that day to have b~en duly appointed
to such post or office by the Government
of, or other appropriate authority in, such
State, or by the Central Government or
other appropriate authority in such Part C
~tate, as the case may be.
2). Nothing in this section shall be deemed
to prevent a competent authority, after the
appointed day, from passing in relation
to any such person any order affecting his
continuance in such post or office.
117. The Central Government may at any time
before or after the appointed day give such
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
987
directions to any State Government as
may appear to it to be necessary for the
purpose of giving effect to the foregoing
provision~ of this part and the
State
Government shall
comply with
such
directions."
Before proceeding to consider these provisions
it
would be convenient to put aside one matter and that
is that it was not suggested that the order of reversion
was one by way of punishment constituting a reduction in rank so a1 to attract Art. 311 of the Constitution.
The grievances of the respondent as formulated
before us were threefold : ( l) that for the purpose of
promotions and for determining reversions the seniority in the police force was not computed on the basis of
a list of seniority prepared for the entire State of
Rajasthan but that the same was done on a regional
basis i. e .. there was a separate seriiority list for
Ajmer and another for other areas in the State and
that this had resulted in police officer> like himself
being superseded by others junior to them merely
because they happened to be serving in a particular
region.
In the petition there was a vague reference
to the maintenance of such regional lists as violative
of the equality guaranteed by Art. 14, (2) It was
further contended by .the respondent that the reversion from the officiating post of Sub-Inspector to the
substantive one of Head Constable was "an alteration in the conditions of his service" which the State
Government was not competent to effect without the
sanction of the Central Government under s. l 15 (7)
of the Act, and that, in any event, there had been a
direction by the · Central Government under s. 117
of the Act which rendered the right to retain an
·officiating post without reversion as such a condition,
(3) Even ifs. 115 were insufficient by itself to constitute the right to retain an . officiating post without
/f6J
NtiJ_t1 of Rajuthan
v.
Rom SMa11
A.yJanzar J.
1963
Stal1 of Roja.shfan
..
Ram S1rorz
Ayy41lgnr J.
988 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1964] VOL.
being reverted to a substantive post as "a condition
of serviCe," still there was a guaranteed right not to
be reverted except in the strict order of juniority
under the provisions of the Standing Orders of the
Police Force which were part of his conditbns of
service a11d that by reason of these. Standing Orders
the reversion was in violation of s. ll 5 ( i) of the Act.
We consider it would be convenient to deal
with these in the reverse order, and takt up first the
interpretation and effect of the Standing Order on
which reliance has been placed both by the learned
judges of' the High Court
<is
well as by learned
Counsel for the respondent before us.
In regard to
them there arc two di;tinct questions: (I)
their
proper interpretation, .(2) whether they would in
law constitute a condition of service and these have
to be considered separately. The Standirig Order
relied on is one numbered 46 issued by the Inspector
General of Police, Ajmer and is dated October 20,
1!149.
The relevant portion of it relied on is the
paragraph numbered 4 (b) whi~h reads :
• -
,
"An officer who has secured
officiating promotion on the basis
of his place on the
approved list should normally be considered
for promotion earlier provided that he maintains an appropriate standard. If he fails to
do so he may be reverted or his confirmation
postponed.
He should not, however, be denied
his claim to
confirmation
merely
because
·~,
although
he has maintained
his standard
someone c lse promoted later is· considered to
have done even better."
It is clear from this provision that it
de~ls not with
the order in which holders of officiating posts may
be reverted but with that in which they could be
considered for confirmation, so that in strictness on
its language the clause would not constitute the
1
-
- "'
2 s:c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
989
impugned reversion as one in breach of its terms.
But ass•.iming that what might be called the spirit
of the rule or the reason behind it be taken into
consideration and it be held that it laid down also
the order in which reversions should take place, still
we have next to consider whether it has any· legal
efficacy as a service condition.
This would depend
upon the Standing Orders having been issued by a
competent authority under the provisions of a statute
which empowered that authority
to
prescribe
"conditions of service."
For undoubtedly if it were
not so it would be merely an administrative instru·
ction issued by the Iuspector General of Police for
the guidance of his officers but could not determine
service conditions fixed by statute or statutory rules
by competent auth9rities or confer any legal fights
which in the event of non-observance could be the
subject of complaint in a Court. Learned Counsel
for the respondent was, therefore, at pains to make
out that these Standing Orders had a statutory basis.
For this purpose reliance was placed upon ss. 12
and 2 of the Police Act (V of 1861) as empowering
the Inspector-General of Police to issue these Standing
Orders. Section 12 of the Police Act
reads, to
quote only the material words :
"12. The Inspector-General of Police may,
from time to time, subject to the approval of
the State Government, frame such orders and
rules as he shall deem expedieqt relative to the
organisation, classification
and
distribution
of the police-force, the place
at "1Yhich the
members of the force shall reside, and the
particular services to be performed by them ... ".
It is clear that the orders and rules referred to in
this section have nothing to do with the determination of the service conditions of the officers recruited
to the police force.
The expression
"organisation"
cannot, in our opinion, in dude within its fold· the
1953
,)'t,tlJ aj Rajaj//ln.
•..
Ram StJra1
Stilt ~f Roj1tthan
••
RtJm Sflfan
990
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
conditions of service of those in the police force.
Turning next to s. 2 to which our attention was
drawn, the material portion 1s its second paragraph
which reads :
"Subject to the prov1S1ons of this Act the pay
and all other conditions of service of members
of the subordinate ranks of an>' police force
shall be such as may be determined by the
State Government."
Under this section, however, it is not the Inspector
General of Police but the State Government that is
empowered to frame rules regulating the conditions
of service of members of the police force. It was
not suggested that• the Standing Orders on which
reliance was placed were those made by the State
Government as they purport to · be only under the
authority of the Inspector General
of Police.
A
feeble argument was attempted to suggest that the
State Government might have delegated their power
m the Inspector General, but nothing j5 better settled
than that ·a power to
make
rules
could not be
delegated
without
express
statutory
provision
therefor.
Some point was sought to be made of the fact
that these Standing Orders were issued in October,
1949, when not the Constitution but s. 243 of the
Government of India Act, l!l35 was in force. But the
respondent gets no advantage out of this circumstance, because s. 243 referred to, enacts that the
conditions of service of the subordinate ranks of
various police forces in India "would be such as may
be determined by or under the Acts relating to those
forces" and we arc again
thrown
back on the
provisions of s. 2 of the Police Act by which it is
the State Government, not the Inspector General of
Police, that is VL-sted with authority to frame conditions of service.
We therefore consider, with great
•
.. !<
~ -
2 s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
991
respect to the learned.Judges of the High Court, that
they were ii) error in treating Standing Order 46 as
a condition of service which was violated by the ,
· order of reversion impugned by the respondent in
his Writ Petition.
Standing Order 46 being put aside, we next
turn to ss. 115 to 117 of the Act. The respondent was
in the service of the Ajmer State as an officiating
Sub-Inspector of Police on the appointed day i. e.,
November 1, 1956 and by virtueofs.115(l)ofthe
Act he would be deemed to have been allotted to
serve in connection with the affairs of the Rajasthan
State, and, in fact, as noticed earlier, there was a
formal order of appointment dated November 1, 1956,
by which he was appointed as an officiating SubInspector of Police. We do not consider it necessary
to deal with sub·s. ( 5) of s. 115 as, in our opinion,
nothing turns on it, though it was referred to by
learned Counsel for the respondent. What is really
crucial for the determination of this appeal is the
proviso to sub-s. (7) by which there was a guarantee
that the conditions of service applicable before the
appointed day would not be varied to the disadvantage of persons in the position of the respondent
except with the previous approval of the Central
Government. The question arising under this proviso
would be whether it is any condition of service
applicable to the holder of an officiating post that he
shall not be reverted to his substantive post. But
before dealing with it, the effect of two other
provisions viz., s. 117 ands. 116 (2) may be noticed.
We first refer to s. 117 because if there is a direction
of the Central Government in relation to a class of
officers and such direction ·is necessary for giving
effect to the provisions of this part, it is the duty of
the State Government to give effect to it and in such
a case the question whether such a direction is strictly
a condition of service or not might not . fall for
determination. The learned Judges of the High Court
·J.9fjJ
St•u •f ~fastk••
••
R1Jm S.«n
1963
~)011 &j R•jasClran
v.
R.,,. Sar 111
AJ.)'"l"' J.
992
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
considered that there was such a direction by
the Central Government and that was part of the
reasoning on
which
they
granted relief 10 the
respondent.
Learned Counsel for the
re,pondent
strenuously
sought
to
support this
argument
before us.
The direction was claimed to be contained in
a letter from the Deputy !'ltcretary to the Government of India Ministry
of Home Affairs to the
411
Chief Secretary to the Government of Rajasthan,
Jaipur dated March ~i. 1957 and headed 'protection
of service conditions to be afforded to state service
personnel.'
In this letter,
after referring to the
proviso to mb·s. (i I of s. 11 ;i of the Act which laid
down that conditions of service applicable to persons
referred to in sub-s. (I) shall not bt: varied to their
disadvantaizc except with the previous approval of
the Central Government, thrre was a paragraph
reading as under:
"2.
(ii) 011.'ciatinq Pay:
When an officer had o!iiciated continuously on
a particular scale of pay or would have
offciated on that scale but for his officiating
appointment to a post on a higher scale or
proceeding on leave or
deputation
for a
minimum peried of three years. immediately
before November I, 1956,
the pay on which
he had so officiated should be protected as if it
were pay and scale drawn in a substantive
capacity."
The letter divides the subject· matter dealt with in
it into several
parts and the ·above paragraph
occurs under the part headed 'Pay'. It was not
suggested
on behalf of the respondent that the
clause had as such any relevance to the questio~ of
reversion, to a substantive post of an. officer in an
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
9!13
officiat;n~ post, or that even otherwise the respondent
had qu,,ldied for the benefit of the provision contained iu it-as regar.:ls pay since he had not officiated
as a Sub Inspector for a· period of three years prior
to the appointed date i.e., November l, 1936. The
argu nent, however, was that since officers holding
merelv officiatillg posts had been mentioned in this
directive, the rigut to continue in that post brcame
a service condition and that no reversion could be
ordered without the sanction of the Central Government. We do not find it pos>ible to read the direction
contained
in
the
clause
extr.1cted
earlier as
having any such effect.
No doubt,
to the extent to which it protects the pay of
certain officers it might have effect under s. 117 of
the Act but beyond It, subject to the proviso to subs. (7) of s. 115, the powers of the State Qovernment
are not intended to be curtailed an-!, in fact, they
are expressly saved by sub-s. (2) of s. ll6 which
permits a competent authority to pass in relation to
such persons "any order affecting his continuance iQ
such post or office."
'
'T'he contention that survives is merely whether.
the right to hold an officiating post is a legal right
and whether it could be stated to be a condition of
service' that such an officer shall not be reverted
except for
proper reasons.
In our opinion, the
matter is concluded by the decision of this Court in
Parshotam Lal Dhingra.
v. Union
of India (').
There, as here, an officer who was appointed to
officiate in Class Il Service as an Assistant Superintendent, Railway Telegraphs was reverted to his
substantive Class III appointment. No doubt, the
question there comidered was whether on the facts
of that case, this order of reversion was passed a~
a punishment so as to attract the constitutional
protection guaranteed by Art. 311 (2) but this Court
had also to consider whether an officer appointed to
an officiating post had any legal right to continue
(IJ
[1958~ S. C.R. 828.
S1a11 of Raj"''""'°
~-
Ram Soran
Ayy .. gar J.
jtg
St.U of RajastA..
••
&.-
"-'·
994 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1!164] VOL:
in that post.
As to that Das, C. J. speaking· for the
majority observed :
"The petitioner hefore m was appointed to
a higher post on an officiating basis .............. .
He had no right to continue in that post and
under the general law the implied term of such
appointment was
that it
was
terminable
at any time on reasonable notice by Govern·
mrnt and therefore his reduction did not
operate as a furfeiture of any right and cannot
be described as reduction io rank by way of
punishment."
(Vide also the judgrr.ent of this Court in State
of Brm1bay v.1'. A. ALra/,am (1),
If he had no legal right to continue in that post it
would rather appear that it was one of the cond11ions
of his service that he could, for
administrative
rea~ons, be rr.vertfd to his substantive appoir1tment.
It therefore appears to u~ that there is no basis for
argumeut that mere reversion to a substantive post
is a bri-ach of the conduions of service. That is why.
we said that the proviso to sub·s. (7) of s. 115 on
which stress is laid by the High Coun really affords
no assistance to the respondent.
The above was,
in general, the reasoning upon which the
learned
Judges of the High Court allowed the petition. We
consirler that "icy were in error in 50 doing and the
appeal has accordingly to be allowed.
It is necessary, now, to mention the first of the
points we have set out earlier which learned Counsel
for the respondent strcnuomly prcs~cd upon us.
He
submitted that the respondent had all< ged in his
petition a violation of Art. 14 of the Constitution,
in that the selection of officers for promotion was
determined not on the basis of the seniority of the
(2) Ci'il Appeal 59 or t96J (Not ytt repor«d) d<cidcd on
Ikf;cmbc:r 12, 1961.
'
..
! S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
995
officers considering the State as a whole but region·
wise and this was the gravamen of the <.;har5c in
this respect made in the petition.
In this conn~ction
he drew our attention to the term; of s. 2 of the
Police Act 5 of 1!161 which reads .:
"2. The entire police·establishmerit under a
State Government shall, for the purposes of
this Act, be deemed to be one police-force, and
shall be formally enrolled; .and shall consist of
suca number of officers and men, and shall be
constituted in such manner as shall from time
to time be ordered by
th~. State Government.
,, '
.............................
~ .......
_ .................... .
He also pointed out that in the. counter-affidavit'
filed by the State this splitting up of the State into
regions and the determination of seniority
and.
promotiln on a regionwise, as distinguished from a.·
Statewise basis, was defended as dictated by adminis-.
frative considerations.
The learned Judges, in their.'
judgment have made a passing reference. to thili
feature of the case and seem to express the opinion
that the system of regionwiie promotion wa' produc·
tive of inequality and hardship.
The difficulty in
the way of the respondent, however, .is that the plea
raised i 1 regard to . this matter .is of the vaguest
character and appears to be designed as affording
some support for the main allegat,ions and contentions
we have dealt with, and not ·as an independent and
distinct ground for i'mpugriing the · constitutional
validity of the scheme of promotion. In consequence
of this siate ofthe pleadings the facts
and detaib
. necessary for sustaining or repelling this contentio11
were not brought into the record, so that admittedly
the point could not be decided on the record as it
stands. Realising this learned Counsel
for
the
respondent urged that the matter should be remitted
to the High Court for a consideration of this issue
. ·\
1g61
. St~t~ ~--R~~itlt-,.
••
kamia..,.
Stdlc oj Raj<1Jtlwi
••
R.m Sara•
996
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
~
about the breach of Art. 14 of the Constitution and
the cons1itutional validity of the regionwise :rniority
lists prepared for promotion, reversion ere. allowing
liberty to the parties to lead further e\icfrnce on the
matter.
Having considered the suggestion carefully
we have arrived at the conclus10n that on
the
pleadings, as they stand, this question could not be
detcrmi11ed s1tisfactorilv. If the issue as to di,crimina1ion and a violation of Art.
14 has to be
satisfactorily investigated and decided
both
the
parties would have to file
am,.nded pleaoings in
ordt r to focus attention on several details, with 1he
result that this would virtually amount to the fi liug
of a new peti1ion. We consider therefore that if the
respondent is so advised he should be at liberty to
challenge the c•rdcr now impugned on these other
grounds and that for that purpose it would really be.
in his interest that he should be permitted to file a
fresh petition making necessary
allegations
and
setting forth the requi;ite facts when the State also
would have an opportunity to make its answers to
such a plea. It is in the light of this consideration
that we have refrained from remanding the case to
the High Court for the consideration of this point.
The result is that the appeal is allowed and
the order of the High Court set aside and the Writ
Petition of the respondent dismi>sed.
We have to
add that this would be without prejudice to his right
to fi:e a fresh petition in regard to the matter we ·
have indicated earlier.
In the circumstances of this
case there would be no order as to costs.
Appeal allowed.
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