# STATE GOVT. HOUSELESS HARIJAN EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION v. STATE OF KARNATAKA AND ORS

- **Citation:** [2000] Supp. 5 S.C.R. 483
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 2000-12-11
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 5015of1999
- **Bench:** A.P. Misra, Ruma Pal
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/state-govt-houseless-harijan-employees-association-v-state-of-karnataka-and-ors-17593
- **Pages:** 27

## Headnote

A
B
land Acquisition Act, 1894-Sections 3(j)(vi), 4(1), 6(1), 6(1-A), 9,
sub-Sections (/) and (2) of Section 48· Acquisition- Withdrawal of·- C
Justiciability of Beneficiary ef acquisition- -Right to be heard --Notification
under Section 48(1) for withdrawal of acquisition-Appellant/beneficiary
given no opportunity of being heard before such notification-legality of
Held, the State Government could not have withdrawn from the acquisition
without hearing the appellant- Though Section 48(1) has been construed to
exclude the owner's right to be heard before withdrawal of acquisition, there D
is no similar provision with regard to the beneficiary of the acquisition--A
beneficiary, may, by such withdrawal suffer substantial loss without redress
particularly when it may have deposited compensation money towards the
cost of the acquisition-An opportunity of being heard may allow him not
only to counter the basis for withdrawal, but also to cure any defect or E
shortcoming and fill any lacunaRequirements of natural justice to be read
into statutory provisions unless excluded expressly or by necessary
implication· -Administrative law--- Principles of natural justice.
Public purpose- -Meaning of-Acquisition with prior approval of
appropriate government for land for any housing scheme sponsored by a F
Society registered under the Societies Registratwn Act-·Contention that
acquisition not for a public purpose as appellant not registered as a Society
Tenability of- Held, if some of the objects with which a Society is established
are invalid and others are valid, the registration of the Society is not ipso
facto vitiated-Appellant-Society registered under the Karnataka Societies
Registration Act-Two of the objects in the Act being two of the aims and G
objects of the appellant-Society-Thus, it cannot be asserted that the appellant
could not have been and cannot continue to be registered under the
Karnataka Act-Notification having been issued and published declaring
that the land was required for a public purpose, such declaration was
conclusive evidence that the land was needed for a public purpose-Such H
483
484
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.
A purpose cannot be lateron questioned or reopened without challenging the
notification-Karnataka Societies Registration Act, 1961.
Prior approval-Requirement of-Contention that letter relied on by
appellant did not amount to prior approval as the Government could not rely
on material collected prior to issuance of the second notification and that
B it was not in accordance with Article 166 of the Constitution-Held, when
earlier proceedings for acquisition came to an end as a matter of law, it does
not mean that the material on the basis of which the earlier notification was
issued ceased to exist as a matter of fact--Such material considered before
granting approval for the third and final notification-No form of prior
C approval or the material on which such approval is to be based, specifiedlack of comp/iattw with Article 166 did not render the prior approval a
nullity--Ct:mstitution of India, 1950--Article 166.
Contention that acquisition was originally commenced under Part Vil
and material gathered prior to first 11.otificarion relevant for an acquisition
D under Part VII, could hot be relied on for proceedings under Part II-Held,
second and third notifications under Section 4(1) clearly stating that the
acquisition was being made for a public purpose and not under Part V/1Therefore, even if the acquisition was originally commenced under Part VII,
it was continued under Part If,
E
The appellant WJ.S a Society registered under the Karnataka Societies
Reglstrntlon Act, 1961 consisting of members who were State Government
employees belonging to the Scheduled Castes. With a view to provide house
sites for its members all of whom were houseles9, the appellant approached
the Government to acquire 15 ccres of land situated in a particular village.
F The said land belon~ed to respondent num

## Text

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r
STATE GOVT. HOUSELESS HARIJAN
EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION
v.
STATE OF KARNATAKA AND ORS.
DECEMBER 11, 2000
[A.P. MISRA AND RUMA PAL, JJ.]
A
B
land Acquisition Act, 1894-Sections 3(j)(vi), 4(1), 6(1), 6(1-A), 9,
sub-Sections (/) and (2) of Section 48· Acquisition- Withdrawal of·- C
Justiciability of Beneficiary ef acquisition- -Right to be heard --Notification
under Section 48(1) for withdrawal of acquisition-Appellant/beneficiary
given no opportunity of being heard before such notification-legality of
Held, the State Government could not have withdrawn from the acquisition
without hearing the appellant- Though Section 48(1) has been construed to
exclude the owner's right to be heard before withdrawal of acquisition, there D
is no similar provision with regard to the beneficiary of the acquisition--A
beneficiary, may, by such withdrawal suffer substantial loss without redress
particularly when it may have deposited compensation money towards the
cost of the acquisition-An opportunity of being heard may allow him not
only to counter the basis for withdrawal, but also to cure any defect or E
shortcoming and fill any lacunaRequirements of natural justice to be read
into statutory provisions unless excluded expressly or by necessary
implication· -Administrative law--- Principles of natural justice.
Public purpose- -Meaning of-Acquisition with prior approval of
appropriate government for land for any housing scheme sponsored by a F
Society registered under the Societies Registratwn Act-·Contention that
acquisition not for a public purpose as appellant not registered as a Society
Tenability of- Held, if some of the objects with which a Society is established
are invalid and others are valid, the registration of the Society is not ipso
facto vitiated-Appellant-Society registered under the Karnataka Societies
Registration Act-Two of the objects in the Act being two of the aims and G
objects of the appellant-Society-Thus, it cannot be asserted that the appellant
could not have been and cannot continue to be registered under the
Karnataka Act-Notification having been issued and published declaring
that the land was required for a public purpose, such declaration was
conclusive evidence that the land was needed for a public purpose-Such H
483
484
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.
A purpose cannot be lateron questioned or reopened without challenging the
notification-Karnataka Societies Registration Act, 1961.
Prior approval-Requirement of-Contention that letter relied on by
appellant did not amount to prior approval as the Government could not rely
on material collected prior to issuance of the second notification and that
B it was not in accordance with Article 166 of the Constitution-Held, when
earlier proceedings for acquisition came to an end as a matter of law, it does
not mean that the material on the basis of which the earlier notification was
issued ceased to exist as a matter of fact--Such material considered before
granting approval for the third and final notification-No form of prior
C approval or the material on which such approval is to be based, specifiedlack of comp/iattw with Article 166 did not render the prior approval a
nullity--Ct:mstitution of India, 1950--Article 166.
Contention that acquisition was originally commenced under Part Vil
and material gathered prior to first 11.otificarion relevant for an acquisition
D under Part VII, could hot be relied on for proceedings under Part II-Held,
second and third notifications under Section 4(1) clearly stating that the
acquisition was being made for a public purpose and not under Part V/1Therefore, even if the acquisition was originally commenced under Part VII,
it was continued under Part If,
E
The appellant WJ.S a Society registered under the Karnataka Societies
Reglstrntlon Act, 1961 consisting of members who were State Government
employees belonging to the Scheduled Castes. With a view to provide house
sites for its members all of whom were houseles9, the appellant approached
the Government to acquire 15 ccres of land situated in a particular village.
F The said land belon~ed to respondent numbers 5 to 7. Pursuant to it, the
Planning Authority passed a resolution to issue 'no objection certificate' for
suitability of the land for house sites in favour of the appellant. The said
decision was communicated to the Assistant Commissioner of the area who
subsequently asked the appellant to furnish certain particulars. The
G particulars as required by the Assistant Commissioner were furnished.
The State Government required the appellant to make a deposit towards
the cost of acquisition which was done. The State Government granted prior
approval to the acquisition and subsequently a notification under Section 4(1)
of the Land Acquisition Act was published. The appellant was called upon to
H deposit a further sum towards the cost of acquisition, by the Land Acquisition
,
STATE OF HOUSELESS HARIJAN EMPLOYEES ASSON. v. STATE
485
Officer which was also deposited.
The records were then forwarded by the Assistant Commissioner to the
Revenue Commissioner and Secretary to Government, Revenue Department.
These were, however, returned with the direction that the recommendation of
A
the District Level Committee should be submitted. Accordingly, the appellant
obtained the recommendations of the District Level Committee and the State B
Level Committee.
Thereafter, the State Government passed an order directing the
authorities to issue the final notification under Section 6(1) of the Land
Acquisition Act As the statutory period provided under Section 6(1-A) of the C
Act h11d alre11dy expired, a fresh notification, under Section 4(1) was directed
to be issued. Prior to the issuance of the notification, the matter w11s
scrutinised by the Deputy Secretary and Secretary of the Revenue Department
and finally approved by the Chief Secretary and the Minister for Revenue.
In pursuance of the decision of the State Government to commence D
afresh the land acquisition proceedings, a second notification under Section
4(1) of the Act was issued proposing to acquire the land for public purpose
for the benefit of the appellant for housing its members. Again the Government
did not publish the declaration under Section 6 of the Act within the time
prescribed.
Thereafter, the matter was referred to the Law Department which was
of the opinion that the aicq uisition of bmd in favour of the appellant was for a
public cause. Accordingly, aifter obtaining the approval of the Government, a
third notification under Section 4(1) was published.
E
The aforesaid notification was challenged by respondents 5 to 7, owners F
of the land sought to be acquired, in a writ petition before High Court No
interim order was passed in the said writ petition and the acquisition
proceedings continued.
The respondents/owners filed objections to tile acquisition all of which G
were rejected. The rejection of their objections under Section SA were affirmed
by Deputy Secretary to Government, Revenue Department and subsequently
approved both by the Minister of Revenue as weU as the Law Minister. Thus,
the final notification under Section 6 of the Act was published declaring that
the acquisition was for the public purpose of allotment of house sites to the
members of the appellant~~ociety. Subsequently, the L 1111d Acquisition Officer H
486
SCPREME COLRT REPORTS [2000] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.
A made an Award under Section 9 of the Act, issued a notice and directed the
appellant to deposit the balance amount representing the difference between
the amounts already deposited by the appellant and the amount of the Award.
The said amount along with a further sum which the appellant was directed
to deposit, was duly deposited. The award was approved by the Divisional
B Commissioner and possession of the acquired land was ordered to be handed
over to the appellant
At this stage, a letter was written by the Department of Revenue to the
Land Acquisition Officer directing him not to hand over possession of the
land to the appellant until further orders. Pursuant to it, the respondents/
C owners withdrew their writ petition challenging the third notification under
Section 4(1). Thereafter, the appellant filed a writ petition challenging the
legality of the aforesaid letter issued by the Department of Revenue. Although
an interim order had been granted not to take further action pursuant to the
letter, the Government issued a notification under Section 48(1) of the Land
Acquisition Act withdrawing the acquisition. The appellant amended the writ
D petition by seeking quashing of the aforesaid notification. A second writ
petition was also filed by the appellant for the same reliefs. However both the
writ petitions were dismissed. Subsequently, by virtue of an order passed by
Supreme Court, the appellant was permitted to proceed with the first writ
petition.
E
The said writ petition was dismissed by a Single Judge of the High Court
holding that the Government had the absolute power to withdraw from the
acquisition since possession had not been handed over to the appellant. The
appeal filed before the Division Bench of the High Court was also dismissed
holding that no reasons were required to be given by the Government when it
F withdrew the acquisition proceedings in the absence of any pleadings with
respect to malafides. Hence the present appeal.
On behalf of the appellant, it was contended that the order withdrawing
the acquisition under Section 48(1) of the Land Acquisition Act was passed
without any notice or hearing the appellant; that the right of the beneficiary
G to be heard had been recognised by the Supreme Court.
On behalf of the respondents, it was contended that the principles of
natural justice should not be extended to withdrawal of an acquisition for public
purpose; that a beneficiary had a right to be heard before notification under
Section 48(1) was issued only in cases of acquisition for companies under
H Part VII of the Act; that the prior approval to the acquisition had been granted
•
>
STATE OF HOUSELESS HARIJAN EMPLOYEES ASSON. v. STATE
487
prior to the earlier notifications under Section 4(1) and therefore with the A
dropping of the earlier notifications, the entire proceedings on the basis of
which they were issued became non est; that the present acquisition was in
f11ct being made under Part VII and that none of the provisions in Part VII
htd been followed.
Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD : l. The acquisition in favour of the appellant was properly
initiated by publication of Notification under Section 4(1) of the Land
Acquisition Act and by the declaration issued under Section 6. The withdrawal
B
of the acquisition under Section 48(1) was vitiated not only because the C
appellant was not heard but also because no reason whatsoever has been given
for such withdrawal. No reason has been put forward by the respondents to
exclude the application of the principle of natural justice to Section 48(1) of
the Act. The requirements of natural justice will be read into statutory
provisions unless excluded expressly or by necessary implication. Section
48(1) does not in terms exclude the principles of natural justice. However, D
the Section has been construed to exclude the owner's right to be heard before
the acquisition is withdrawn. This is because the owners' grievances are
redressable under Section 48(2). But as far as the beneficiary of the
acquisition is concerned there is no similar statutory provision. In contrast
with the owners position the beneficiary of the acquisition may by withdrawal E
from the acquisition suffer substantial loss without redress particularly when
it may have deposited compensation money towards the cost of the acquisition
and the steps for acquisition under the Act have substantially been proceeded
with. An opportunity of being heard may allow the beneficiary not only to
counter the basis for withdrawal, but also, if the circumstances permitted, to
cure any defect or shortcoming and fill any lacuna. In the circumstances of F
the c11se, the State Government could not have withdrawn from the iicquisition
without hearing the appellant. The impugned notification under Section 48(1)
is therefore quashed. 1509-C, D; 496-G; 497-H; 498-8-C; 499-01
Larsen & Toubro ltd. v. State of Gujarat and Ors., 1199814 sec 387; G
Union of India v. Col J.N. Sinha, !19701 2 SCC 458; Olga Tellis v. Bombay
Municipal Corporation, 119851 3 SCC 545 and Alr.ar Nath Ashram Trust
Society v. Governor ofU.P., 1198811 SCC 591, relied on.
CB. Gautam v. Union of India, 119931 I SCC 78 and Special land
Acquisition Collector v. Godrej Boyce, 1198811SCR590, referred to.
H
A
488
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.
2.1. In order that an acquisition may be for a public purpose within the
meaning of Sectipn '3(1)(vi) of the Land Acquisition Act, the acquisition should
have been done with the prior approval of the appropriate Government; must
have provided for land for any housing scheme and the housing scheme should
have been sponsored by a Society registereo under the Societies Registration
B Act, 1860 or any other corresponding law in the State. Of these three
requirements, according to the Law Department, the third requirement was
lacking. The opinion of the Law Department and consequently the basis of
the impugned order are unacceptable for several reasons. Admittedly, the
appellant is registered under the Karnataka Societies Registration Act.
Section 3 of the Karnataka Act specifies the Societies to which the Karnataka
C Act applies. The Societies must be formed for any one or more of the seven
objects mentioned. The last two objects mentioned in the Karnataka Act are
in fact included in the Memorandum of Association of the appellant as being
two of the aims and objects of the appellant The opinion of the Law Department
that none of the objects of the Appellant were within the objects specified in
D
Section 3 was factually incorrect. It has not been shown that if some of the
objects with which a Society is established are invalid and others are valid,
the registration of the Society is ipso facto vitiated. (501-B, C, D, El
2.2. Once the notification under Section 6 was issued and published
declaring that the land was required for a public purpose under sub-Section
E (3) of Section 6, the said declaration was "conclusive evidence that the land
is needed for a public purpose ...... ". The stage of questioning the 'public
purpose' aspect of the acquisition is over and cannot be reopened by the State
nor can the respondents/owners raise this issue without challenging the
notification under Section 6. They had challenged it under Article 226 of the
Constitution but then withdrew their writ petition. (502-F)
F
3. Under Section 3(1)(vi) the prior approval to the acquisition is required
if an acquisition is made for the purpose of providing land for carrying out,
inter-alia. any housing scheme sponsored by a Society registered under the
Societies Registration Act, 1860. The fact of prior approval has not been denied
G by the State Government Lack of approval of the appropriate government to
the acquisition was not the ground on which withdrawal from the acquisition
had been made and it was not open to the State Government to justify its
decision on any other ground. No form of the prior approval required under
Section 3(1)(vi} of the Act has been specified in the Act itself. What the Section
in terms requires is the prior approval to the acquisition for the purpose
H specified. This was expressly given. Section 4(1) read with Section 3(1)(vi) of
..
!
STATE OF HOUSELESS HARIJAN EMPLOYEESASSON. v STATE
489
the Act indicates that there are two separate functions to be preformed by the A
State Government. Under Section 4(1) it must prima facie come to the
conclusion that the land proposed to be acquired is required for a public
purpose and under Section 3(t)(vi), such tentative conclusion must be coupled
with specific approval to acquire the land for the purposes specified for the
benefit of the registered Society or co-operative Society, as the case may be.
The Act does not specify the material on which either the tentative conclusion B
to Section 4(1) or approval under Section 3(t)(vi) is to be based. In this case
. the earlier notifications were not cancelled. No further steps could be taken
on the earlier notifications only because of administrative delay which crossed
the period of limitation provided under Section 6(1)(A). While the proceedings
under Section 4(1) may come to an end as a matter of law, it does not mean C
that the material on the basis of which the earlier notification was issued
ceased to exist as a matter of fact. The material in this case although collected
prior to the issuance of the second notification was all there and according to
the letter of approval, the matter was "minutely examined" by the State
Government in consultation with the Law Department before granting the
approval for the third and final notification. The lack of compliance ~ith D
Article 166 of the Constitution did not render the prior approval a nullity.
[498-F; 503-A; 504-C; 508-D, B, C, F[
Mohinder Singh Gill and Anr. v. The Chief Election Commissioner, New
Delhi and Ors., (1978] l SCC 405; Mis Fomento Resorts and Hotels Ltd. v. E
Gustavo Ranato DA Cruz Pinto and Ors .. [1985] 2 SCC 152 and R.
Chitralekha & Anr. v. State of Mysore & Ors .. (1964] 6 SCR 368, relied on.
Gulabra v. State of Gujarat, (1996] 2 SCC 26, distinguished.
Dattatreva v. The State of Bombay, (1952] SCR 612; Major E.G. 3arsay F
v. State of Bombay, AIR (1961) SC 1762 and HMT House Building Cooperative society v. Syed Khader & Ors .. (1995] 2 SCC 677, referred to.
4. There is 110 basis for the submission that the acquisition w11s originally
commenced under Part VII. After the first notification under Section 4(1) G
was issued pursuant to a directive by the Under Secretary to the Deputy
Commissioner, enquiries were held and the District and State Level
committees enquired into and verified the appellant's case before
recommending it. The material was relevant not only to the question of public
purpose under Section 4 but could also form the basis of an approval under
Section 3(1)(vi). It is not disputed that the material was considered when the H
490
SUPREME COCRT RF PORTS [2000] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.
A second and the third notifications under Section 4(1) were issued and both
these notifications clearly state that the acquisition was being made for a
public purpose and not under Part VII of the Act. Therefore, even if the
llcquisition was originlllly commenced under Part VII it was contim1ed under
Part II. [506-F; 507-F, GI
B
State of Gujarat v. Patel Chaturbhai Narsibhai, (197511 SCC 583 and
Amar Nath Ashram Trust Society v. Governor of UP., [19881 I SCC 591,
distinguished.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 5015of1999.
C
From the Judgment and Order dated 21.1.98 of the Karnataka High Court
in W.A. No. 2990of1997.
M. Rama Jois and P.S. Misra, S.N. Bhat, D.P. Chaturvedi, G.V.
Chandrasekhar, P.P. Singh, Devendra Singh, Surya Kant, Shambhu Prasad
D Singh and N. Ganpathy for the appearing parties.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
RUMA PAL, J. The question to be decided in this appeal relates to the
rights of the beneficiary of an acquisition under the Land Acquisition Act
E (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act') to resist withdrawal of acquisition
proceedings.
In the course of the arguments before us, we were of the view that the
original records pertaining to this case should be produced. This was directed
on 14th September 2000. The entire records have admittedly not been produced
F by the State Government. We have been informed by the learned counsel
appearing on behalf of the State that one of the files pertaining to the case
has been destroyed on 3rd February, 2000.
On the basis of the records we have found that the appellant is a
Society registered under the Kamataka Societies Registration Act, 1961. It has
G 360 members all of whom are State Government Employees belonging to the
Schedule Castes of Adidravida and Adikarnataka. It wanted to provide house
sites for its members all of whom are houseless. In 1983, the appellant
approached the Government to acquire 15 acres of land at Maralur village.
The land belonged to respondents Nos. 5 to 7 herein.
H
By a letter dated I 0.1.1983 the Planning Authority wrote to the Assistant
\
I
STATE OF HOUSELESS HARIJAN EMPLOYEESASSON. v. STATE (RUMA PAL,J] 491
Commissioner, Tumkur stating that a resolution had been passed to issue "no A
objection certificate" for suitability of the land for house sites in favour of
the appellant. It further said that the land was earmarked partly for residential
and partly for open place in the draft lay out plan of Tumkur.
On 16. 7 .1984 a letter was written by the Assistant Commissioner to the
appellant in which the appellant had been asked to furnish the followmg B
particulars:
I.
The lists of members of the Association who are siteless and
houseless.
2.
The financial soundness of the Association by way of the
shares collected. The amount deposited in the Bank etc.;
3.
The audit report for the previous three years;
4.
Whether the an;a proposed for acquisition is treated as residential
in the plan i.e. outline development plan, or comprehensive
development plan, prepared by the Town Planning Department
or not;
5.
Whether the layout plan proposed by the association fits in the
comprehensive plan of the city area,
6.
Whether the proposed area is in excess/less as compared to the
demand based on the number of eligible members."
On 17 .8.1984 the particulars as required by the Assistant Commissioner
were furnished including a copy of the lay out plan.
According to the appellant, the State Government required the appellant
c
D
E
to make a deposit towards the cost of acquisition. The appellant deposited F
the required amount in 1984. According to the appellant, the State Government
granted prior approval to the acquisition by letter dated 7th September 1986. A
notification under Section 4 ( 1) of the Act was published on 6th August 1987.
On 9th July 1987, the appellant was called upon to deposit a further sum G
towards the cost of acquisition by the Land Acquisition Officer. This amount
was also deposited.
The records were then forwarded by the Assistant Commissioner, Tumkur
under cover of a letter dated 19.11.1987 to the Revenue Commissioner and
Secretary to Government, Revenue Department. These were returned with the H
492
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2000] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.
A direction that the recommendation of the District Level Committee should be
submitted.
B
According to the appellant, on 13th May 1988 it wrote to the Assistant
Commissioner, Tumkur Sub-Division giving particulars of the housing scheme
and again enclosing a proposed lay out plan.
A letter dated 30.5.1988 was written by the appellant to the Divisional
Commissioner, Tumkur requesting for expedition in which it was stated, "the
Association has already formed 361 sites as per the draft plan measuring East
to West and North to South 30 ft.x 40 ft. respectively apart from road and park
in 15 acres of land acquired at SY No.49 as per the Government Order No.
C RD/45/AQT/83 dated 27.3.1987".
The District Level Committee held~ meeting on 17.6.1988. The minutes
of the meeting show that before recommending the appellant's case all the
aspects were considered and in particular :
D
"An extent of 80 x 210 Sq. feet has been left for public amenities as
per the site plan, which is enclosed in the file. The Town Planning
Authority has pointed that I 00/o of the land should be left for public
amenities. The Society has agreed to this."
At its meeting held on 28.7.1988 the State Level Committee recommended
E the acquisition of the land in favour of the appellant for providing house sites
to its members.
On I 0th August 1988, the State Government passed an order directing
the authorities to issue the final notification under Section 6 {I) of the Act.
As the statutory period provided under Section 6(1-A) (which has been
p
inserted by way of amendment in the State of Kamataka) had already expired,
a fresh Notification under Section 4 (I) of the Act was directed to be issued.
Prior to the issuance of the Notification, a detailed note was prepared by the
Deputy Secretary, Revenue Department which was forwarded to the Secretary.
On 1.2.90, the Secretary referred to his note and proposed, "We may give
clearance in favour of the Association. For approval." This was approved by
G the Chief Secretary and placed before the Minister for Revenue who in tum
approved the note on 12th February 1990.
On 14th February, 1990 the Secretary, Revenue Department wrote to the
Deputy Commissioner, Tumkur District:
H
"Sub: In the matter of acquisition of 15 Acres of land in Survey No.
STA TE OF HOUSELESS HARIJAN EMPLOYEES ASSON. v. STATE (RUMA PAL, J.] 493
49 of Maralur Village, Tumkur Kasaba, for housing sites in favour of A
Houseless Harijan-Girian Government Employees Association.
Ref: I. Your office letter No. LAW/CR/130/88-89, dated 17.10.1989.
2.
Your letter No. LA W/CR/18/88-89, dated 26.10.1989: 5.12.1989.
After considering in great detail, the proposal contained in your letter B
and requisition of Houseless Government Servants Association,
Tumkur and all other aspects, the State Government has decided to
commence afresh the land acquisition proceedings. Therefore, I am
directed to request you to take steps for issue of notification under
Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act."
C
A second notification under Section 4(1) of the Act was issued on 27.2.90
proposing to acquire the land for public purpose for the benefit of the
appellant for housing its members. Again the Government did not publish the
declaration under Section 6 of the Act within the time prescribed.
A letter was written on 15.3.1991 by the Secretary, Revenue Department
addressed to the Deputy Commissioner. The unofficial translation of the letter
reads:
D
"Sub: Allotment of 15 Acres of Land in Survey No.49 in the Village
Maralooru, Tumkur Disrtrict to Landless Scheduled Castes State E
Government Employees Union (Regd.) -Reg.
Inviting attention to your letter No. LQCR- 72-90-91 dated 20th
November, 1990 on the above subject, it is brought to your notice that
while keeping in mind the fact that the matter of acquisition of these
lands has been dropped on earlier two occasions after the initiation F
of the land acquisition proceedings, on examination of the objections
of the land owners, again the matter of acquisition of land for being
allotted to landless Scheduled Castes State Government Employees
Union has been minutely examined in consultation with the Law
Department. According to the opinion of the Law Department the G
acquisition of land in favour of the impugned Union is for a public
cause. In view of this it has been decided by the Government to
acquire 15 acres of land of Survey No. 49 in Maralooru Village, Tumkur
District/(Kasha) in favour of the Landless Scheduled Caste State
Government Employees Union, Tumkur. Thererore, I am directed to
convey the approval of the Government to initiate action for issue of H
494
A
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2000] SUPP. S S.C.R.
notification under Column 4(1) for acquisition of the above mentioned
land in favour of the above mentioned Union".
A third notification under Section 4( I) was accordingly published on
22.7.1991. This was challenged by respondents 5 to 7 before the High Court
(Writ Petition No. 21438of1991). lt was contended that the appellant was not
B duly registered under the Kamataka Societies Registration Act, 1960 and,
therefore, it was not lawful to acquire the land for it. No interim order was
passed and the acquisition proceedings continued.
The respondent-owners filed objections to the acqu1s1t1on. All the
objections including the objection relating to the non-registerability of the
C appellant under the Karnataka Society Registration Act were rejected.
D
E
According to the noting on the file dated 23 .11.1991 " the land owner can
question the validity of the registration of the Association on the housing
activities, before the appropriate authority and not before this authority.
Therefore, this objection is not tenable".
The rejection of the owner-respondents, objection under Section 5-A
was affirmed on 3.12.1991 in the report prepared by Deputy Secretary to
Government, Revenue Department which was approved both by the Minister
of Revenue as well as the Law Minister. Directions were accordingly issued
to proceed under Section 6(1) (a) of the Act on 12.3.1992.
The final Notification under Section 6 of the Act was published on 15th
May 1992 declaring that the acquisition was for the public purpose of allotment
of house sites to the members of the appellant. On 7th September 1992, the
Land Acquisition Officer made the Award under Section 9 of the Act, issued
a notice dated 15th September 1992 and directed the appellant to deposit the
F balance amount representing the difference between the amounts already
deposited by the appellant and the amount of the Award. The balance amount
of Rs. 7,36,231 was deposited on 19th November 1992. A further sum of
Rs. 65,926 was also deposited on 4th January 1993 by the appellant pursuant
to the directions of the Land Acquisition Officer. The total amount deposited
G by the appellant towards the cost of acquisition is Rs. 19,01,915. The Award
was approved by the Divisional Commissioner by his 0.M. dated 26th May
1993. The approval records that an inquiry was held by the Deputy
Commissioner and Assistant Commissioner regarding the members of the
Society and that the authorities were satisfied that the appellant-Association
consisted of SC/ST members. According to the orders of the Divisional
H Commissioner, possession of the acquired land was to be handed over to the
=
STATE OF HOUSELESS HARIJAN EMPLOYEES AS SON. v. STATE [RUMA PAL, J.] 495
appellant in accordance with law,
At this stage, a letter was written by the Department of Revenue to the
Land Acquisition Officer directing him not to hand over possession of the
land to the appellant until further orders. According to the appellant-Society,
A
the Government's volte-face was because S. Shafiq Ahmed, the local M.L.A.
(responde.nt No. 2) had objected to the finalisation of the land acquisition B
proceedings in favour of the appellant. It is alleged that the respondent No.2
had sent his objections not only to the Divisional Commissioner but also to
the Revenue Minister. The Minister instructed the Revenue Commission to
stop the land acquisition proceedings which in turn passed on the instruction
to the Secretary to the Revenue Department of the State Secretariat as a C
consequence whereof the letter dated 5th July 1993 was written. On 6th July
1993, the respondents 5,6 and 7 withdrew Writ Petition No. 21438/91.
The appellant tiled a writ petition challenging the legality of the letter
dated 5th July 1993. Although an interim order had been granted not to take
further action pursuant to the letter, in the office note dated 25.6.93, the D
Minister of Revenue has recorded, "In view of the opinion offered by the Law
Deptt., it is not permissible to acquire land on behalf of the Govt. House less
Employees Association registered under Sec. 3 of the Karnataka Societies
Registration Act. Hence withdrawal notification u/s 48( I) of the LA Act may
be issued." And on 2nd August 1993, the Government issued a Notification
under Section 48( I) of the Act withdrawing the acquisition. This was published
in the Official Gazette on 5th August 1993. The appellant amended the writ
application by seeking quashing of the Notification dated 2nd August 1993.
E
A second writ petition was also filed hy the appellant for the same reliefs.
However both writ petitions were dismissed. It is not necessary for us to
consider the order dismissing the second petition. Suffice it to say that by F
virtue of an order passed by this Court, the appellant was permitted to
proceed with the first writ petition filed by it on 9th July 1993.
The writ petition was dismissed by the Single Judge holding that there
was no approval to the acquisition under Section 3(f)(iv) of the Act and that G
the letter dated 7th September 1986 relied upon by the appellant in this
connection did not amount to such approval. It was also held that ma/afides
had not been established, "as respondent No. 2 had filed statement of
objections denying all such allegations" ;nd that the appellant had not
"produced any material to establish that the release from the acquisition was
at the instance of the second respondent in collusion with the land owners". H
496
SUPREME COuRT REPORTS [2000) SUPP. S S.C.R.
A The Single Judge also held that the Government had the absolute power to
withdraw from the acquisition since possession had not been handed over
to the appellant.
B
The appellant's appeal was given short shrift by the Division Bench of
the High Court. It was said that no reasons were required to be given by the
Government when it withdrew the acquisition proceedings in the absence of
any pleadings with respect to malajides. It was also said that the decision
of this Court in Special Land Acquisition Officer, Bombay v. Godrej & Boyce,
[ 1988] I SCR 590 which had been relied upon by the appellant did not apply
as this Court had, according to the High Court, held that reasons were
C required to be given by the Government for withdrawing from the acquisition
only in connection with acquisition proceedings initiated under Part VIII of the
Act and not in cases where the proceedings had been initiated under Part II.
Before concluding the narration of facts, we note that according to the
appellant, during the pendency of these proceedings, respondents 5, 6 and
D 7 sold the land to the respondents 8 to 34. The respondents 5,6 and 7 have
denied this. We do not propose to go into this dispute.
The arguments have been wide ranging and the parties have submitted
written notes of their arguments. But the basic grievance of the appellant is
that the order withdrawing the acquisition under Section 48(1) of the Act was
E passed without any notice or hearing the appellant. According to the appellant,
the right of the beneficiary to be heard has been recognized by the decision
of this Court in Larsen & Toubro ltd. v. State of Gujarat and Others, [1998]
4 SCC 387. According to the respondents, the decision in Larsen & Toubro
Ltd. is limited to the case of a company for which land had been acquired after
formalities under Part VII of the Act had been completed. It was submitted
F that the principles of natural justice should not be extended to withdrawal of
an acquisition for public purpose.
This Court has consistently held that the requirements of natural justice
will be read into statutory provisions unless excluded expressly or by necessary
G implication.
In the case of Union of India v. L'o/. JN. Sinha, [1970) 2 sec 458, this
Court said:
" .......... It is true that if a statutory provision can be read consistently
with the principles of natural justice, the courts should do so because
H
it must be presumed that the Legislatures and the statutory authorities
•
S fATEOF HOUSELESS HARIJAN EMPLOYEES ASSON v. STAl'E [RUMA PAL. J. l 497
intend to act in accordance with the principles of natural justice. But A
if on the other hand a statutory provision either specifically or by
necessary implication excludes the application of any or all the
principles of natural justice then the court cannot ignore the mandate
of the Legislature or the statutory authority and read into the
concerned provision the principles of natural justice."
The Constitution Bench in Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal
Corporation, : 1985] 3 SCC 545 p1aced the onus to prove the exclusion of the
rules of natural justice by way of exception and not as a general rule on the
person who asserted it.
B
"The ordinary rule which regulates all procedure is that persons who C
are likely to be affected by the proposed action must be afforded an
opportunity of being heard as to why that action should not be taken.
The hearing may be given individually or collectively, depending
upon the facts· of each situation. A departure from this fundamental
rule of natural justice may be presumed to have been intended by the D
Legislature only in circumstances which warrant it. Such circumstances
must be shown to exist, when so required, the burden being upon
those who affirm their existence."
Both these views were affirmed by the Constitution Bench in C. B.
<.iautam v. Union of/ndia, [ 1993] 1 SCC 78.
{'.
Admittedly, the appellant was given no opportunity of being heard
before the decision was taken by the respondent-authorities to v. ithdraw the
acquisition in exercise of section 48 ( 1) of the Act.
Section 48 (I) of the Act provides:
''48. Completion of acquisition not cumpulsory, hut compensation to
he awarded when not completed- {I) Except 'n the case provided for
in Section 36, the Government shall be at liberty to withdraw from the
acquisition of any land of which possession has not been taken."
The section does not in terms exclude the principles of natural justice.
F
(J
However, the section has been construed to exclude the owner's right t'J be
heard before the acquisition is withdrawn. This is because the owners'
grievances are redressabl~ under Section 48 (2). "No irreparable prejudice is
caused to the owner of the land and, if at all the owner has suffered any
damage in consequence of the acquisition proceedings or incurred costs in I I
498
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2000] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.
A relation thereto, he will be paid compensation thereof under Section 48 (2) of
the Act." [See: Amar Nath Ashram Trust Society v. Governor of U.P., [I 988]
I SCC 591 at p. 596. [See: also Special Land Acquisition Collector v. Godrej
Boyce, [1988] I SCR 590]. But as far as the beneficiary of the acquisition is
concerned there is no similar statutory provision. In contrast with the owners
B position the beneficiary of the acquisition may by withdrawal from the
acquisition suffer substantial loss without redress particularly when it may
have deposited compensation money towards the cost of the acquisition and
the steps for acqui~ition under the Act have substantially been proceeded
with. An opportunity of being heard may allow the beneficiary not only to
counter the basis for withdrawal, but also, if the circumstances permitted, to
C cure any defect or shortcoming and fill any lacuna. No reason has been put
forward by the respondents to exclude the application of the principle of
natural justice to Section 48 (I) of the Act.
The decision in Larsen & Toubro which relied upon an earlier decision
in Amamath Ashram Trust Society and Another v. Governor of U.P. and
D Others, (supra) to hold that a beneficiary has a right to be heard before a
notification under Section 48 (I) is issued, does not appear to be limited to
acquisition for companies under Part VII of the Act as is contended by the
respondents although the acquisition in that case had been made for a
company for the purpose of setting up a housing colony_ Both cases have
also drawn a distinction between the rights of an owner and the beneficiary
E of the acquisition to object to withdrawal from the acquisition for the reasons
noted earlier.
It may be noted that as in the case of the company, under Section 3
{f)(vi) the prior approval to the acquisition is required if an acquisition is made
for the purpose of providing land for carrying out, inter-alia, any housing
F scheme sponsored by a Society registered under the Society Registration
Act, 1860. This approval must be made after adequate enquiry. Again the
issuance of the Notification under Section 4 is followed by filing and hearing
of objections under Section 5-A by the Collector.