# STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH & ORS v. CHITRA ~TA RAO

- **Citation:** [1976] 1 S.C.R. 521
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1975-08-29
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 2040 of 1974
- **Bench:** A. N. Ray, K. Mathew, Y. V. Ciiandrachud
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/state-of-andhra-pradesh-ors-v-chitra-ta-rao-6625
- **Pages:** 8

## Headnote

Constitution of India, 1950, A.rt. 22&-Scope ·of High Court's power in relation to depa1tn1ental enquiries intd guilt of goYernment servants .
(1) The jurisdictiQn of the High Court to issue a writ of certiorari under ~rt.
226 is a supervisory jurisdiction, and not as an appellate court. 'fhe. fip.d1ngs
of.fact reached by an inferior court or tribun<l!l as result of the appreciation of
evidence are not reopened or questioned in these proceedings.
An error of law
which is apparent on the face of record can be corrected but not an error of .
fact, however, grave it may be.
In regard to a finding of fact recorded by a
tribunal a writ can be issued if it i!'I shown that the tribunal had erroneously
refused to admit admissible and material evidence or had erroneously admitted
inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding.
Again, if a
finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of
la\V which can be corrected by a writ of certiorc:!fi, but if there is somo evidence
which may reasonably supPort the conclusion, its adequacy or sufficiency and
the inference of fact drawn, are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the tribunal.
The Court is concerned to determine whether the inquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf, and according to the procedure prescribed in that
behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated. Therefore, in
departmental enquries relating to the guilt of delinquent officers, the High Court
may interfere only where the departmental authorities have held the proceeding1
against the delinquent officer in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural
justice or in violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of inquiry
or where the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair decision by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and the merits of the
case, or by allowing themselves to be influenced by irrelevMJt considerations, or
where the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly arbitrary and Capricious
that no reasonable person
could ever have
arrived
at
that
conclusion.
[525-E-527B]
State of Andhra PradesH v. S. Sree Rama Rao [1963) 3 S.C.R. 25; Railway
Board, representing the Union cJf JndW, New Delhi & Anr. v. Niranjan Sinrh [1969]
3 S.C.R. 548 and Syed Yakoob v. K. S. Radhaknslman & Ors. [1964] 5 S.C.R. 64,
referred to.
(2) There is no warrant for the view that in considering whether a. public
officer is guilty of misconduct charged against him the rule followed in criminal
trials, namely, that an offence is not established unless proved beyond reasonable doubt, must be applied.
[525F.G]
In the present case, charges that the respondent fradulently claimed travelline
allowance were inquired int9 by the Disciplinary Proceedings Tribunal. The
Tribunal found him guilty and recommended dismissal. The Government accepted the recommendation and dismissed the respondent. In a
writ
petition,
challenging the order of dismissal, the High Court equated the charge of misconduct to a charge under s.5(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947,
discussed the eviden:::e and findings of the Tribunal on that basis and held, that
the ·prosecution did not adduce
m~terial and essential evidence namely, the
oonductor's chart which would show whether the respondent travelled on a
particular day, that a statement made by the respondent during investigation was
not admissible in evidence, that it wa! not safe to rely on it. and set aside the
order of dismissal.
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Allowing the appeal to this Court.
HELD: (a) The High Court was not correct in holding that the dome!tic
inttuiry before the . Tribunal. was the .same as prosecution in a criminal case.
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[525C·DJ
3-L925SupCl/75
522
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1976] 1 s.c.~.
(b) The respondent was. given full opportunity to explain the statement
made by him during investigation.
Further, the Tribunal did not base its finding only on that statement.
It had given its reaso

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STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH & ORS.
v.
CHITRA ~TA
RAO
August 29, 1975
521
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[A. N. RAY, C.J., K, K. MATHEW AND Y. V. CIIANDRACHUD, JJ.]
Constitution of India, 1950, A.rt. 22&-Scope ·of High Court's power in relation to depa1tn1ental enquiries intd guilt of goYernment servants .
(1) The jurisdictiQn of the High Court to issue a writ of certiorari under ~rt.
226 is a supervisory jurisdiction, and not as an appellate court. 'fhe. fip.d1ngs
of.fact reached by an inferior court or tribun<l!l as result of the appreciation of
evidence are not reopened or questioned in these proceedings.
An error of law
which is apparent on the face of record can be corrected but not an error of .
fact, however, grave it may be.
In regard to a finding of fact recorded by a
tribunal a writ can be issued if it i!'I shown that the tribunal had erroneously
refused to admit admissible and material evidence or had erroneously admitted
inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding.
Again, if a
finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of
la\V which can be corrected by a writ of certiorc:!fi, but if there is somo evidence
which may reasonably supPort the conclusion, its adequacy or sufficiency and
the inference of fact drawn, are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the tribunal.
The Court is concerned to determine whether the inquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf, and according to the procedure prescribed in that
behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated. Therefore, in
departmental enquries relating to the guilt of delinquent officers, the High Court
may interfere only where the departmental authorities have held the proceeding1
against the delinquent officer in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural
justice or in violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of inquiry
or where the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair decision by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and the merits of the
case, or by allowing themselves to be influenced by irrelevMJt considerations, or
where the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly arbitrary and Capricious
that no reasonable person
could ever have
arrived
at
that
conclusion.
[525-E-527B]
State of Andhra PradesH v. S. Sree Rama Rao [1963) 3 S.C.R. 25; Railway
Board, representing the Union cJf JndW, New Delhi & Anr. v. Niranjan Sinrh [1969]
3 S.C.R. 548 and Syed Yakoob v. K. S. Radhaknslman & Ors. [1964] 5 S.C.R. 64,
referred to.
(2) There is no warrant for the view that in considering whether a. public
officer is guilty of misconduct charged against him the rule followed in criminal
trials, namely, that an offence is not established unless proved beyond reasonable doubt, must be applied.
[525F.G]
In the present case, charges that the respondent fradulently claimed travelline
allowance were inquired int9 by the Disciplinary Proceedings Tribunal. The
Tribunal found him guilty and recommended dismissal. The Government accepted the recommendation and dismissed the respondent. In a
writ
petition,
challenging the order of dismissal, the High Court equated the charge of misconduct to a charge under s.5(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947,
discussed the eviden:::e and findings of the Tribunal on that basis and held, that
the ·prosecution did not adduce
m~terial and essential evidence namely, the
oonductor's chart which would show whether the respondent travelled on a
particular day, that a statement made by the respondent during investigation was
not admissible in evidence, that it wa! not safe to rely on it. and set aside the
order of dismissal.
H
Allowing the appeal to this Court.
HELD: (a) The High Court was not correct in holding that the dome!tic
inttuiry before the . Tribunal. was the .same as prosecution in a criminal case.
fl'I"'
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[525C·DJ
3-L925SupCl/75
522
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1976] 1 s.c.~.
(b) The respondent was. given full opportunity to explain the statement
made by him during investigation.
Further, the Tribunal did not base its finding only on that statement.
It had given its reasons for its conclusion and it is
not possible for the High Court to say that no reasonable person could have
arrived at that conclusion.
The High Court had accepted the explanation that
the conductors' charts were destroyed and therefore could not be produced.
Moreover, the conductor's chart would not show the names of the persons paying the money.
The High Court reviewed and re·assessed the evidence and
then rejected evidence as no evidence, and this is precisely what the High Court,
in exercising jurisdiction under Art. 226, should not do. [525C; 5278-D]
(c) The respondent's contention that the Tribunal relied upon certain reports
which were not available to the respondent is not correct.
A reference to the
inquiry report of the Tribunal shows that the Tribunal had not relied upon those
documents for finding-the respondent guilty.
I527G-528B]
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
2040 of
1974.
Appeal by special leave from the Judgment and Order dated the
13th June, 1974 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in W.P. No. 2145
of 1972.
Niren De, Attorney-General of India and P. P. Rao, for the appellant.
A. Subba Rao for the respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
RAY, C.J. This appeal is by special leave from the judgment dated
13 June, 19.74 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court quashing an order
of dismissal.
The principal question canvassed by the AttorneyGeneral is that the High Court should not have interfered with the
findings of the Tribunal.
The State Government in the year 1964 received certain complaints
alleging misconduct against the respondent. The Director of AntiCorruption Bureau was asked to inquire and make a report.
The
Government in the light of advice tendered by the Vigilance Commission referred the matter to the Tribunal constituted under Andhra
Pradesh Civil Services (Disciplinary
Proceedings Tribunal) Act,
1960,
Three charges were framed against the respondent. Broadly stated
the charges were that the respondent claimed false travelling allowA
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ance on certain days in the months of January, April and September,
1964.
The respondent denied the charges and submitted a written
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statement on 4 November, 1968. The Tribunal made inquiries and on
9 December, 1968 recommended dismissal of the respondent from the
service.
The Government thereafter gave a notice to the respondent on 22
February, 1969 to show cause why the penalty of dismissal from
service should not be imposed on him.
On 20 March, 1969 the
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respondent submitted his written explanation.
The Government after
considering the explanation of the respondent, by an order dated 24
May, 1969 dismissed the respondent from service.
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A. P. STATE V. C. V. RAO (Ray, C.J.)
523
The respondent challenged the order of dismissal in the Andhra
Pradesh High Court.
The High Court by judgment dated 27 July,
1970 set aside the order of dismissal on the ground that the recom·
meudatious of the Tribun.al were not communicated to the respondent
alongwith the notice regarding the proposed punishment of dismissal.
The High CoJirt observed that it was open to the punishing authority to
issue a fresh show cause notice regarding the proposed punishment after
communicating the enquiry report and the recommendations
of the
Tribunal.
The Government thereafter complied with the directions of the
High Court.
The Government cancelled the order of dismissal dated
24 May, 1969.
The Government, however, ordered that the respondent shall be deemed to have been under suspension from service from
21 May, 1969 until further orders.
The order of suspension was
challenged by the respondent and set aside by the Andhra Pradesh High
Court on 22 March, 1970.
The Government then issued fresh notices dated 16 September,
1970 and 25 September, 1970 to the respondent and communicated
the report of the Tribunal and the recommendations of the Tribunal
and the Vigilance Commission regarding the proposed penalty. The
respondent submitted his explanation on 6 and 23 October, 1970.
The Government considered the same.
The Commerce Department
thereafter by an order dated 5 May, 1972 dismissed the respondent
from service.
The charge§ against the respondent were that he made three false
claims for travelling allowflnce for three journeys.
The first .iOUfll.ey
was on 3 January, 1969 from Rajahmundry to Hyderabad.
The
second journey was on 19 April, 1964 from Rajamundry to Hydera·
bad and Hyderabad to Rajahmundry on 24 April, 1964. The third
journey was from Rajahmundry to Guntur on 13 September, 1964
and Guntur to .Rajahmundry on 16 September, 1964.
The respondent in his written statement filed before the Tribunal
denied the charges and maintained that he travelled by first class on
the days mentioned in the claim for travelling allowance.
He stated
that he travelled by first class from Rajahmundry to Hyderabad on 3
January, 1964 in accordance with his tour programme and claimed
the travelling allowance. He also said that he traveiled by first class
from Rajahmundry to Hyderabad on 19 April, 1964 and from Hy·
derabad to Raiahmundry on 24 April, 1964 and claimed travelling
allowance.
Io Exhibit P-45 which was his signed statement dated 8 January,
1967, he stated that on 3 January, 1964 he went with his Joint Director
from Vijayorgram from Raiahmundry in a car. In that statement he
said that he went from Hyderabad to Waltair on 7 January, 1964 and
he claimed travelling allowance from Vijayawada to Hyderabad.
In
Exhibit P-45 he said that on 19 April, 1964 he travelled ·from Rajah·
mundry to Vijayawada by first class and he went to Hyderabad · by
first class on 19 April, 1964. In Exhibit P-45 he said that he did not
524
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1976] 1 s.C.R.
travel on 24 April, 1964 from Hyderabad to Rajahmundry because
there was no accommodatiO!n.
He waited at Hyderabad. On 28
April, 1964 he got reservation and travelled to Rajahmundry.
The Tribunal on enquiry found the responde'nt guilty of charges
1 and 2.
In the Enquiry Report dated 9 December, 1968, the Tribunal recommended dismissal of the respondelnt.
The respondent in the High Court challenged the order of dismissal.
The High Court set aside the order of dismissal on the grounds
that the prosecution did not adduce every material and essential evidence to make out the charges and that the conclusion reached by the
Tribunal was not based on evidence.
The High Court held that Exhibit P-45 was not admissible in evidence according to the Evidence Act
and it was not safe to rely on such a statement as a matter of prudence.
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The High Court said that corruption or misconduct under rule
2(b) of the Andhra Pradesh Civil Service (Disciplinary Proceedings
Tribunal) Rules, has the same meaning as criminal misconduct in
the discharge of offi_cial duties in section 5 (I ) of the Prevention of
Corruption Act, 1947. The High Court in that background discussed
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the evidence an_d findings of the Tribunal as to whether the prosecution placed evi<Jence in respect of the ingredients of the charge under
section 5(1){d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947.
The High Court referred to these features in regard to the finding
of the Tribunal. Four years elaP.sed between the _journeys forming
subject-matter of the charge and the framing of the charge. The resE
pendent in his evidence said that he secured accommodation through
the Conductor-in-charge of the first class compartment after the arrival of the train.
It was possible that the respondent might have con-
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verted his ticket to first class one once he found that first class accom-
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modation ·was available on the train even though he had purchased
a ticket of lower denomination.
The conductor's chart· is the only
basis for showing whether a particular person travelled by first class
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by a particular train and not by a copy of the reservation chart kept
at the starting station.
Though the prosecution oroduced evidence to
show that the respondent did not purchase or reserve first class accommodation in advance, the prosecution failed to produce the Conductor's charts relating to the trains in question.
Accordmg to the High
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Court "The prosecution utterly failed to adduce any evidence to exclude
these possibilities".
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The High Court said that it was doubtful whether Exhibit P-45
was admissible in evidence. It was said to be taken during the course
of investigation.
The High Court said that even if the statement is
accepted, it only shows that the respondent did not actually travel on
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the days mentioned in the tour programme according to which travel-
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ling allowance was paid.
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The respondent made the statement marked Exhibit P-45 on 8
January,
1967. The charge-sheet was framed on 17 November,
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A. P. STATE V. c. V. RAO (Ray, C.J.)
525
1967. The respondent filed the writtein statement on 2 August, 1968.
He filed an additional written statement on 4 November, 1968. It is
apparent that the charge-sheets were framed after investigation .
lt transpired on evidence before the TribU11al that ope first class
ticket bearing No. 03834 was collected at Hyd.erabad on 4 January,,
1964. The further evidence about ticket No. 03834 was that it was
issued to on~P. Ramachandra Raju who travelled from Rajahmundry
to Hyderaba<J on the night of 3 January, 1964.
The fUrther evidence
before the Tribunal was that one first class ticket bearing No. 04049
for the journey from Rajahmundry to Hyderabad was sold to one
A. S. Murty for the journey dn 19 April, 1964.
The Tribunal examined the respondent.
The respondent was
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given full opportunity to deal with Exhibit P-45.
The High Court was not correct in holding that the domestic
enquiry before the Tribunal was the same as prosecution in a crurunal
case.
The High Court was also in error in holding that Conductor's
chart would show whether
the respondent
travelled or not.
The
High Court accepted the explanation that Conductor's charts were
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burnt and, therefore, they could not be produced. Further, Conductor's chart could not show the name of the persons paying the money.
There was positive evidence before the Tribunal of tickets being purchased by persons other than respondent on 3 January, 1964 and 19
April, 1964.
These features figured prominently before the Tribu·
nal.
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The High Court all throughout treated the enquiry before the Tri·
bunal as a criminal prosecution.
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The scope of Article 226 in dealing with departmental inquiries
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has come up before this Court. Two propositions were laid down by
this Court in State of Andhra Pradesh v. S. Sree Rama Rao(!). First,
there is no warrant for the view that ln considering whether a public
officer is guility of misconduct charged against him, the rule followed
in criminal trials that an offence is not established unless proved by
evidence beyond reasonable doubt to the satisfaction of the Court must
be applied.
If that rule be not applied by a domestic Tribunal of
Inquiry the High Court in a petition under Article 226 of the Con·
stitution is not competent to declare the order ot the authorities holding
a departmental inquiry invalid.
The High Court is not a Court of
Appeal under Article 226 over the decision of the authorities holding a
departmental enquiry against a public servant.
The Court is concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent
in that behalf and acdording to the procedure prescribed in that behalf,
and whether the rules of natural .iustice are not violated.
Secdnd,
where ther is some evidence which the authorities entrusted with the
duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and which evidence may reason·
ably support the conclusion that the delinqu~nt officer is guilty of the
charge, it is not the function of the High Court to review the evidence
(1) [1963] l S.C.R. 25.
526
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1976] 1 S.C.R.
and to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence.
The High
Court may interfere where the. departmental authonttes. have held the
proceedings against the delinquent in a manner inconsistent with the
rules of natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules prescnbmg
the mode of enquiry or where the authorities have disabled themselves
from reaching a fair decision by some consideratwns extraneous to
the evidence and the merits of the case or by a!lowmg themselves to
be influenced by irrelevant considerations or where the conclusion on
the very face of it is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at that conclusion. The departmental authorities are, if the enquiry is otherwise properly held, the
sole judges of facts and if there is some legal. evidence on which their
findings can be based, the adequacy or rehabihty of that evidence
is not a matter which can be permitted to be canvassed before the
High Court in a proceeding for a writ under Article 226.
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Again, this Court in Railway Board, representing the Union of
India, New Delhi & Anr. v. Niranjan Singh(!) said that the High Court
does not interfere with the conclusion of the disciplinary authority uinless the finding is not supported by any evidence or it can be said that
no reasonable person could have reached such a finding.
1n Niranjan
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Singh's case (supra) this Court held that the High Court exceeded its
powers in interfering with the findings of the disciplinary authority on
the charge that the respondent was instrumelntal in compelling the
shut-d1own of an air compressor at about 8.15 a.m. on 31 May, 1956.
This Court said that the Enquiry Committee felt that the evidence of
two persons that the respondent led a group of strikers and compelled
them to close down their compressor could not be accepted at its face
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value.
The General Manager did 'not agree with the Enquiry Committee on that point.
The General Manager accepted the evidence.
This Court said that it was open to the General Manager to do so
and he was not bound by the conclusion reached by the Committee.
This Court held that the conclusic<~ reached by the disciplinary authority should prevail and the High Court should not have intefered with
the conclusion.
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The jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari under Article 226 is a
supervisorv jurisdiction.
The Court exercises it not as an Appellate
Court.
The findings of fact reached by an inferior court or Tribunal
as a result of the appreciation of evidence are not reopened or questioned in writ proceedings.
An error of law
which
is
apparent
on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but
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not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be.
In regard
to a finding of fact recorded by a Tribunal. a writ can be issued if it is
shown that in recording the said finding, the Tribunal had erroneously
refus~d to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously
admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impmrned finding.
Again if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that-would be
regarded as an error of law which can be corrected bv a writ of cerH
tiorari.
A finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be chal-
(1) [1969] 3 S.C.R. 548.
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A. P. STATE V. C. V. RAO (Ray, C.J.)
527
lenged on the ground that the relevant and. material evidence adduced
before the Tribunal is insufficient or inadequate to sustaln a finding.
The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference
of fact to be drawn· from the said finding are within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Tribunal. See Syed Yakoob v. K. S. Radhakrishnan
& Ors( 1).
The High Court in the present case assessed the entire evidence
and came to its own conclusion.
The High Court was not justified to
do so.
Apart from the aspect that the High Court does not corre~
a finding of fact on the ground that the evidence is not sufficient or
adequate, the evidence in the present case which was considered by
the Tribunal cannot be scanned by the High Court to justify the conclusion that th~re is no evidence which would j)lstify the finding of
the Tribunal that the respondent did not make the journey.
The Tribunal gave reasons for its conclusions. It is not possible for the High
Court to say that no reasonable person could have arrived at these
conclusions.
The High Court reviewed the evidence, re-assessed the
evidence and then rejected the evidence as no evidence.
That is
precisely what the High COurt in exercising jurisdiction to issue a
writ of certiorari should not do.
The respondent raised another cdntention that the State did not
give the respondent a document described as 'B' Report and Investigation Report of the Anti-Corruption Bureau.
The ground advanced
by the respondent in the petition before the High Court was that 'B'
Report and Investigation Report to which the reference is made by
the Tribunal in its report and which are relied on to support the
charges, were not made available to the respondent.
The High Court
did not express any opinion on ihis question because the High Court
set aside the dismissal on the ground that there was no evidence for
the Tribunal to come to that conclusion.
The ·State in the affidavit
filed in the High Court in answer to the respondent's petition said that
'B' Report and Investigation Report are secret reports which are
intended for the reference of the Tribunal of Disciplinary Proceedings
and the Govennment and, therefore, lhese reports are not supplied
to the officers.
We need not expres~. any opinion on that answer
of the State i11_the affidavit.
The respondent in answer to the affidavit
of the State said that the Tribunal nsed the 'B' Report and the Investigation Report against the respondent and did not supply copies.
It is
because the respondent alleged in the writ petition that the Tribunal
relied on 'B' Report and Investigation Report, we looked into the
Inquiry Report of the Tribunal to find out whether that was a correct
state!Jlent.
We find that there is a reference, to 'B' Report by the
Tribunal only because the respondent challenged the genuinelness and
authenticity of Exhibit P-45.
The respondent's case was that if he
made a statement like Exhibit P-45, the Investigating Officer would
have' sent it along with his report. The Inquiry Officer says that the
Investigating Officer recorded the statement of the respqndent.
The
Tribunal has not relied on 'B' Report or Investigation Report.
The
(1) [1964] 5 S.C.R. 64.
528
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1976) 1 S.C.R.
respondent never demrunded 'B' Report and Investigation Report. The
respondent was interested before the Tribunal to displace Exhibit P·
45 by doubting its genuineness.
The Tribunal found that Exhibit P45 was genuine find was a statement made and signed by the respondent in the presence of the Investigating Officer. It does not appear
that the Tribunal based its finding only on Exhibit P-45.
For these reasons we are of opinion that the High Court was
wrong in setting aside the dismissal order by reviewing and re·assessing
the evidence.
The appeal is accepted.
The judgment of the High
Court is set aside.
Parties will pay and bear their own costs.
V.P.S.
Appeal allowed.
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