# Stat• qf B0111bay v. Atma Ram Sridhar Vaidya - **Citation:** [1951] 1 S.C.R. 167 - **Court:** Supreme Court of India - **Decided:** 1951 - **Case number:** Criminal Application No. 807 of 1950 - **Bench:** Shri Harilal Kania C.J, Saiyid Fazl Ali, PATANJALI SAsTRr; MuKHERJEA, DAs, Chandrasekhara Aiyar - **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/stat-qf-b0111bay-v-atma-ram-sridhar-vaidya-173 - **Pages:** 46 ## Headnote Constitution of fodia, Arts. 21, 22 (5)-Preventive detention -Duty to communicate grounds and to afford opportunity to make representation-Whether distinct rights-Ground supplied vague -Non-supply of particulars or supply of particulars at later st.7ge -Whether vitiates dttention-furisdiction of court to consider sufficiency of grounds-Preventive Detention A.ct (IV of 1950), s. 3. The respondent was arrested on the 21st of April, 195(), under the Preventive Detention Act, 1950, and on the 29th of 19Sl Col. D. I. Mil() Phersott v. M. N. APflanM and ANJtlrer. Fazl Ali]. 1951 Jan. 25. 1951 Stat• qf B0111bay v. .Atma Ram Sridhar Vaidya. 168 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1951] April, 1950, he was mpplied with the ground for his detention which. was as iollo~·s ; "That you are engaged and are likely to he cng:iged in pron1oting: acts of sabotage on railway and r:tihvay property . in Greater Bombay." The respondent filed a habsas corpus petition contending that the ground supplied was vague as it did not 1ncntion the time, place or nature of the s~botage or how the respondent promoted it and that as the ground gave nc particulars, his detention was illegal. Pending the_ disposal of the petition, the Con1missioner of Police sent a comn1unica<:ion to the respondent giving these further particulars, viz., that the activities 1nentioned in the grounds supplied to him ·.vcre being tarried on by };im in Greater Bombay between January, 19S(J, and the d.tte of h~s detention and that he will in all probability continue to do so. The High Court of Bombay held th•t if the,;e particulars had been furnished at the time when the grounds were furnished on the 29th of· April, 1950, very likely they would have come to the conclusion that the grounds were such as would have led the ATANJAU SAsTa! and DAs JJ.-As the power to issue a detention order depends upon the existence of a state of mind in the detaining authority, that is,. its satisfaction, which is purely a · subjective condition and judicial enquiry into the sufficiency of the grounds to justify ilie detention . is thus excluded, it would be wholly inconsistent with the scheme to hold that it is open to the· court to examine tho sufficiency of the same grounds to enable · the person detained to make a representation, for, the grounds to be communicated to the person detained are the grounds on which the order has been made. There is further nothing in Art. 22, cl. (5), to warrant the view that the grounds on which the order of detention has been made must be such, that when communicated to the person they are found by a cour: of law to be sufficient to enable him to make what the court considers to be an adequate representation, or that the latter part of cl. ( 5) confers a distinct right on the detenue or an independent obligation on . the detaining authority to furniSh the detcnue with sufficient particulars and details to enable him to make an effective representation. · Held by the Full Court (KANIA ,C.J., FAzL Au, PATANJAU SASTRI, MuKHERJEA DAs and CHANDRASEKHARA A1YYAR JJ.)- ln any view, on the facts of the case there was no infringement of any fundamental right of the respondent or contravention of any constitutional provision as he had been s,upplicd with sufficient particulars as soon as he raised the objection that the grounds supplied were vague and the respondent was not, therefore, entitled to be released. Per (KANIA C.J., FAzL Au, MuKHERJEA and CHANDRASEKHARA A1YAR JJ.)-The "grounds for making the order which have to be communicated to the person detained .1s soon as may be arc conclusions of facts and not a complete recita! of all the facts. These grounds must be in existence when the order is made. No part of the grounds can be held back, and after they have been once conveyed there can be no addition to the grounds. All facts leading to the conclusion constituting the ground need not, however, be conveyed at the same time. If a second communication contains no further conclusion of fact but only furnishes some of the facts on which the first mentioned conclusion was founded it does not amount to a fresh ground. The test th~reforc is whether what is conveyed in the second communication is a statement of facts or events, which facts or 1951 Stot1 qf Bombay v. Atma Ram SriJAar Vaidya. J95J Staie qf Bomba7 v. Atma Ram Sridhar Vaidya. EaniaC. ]. 170 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1951] events were already taken into consideration in arriving at the conclusion constituting the ground already supplied. So long as the later communications do not make out a new ground, their contents are no infringement of the two procedural rights of the r the appellant. A. S. R. Chari and Bava Shiv Charan Singh for the respondent. 1951. Jan. 25. The judgment of Kania C.J., Faz! Ali, Mukherjea and Chandrasekhara Aiyar JJ. was delivered by Kania C.J. Patanjali Sastri and Dass JT. delivered separate judgments. KANIA C. J.-This is an appeal from.a judgment of the High Court at Bombay, ordering the release of the respondent who was detained in custody under a detention order made under the Preventive Detention Act (IV of 1950). The respondent was first arrested on the 18th December, 1948, under the Bombay S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 171 Public Security Measures Act, 1948 (Bombay Act IV of 1947), but was released on the 11th of November, 1949. He was arrested again on the 21st of April, 1950, under the Preventive Detention Act, 1950, and on the 29th of April, 1950, grounds for his detention were supplied to him. They were in the following terms : "That you are engaged and are likely to be engaged in promoting acts of sabotage ori railway and railway property in Greater Bombay." The respondent. filed a habeas corpus petition on the 31st of July, 1950, in which, after reciting his previous arrest and release, in paragraphs 6 and 7 he mentioned as follows:- "(6) On his release the applicant left Bombay and stayed out of Bombay, that is, in Ratlam and in Delhi. (7) On the 20th April, 1950, he returned to Bombay and was immediately arrested as stated above." He contended that the sole aim of the Government in ordering his detention was not the preservation of public order or the security of the State, but the locking-up of active trade unionists who belonged to the All-India Trade Union Congress. He contended that the ground is "delightfully vague and does not mention when, where or what kind of sabotage or how the applicant promoted it." He further urged that the ground gave no particulars and therefore was not a ground as required to be furnished under the Preventive Detention Act, 1950. He stated that the present appellant acted mala fide, for a collateral purpose, - outside the scope of the Act, and that the applicant's detention in any event was illegal and mala fide. When this petition was presented to the Court on the 9th of August, 1950, it directed the issue of a notice to the Commissioner of Police. Pending the disposal of the Rule, on the 26th August, 1950, the Commissioner of Police sent a communication .to the respondent as follows: "In pursuance of section 7 of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950 (Act IV of 1950), and in continuation of my communication No. 227 dated the 29th April, 4-1 S. C. India/68 t95J $tale qf Bom6ay v. Atma Ram SritllitW V aitfyo. KanioC. J1 1951 Stoi.~ Bom6ay v. Abrut Ram Sridhar Yaidy•. KaaiaC.J. 172 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1951] 1950, the following further particulars arc hereby communicated to you in connection with the grounds on which a detention order has been made against you under sub-section (1) of section 3 of the said Act:- That the activities mentioned in the grounds furnished to . you were being carried on by you in Greater Bombay between January 1950 and the date of your detention; and In all probability you will continue to do so. 2. If, in view of the particulars now supplied, you wish to make a further representation against the order under which you are detained, you should address it to the Government of :SOmbay and forward it through the Superintendent of Arthur Road Prison, Bombay." On the 30th of August, 1950, the Commissioner of Police filed an affidavit against the petition of the respondent in which it was stated that the objectionable activities were carried on by the applicant between the months of January, 1950, and the date of detention. It further stated that in or about the month of January, 1950, there was a move for a total strike on the railways in India in the month of March, 1950, and the applicant was taken prominent part to sec that the strike was brought about and was successful. As a means to make the strike successful and bring about total cessation of work on all railways, the applicant and his associates were advocating sabotage on railways and railway property in Greater Bombay. He further stated that reliable materials were put before him of the respondent being engaged in such activities by experienced police officers. He added that although the railway strike in the month of March did not materialise, the idea of bringing about such strike as soon as convenient continued to be entertained and the present respondent was actively engaged in bringing about such- a strike in the near future. He then stated that the disclosure of further facts relating to the activities of the dctcnuc was against public "interest. In para. 6 there was a· specific denial that J S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 173 the respondent, after his release· in Novcrnber, 1949, and till 20th April, 1950, was out of Bombay. It was stated that he used to go out of Bombay at times but during the major part of the period he was in the city of Bombay. When the matter came up before a Bench of the High Court the respondent's petition was granted. In the judgment of the Court, Chagla C. J. observed: "It is clear by reason of the view we have taken in several cases under section 491 · of the Criminal Procedure Code, that this is not a ground which would enable the detenue to make a representation to which he is entitled both under the Act and under the Constitution." After noticing the affidavit of the Commissioner of Police, it was further observed : "We appreciate the fact that, after our decision was given, Government decided to place all the materials before us so that we should be satisfied that what influenced the detaining authority in making the order was not any ulterior motive but that ample materials were at the disposal of the detaining authority which would justify the applicant's detention. We have looked at this affidavit and we have also looked at the particulars furnished to us by Mr. Chudasama. ·If these particulars had been furnished at the time when the grounds were furnished on the 29th of April, 1950, very likely we would have come to the conclusion that the grounds were such as would have led the detenue to know exactly what he was charged with and to make a proper representation." The judgment is however based on the following observation of the Chief Justice : "A new and important question arises for our consideration; and that is whether it is permissible to the detaining authority to justify the detention by amplifying and improving the grounds originally furnished ........ The only grounds which we have to consider and which were furnished in the purported compliance of article 22(5) were the grounds furnished to the detenue on the 29th of April, 1950; and if these grounds were not such as to enable the detenue to make a proper representation, then there was a 1951 Slate ef B11111t•.1 v. Atma Ram Sridhar Y 11;,/ya. Xallill C.]. 1951 Sttdt ef Bomhay v. Atma Ram Srfr!krzr Jl nU!ya. Kania C. J. 174 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1951] violation of the fundamental right and a contravention of the statutory provisions. That violation and that contravention cannot be set right by the detaining authority by amplifying or improving the grounds already given. As we said before, the point of time at which we have to decide whether there was a compliance or not with the provisions of article 22(5) is the 29th of April, 1950, when the grounds were furnished, and not when further and better particulars were given on the 26th of August 1950." The learned Attorney-General, appearing for the appellant, has strenuously objected to this line of approach. As the question of vagueness of grounds for the order of detention and the question whether supplementary grounds could be furnished after the grounds were first given to the detenue have arisen in various High Courts,' we think it right that the general principles should be properly appreciated. The Constitution of India has given legislative powers to the States and the Central Government to pass laws permitting preventive detention. In order that a legislation permitting preventive detention may not be contended to be an inJlringement of the Fundamental Rights provided in Part III of the Constitution, article 22 lays down the permissible limits of legislation empowering preventive detention. Article 22 prescribes the minimum procedure that must be included in any law permitting preventive detention and as and when such requirements are not observed the detention, even if valid ab initio, ceases to be "in accordance with procedure established by law" and infringes the fundamental right of the detenue guaranteed under articles 21 and 22(5) of the Constitution. In that way the subject of preventive detention has been brought into the chapter on Fundamental Rights. In the present case we are concerned only with clauses (5) and ( 6) of article 22 which run as follows :- 22. "(5) When any person is detained in pursuance of an order made under any law providing for preventive detention, the authority making the order shall, S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 175 as soon as may be, communicate to such person the ground on which the order has lx;en made an~ shall afford him the earliest opporturuty of making a representation against the order. ( 6) Nothing in clause (5) shall require the authority making any such order as is referred to in that clause to disclose facts which such authority considers to be against the public interest to disclose." It has to be borne in mind that the legislation in question is not an emergency legislation. The powers of preventive detention under this Act of 1950 are in addition to those contained in the Criminal Procedure Code, where preventive detention is followed by an inquiry or trial. By its very nature, preventive detention is aimed at preventing the commission of an offence or preventing the detained person from achieving a certain end. The authority making the order therefore cannot always be in possession of full detailed information when it passes the order and the information in its possession may fall far short of legal proof of any specific offence, although it may be indicative of a strong probability of the impending commission of a prejudicial act. Section 3 of the Preventive Detention Act therefore requires that the Central Government or the State Government must be satisfied with respect to any person that with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to ( 1) the defence of India, the relations of India with foreign powers, or the 1 security of India, or (2) the security of the state or the maintenance of public order, or (3) the maintenance of supplies of and services essential to the community .......... it is necessary so to do, make an order directing that such person be detained. According to the wording of section 3 therefore before the Government can pass an order of preventive detention it must be satisfied with respect · to the individual person that his activities arc directed against one or other of the three objects mentioned in the section, and that the detaining authority was satisfied that it . was necessary to prevent him from 1951 State qf Bombay v. AtmaRawa Sridhar Yail/ya. Kania C.J. 1951 St"1e qf BDmbay "· Atmallam Sridhar Vaidya. KaniaC.J. 176 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1951] acting in such a manner. The wording of the section thus clearly shows that it is the satisfaction of the Central Government or the State Government on the point which alo'ne is necessary to be established. It is significant that while the objects intended to be defeated are mentioned, the different methods, acts or omissions by which that can be done are not mentioned. as it is not humanly possible to give such a~ exhaustive list. The satisfaction of the Government however must be based on some grounds. There can be no satisfaction if there are no grounds for the same. There may be a divergence of opinion as to whether certain grounds are sufficient to bring about the satisfaction required by the section. One person may think one way, another the other way. If, therefore, the grounds on which it is stated that the Central Government or the State Government was satisfied are such as a rational human being can consider connected in some manner with the objects which were to be prevented from being attained, the question of satisfaction except on the ground of mala fides cannot be challenged in a court. Whether in a particular case the grounds are sufficient or not, according to the opinion of any person or body other than the Central Government or the State Government, is ruled out by the wording of the section. It is not for the court to sit in the place of the Central Government or the State Government and try to determine if it would have come to the same conclusion as the Central or the State Government. As has been generally obsen·ed. this is a matter for the subjective decision of the Government and that cannot be substituted by an objective test in a court of law. Such detention orden are passed on information and materials which may not be strictly admissible as evidence under the Evidence Act in a court, but which the law, taking into consideration the needs and exigencies of administration, has allowed to be considered sufficient for the subjective decision of the Government. An order having been so permitted to ~e made, the next step to be considered is, has the detamed person S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 17'1 any say in the matter? In the chapter on Fundamental Rights, the Constitution of India, having given every citizen a right of freedom of movement, speech, etc., with their relative limitations prescribed in the different articles in Part III, has considered the position of a person detained under an order made under a Preventive Detention A1=t. Three things are expressly considered. In article 22(5) it is first considered that the man so detained has a right to be given as soon as may be the grounds on which the order has been made. He may otherwise remain in custody without having the least idea as to why his liberty has been taken away. This is considered an elementary right in a free democratic State, Having received the grounds for the order of detention, the next point which is considered is, 'but that is not enough; what is the good of the man merely knowing grounds for his detention if he cannot take steps to redress a wrong which I1e thinks has been committed either in belief in the grounds or in making the order." The clause therefore further provides that the detained person should have the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order. The representation has to be against the order of detention because the grounds are only steps for the satisfaction of the Government on which satisfaction the order of detention has been made. The third thing provided is in clause (6). It appears to have been thought that in conveying the information to the detained person there may be facts which cannot be disclosed in the public interest. The authorities are therefore left with a discretion in that connection under clause (6). The grounds which form the basis of satisfaction when formulated are bound to · contain certain facts, but mostly they are themselvea deductions of facts from facts. That is the general structure of article 22, clauses (5) and (6), of the Constitution. The question arising for discussion is what should be stated in the grounds. It is argued that whatever may be stated or omitted to be stated, the ground c.'\Illlot be vague; that the Constitution envisages the 195{ State of Bomba.1 v. Att114 Ra• Sridhar Vaidya. KaniaC. J. 195! Stat< ef Bom••.1 Atma Ram Sridhar Vaidya. EaniaC.j. 178 SUPRF.ME COURT REPORTS [1951] furnishing of the grounds once and therefore there . is no occasion for furnishing particulars or supplemental grounds at a later stage;. and that article 22(5) does not give the detained person a right to ask for particulars, nor does it give the authorities any right to supplement the grounds, once they have furnished the same. In our opinion much of the controversy is based on a somewhat loose appreciation of the meaning of the words used in the discussion. We think that the position will be clarified if it is appreciated in the first instance what are the rights given by article 22 (5). The first pan of article 22, clause (5), gives a right to the detained person to be furnished with "the grounds on which the order has been made" and that has to be done "as soon as may be." The second right given to such persons is of being afforded "the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order." It is obvious that the grounds for making the order as mentioned above, are the grounds on which the detaining authority was satisfied . that it was necessary to make the order. These grounds therefore must be ·in existence when the order is made. By their very nature the grounds are conclusions of facts and not a complete detailed recital of all the facts. The conclusions drawn from the available facts will show in which of the three categories of prejudical acts the suspected activity of the particular person is considered to fall. These conclusions are the "grounds" and they must be supplied. No part of such "grounds" can be held back nor can any more "grounds" be added thereto. What must be supplied are the "grounds on which the order has been made" and nothing less. The second right of being afforded the "earliest opponunity of making a representation against the order" is not confined to only a physical opportunity by supplying paper and pen only. In order that a representation can be made the person detained must first have knowledge of the grounds on which the authorities conveyed that they were satisfied about the necessity of making the detention order. It is therefore clear that if the representation has to be intelligible to meet the charges S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 179 contained in the grounds, the information conveyed to the detained person must be sufficient to attain that object. Ordinarily, the "grounds" in the sense of conclusions drawn by the authorities will indicate the kind of prejudicial act the detenue is suspected of being engaged in and that will be sufficient to enable him to make a representation setting out his innocent activities to dispel the suspicion against him. Of course if the detenue is told about the details of facts besides the grounds he will certainly be in a better position to deal with the same. It is significant that the clause does not say that the "grounds" as well as details of facts on which they are based must be furnished or furnished at one time. The law does not prescribe within what time after the grounds are furnished the representation could be made. The time in each case appears deliberately unprovided for expressly, because circumstances vary in each case and make it impossible to fix a particular time for the exercise of each of these two rights. It thus appears clear that although both these rights are separate and are to be exercised . at different times, they are still connected with each other. Without getting information sufficient to make a representation against the order of detention it is not possible for the man to make the representation. Indeed the right will be only illusory but not a real right at all. The right to receive the grounds is independent but it is thus intentionally bound up and connected with the right t<> make the representation. Although these two rights are thus linked up, the contingency of further communication between the furnishing of the grounds on which the order is made and the exercise of the right of representation granted by the second part of · that clause is not altogether excluded. One thing is clear from the wording of this clause and that is that after the grounds are once conveyed to the detenue there can be no addition to the grounds. The grounds being the heads, from which the Government was satisfied that it was necessary to pass the order of detention, there can be no addition to those 1951 State of Bombay v. Atma Ram Sriihar Y aitlya, Ka11iaC.J. 1951 State of Bombay v. Atma RIJln Sridhar Vait(ya. .Kania C. ]. 180 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1951 J grounds because such additional grounds will be either the grounds which were not elements to bring about the satisfaction of the Government or if thev were such grounds there has been a breach of the provision of the first part of article 22(5), as those grounds for the · order of detention were not conveyed to the detained person "as soon as may be." This however does not mean that all facts leading to the conclusion mentioned in the grounds must be conveyed to the detained person at the same time the grounds are conveyed to him. The facts on which the conclusion mentioned in the grounds are based must be available to the Government, but there may be cases where there is delay or difficulty in collecting the exact data or it may not be convenient to set out all the facts in the first communieation. If the second communication contains no further conclusion of fact from facts, but only furnishes all or some of the facts on which the· first mentioned conclusion was founded it is obvious that no fresh ground for which the order of detention was made is being furnished to the detained person by the second communication which follows some time after the first communication. As regards the contents of that communication therefore the test appears to be whether what is conveyed in the second communication is a statement of facts or events, which facts or events were already taken into consideration in arriving at the conclusion included in the ground already supplied. If the later communication contains facts leading to a conclusion which is outside the ground first supplied, the same cannot be looked into as supporting the order of detention and therefore those grounds arc "new" grounds. In our opinion that is the more appropriate expression to be used. The expression "additional grounds" seems likely to lead to confusion of thought. The next point to be considered is the time factor. If a second communication becomes necessary, when should it be made? Clause 22 (5) lays down two time factors. The first is that the grounds should be supplied "as soon as may be" This allows the S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 1Rt authorities reasonable time to formulate the grounds on the materials in their possession. The time element is necessarily left indeterminate because acti~ities of individuals tending to bring about a certain result may be spread over a l