# STATE BANK OF PATIALA AND ANOTHER v. RAM NIWAS BANSAL (DEAD) THROUGH LRS

- **Citation:** [2014] 3 S.C.R. 984
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 2014-03-03
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 239 of 2003
- **Bench:** H.L. Gokhale, Dipak Misra
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/state-bank-of-patiala-and-another-v-ram-niwas-bansal-dead-through-lrs-29816
- **Pages:** 42

## Headnote

SERVICE LAW:
C
Disciplinary proceedings - Punishment of dismissal from
service on 23.4.1985 - Full Bench of High Court ordered
reinstatement on the ground that non-supply of enquiry report
had caused serious prejudice to the delinquent employee and
on that basis set aside the order of punishment and directed
0 the disciplinary authority to grant an opportunity to the
employee to reply to enquiry report and pass appropriate
orders after granting personal hearing to him - The Bank
completed the disciplinary proceedings and passed an order
of dismissal with retrospective effect - Challenged - Held: The
direction of Full Bench of High Court for reinstatement was a
E direction for reinstatement for the purpose of holding a fresh
enquiry from the stage of furnishing the report and no more -
The Bank passed an order of dismissal on 22.11.2001 with
effect from 23. 4. 1985 - On the face of the said order, it is
absolutely unacceptable that the Bank in 2001 can pass an
F order with effect from 23. 4. 1985 which would amount to
annulment of the earlier judgment of the Full Bench of High
Court - When on the date of non-furnishing of the enquiry
report, the delinquent officer was admittedly not under
suspension, but was in service, fie would continue in service
G till he is dismissed from service in accordance with law or
superannuated in conformity with the Regulations - The order
of removal cannot be made retrospective.
H
984
STATE BANK OF PATIALA v. RAM NIWAS BANSAL 985
(DEAD) THROUGH LRS.
STATE BANK OF PAT/ALA (OFFICERS') SERVICE A
REGULATIONS, 1979:
Regulation 19(1), provisos - Date of superannuation -
Entitlement to back wages - Whether till the date of
superannuation or till the date of dismissal - Held: The first
B
proviso to Regulation 19(1) states that the period of service
can be extended by the discretion of the competent authority
and such extension has to be desirable in the interest of the
Bank - Unless an extension is granted by a positive or an
affirmative act by the competent authority, an officer of the
C
Bank retires on attaining age of 58 years or upon the
completion of 30 years of service, whichever occurs first -
Order of dismissal was passed on 22. 11.2001 while the
employee completed 30 years of service on 25.2.1992 - The
claim for grant of full salary for the whole period till the order
of removal is, therefore, not sustainable as the officer stood
D
superannuated on completion of 30 years - His continuance
by virtue of the order passed by the High Court has to be
treated as a deemed continuance for the purposes of
finalization of the disciplinary proceeding only.
E
The delinquent employee was bank officer in the
appellant-bank. He was charge-sheeted in the year 1980.
for certain financial irregularities. Two supplementary.
charge-sheet were also issued to him in 1981 and 1982.
The Enquiry Officer submitted his report to the General
F
Manager of the Bank holding that certain charges had
been proved, some. charges had been partly proved and
some charges had not been proved. The disciplinary
authority concurred with the findings recorded by the
Enquiry Officer and gave recommendation for removal of G
the delinquent officer from the Bank's service to the
appointing authority in accord with the terms of
Regulation 68(1 )(ii) of the State Bank of Patiala (Officers')
Service Regulations, 1979. The appointing authority
agreeing with the findings recorded by the Enquiry
H
986
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2014] 3 S.C.R.
A Officer and the recommendations of the disciplinary
authority, imposed the penalty of removal by order dated
23.4.1985. The order imposing punishment of removal
and a copy of the enquiry report was sent to the
delinquent who then unsuccessfully who filed an appeal
B under Regulation 70 of the 1979 Regulations. He then
filed writ petition before the High Court.
On 22.5.1998, the Full Bench of the High Court held
that non-supply of comments of the General Manager had
C caused serious prejudice to the delinquent

## Text

_Characters 0–39,992 of 82,893. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39992 for what follows._

[2014] 3 S.C.R. 984
A
STATE BANK OF PATIALA AND ANOTHER
B
v.
RAM NIWAS BANSAL (DEAD) THROUGH LRS.
(Civil Appeal No. 239 of 2003)
MARCH 3, 2014
[H.L. GOKHALE AND DIPAK MISRA, JJ.]
SERVICE LAW:
C
Disciplinary proceedings - Punishment of dismissal from
service on 23.4.1985 - Full Bench of High Court ordered
reinstatement on the ground that non-supply of enquiry report
had caused serious prejudice to the delinquent employee and
on that basis set aside the order of punishment and directed
0 the disciplinary authority to grant an opportunity to the
employee to reply to enquiry report and pass appropriate
orders after granting personal hearing to him - The Bank
completed the disciplinary proceedings and passed an order
of dismissal with retrospective effect - Challenged - Held: The
direction of Full Bench of High Court for reinstatement was a
E direction for reinstatement for the purpose of holding a fresh
enquiry from the stage of furnishing the report and no more -
The Bank passed an order of dismissal on 22.11.2001 with
effect from 23. 4. 1985 - On the face of the said order, it is
absolutely unacceptable that the Bank in 2001 can pass an
F order with effect from 23. 4. 1985 which would amount to
annulment of the earlier judgment of the Full Bench of High
Court - When on the date of non-furnishing of the enquiry
report, the delinquent officer was admittedly not under
suspension, but was in service, fie would continue in service
G till he is dismissed from service in accordance with law or
superannuated in conformity with the Regulations - The order
of removal cannot be made retrospective.
H
984
STATE BANK OF PATIALA v. RAM NIWAS BANSAL 985
(DEAD) THROUGH LRS.
STATE BANK OF PAT/ALA (OFFICERS') SERVICE A
REGULATIONS, 1979:
Regulation 19(1), provisos - Date of superannuation -
Entitlement to back wages - Whether till the date of
superannuation or till the date of dismissal - Held: The first
B
proviso to Regulation 19(1) states that the period of service
can be extended by the discretion of the competent authority
and such extension has to be desirable in the interest of the
Bank - Unless an extension is granted by a positive or an
affirmative act by the competent authority, an officer of the
C
Bank retires on attaining age of 58 years or upon the
completion of 30 years of service, whichever occurs first -
Order of dismissal was passed on 22. 11.2001 while the
employee completed 30 years of service on 25.2.1992 - The
claim for grant of full salary for the whole period till the order
of removal is, therefore, not sustainable as the officer stood
D
superannuated on completion of 30 years - His continuance
by virtue of the order passed by the High Court has to be
treated as a deemed continuance for the purposes of
finalization of the disciplinary proceeding only.
E
The delinquent employee was bank officer in the
appellant-bank. He was charge-sheeted in the year 1980.
for certain financial irregularities. Two supplementary.
charge-sheet were also issued to him in 1981 and 1982.
The Enquiry Officer submitted his report to the General
F
Manager of the Bank holding that certain charges had
been proved, some. charges had been partly proved and
some charges had not been proved. The disciplinary
authority concurred with the findings recorded by the
Enquiry Officer and gave recommendation for removal of G
the delinquent officer from the Bank's service to the
appointing authority in accord with the terms of
Regulation 68(1 )(ii) of the State Bank of Patiala (Officers')
Service Regulations, 1979. The appointing authority
agreeing with the findings recorded by the Enquiry
H
986
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2014] 3 S.C.R.
A Officer and the recommendations of the disciplinary
authority, imposed the penalty of removal by order dated
23.4.1985. The order imposing punishment of removal
and a copy of the enquiry report was sent to the
delinquent who then unsuccessfully who filed an appeal
B under Regulation 70 of the 1979 Regulations. He then
filed writ petition before the High Court.
On 22.5.1998, the Full Bench of the High Court held
that non-supply of comments of the General Manager had
C caused serious prejudice to the delinquent officer and
there was denial of fair and reasonable opportunity and
on that basis set aside the order of punishment. However,
it directed the disciplinary authority to grant an
opportunity to the respondent to reply to the enquiry
report and pass appropriate orders after granting
D personal hearing to him in accordance with law. The
appellant-Bank challenged the said order before the
Supreme Court. On 12.4.1999, Supreme Court directed
stay of reinstatement of the respondent with the direction
that the Bank would comply with the provisions of
E Section 17-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. It was
further observed that the Bank and its functionaries
would be at liberty to proceed with the enquiry in terms
of the permission granted by the High Court and any
decision taken would be without prejudice to the outcome
F of the appeal.
On 20.8.1999 the Bank filed application for
modification of the order dated 12.4.1999 on the ground
that Section 17-B of the Act was not applicable. On
G 6.12.1999, the Supreme Court, leaving the question of law
open, dismissed the appeal of Bank. The Bank in
compliance with the order dated 22.5.1998 passed by the
Full Bench of the High Court, sent a copy of the enquiry
report to the employee wherein it was mentioned that he
should appear before the disciplinary authority on the
H
STATE BANK OF PATIALA v. RAM NIWAS BANSAL 987
(DEAD) THROUGH LRS.
date fixed for personal hearing. The respondent filed an A
application CM No. 1965 of 2001 seeking clarification of
the order dated 22.5.1998 with a further direction to the
Bank to reinstate him in service with full back wages.
During the pendency of the said application in the writ
petition the appointing authority passed the order of B
removal on 22.11.2001 with effect from 23.4.1985.
On 23.11.2001, CM No. 1965 of 2001 was disposed of
by the Full Bench by the impugned order wherein it was
held that the delinquent officer was never placed under C
suspension; that after the order of dismissal of his
service dated 25.4.1985 was set aside by the Court on
22.5.1998, the disciplinary authority has neither
concluded the disciplinary proceedings nor has it passed
any other appropriate order for the reasons best known
to the concerned authority.
D
The three issues for consideration in the instant
appeal were, (i) whether the employer Bank could have,
in law, passed an order of dismissal with retrospective
effect; (ii) whether the delinquent officer stood E
superannuated after completion of thirty years as
provided under the Regulations on 25.2.1992; and (iii)
whether the legal heirs of the deceased-employee are
entitled to get the entire salary computed till the actual
passing of the order of dismissal, that is, 22.11.2001 or F
for that matter till the date of superannuation, that is,
25.2.1992.
Disposing of the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1. The judgment by Full Court passed on
~
22.5.1998 had attained finality inter se parties. The Full
Bench took note of the fact that the report of the enquiry
officer was not furnished to the delinquent officer as a
result of whi~h he was deprived of the benefit of knowing
the contents of the report and submitting his version with H
988
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2014] 3 S.C.R.
A regard to the correctness of the findings of the enquiry
report. The High Court opined that the delinquent officer
had suffered serious prejudice. Thereafter, the Court
referred to the order of punishment passed by the
Managing Director which apparently showed that the
B recommendations of the General Manager (Operation)
were taken into consideration. The said direction of Full
Court for reinstatement is a direction for reinstatement for
the purpose of holding a fresh enquiry from the stage of
furnishing the report and no more. The direction for
c reinstatement was stayed by the Supreme Court. The
Bank proceeded to comply with the order of the High
Court from the stage of reply of enquiry. The High Court
by the impugned order had directed payment of back
wages to the delinquent officer from the date of dismissal
0
till passing of the appropriate order in the di~ciplinary
proceeding/superannuation of the petitioner therein
whichever is earlier. The Bank has passed an order of
dismissal on 22.11.2001 with effect from 23.4.1985. On the
earlier round the punishment was set aside and direction
for reinstatement was passed. Thus, on the face of the
E said order it is absolutely inexplicable and unacceptable
that the Bank in 2001 can pass an order with effect from
23.4.1985 which would amount to annulment of the
judgment of the earlier Full Bench. As has been held by
the High Court in the impugned judgment that when on
F the date of non-furnishing of the enquiry report the
delinquent officer was admittedly not under suspension,
but was in service and, therefore, he would continue in
service till he is dismissed from service in accordance
with law or superannuated in conformity with the
G Regulations. The order of removal cannot be made
retrospective. [para 27, 30) [1011-D-F; 1014-H; 1015-A-G]
Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad v. B. Karunakar
and Ors. (1993) 4 SCC 727: 1993 (2) Suppl. SCR 576 R.
H Jeevaratnam v. State of Madras AIR 1966 SC 951: 1966 SCR
STATE BANK OF PATIALA v. RAM NIWAS BANSAL 989
(DEAD) THROUGH LRS.
404 - relied on.
A
The Gujarat Mineral Development Corporation v. Shri
P.H. Brahmbhatt (1974) 3 SCC 601: 1974 (2) SCR 128; P.H.
Kalyani v. Mis. Air France, Calcutta AIR 1963 SC 1756 :
1964 SCR 104 ; Mis. Sasa Musa Sugar Works (P) Ltd. v.
B
Shobrati Khan AIR 1959 SC 923: 1959 Suppl. SCR 836;
Management of Ranipur Colliery v. Bhuban Singh AIR 1959
SC 833: 1959 Suppl. SCR 719; R. Thiruvirkolam v.
Presiding Officer and Anr. (1997) 1 SCC 9: 1996 (8) Suppl.
SCR 687; Gujarat Steel Tubes Limited and Ors. v. Gujarat C
Steel Tubes Mazdoor Sabha and Ors. (1980) 2 SCC 593:
1980 (2) SCR 146; Punjab Dairy Development Corporation
Ltd. and Anr. v. Kala Singh and Ors. (1997) 6 SCC 159: 1997
(1) Suppl. SCR 235; Desh Raj Gupta v. Industrial Tribunal
IV, U.P. (1991) 1 sec 249: 1990 (1) Suppl. SCR 411;
Vishweshwaraiah Iron and Steel Ltd. v. Abdul Gani and Ors.
D
AIR 1998 SC 185: (1997) 8 SCC 713; Vishweshwaraiah Iron
and Steel Ltd. v. Abdul Gani and Ors. (2002) 10 SCC 437;
Pradip Chandra Parija v. Pramod Chandra Patnaik (2002) 1
SCC 1: 2001 (5) Suppl. SCR 460 ; Engineering Laghu
Udyog Employees' Union v. Judge,Labour Court and E
Industrial Tribunal and Anr. (2003) 12 SCC 1: 2003 (6) Suppl.
SCR 253; Workmen v. Motipur Sugar Factory AIR 1965 SC
1803: 1965 SCR 588; Workmen v. Firestone Tyre & Rubber
Co. of India (P) Ltd. (1973) 1 SCC 813: 1973 (3) SCR 587;
Jaipur Zila Sahakari Bhoomi Vikas Bank Ltd. v. Ram Gopal F
Sharma and Ors. (2002) 2 SCC 244: 2002 (1) SCR 284;
Punjab Beverages (P) Ltd. v. Suresh Chand (1978) 2 SCC
144: 1978 (3) SCR 370 - referred to.
2.1. The first proviso to Regulation 19(1) states that G
the period of service can be extended by the discretion
of the competent authority and such extension has to be
desirable in the interest of the Bank. The second proviso
provides that an officer who has joined the service of the
bank either as an officer or otherwise on or after 19.7.1969
H
990
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2014] 3 S.C.R.
A and attained the age of 58 years shall not be granted any
further extension in service. By this proviso, the power
of the competent authority in respect of officers who had
joined as officers or otherwise after the cut-off date, i.e.
19.7.1969 and have attained the age of 58 years of service,
B is curtailed. The delinquent officer joined the service as
a clerk in the Bank on 26.2.1962 and was promoted as
Grade-II Officer in 1971 and as Grade-I Officer in 1977.
Even if this provision is extended to him, he could not
have been granted extension of service after completion
C of 58 years of age. The said officer attained the age of 58
years on 24.2.2002. Be that as it may, the grant of
extension is dependent on satisfaction the conditions as
laid down in the first proviso. As is seen from the earlier
round of litigation, the Full Bench had quashed the
0
punishment and directed for reinstatement. In the second
round in CM No. 1965 of 2000 the High Court has directed
that the employee shall continue till passing of the
appropriate orders in the disciplinary proceedings or
superannuated as per rules. It has not commented on the
validity of superannuation in the year 1992 as pleaded by
E the Bank and left it to be agitated in appropriate
proceeding. [Para 32] [1016-F-H; 1017-A-C]
2.2. Regulation 19(2) lays down that if the disciplinary
proceedings have been initiated against an officer during
F the period when he is in service, the said proceedings
can continue even after his retirement at the discretion
of the Managing Director and for the said limited purpose
the officer shall be deemed to be in service. In the case
at hand, the disciplinary proceeding was initiated against
G the delinquent officer while he was in service. The first
order of dismissal was passed on 23.4.1985. The said
order of punishment was set aside by the High Court and
the officer concerned was directed to be reinstated for the
limited purpose, i.e., supply of enquiry report and to
H proceed in the disciplinary proceeding from that stage.
STATE BANK OF PATIALA v. RAM NIWAS BANSAL 991
(DEAD) THROUGH LRS.
The said order was not interfered with by this Court. The
A
Bank continued the proceeding. The said continuance
was in pursuance of the order of the Court. Under these
circumstances, it has to be accepted that the concept of
deemed continuance in service of the officer would have
full play and, therefore, an order of removal could have
B
been passed after finalization of the departmental
proceeding on 22.11.2001. The said order would not have
been made retrospectively operative, but that will not
invalidate the order of dismissal but it would only have
prospective effect. [Paras 34, 38] [1018-C-D; 1020-G-H; c
1021•A-D]
2.3. For the purpos~ of deemed continuance, the
delinquent officer would not be entitled to get any benefit
for the simple reason, i.e., the continuance is only for
finalisation of the disciplinary proceedings, as directed
D
by the Full Bench of the High Court. Hence, the effect and
impact of Regulation 19(1) of the Regulations comes into
full play. On a seemly construction of the first proviso, it
requires an affirmative act by the competent authority, for
it is an exercise of power of discretion and further the
E
said discretion has to be exercised where the grant of
extension is deemed desirable in the interest of the Bank.
As the facts would reveal, in the year 1992 the concerned
officer stood removed from serifice and at that juncture
to expect the Bank in law to intimate him about his date
F
of superannuation or to pass an order would be an
incorrect assumption. The conclusion which appears
logical and acceptable is that unless an extension is
granted by a positive or an affirmative act by the
competent authority, an officer of the Bank retires on
G
attaining age of 58 years or upon the completion of 30
years of service, whichever occurs first. The first proviso
would have full play and it should be apposite to
conclude that the delinquent officer stood superannuated
on completio_n of 30 years of service on 25.2.1992. It is
H
992
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2014] 3 S.C.R.
A because the conditions stipulated under the first proviso
to the said Regulation deal with a conditional situation to
cover certain categories of cases and require an
affirmative act and in the absence of that it is difficult to
hold that the delinquent officer did not retire on
B completion of thirty years of service. [Para 39] [1021-EG, H; 1022-A-B, G-H; 1023-A-B]
UCO Bank and Anr. v. Rajinder Lal Capoor (2007) 6
SCC 694: 2007 (7) SCR 543; Ramesh Chandra Sharma v.
Punjab National Bank and Anr. (2007) 9 SCC 15: 2007 (7)
C SCR 585; State Bank of India v. Ram Lal Bhaskar and Anr.
(2011) 10 SCC 249: 2011 (12) SCR 1036 - relied on.
3. The order of removal from service would come
into effect from the date of passing of the order, i.e.,
0 22.11.2001 as it has to be prospectively operative and,
therefore, as a natural corollary he remained in service
from 23.4.1985 till he attained the age of superannuation,
i.e., 25.2.1992 or till the end of February, 1992, being the
last day of the month. The claim made by employee for
E grant of full salary for the whole period till the order of
removal is not sustainable as the officer stood
superannuated on completion of thirty years and his
continuance by virtue of the order passed by the High
Court has to be treated as a deemed continuance for the
purposes of finalization of the disciplinary proceeding.
F During the continuance of the disciplinary proceeding
the delinquent officer was not put under suspension.
After the order of punishment passed by the disciplinary
authority and affirmed by the appellate authority was
quashed by the High Court on 22.5.1998, the concerned
G officer has to be treated to be in service from his date of
first removal till his date of retirement. Had the Bank
brought to the notice of the Full Bench about the legal
position under the Regulations, in all probability, lhe
matter would have been dealt with differently. Be that as
H it may, grant of salary in entirety for the period as
STATE BANK OF PATIALA v. RAM NIWAS BANSAL 993
(DEAD) THROUGH LRS.
determined to be the period of continuance in service
A
would not be apposite and similarly, the submission
advanced on behalf of the Bank that payment of rupees
five lacs would meet the ends of justice does not deserve
acceptance. Ordinarily, the Bank would have been asked
to pay fifty per cent of the back wages for the period
B
commencing 23.4.1985 till the end of February, 1992, with
some interest but to give quietus to the controversy and,
the Bank is directed to deposit a further sum of rupees
five lacs with the Registrar General of the High Court
within two months hence and the respondents shall be c
entitled to withdraw the same. If the amount earlier
deposited has not been withdrawn by the original
respondent, the same shall also be withdrawn by the
legal heirs. [Paras 40, 41) (1023-C-F; 1024-C-H; 1025-A]
C.L. Verma v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Anr. 1989
D
Supp (2) SCC 437; A.P. State Road Transport Corporation
and Ors. v. Abdul Kareem (2005) 6 SCC 36: 2005 (1) Suppl.
SCR 918; A.P. SRTC and Anr. v. B.S. David Paul (2006) 2
SCC 282: 2006 (1) SCR 2006; J.K. Synthetics Ltd. v. K.P.
Agrawal and Anr. (2007) 2 SCC 433: 2007 (2) SCR 60 •
E
relied on.
Case Law Reference:
1993 (2) Suppl. SCR 576
relied on
Para 9
F
1966 SCR 404
relied on
Para 15
1974 (2) SCR 128
referred to
Para 15
1964 SCR 104
referred to
Para 16
1959 Suppl. SCR 836
referred to
Para 16
G
1959 Suppl. SCR 719
referred to
Para 18
1996 (8) Suppl. SCR 687
referred to
Para 19
1980 (2) SCR 146
referred to
Para 19
H
994
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2014) 3 S.C.R.
A
1997 (1) Suppl. SCR 235
referred to
Para 20
1990 (1) Suppl. SCR 411
referred to
Para 20
(1997) 8 sec 113
referred to
Para 21
B
(2002) 1 o sec 437
referred to
Para 22
2001 (5) Suppl. SCR 460
referred to
Para 22
2003 (6) Suppl. SCR 253
referred to
Para 23
1965 SCR 588
referred to
Para 23
c
1973 (3) SCR 587
referred to
Para 23
2002 (1) SCR 284
referred to
Para 25
1978 (3) SCR 370
referred to
Para 25
D
2007 (7) SCR 543
relied on
Para 34
2007 (7) SCR 585
relied on
Para 35
2011 (12) SCR 1036
relied on
Para 37
E
1989 Supp (2) sec 437
relied on
Para 39
2005 (1) Suppl. SCR 918
relied on
Para 40
2006 (1) SCR 2006
relied on
Para 40
F
2007 (2) SCR 60
relied on
Para 40
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 239
of 2003.
From the Judgment and Order dated 23.11.2001 of the
G High Court for the States of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh
in CM No. 1965 of 2001 in C.W.P. No. 4929 of 1986.
WITH
T.C. (C) No. 79 of 2013.
H
Vil<as Singh, Sanjay Kapur, Lekha Vishwanath, Priyanka
STATE BANK OF PATIALA v. RAM NIWAS BANSAL 995
(DEAD) THROUGH LRS.
Das for the Appellants.
P.S. Patwali (for Nikhil Nayyar) for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delvered by
A
DIPAK MISRA, J. 1. Ram Niwas Bansal, predecessor-inB
interest of the respondents 1 to 4, the legal heirs who have been
brought on record after his death during the pendency of this
appeal, while posted as Accountant at the Narnaul Branch of
the appellant-Bank in the Officer Cadre, was served with a
charge-sheet dated 20.10.1980 for certain financial c
irregularities. Two supplementary charge-sheets dated
15.1.1981 and 8.1.1982 were also issued to the said officer.
After explanation was offered by late Ram Niwas Bansal, the
disciplinary authority appointed an Enquiry Officer who, after
conducting the enquiry, submitted his report to the General o
Manager (Operations) of the Bank holding that certain charges
had been proved, some charges had been partly proved and •
some charges had not been proved. The disciplinary authority
concurred with the findings recorded by the Enquiry O~icer and
recommended for removal of the delinquent officer from the
E
Bank's service to the appointing authority in accord with the
terms of Regulation 68(1 )(ii) of the State Bank of Patiala
(Officers') Service Regulations, 1979 (for short "the 1979
Regulations") and the appointing authority, i.e., Managing
Director, agreeing with the findings recorded by the Enquiry
Officer and the recommendations of the disciplinary authority,
F
imposed the penalty of removal vide order dated 23.4.1985.
The order imposing punishment of removal from service along
with a copy of the enquiry report was sent to late Bansal who
preferred an appeal under Regulation 70 of the 1979
Regulations before the Executive Committee which, vide order
G
dated 18.7.1986, rejected the appeal.
2. Being grieved by the aforesaid orders, he preferred
CWP No. 4929 of 1986 before the High Court for issuance of
a writ of certiorari for quashment of all the orders and for issue
H
996
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2014] 3 S.C.R.
A of appropriate direction to reinstate him in service with full
service benefits. On 1.10.1993 the learned single Judge
referred the matter to the larger Bench and ultimately the matter
was placed before the Full Bench.
B
3. The Full Bench, vide order dated 22.5.1998, ruled that
non-supply of comments of the General Manager had caused
serious prejudice to the delinquent officer and there was denial
of fair and reasonable opportunity and on that basis set aside
the order of punishment. However, it directed the disciplinary
C authority to grant an opportunity to the petitioner therein to reply
to the enquiry report and pass appropriate orders after granting
personal hearing to the petitioner therein in accordance with
law.
4. Dissatisfied with the aforesaid judgment and order, the
D appellant-Bank preferred Special Leave Petition (C) No. 2442
of 1998 and after grant of leave the same was registered as
Civil Appeal No. 773 of 1998. On 12.4.1999 this Court directed
stay of reinstatement of the respondent therein with the
direction that the Bank would comply with the provisions of
E Section 17-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for brevity,
"the Act"'). It was further observed that the Bank and its
functionaries would be at liberty to proceed with the enquiry in
terms of the permission granted by the High Court and any
decision taken would be without prejudice to the outcome of
F the appeal. H may be noted that this order was passed when a
prayer for stay of the contempt proceeding that was initiated
by said Bansal before the High Court was made before this
Court. Be it stated, this Court directed stay of further
proceedings of the contempt petition.
G
5. On 20.8.1999 the Bank filed Interlocutory Application
No. 4 of 1999 for modification of the order dated 12.4.1999
on the ground that Section 17-B of the Act was not applicable.
On 7.9.1999 the employee filed another Contempt Petition No.
396 of 1999 for non-implementation of the order passed by this
H Court. On 6.12.1999 this Court, leaving the question of law
STATE BANK OF PATIALA v. RAM NIWAS BANSAL 997
(DEAD) THROUGH LRS. [DIPAK MISRA, J.]
open, dismissed the civil appeal as well as the contempt
A
petition.
6. As the factual score would further unfold, on 10.7.2000
the Bank in compliance with the order dated 22.5.1998 passed
by the Full Bench of the High Court, sent a copy of the enquiry 8
report to the employee wherein it was mentioned that he should
appear before the disciplinary authority on the date fixed for
personal hearing. lri the meantime, on 24.7.2000 the
application for contempt was dismissed by the High Court on
the foundation that there was no direction for payment of any
C
salary to the employee or grant of any consequential benefits
in the writ petition. Against the aforesaid order, the employee
preferred Special Leave Petition (C) No. 15098 of 2000 and
the same stood dismissed as withdrawn vide order dated
27.9.2000 granting liberty to the employee to approach the High
0
Court for consequential reliefs.
7. On 14.10.2000 CM No. 1965 of 2001 was filed by the
writ petitioner therein seeking clarification of the order dated
22.5.1998 with a further direction to the Bank to reinstate him
in service with full back wages. During the pendency of the said
E
application in the writ petition the appointing authority passed
the order of removal on 22.11.2001 with effect from 23.4.1985.
8. On 23.11.2001 the CM No. 1965 of 2001 was disposed
of by the Full Bench by the impugned order. A contention was
raised by the Bank that the respondent-employee stood
superannuated in the year 1992 after completion of thirty years
of service. The Full Bench, after adverting to the fac_ts in
chronology and referring to the observations made by this-Court
F
in Special Leave Petition No. 15098 of 2000 and placing
reliance on various decisions, took note of certain aspects
G
which we think is necessary to be reproduced: -
"Reverting back to the facts and circumstances of the
present case, it is again not disputed before us that the
delinquent officer was never placed under suspension.
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998
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2014] 3 S.C.R.
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After the order of dismissal of his service dated 25.4.1985
was set aside by the Court on 22.5.1998, the disciplinary
authority has neither concluded the disciplinary
proceedings nor has it passed any other appropriate order
till today, for the reasons best known to the concerned
B
authority. The question before this Court is not whether the
petitioner would or would not stand superannuated in
February, 1992 after serving the Bank for a period of 30
years. This question, in any case, was beyond the purview
and scope of the writ petition itself. Thus, the parties cannot
c
call upon the Full Bench to decide this question in an
application in this Writ Petition. The parties are free to
agitate the question in this regard before the appropriate
proceedings."
9. Thereafter, the Full Bench referred to the decision in
D Managing Director, EC/L, Hyderabad v. B. Karunakar and
others1 and came to hold that:
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F
G
"The Full Bench having decided in no uncertain terms that
serious prejudice was caused to the petitioner in the
departmental proceedings, the Bench set aside the order
of dismissal and remanded the matter to the authorities
concerned granting permission to proceed further in the
departmental enquiry in accordance with law and to pass
appropriate orders. The disciplinary authority has
miserably failed, over a period of more than three years,
to pass any appropriate orders. We are unable to
understand this conduct on the part of the respondentauthorities. Though it has been contended that the
petitioner has superannuated in the year 1992, but
eventually, no copy of such order has been placed on
record of this Court. The Hon'ble Apex Court had granted
the interim stay during the pendency of the Special Leave
Petition subject to compliance of provisions of Section 17B of the Industrial Disputes Act, which itself indicates that
H
1.
(1993) 4 sec 121.
STATE BANK OF PATIALA v. RAM NIWAS BANSAL 999
. (DEAD) THROUGH LRS: [DIPAK MISRA, J.)
the respondent Bank was obliged to pay salary in terms
A
thereof to the petitioner. Admittedly at no point of time, right
from the commencement of the disciplinary proceedings
till today, the petitioner was ever placed under suspension.
Upon dismissal of the Special Leave Petition, the
judgment of the Full Bench has attained finality at least
B
interese the parties."
10. After so stating the Full Bench observed that on the
date of non-furnishing of enquiry report to the delinquent officer
he was admittedly not under suspension but was in service
and, therefore, the inevitable conclusion was that he would
C
continue in service till he was dismissed from service in
accordance with law or superannuated in accordance with
Rules. However, without adverting to the issue whether he stood
superannuated in the year 1992 or not, was left to be agitated
independently. Eventually, the application was allowed and the
D
respondents therein were directed to pay back wages to the
deceased-respondent from the date of dismissal till passing of
the appropriate orders in the disciplinary proceedings or
superannuation of the petitioner therein whichever was earlier.
The said order is under assail in Civil Appeal No. 239 of 2003.
E
11. At this juncture, it is essential to state the facts in
Transfer Case (C) No. 79 of 2013. Be it noted, when the Civil
Appeal was listed for hearing on 16.1.2013, this Court, while
hearing the appeal, was apprised about the subsequent
F
development that had taken place in pursuance of which the
original respondent No. 1 had preferred Civil Writ Petition No.
11412 of 2003 in the High Court of Punjab and Haryana,
Chandigarh. Learned counsel for the respondents agreed for
transfer of the writ petition to this Court and on that day learned
G
counsel for the Bank took time to obtain instructions and,
eventually, on 24.1.2013 agreed to the transfer of the writ
petition to this Court to be heard along with the civil appeal.
Thereafter, by virtue of order dated 30.4.2013 it has been
registered as Transfer Case (C) No. 79 of 2013.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2014) 3 S.C.R.
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12. On a perusal of the writ petition it transpires that the
petitioner therein referred to the order passed by the Futl Bench
on 23.11.2001 and thereafter stated about the disciplinary
action taken against him after the initial judgment and order
passed by the Full Bench on 22.5.1998 and receipt of the order
B dated 22.11.2001 along with a cover letter dated 26.11.2001
whereby the Bank had removed him from service with
retrospective effect from 23.4.1985, i.e., the date of earlier
removal. It was contended in the writ petition that the said order
was unsustainable, because the order of termination could have
c not been given retrospective effect; that the conduct of the Bank
was far from being laudable and replete with legal mala fide
and colourable exercise of power; that the order of dismissal
was violative of principles of natural justice and further the
grounds mentioned in the order were totally unjustified; and that
0 an attempt had been made by the Bank to overreach the
judgment of the Full Bench. On the aforesaid basis, a prayer
was made for quashing the order dated 22.11.2001 and
directing the Bank to reinstate him in service with entire benefits
with effect from 23.4.1985 along with interest and to pass such
E other orders as it may deem fit and proper in the facts and
circumstances of the case.
13. We have heard Mr. Vikas Singh, learned senior
counsel for the appellant bank and Mr. P.S. Patwalia, learned
senior counsel for the legal heirs of the deceased-employee
F in the appeal as well as the in the transfer petition.
14. The three issues that eminently emerge for
consideration are, (i) whether the employer Bank could have,
in law, passed an order of dismissal with retrospective effect;
G (ii) whether the delinquent officer stood superannuated after
completion of thirty years as provided under the Regulations
on 25.2.1992; and (iii) whether the legal heirs of the deceasedemployee are entitled to get the entire salary computed till the
actual passing of the order of dismissal, that is, 22.11.2001 or
for that matter till the date of superannuation, that is, 25.2.1992.
H
STATE BANK OF PATIALA v. RAM NIWAS BANSAL 1001
(DEAD) THROUGH LRS. [DIPAK MISRA, J.]
15. Regard being had to nature of controversy, we shall
A
proceed to deal with first point first, that is, whether the order
of removal could have been made with retrospective effect. Mr.
Patwalia, learned senior counsel appearing for the employee,
has submitted that the disciplinary authority could not have
passed an order of removal by making it operational from a
B
retrospective date. He has commended us to a three-Judge
Bench decision in R. Jeevaratnam v. State of Madras2• In the
said case, the appellant-therein instituted a suit for a declaration
that the order of dismissal from service was illegal and void.
The trial Court dismissed the suit and the said decree was c
affirmed in appeal by the High Court. One of the contentions
raised before this Court that the order of dismissal dated
October 17, 1950 having been passed with retrospective effect,
i.e., May 29, 1949, was illegal and inoperative. This Court
opined that an order of dismissal with retrospective effect is,
0
in substance, an order of dismissal as from the date of the
order with ,the superadded direction that the order should
operate retrospectively as from an anterior date. The two parts
of the order are clearly severable. Assuming that the second
part of the order is invalid, there is no reason why the first part
E
of the order should ot be given the fullest effect. The said
principle has been followed in The Gujarat Mineral
Development Corporation v. Shri P.H. Brahmbhatt3.
16. Mr. Vikas Singh, learned senior counsel has heavily
relied on the Constitution Bench decision in P.H. Kalyani v.
F
Mis. Air France, Calcutta 4 , wherein the employee had
challenged the order of the Labour Court relating to his
dismissal by the employer, the respondent company therein. He
was served a charge-sheet containing two charges of gross
dereliction of duty inasmuch as he had made mistakes in the
G
preparation of load-sheets on one day and a balance chart on
another day, which mistakes might have led to a serious
2.
AIR 1966 SC 951.
3.
(1974) 3 sec 601.
4.
AIR 1963 SC 1756.
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1002
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2014] 3 S.C.R.
A accident to the aircraft. An enquiry was fixed by the Station
Manag_er. His authority was questioned by the appellant but his
objection was overruled and the enquiry was held and
completed. The enquiry officer forwarded the findings and his
recommendations to the competent authority of the company,
B on the basis of which he was dismissed from service. The order
of dismissal provided for payment of one month's wages for
the appellant and also stated that an application was made
before the industrial tribunal for the approval of the action taken,
apparently as some industrial dispute was pending before the
c tribunal. In accordance with the order of dismissal, the
respondent company filed an application before the Labour
Court seeking approval of the action. The appellant thereafter
filed an application under Section 33-A of the Act challenging
the legality of the actions taken on many a ground. The grounds
D were considered by the Labour Court and all of them were
substantially decided against the appellant. The Labour Court
held that the dismissal of the appellant was justified and
accordingly accorded approval to the order of dismissal
passed by the Management. While dealing with various points
raised by the appellant, the Labour Court held that the
E application under Section 33(2)(b) of the Act was validly made
even though it had been made after the order of dismissal had
been passed. It also opined that the case was not covered by
Section 33( 1) of the Act and it was not necessary to obtain the
previous permission of the tribunal before dismissing the
F appellant, for he was not a protected workman. After dealing
with the other legal facets, the Labour Court dismissed the
application of the appellant-employee under Section 33-A of
the Act. Before the Constitution Bench, it was urged that the
domestic enquiry held by the employer was defective as no
G approval of the action taken in connection with enquiry and
further the Labour Court, even if held that the dismissal was
justified, it should have held that the order of dismissal would
become operative from the date of the award. In support of the
said submission, reliance was placed on Mis. Sasa Musa
H
STATE BANK OF PATIALA v. RAM NIWAS BANSAL 1003
(DEAD) THROUGH LRS. [DIPAK MISRA, J.]
Sugar Works (P) Ltd. v. Shobrati Khan 5 wherein it was
A
observed as follows:-
" ... as the management held no inquiry after suspending the
workmen and proceedings under Section 33 were
practically converted into the inquiry which normally the
B
management should have held before applying to the
Industrial Tribunal, the management is bound to pay the
wages of the workmen till a case for dismissal was made
out in the proceedings under Section 33."
17. Referring to the said case, the Constitution Bench
C
observed that in Shobrati Khan (supra), an application was
made under Section 33(1) of the Act for permission to dismiss
the employees and such permission was asked for though no
enquiry whatsoever had been held by the employer and no
decision was taken that the employees be dismissed and it
D
was in those circumstances that a case for dismissal was made
out only in the proceedings under Section 33(1) and, therefore,
the employees were held entitled to their wages till the decision
on the application under Section 33 of the Act. The Constitution
Bench observed that the matter would have been different if in
E
that case an enquiry had been held and the employer had come
to the conclusion that dismissal was proper punishment and
then they had applied under Section 33(1) for permission to
dismiss and, in those circumstances, the permission would
have related back to the date when the employer came to the
F
conclusion after an enquiry that the dismissal was the proper
punishment and had applied for removal of the ban by an
application under Section 33(1 ).
18. The larger Bench, in that context, made a reference to
the to the decision in Management of Ranipur Colliery v.
G
Bhuban Singh6 and thereafter held thus:-
5.
AIR 1959 SC 923.
6.
AIR 1959 SC 833.
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A
B
c
D
E
F
G
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1004
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2014] 3 S.C.R.
"The present is a case where the employer has held an
inquiry though it was defective and has passed an order
of dismissal and seeks approval of that order. If the inquiry
is not defective, the Labour Court has only to see whether
there was a pnma facie case for dismissal, and whether
the employer had come to the bona fide conclusion that
the employee was guilty of misconduct. Thereafter on
coming to the conclusion that the employer had bona fide
come to the conclusion that the employee was guilty i.e.
there was no unfair labour practice and no victimisation,
the Labour Court would grant the approval which would
relate back to the date from which the employer had
ordered the dismissal. If the inquiry is defective for any
reason, the Labour Court would also have to consider for
itself on the evidence adduced before it whether the
dismissal was justified. However, on coming to the
conclusion on its own appraisal of evidence adduced
before it that the dismissal was justified its approval of the
order of dismissal made by the employer in a defective
inquiry would still relate back to the date when the order
was made. The observations therefore in Messrs.