# Stal1 of Plllljab v. Mst. QoUar Jlhan · 81gum

- **Citation:** [1964] 1 S.C.R. 971
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1964
- **Case number:** CIVIL APPELLATE JumSDICT!ON : Civil Appeal No. 592 of 1961
- **Bench:** S; K. DAs, A. K. Sarkar, N. Rajagopa.La. Ayyangar
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/stal1-of-plllljab-v-mst-qouar-jlhan-81gum-2824
- **Pages:** 9

## Headnote

Li.mitation-hand Acquisition Act, (1 of i8U), a. 18.
On October 25, 1953, the Collector made an award in
respect of land bekmging to the respondents, who were evacuees,
in the Distric: of Gui gaon. The respondents were not notified
about the acquisition and they were not present at the time of
.the award.
The respondents filed an application before the Collector
stating that they came to know of the contents of the Award
only on July 22, 1955. when they received the compensation
amount and that the amount of Rs. 96/· pe1 acre as given in
the Award was too low and that the market value of the land
was about Rs. 600/· per acre. The Collector accepted the
application and referred the matter under s. 18 of the Land
Acquisition Act, to the Senior Subordinate Judge, Gurgaon.
The Senior Subordinate Judge held that the application for a
reference which was made on September 30, 1955, was filed
beyond the period of limitation prescribed by s. 18 and discharged the reference. The matter was taken to the High
Court in revision by the respondents and the High Court
accepted the revision ::etition and direc1ed the Subordinate
Judge to deal with the reference on merits, on the view that
the civil court was precluded from going into questions other
than the matters specified in s. 18 of the Act. The High Court
did not go into the correctness of the decision on merits on the
question of limitation. On appeal by special leave.
Held, assuming that the civil court could go into the
quntion of limitation, the respondents who were entitled to
notice under s. 12, sub-s. 2, of the Act had admittedly received
no notice nor were they present at the time when the Award
was made and therefore . neither cl. (a) nor the first part of
cl. (b) of the proviso to s. 18 applied.
The scheme of the Act roquires that before applying for
reference under s. 18, the parties concerned must have knowledge of the essential contents of the award and hi the present
1969
Fe~""'''• 11.
1963
Stal1 of Plllljab
v.
Mst. QoUar Jlhan
· 81gum
Das, J.
!li2
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
case the petitioners though they had come to know of the award
earlier did not know the e;•ential content< of the award till
July 22, 1955, therefore, the period of six month< contemplated
in the scrond part of cl. (b) of s. 18 would commence from
that date and the application for reference was within time.
Raja Hamh Chandra Raj Singh v. The Deputy Land
Acquisition Offir.<r, (1962] 1 S. C.R. 676, relied on.
CIVIL APPELLATE JumSDICT!ON : Civil Appeal
No. 592 of 1961.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and
order dated November 16, 1959, of the Punjab
High Court at Chandigarh in Civil Revision No. 2tl8
of 1958.
R. Ganapathy Iyer and R. N. Sachthey, for
the appellant.
S. P. Sinha and Saukat llu,ssain, for respondent No. 2.
1963. February 11. The Judgment of the
Court was delivered by
•
S. K. DAS, J.-This is an appeal by special
leave from the judgment and order dated November
16, 1959 passed by the Punjab High Court on an
application in revision in respect of an order dated
December l i, 1957 by
which the learned Senior
Subordinate Judge of Gurgaon held that a reference
by the Collector of Gurgaon under s. 18 of the Land
Acquisition Act (Act I of 1894) was incompetent by
reason of the circumstance that it was made on an
apelication filed beyond time.
The appellant before
us 1s the State of Punjab and the respondents are two
ladies being related as mother and daughter. We
shall presently state the relevant facts, but before
we do so it is necessary to say that the only point on
which the High Court disposed of the application in
revision before it made by the respondents herein,
was whether the civil court to which a reference is
•
•.
..
. '
I
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
973
made by the Collector under s. 18 of the Land
Acquisition Act on an application filed beyond time,
can reject the reference on the ground that the
reference made is incompetent. On this point there
is a conflict of jud

## Text

J
1 s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
971
STATE OF PUNJAB
ti.
MST. Q.AISAR JEHAN BEGUM' AND ANR.
(S; K. DAs, A. K. SARKAR and N. RAJAGOPA.LA.
AYYANGAR, jJ.)
Li.mitation-hand Acquisition Act, (1 of i8U), a. 18.
On October 25, 1953, the Collector made an award in
respect of land bekmging to the respondents, who were evacuees,
in the Distric: of Gui gaon. The respondents were not notified
about the acquisition and they were not present at the time of
.the award.
The respondents filed an application before the Collector
stating that they came to know of the contents of the Award
only on July 22, 1955. when they received the compensation
amount and that the amount of Rs. 96/· pe1 acre as given in
the Award was too low and that the market value of the land
was about Rs. 600/· per acre. The Collector accepted the
application and referred the matter under s. 18 of the Land
Acquisition Act, to the Senior Subordinate Judge, Gurgaon.
The Senior Subordinate Judge held that the application for a
reference which was made on September 30, 1955, was filed
beyond the period of limitation prescribed by s. 18 and discharged the reference. The matter was taken to the High
Court in revision by the respondents and the High Court
accepted the revision ::etition and direc1ed the Subordinate
Judge to deal with the reference on merits, on the view that
the civil court was precluded from going into questions other
than the matters specified in s. 18 of the Act. The High Court
did not go into the correctness of the decision on merits on the
question of limitation. On appeal by special leave.
Held, assuming that the civil court could go into the
quntion of limitation, the respondents who were entitled to
notice under s. 12, sub-s. 2, of the Act had admittedly received
no notice nor were they present at the time when the Award
was made and therefore . neither cl. (a) nor the first part of
cl. (b) of the proviso to s. 18 applied.
The scheme of the Act roquires that before applying for
reference under s. 18, the parties concerned must have knowledge of the essential contents of the award and hi the present
1969
Fe~""'''• 11.
1963
Stal1 of Plllljab
v.
Mst. QoUar Jlhan
· 81gum
Das, J.
!li2
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
case the petitioners though they had come to know of the award
earlier did not know the e;•ential content< of the award till
July 22, 1955, therefore, the period of six month< contemplated
in the scrond part of cl. (b) of s. 18 would commence from
that date and the application for reference was within time.
Raja Hamh Chandra Raj Singh v. The Deputy Land
Acquisition Offir.<r, (1962] 1 S. C.R. 676, relied on.
CIVIL APPELLATE JumSDICT!ON : Civil Appeal
No. 592 of 1961.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and
order dated November 16, 1959, of the Punjab
High Court at Chandigarh in Civil Revision No. 2tl8
of 1958.
R. Ganapathy Iyer and R. N. Sachthey, for
the appellant.
S. P. Sinha and Saukat llu,ssain, for respondent No. 2.
1963. February 11. The Judgment of the
Court was delivered by
•
S. K. DAS, J.-This is an appeal by special
leave from the judgment and order dated November
16, 1959 passed by the Punjab High Court on an
application in revision in respect of an order dated
December l i, 1957 by
which the learned Senior
Subordinate Judge of Gurgaon held that a reference
by the Collector of Gurgaon under s. 18 of the Land
Acquisition Act (Act I of 1894) was incompetent by
reason of the circumstance that it was made on an
apelication filed beyond time.
The appellant before
us 1s the State of Punjab and the respondents are two
ladies being related as mother and daughter. We
shall presently state the relevant facts, but before
we do so it is necessary to say that the only point on
which the High Court disposed of the application in
revision before it made by the respondents herein,
was whether the civil court to which a reference is
•
•.
..
. '
I
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
973
made by the Collector under s. 18 of the Land
Acquisition Act on an application filed beyond time,
can reject the reference on the ground that the
reference made is incompetent. On this point there
is a conflict of judicial opinion. In disposing of the
application in revision the learne<I single Judge who
heard it proceeded on the basis that he was bound
by the Division Bench decision of the same High
Court in Hari Krishan Khosla v. State of Pepsu ('),
which held that the jurisdiction of the civil court on
a reference under s. 18 was confined to considering
and pronouncing upon any of the four different
objections to an award under the Act which might
have been raised in the written application for the
reference and the civil court had no jurisdiction to
decide the question of limitation. Therefore, the learned single Judge did not go into the further question as
to whether the application made for a reference in the
present case was filed beyond time or not as prescribed by the proviso to s. l8 of the Act. That question
has however been agitated before us by reason of the
decision in Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh v. The
Deputy Land Acquisition Officer('), a decision of this
court which was not available at the time when the
learned single Judge of the Punjab High Court
disposed of tb.e application in revision.
We proceed now to state the relevant facts.
The respondents who were evacuees were owners of
55 bighas and 7 biswas
of land in two villages
known as Salarpur and Naslrpur in the district of
Gurgaon'.
Their lands in the aforesaid two villages
along with lands of other persons in other villages
were acquired by the appellant for use as a field
Firing and Bombing Range. The respondents were
not nntified about the acquisition and were not present at the time of the award.
The respondents
alleged, and this was not denied, that the Collector
treated the property as evacuee property and none of
the notices contemplated by the Land Acquisition
(I) A.T.R. 1958 Punjab 490.
(2) (1962] I S.C.R. 676.
•
.
1963
Stai. qf P .. jab
..
Mii. QaUar J,/i/Jll
81gum
Das, J.
1963
SMJ. of Pvnjah
••
Mst. Qais"' J1/um
·B1pm
Das, I.
974 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964) VOL.
Act, 1894 were is.med to them. The Collector made
an awafd on October 25, 1953 by which he allowed
compensation at the rate of Rs. 96/- per acre in
respect of the lands of the respondents. On December 24, 1954 that is more than a year after the
award, the respondents made an application to the
Collector in which they said that certain agricultural lands of villages Salarpur and Nasirpur were
compulsorily acquired by the Collector by an award
dated October 30, 1953 (October 30 was presumably
a mistake for October 25 ), but they were not given
any notice of the acquisition proceedings.
The
respondents further stated that the awerd had fixed
the compensation to be givt>n to the land owners
affected by the acquisition, but the amoun~ to be
paid to each owner wat not apportioned therein.
The respondents then referred to a judgment and
decree of the Lahore High Court dated November,
13, 1944 under which they were held to be the
owners of the lands in question.
A prayer was made
on behalf of the respondents for payment of the
compensation money at an early date for the purpose
of defraying the expenses of a daughter's marriage,
but without prejudice to the claim of the respondents
for enhancement of the amount of compensation.
The amount ol compensation appears to have been
*paid on July 22, 1955 and on September 30, 1955
the respondents made an application to the Collector
for a reference under s. 18 of the Act.
In this
application the respondents stated that they knew
about the award on July U, 1955 when they received
the compensation amount and therefore the petition
was within time.
The principal objection which
they raised to the award was that the market value
of the land was not Rs. 96/ - per acre as given in the
award, but about Rs. 600/- per acre. The Collector
accepted this application in a very short order which
stated :
"Public Prosecutor has been heard. Mst. Timur
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'
I
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
975
Jehan Begum has filed an affidavit to the effect
that she had no knowledge of the award at the
time it was made and that she only came to
know about it in July, 19.55, when she received
the award money.
Nothing has been shown
to me to the contrary to prove that the award
was made within the knowledge of the petitioners.
Under the circumstances it would be
only fair and equitable to refer the petition
under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act
to a civil court for determining the compensation, which I here bl do."
A reference was
made
accordingly to the
civil court and the Senior Subordinate Judge of
Gurgaon who heard it came to the conclusion that
the application made to the Collector for a reference
war barred by time, because the Collector's award
was made on October 25, 1953 and the application
for a reference was made on September 30, 1955.
The learned Subordinate Judge expressed some doubt
as to whether the respondents were entitled to count
the period of the limitation irom the date of knowledge but he held that even if they were entitled to
do so, their date of knowledge must be taken to be
December 24, 1954 on which date they made an
application for interim payment and the application
for reference having been m'lde more than six months
from the date of knowledge, the application was
barred by time within the meaning of the proviso to
s. 18 of the Act.
As to whether it was open to the
civil court to go into the question of limitation the
learned Subordinate .Judge referred to the conflict of
judicial opinion and said that the preponderance of
opinion was in favour of the view that th~ civil court
could go into the question in order to find out whether the reference was competent or not. In this view
of the matter, the learned Subordinate Judge discharged the reference on the ground that it was
incompetent.
It may be mentioned here that the
1943
State of Punjab
v.
Mst. Q<isar J ehan
B•gum
Das, J.
""
SW. " l'wajd
••
Mn. Q_oiw 1'1111•
/J1pn
I.Ju, J,
976 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
Division Bench decision of the Punjab High Court in
Hari Krishan Khoala'a caae ('),was not available to
the learned Subordinate Judge on the day he passed
bis orders. The matter was then to the High Court
on an application in revision by the respondents and
we have already stated that the High Court dealt
with it on the footing of the decision in Hari
Krishan
Khosla's
case (1).
The
High Court
accepted the application in revision, set aside the
order of the learned Subordinate Judge and directed
him to deal with the reference on merits. It is from
this order of the High Court that the appeal has
come to us by special leave.
It is neccssarv at this stage to set out the proviso to s. 18 of the Act :
" ............
Provided that every such application shall be
made;-
•
(a) if the person making it was present or
represented before the Collcctorate at the time
when he made his award. within six weeks from
the date of the Collector's award;
(b) in other cases, within six weeks of the
receipt of the notice from the Collector under
section 12, sub-section (2), or within six months
from the date of the
Collector's
award,
whichever period shall first expire."
Assuming that the appellant can raise the grou~d
of limitation, the first question before us
is,
whether the application made on September 30, 1955
was within time within the meaning of the aforesaid
proviso. Clause (a) of the proviso is clearly not
applicable in the present case, because admittedly
the, respondents were neither present nor were
(I) A.I.R. 1958 Punjab 490.
•
•
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
977
represented before the Collector when the latter made
his award. The first part of cl. (b) is also not
applicable, because the respondents did not receive
any notice from the Collector under sub-s. (2) of s. 12
of the Act. That sub-section requires the Collector
to give immediate notice of his award to such of the
persons interested as are not present personally or by
their representatives when the award is made. Clearly
enough, the respondents herein were entitled to a
notice under sub-s. (2) 'of s. Ll but admittedly no
notice was issued to them.
As to the second part of cl. (b) of the proviso, ·
the true scope and effect thereof was considered by
this court in Raja Harish Chandra's case ('). It was
there
observed
that a literal
and mechanical
construction of the words "six months from the date
of the Collector's award" occurring in the second
part of cl. (b) of the proviso would not be appropriate
and "the knowledge of the party affected by the
award, either actual or constructive, being an essential
requirement of fair play and natural justice, the
expression ...... used in the proviso must mean the
date when the award is either communicated to the
party or is known by him either actually or constructively." Admittedly the award was never communicated to the respondents. Therefore
the question
before us boils down to this. When did the respondents
know the award either actually or constructively ?
Learned counsel for the appellant has placed very
strong reliance on the petition which the respondents
made for interim payment of compensation on
December 24, 1954. He has pointed out that the
learned Subordinate Judge relied on this petition as
showing the respondents' date of knowledge and
there are no reasons why we should take a different
view. It seems clear to us that the ratio of the
,
decision in Raja Harish- Chandra's case (1), is that
the party affected by the award must know it, actually
or constructively and the period of six months will
(I} (1962) I s.c.R. 675.
19$]
Statt of Punja&
y;
Mst, Qa1s.rr Jtfr• a
Ueg'11111
Da •• J.
,,.,
... .., ~-
••
.... LQ•,_I_
a,,,.
D.,, J.
•
978 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
run from the date of that knowledge. Now, know ledge
of the award does not mean a mere knowledge of the
fact that an award has been made. The knowledge
must relate to the essential contents of the award.
These contents may be known either actually or
constructively. If the award is communicated to a
party under s. 12 (2) of the Act, the party must be
obviously fixed with knowledge of the contents of the
award whether he reads it or not. Similarly when
a party is present in court either personally or through
his representative when the award is made by the
Collector, it must be presumed that he knows the
contents of the award. Having regard to the scheme
of the Act we think that knowledge of the award
must mean knowledge of the essential contents of the
award. Looked at from that point of view, we do
not think that it can be inferred from the petition
dated December 24, 1954 that the responden~ had
knowledge of the award. One of the respondents
gave evidence before the learned Subordinate Judge
and she said :
"The application marked as Ex. D-1 was given
by me but the amount of compensation was
not known to me, nor did I know about aquisition of the land. Chaudhari Mohd. Sadiq,
my karinda had told me on the day I filed the
said applicatiqn that the land
had been
acquired by the Government."
This evidence was not seriously contradicted on
brhalf of the appellant and the learned Subordinate
Judge did not reject it.
It is worthy of note that
'before the Collector also the appellant did not
seriously challenge the statement of the respondents
that they came to know of the award on July 22,
1955 the date on which the compensation was paid.
In the reply which the appellant filed before the
•
ltarned Subordinate Judge there was no contradiction
of the avennent that the respondents had come to
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
979
know of the award on July 22, 1955. That being
the position we have come to the conclusion that
", the date of knowledge in this case was July 22, 1955.
•
The application for a reference was clearly made
within six months from that date and was not therefore barred by time within the meaning of the second
part of cl. (b) of the proviso to s. 18 of the Act.
In the view which we have taken on the question of limitation, it is unnecessary for us to decide
the other question as to whether the civil court, on a
reference under s. 18 of the Act, can go into the
question of limitation. We have already stated that
there is a conflict of judicial opinion on that
question. There is on one side a line of decisions
following the decision of the Bombay High Court
in re. Land, Acquisition Act ('), which have held that
the civil court is not debarred from satisfying itself
that the reference which it is called upon to hear is
a valid reference. There is, on the other side, a line
of decisions which say that the jurisdiction of the
civil court is confined to considering and pronouncing
upon any one of the four different objections to an
award under the Act which may have been raised
in the written application for the reference. The
decision of the Allahabad High Court in Secretary of
State v. Bhagwan Prasad ('), is typical of this line of
decisions.
There is thus a marked conflict of j udi-
-·dal opinion on the question. This conflict, we think,
must be resolved in a more appropriate case on a
future occasion. - In the case befo:e us the qutstion
does not really arise and is merely academic and we
prefer not to decide the question in the present case.
For the reasons given above, we would dismiss
the appeal with costs.
Appeal dismissed .
(I) (1905) LL.n. 30 Bom'>'Y 275.
(21 11"20: J.L.R. ~2 Alla'iabad 9R,
J9o3
Sta11 ef Prmjii6
v.
Mst. Qoisar Jt/uJJo
Br gum
Das, J.