# STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH v. CHEEMALAPATI GANESWARA RAO & ANR - **Citation:** [1964] 3 S.C.R. 297 - **Court:** Supreme Court of India - **Decided:** 1961-01-19 - **Case number:** Criminal Appeal No. 39 of 1961 - **Bench:** K. SuBBA Ri1.o, Raghuba.R Dayal, j. R. MUDHOLKAR - **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/state-of-andhra-pradesh-v-cheemalapati-ganeswara-rao-anr-2895 - **Pages:** 61 ## Headnote Criminal Trial-'-Joind.er nf charg" and pers<»U- Oon•· pirac71, charge of-If illegal after conspiracy fructifieaExamination of accmed-Right of accv•ed to examine him.ielf aa witneM-lf duty of Oovrt to inform acc""ed of right-Pardota, legality of-Approver-Refreshing memory by reference to document•-lf Pormiasible-AamiMibility of evidence-Account Boo"8 -Ab1enee of entrie. •f payment. aUeged -Gode of Criminal ProceJure, 1898 (5 Bf 1~98), 81. 233 to 339,342,337,529,537Indian Evidence Act. 1872(1of1872), 81.ti,ll,34,lli9,1~~. A and B were tried together at one trial, A of offences under ss. 120-B, 409,477-A and 471 read with •· 476 Indian Penal Code and B of offences under ss. 120-B,409 read with 109 1963 J.jm,ra Nath •• Stal• •! '-fa1hJ• Prad!1h Raghubar Dayal /, Jj63 Stat1 of AndAr• Prad1sh y, Cluemolapati Ganer!riar!J {(flO 298 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964]VOL. and HI read with 467 Indian Penal Code. The Senions Judge who tried them convicted A of all the offence• char11cd and B of the first two charges. On app•al the High Court acquitted both of them. The State appealed to the Supreme Court. The respondents contended: (i) that there was a misjoinder of charges and persons on account ,,f the cumulative uae of the various clauses of s. 239 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which wa• not permissible, (ii) that no charge of conspiracy could be framed after the conspiracy had fructifi•d, (iii) that the Sessions Judge had failed to inform the accused of their right under s. 342 (+) of the Code to examine themselves as witnesS can also be resorted to in the case of a joint trial of several persons permissible under s. 239. Even if there was a misjoinder the High Court was incompetent to set aside the convictions without coming to the definite conclusion that the misjoinder had occasioned failure of justice. Re: Jlanka11alapati Gopala Rao, A.I.R. 1956 Andhra 21 and T.B .. Mukherji v. State, A.I.R. 1954 All. 501, not approved. State of Andhra Prad"8h v. KandimaUa Subbaiah, [1962] 2 $.C.R. 194, K.V. Kri8'tna Murthy Iyer v. State of M can also be resorted to in the case of a joint trial of several persons permissible under s. 239. Even if there was a misjoinder the High Court was incompetent to set aside the convictions without coming to the definite conclusion that the misjoinder had occasioned failure of justice. Re: Jlanka11alapati Gopala Rao, A.I.R. 1956 Andhra 21 and T.B .. Mukherji v. State, A.I.R. 1954 All. 501, not approved. State of Andhra Prad"8h v. KandimaUa Subbaiah, [1962] 2 $.C.R. 194, K.V. Kri8'tna Murthy Iyer v. State of Murse of business, and both these were relevant facts. Qu-.n Empre8' v. Grees Ohander Banerjee (1884) I.L.R. 10 Cal, 1024, and Ram Pershad Singh v. Lakhpati Koor, (1902) I.L.R. 30 Cal. 231, referred to. CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 39 of 1961. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated January 30, 1960 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court (in Criminal Appeals Nos. 277 and 278 of 1957 and Criminal Revision Case No. 810 of 1957. A.S . .R. Chari, K.R. Ohoudhry and P.D. Menon, for the appellant. Bhimasankaram and R. Thiagarajan for respon· dent No. 1. R. Mahalingier, for respondent No. 2. 1963. April 23. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by MuDHOLKAR J.-The respondent No. I wa1 tried before the Court of Sessions, Visakhapatnam for offences under s. 120-B, Indian Penal Code, s. 409, s. 477-A ands. 471 read with s. 467, I.P.C. while respondent No. 2 was tried for an offence under - - - 3 s.a.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 301 s. 120-B and for offences under ss. 409 read with s. 109, 477-A and 471 read withs. 467, I.P.C. Each of the respondents was convicted of the first two offences, but the respondent No. 1 alone was convicted of the other two offences. Various sentences were passed against them by the Additional Sessions Judge, Visakhapamam, who presided over the court. The respondents preferrP.d appeals before the High Court challenging their convictions and sentences. The State on the other hand preferred an application for revision under s. 439, Cr. P.C. for the enhance· ment of the sentences passed on the respondents. The High Court allowed the two appeals, acquitted the respondents and dismissed the application for revision preferred by the State. The State of Andhra Pradesh has come up before this Court in appeal by obtaining special leave under Art. 136 of the Con· stitution. The prosecution case in so far as it is material for the decision of this appeal is as follows : In the year 1929 the Andhra Engineering Co., which was originally a partnership firm formed by one D.L.N. Raju was converted into a private limited company with its headquarters at Visakh· apatnam. (We shall refer to this company throughout as the AECO). It obtained licences from the Government under the Electricity Act for supply of electrical energy to Visakhapatnam, Anakapalli and some other places. As the AECO did n0t have the necessary capital to undertake the work Raju floated in the year 1913 a public limited company called Visakhanatnam Electric Supply Corporation Ltd., (referred hereafter as VESCO) and another in the year 1936 called the Anakao.alli Electric Supply Corporation Ltd. The AECO transferred its licences for the supply of electrical energy to the consumers of Visakhapatoam to VESCO and similarly transferred to AECO the licence to supply 19/iJ Stat1 of Andhra Pradtsh v. Cli1emalapati Gan1swar" Rao Mudho/kar /. 196S Slt1t1 of Aadhr11 P1ad11h •• CheemalajJati Garuswara Rao Mudho/kar J. I 302 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964JVOL. . t electrical energy to consumers at Anakapalli. The AECO was appointed Managing Agent for each of these Corporations under separate agreements. Some time later other industrial concerns, the Andhra Cements Ltd., Vijayawada and the East Coast Ceremics, Rajahmundry were started apparently by Raju himself and the AECO was appointed the Managing Agent of each of these concerns. The original managing agency agreement in favour of AECO with resprct to VESCO was for a period of 15 years i.e., from 1933 to 1948 and was later renewed for the remaining term of the currency of the licence granted by the Government under the Electricity Act. A mention may be made o( the fact that in June, 1952 the VESCO undertaking was acquired by the Government under the provisions of the "Electricity Undertaking Acquisition Act" but nothing turns on it. The VESCO had its own Board of Directors while the AECO had also its own separate Board of Directors. The VESCO had no Managing Director but at each meeting of its Board of Directors one of the Directors used to be elected Chairman. The same practice was followed at the meeting of the general body of the shareholders. The AECO on the other hand always had a Managing Director, first of whom was D.L.N. Raju. He died in the year 1939 and was succeeded by R.K.N.G. Raju, an Advocate of Ra.iahmundry. This person, .however, did not shift to Visakhapatnam on his becoming the Managing Director but continued to stay most of the time at Rajahmundry. According to the pro· secution both these concerns were running smoothly and efficiently during the lifetime of D.L.N. Raju because· he was personally attending to their affairs. His successor, however, opart from the fact that he continued to be staying mostly at Rajahmundry, was also interested in several other ventures, including a sugar factory at Dewas in Central India. - 3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 303 Eventually many or those ventures failed. Accord· ing to the prosecution the second Raju was not bestowing sufficient care and attention on the affairs of VESCO. The AECO as Managing Agents of VESCO had appointed in the year 1939 one D.V. Appala Raju, a trusted employee, as its representative and as the secretary of VESCO. In 1944 this person resigned from his appointments and started his own business in radio and electrical goods in the name Jf D. Brothers. He was succeeded by T. Visweswara Rao, P.W. 6, an employee of the AECO. The respondent No. 1, Ganeswara Rao was also an old employee of AECO, having been appointed a stenotyp1st in the year 1 J23 on an initial salary of Rs. 40/- p.m. Eventually he became the Head Clerk therein. He pressed his claim for appointment as Secretary of VESCO and rep1esentative of the Managiug Agents at Visakhapatnam and R K.H.G. Raju appointed him to that post. All this is not disputed. The respondent No. 1, even after his appointment on two posts connected with VESCO, continued to work with the AECO also whose business had by then been confined only to that of Managing Agents of the four companies floated by D.L.N. Raju. It is the prosecution case that as Secretary of VESCO and the resident representative of the Managing Agents, the respondent No. I was attending to the day to day affairs of VESCO, which included the receiving of aU sums of money due to VESCO, spending money for the purpose of VESCO, attending to the appointment, supervision and control of the staff of VESCO. purchasing materials required for the purpose of VESCO and supervising over the accounts of VESCO. He was thus all important with respect to the every day affairs of 196S State of A11d .. ra Pradesh •• Ch1emc{ojJ11ti Gunerwara Rae 1961 ltate of Andhra Fradesh •• Ch1mialtJf11ti Gane1wara Rao Mu,Jho/kar J, 304 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL. VESCO. His dual capacity enabled the respondent No. I to earn the confidence not only of the Directors of AECO but also of those of VESCO. The accounts maintained by the VESCO used to be explained by him not only to the Directors but also to the shareholders. The knowledge of the Financial position of VESCO obtained by them used to be derived essentially from the re1pondent No. I. As Secretary of VESCO it was his duty to convene the meetings of the Board of Directors, to present before them the periodical statement of receipts and expenditure of VESCO, to convt>ne meetings of the General Body, to prepare the Managing Agents' report and the Directors' report as also to see to the presentation of auditors' report and the statement of accounts. The explanations of the Managing Agents and the Directors of VESCO with respect to the items mentioned in the orders of the Board used also to be placed by him before the shareholders. It was also his duty to have the accounts of VESCO audited by the auditors elected by the general body and to produce before the auditors the relevant accounts, vouchers, bank statements and so on. There were no complaints about the management of the affairs of VESCO or the AECO till .the end of 1946 or the beginning of 1947. One significant fact, however, which occurred prior to 1946 is referred to by the prosecution. Till the year 1945 Messrs C. P. Rao & Co., a firm of Chartered Accountants were the auditors of VESCO but after the respondent No. I became Secretary. one B. Rajan was elected Auditor not only for VESCO but for all the other four concerns, including AECO. This person was Auditor for Green lands Hotel at Visakhapatnam, of which the respondent No. 1 was a Director. R,K.N.G. Raju took tiU towards the end of 1947 and died at Madras in April, 1948. According • 3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 305 to the prosecution the respondent No. I wanted to take advantage of this fact and conceived of a scheme for misappropriating as much money belonging to VESCO as possible before the managing agency agreement of AECO came to an end in October, 1948. The respondent No. 1 secured the promotion of the approver K.V. Ramana, who was originally Accounts Clerk, to the post of Senior Accountant. Similarly K. V. Gopala Raju was transferred from the post of Stores Clerk to the general department and K.S.N. Murty, the discharged accused, was appoint· ed Stores Clerk in his place. Later, however, Murty was also got transferred to the general section and replaced by P. W. 18, Srinivasa Rao originally a stores boy. The approver who was originally an Accounts clerk with the AECO was, it may be mentioned, appointed a cashier in VESCO in 1946 at the instance of the respondent No. l and was thus beholden to him. He was later promoted as Senior Accountant and in his place the respondent No. 2 Lakshminarayana Rao was appointed the Cashier. According to the prosecution the resp9ndent No. 1 took both the approver and Lakshminarayana Rao in his confidence as also some other persons "known and unknown" for carrying out his nefarious purpose, namely, the misappropriation of the funds of VESCO during the subsistence of AECO's managing agency of VESCO. The conspiracy is said to have been hatch· ed in the year 194 7 and falsification of accounts and misappropriation of funds of VESCO went on till the end of the accounting year. The term of the·manag· i !lg agency was renewed in 1943 and AECO continued to be managing agents until the VESCO was taken over by the Government in 1952. The res• pondent No. 1 continued to, be the Secretary of VESCO and resident representative of the Managing Agents throughout the period of conspiracy. 1963 Stat1 of -Anihra Pfad.sh v. Cheomalapatl Gan1swara Rao Mudiw/kar /, 1963 Stat1 of A,,-fhra Prad1sll •• C~ennalapati Ganeswara Rae Mudlwlkar J, 306 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOi:.. After the death of R.K.N.G. Raju, it was discovered that the AECO was indebted to many concerns which were under its managing agency, the liability being shown either as that of AECO or that of R.K.N.G. Raju personally. Again, the VESCO was shown as indebted to the Andhra Cements to the extent of Rs. 42,000/-. This amount was, however, paid by the AECO from the funds of VESCO. The respondent No. 1 and wme of his friends were in search of a rich and substantial man who would be amenable to them to fill the post of Managing Director of AECO. Eventually their choice fell on G. V. Subba Raju, P. W. 25, a resident of . Manchili, who held a large. number of shares in the AECO and who was, besides, related to R.K.N.G. Raju by marriage. It is said that this person has not received much education and knows only how to sign his name in English. He was assured that by consenting to become the Managing Director he would not be required to discharge onerous duties and that the respondent No. l woi:ld look to all the affairs of VESCO. He was also told that apart from signing important papers which may be sent to him by the respondent No. 1 from time to time to Manchili or wherever he might be, he would have no work to do. He agreed and was elected Managing Director of AECO in the middle of 1948. Upon this understanding he accepted the position offered to him. The VESCO used to receive large ;imounts of money from hi(\'h ten~ion power consumers such as the railways, K. G. Hospital, the Port Administration, the Andhra University etc., by cheques. But domestic consumers usually· paid their bills in cash to the bill collector_s who used to hand over their collections to the respondent No. 2. The respondent No. 2 was asked by the respondent No. I to main· tain a private note book. In that book payments which used to be made by respondent No. 2 on the 3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 307 basis of slips issued by the respondent No. I (which included payments to his relatives or to business firms in which he was personally interested) used to be noted and the amount totalled up at the end of the day. This amount was posterl in VESCO's Cash Handover Book as "by safe" indicating that this amount was kept in the safe, though in fact it was not. On the basis of the entries in the Handover Book the final accounts were written up. The respondent No. I opened four personal accounts in different banks, including the Imperial Bank of India (as the State Bank thr.n was). When the respondent No. I had to issue a personal cheque on any of these Banks hr. used to ask the second respondent to send an equivalent amount to the Bank concerned for being credited to his account. These amounts also used to be noted in the private note book and entered 'by safe' in the Handover Book. Another thing which the respondent No. I initiated was opening a heading in the ledger called "advance purcha~e of materials." Amounts which had been misappropriated used to be posted therein though in fact no orders were placed for any material. It may be mentioned that Subba Raju used to visit Visakhapatnam twice a month and check up the account books. At that time it used to be represented to him that the amounts which were shown to be in the safe and not found therein (hut which were actually mis• appropriated) had been sent to the Bank for being deposited. Apparently Subba Raju was fully satisfied with this and other explanations and, therefore, he appointed one C. S. Raju, who was the Manager of Andhra Cements to supervise over the affairs of VESCO. Apparently because of this a new method of misappropriation was adopted by the respondents by startinf{ in the VESCO account books, an account called "suspense account". A lakh of rupees passed through that account. Amounts which were misappropriated used to find their way in this 196J Stal• qf And/Ir• Prat4th v. Ch11malapati Gan1sw.;,. Rao Mudho/ka< I. 1969 Sltd1 ~f Andhra Ptarksh v. ci.. .... tap•ti Gaul,WdTa Ra• Mrdhalluu J, 308 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL. account. A new cash book was also said to have been prepared by the conspirators with the object of covering up the misappropriations which had been made. Subba Raju was not satisfied with the nature of supervision exercised by C. S. Raju over the affairs of VESCO because he user! to look only at the cash book entries of the days on which he paid visits to VESCO's office, to which he used to go with previous intimation. Besides · that, C. S. Raju's management of Andhra Cements had landed it into a loss of Rs. 30,000-. Because of all these things he had C. S. R"ju replaced towards the end . of the year 19.51 by one Subbaramayya, a retired Finance Officer from the Madras Electricity Board both as a Director of Andhra Cements and as a Supervisor over the accounts of VESCO. Subbaramayya took his work seriously and called for information on a number of points from the respondent No. 1. He, however, was unable to obtain any information. lnJanuary, 1952 he therefore brought one S. G. Krishna Aiyar who had vast experience in the maintenance of accounts of electrical undertaking's having been Chief Account<1nt of the South Madras Electric Supply Corporation; to undertake an investigation and then to act as Financial Adviser. In the meantime on November 29, 1951 there was a. meeting of the General Body at which the accounts were, among other things, to be considered. There was a considerable uproar at that meeting because the respondent No. 1 said that the Auditor's · ·report had not been received. The shareholders felt that the report had been received but was being suppressed or deliberately withheld. However, the meeting was postponed and eventually held on December 9, 1951. On that date the respondent No. I produced the auditor's report (Ex. p. 234 of which Ex. P. 235 is a printed copy). According to • • 3 s.c.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 309 the prosecution the report is a forged document. That was also the feelin~ of a number of shareholders who wanted to see the original but one Dutt who was Chairman of the meeting after seeing Ex. P. 234. said that the report seemed to be a genuine one. S. G. Krishna Aiyar after his appointment in January, 1952, made close enquiry and submitted an mterim report. That report showed that during the period 1948-49 Rs. 33,271-10-0 shown as paid to the Andhra Power System were in fact not paid. The respondent No. 1 on being asked to explain said that he would give his explanation to the Managing Director. The Interim Report showed that there was a shortage of about Rs. 90,000/- for this period. On February 12, 1952 the respondent No. 1 wrote to the Managing Director admitting his responsibility and agreed to make good the amounts found short or such other amounts as would be found short up to the end of March, 1952. Further scrutiny of the accounts was being carried out by Krishna Aiyar and in his subsequent report he pointed out that Rs. 2,38,000/- which were shown as having been paid to the Andhra Power System had actually not been paid. In fact in April, 1952. the Collector attached VESCO properties for realising this amount. On April 30, 1952 the respondent No. 1, by selling some of his property, himself paid Rs. 50,000/- to the Andhra Power System towards the sum due to it from VESCO and had promised to pay the balance shortly thereafter. He was given time for doing so but he failed to pay it. The Directors of VESCO thereafter authorised K.. S. Dutt, one of the Directors to lodge a complaint with the police which he accordingly lodged on May 19, 1952. On the next day the police placed an armed guard around the office of the respondent No. 1 and seized a number of papers. As a result of investigation they found that there was a total misappropriation 1963 Mat1 •f Andlara p,.,,,,, v. Chmnalap.tl Can1swua Ra• Muih•lk"' I. 1963 Stal1 of Arnihra Pradesh y, Ch1emalajJati 01J111swa1a R11'1 ludkolkar J. 310 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL. of Rs. 3,40,000/·. On May 13, 1954 a charge· sheet was filed against the two respondents as well as Murti and the approver Ramana. On September 13, 1954 Ramana offered to make a full confession to the Additional District Magistrate (Independent). who was empowered to grant pardon under s. 337 of 1he Code of Criminal Procedure. He, however, directed Ramana to make his confession before a SubMag~strate. The latter accordingly made a con· fession on November 15, 1954 and on November 17, 1954 the Additional District !\.1agistrate (Independent) granted him pardon and that 1s how he came to be examined as a witness in this case. As already stated, the Additional Sessions Judge convicted both the respondents, the respondent No. l in respect of each head of the offences with which he was charged and the respondent No. 2 in respect only of the offences of conspiracy and misappropriation. The High Court set aside the conviction of the respondents on a number of grounds. In the first place according to the High Court, joint trial of two or more persons in respect of different offences com· mitted by each of them is illegal and that here as they were charged with having committed offences under s. 120-B, s. 409, s. 477-A and s, 476/467, I.P.C. they could not be tried jointly. According to it the provisions of s. 239 were of no avail. Next according to the High Court even ifs. 239 is applicable its provisions are subject to those of s. 234 and as such the trial being for more than three offences wali impermissible. Then according to the High Court offences under. s. 409 and s. 4 71/467 are of, different kinds and are not capable of joint commission. ·Therefore, they could not be jointly tried. Further, according to the High Court where a conspiracy has yielded its fruits the conspirators can be charged with the actual offences committed and not with conspiracy to commit those offences. Charge of conspiracy, according to the High Court, can be validly made 3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 311 only when the prosecution establishes that every conspirator expected to receive a personal benefit from it and that the prosecution has not been able to establish that the respondent No. 2 or the approver evidently had any such expectations since they did not in fact receive any corresponding benefit. In so far as the respondent No. 2 is concerned the High Court has held that since he was charged with a specific offence under s.409, l.P.C. he could not be convicted of mere abetment of an offence. The approver's evidence was held by the High Court to be inadmissible because the pardon granted to him was illegal. The High Court has also held that his evidence is unreliable and further that the Additional Sessions Judge was in error in allowing him to refresh his memory by referring to various documents in a manner not permitted by s. 159 of the Evidence Act. The High Court has further stated that inadmissible evidence was taken on record by the Additional Sessions Jujge, namely, account books of Billimoria Brothers, maintained in Gujrati and further that the Additional Sessions Judge was in error in allowing the prosecution to use those account books for establishing absence of entries with regard to certain payments alleged in the VESCO books to have been made to them. Finally, the High Court held that the examination of the respondent under s. 342 of the Code was unfair for a number of reasons and that the Additional Sessions Judge had failed to perform an important duty in that he did not call the attention of the respondents to the provisions of s. 342 which enable an accused person to give evidence in his own behalf. Mr. Bhimasankaram, appearing for the two respondents, however, has not sought to support the judgment of the High Court on all these points. The pointa which he urged are briefly these: (1) That there was a misjoinder of charges and persons in that the various provisions 1963 Stalt of Andhra Pr..Ush •• Che1malapa!i Gan1swa'a Rao Mudholkar .I. 1969 State of Andhro Eradash "· Cheemalapati . G4ntswara R(N) Mudho/kor /, . 312 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964]VOL. ofs. 239 were clubbed together and an omnibus charge of conspiracy was framed which on its face was one likely to embarrass the respondents and make their task of defending themselves difficult . (2) The procedure adopted in the investigation and committal stages was irregular. (3) Irrelevant evidence was introduced and some evidence was introduced in a manner not authorised by the Evidence Act. ( 4) That the Court abused its powers under s. 342, Cr. P.C. while conducting the examination of the respondents. (5) The evidence of the approver was inadmissible because the pardon granted to him was illegal, that, in any case, it is unreliable, was so found even bv the Ses- . sions Judge and must, ther~fore, be rejected. If the evidence of the approver is left out the remaining evidence would be inadequate to sustain the prosecution case. We shall deal with Mr. Bhima~ankaram's contentions in the order in which we have set them out. The first question for consideration is whether there was a misjoinder of parties and of persons. The first charge is in respect of the col'spiracy alleged to have been entered into by the two respondents, K. V. Ramana, the approver, and others "known and unknown" to commit criminal breach of trust of the funds of VESCO and, in order to screen its detection, to falsify the accounts of VESCO and to use forged documents as genuine. On the face of it this is a valid charge. But certain objections have been taken to it with which we will deal at th ' 3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 313 appropriate place. The second charge is for an offence of criminal breach of trust punishable under s. 409 and the accusation therein is that the two respondents along with Ramana, misappropriated 69 items ag~regati:ag to a little over Rs. 3,20,UOO/-. It is clear from the charge that some of the amounts were misappropriated between April, 194 T and March, 1950, some between April, 1947 and March, 1949, some between April, 1947 and March, 1951 and quite a large number between September, 1947 and March, 1950 and a still large number between April, 11J51 and March, 1952. It is thus apparent that offences committed within a space of 12 months were tried along with offences committed beyond that period. lJnless, therefore, the provisions of s. 239 are applicable it would follow that there was a misjoiuder of charges. The third charge· is that the two respondents, along with the approver Ramana made false entries on seven different dates in the account books between September 19, 1947 and March 18, 1952 and thus committed an offence under s. 477-A, l.P.C. The fourth charge is that the two respondents, along with the approver Ramana forged six documents on different dates between March 28, 1949 and November 12, 1951 and thus committed an offence under s. 4 71 read with s. 467, I.P.C. As we have pointed out earlier the respondent No. I alone was convicted by the Additional Sessions Judge in respect of the third and fourth charges. Mr. Bhimasankaram supports the reason given by the High Court for coming to the conclusion that there was a misjoinder of charges. The main reasons upon which the conclusion of the High Court is based are firstly that there could be no clubbing together of the provisions of the various clauses of s. 239 and secondly that the respondents were charged with more than three offences of the same kind and that this was in contravention of 1. 239 (c). In coming to the conclusion that the 1961 Stat. ef A""1r< Pr ad.sh v. Cheema[a/Jafi Gtlnlsw•rs Rn Muiholkar J. 1963 Stale of Andhr• Pradesh v. Cheemalopati (;Q.neswara f<.ao M udh~Htir . J 314 SUPREME COURT REPORTS[l964]VOL. provisions of various clauses of s. 239 cannot be applied cumulatively the High Court has relied upon the decision in Re: Vankaval,a,pati Gopala Rao('). There the learned Judges have held thus: "These clauses are mutually exclusive and thev cannot be simultaneously applied and to construe them as supplementing each other would be enlarging the scope of the exceptions. Each clause is an exception to the general rule enacted in s. 233, Cr. P.C. If such a combination is permissible, all persorn1 accused of offences described in els. (a) to (g) can be tried together in one case which certainly involves a bewildering multiplicity of charges and which would obviously set at naught the salutary principle contained in s. 233." (p. 24) . In support of this view the High Court in that case has relied upon the decision in T. B. Mukherji v. State (') and referred to the decision in Singarachariar v. Emperor (') and D. K. Chandra v. The State('). Before considering these decisions it will be useful to look at the scheme. of Chapter XIX of the Code of Criminal Procedure which deals with the charge. The chapter is split up into two sub-heads, '·Form of charges" and "Joinder of charges." Sections 221 to 232 are comprised under the first sub-head and ss. 233 to 240 in the second. Sections 221 to 223 deal with the framing and content of charge. s. 224 deals with the interpretation of the language of the charge and s. 225 with the effect of errors in the charge. Sections 226 to 231 deal with the power of the court with regard to framing and altering charges and the procedure to be adopted at the trial where a charge is found to be defective or there is no charge or where a new charge is to be (I) A.I.R. 19S6 Andhra 21, (.I) A,I,ll, UIH Mad. 17 •• (2) A,J,R, 1954 All. 601, l•l A,J,R, 1952 11 ... 177, r,81 3 s.c.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 315 framed. Section 232 deals with the power of the appellate court or the High Court when it discovers that there is material error in the charge. Then we come to the other sub·head of this chapter. Section 233 provides that for every distinct offence of which any person is accused there shall be a separate charge. It thus lays down the normal rule to be followed in every case. But it also provides that this will be subject to the exceptions contained in ss. ~34, 235, 230 and 239. The first three provisions relate to the framing of charges against a single accused person. Section 234 (1) deals with the trial of a person for offences of the same kind not exceeding three committed within the space of 12· months from the first to the last of such offences ands. ::!34 (i) what is meant by the expression 'offences· of the same kind'. This provision lifts partially the ban on the trial of a person for more than one offence at the same trial. Section 235(1), however, goes a step further and permits the trial of a person for more offences than one if they are so connected together as to form the same transaction. 1 hus under this provision if the connection between the various offences is established the limitations placed by s. 234( 1) both as regards the number and the period during which the offences are allegt>d to have been committed will not apply. Full effect cannot possibly be given to this provision if we hold that it is subject to the limitation of s.234(1). Sub-section (2) of s. 235 deals with a case where an offence falls within two definitions and sub·s.(3) deals with a case in which a number of acta are alleged against an accused person, different combinations of which may constitute different offences. Then we come to s. 236 which provides that if a single act or series of acts is of such a nature that it is doubtful which of several offences the facts which can be proved will constitute, the accused may be charged with having committed all or any of such ofi'euces and further provides that any number of 1uch 1963 S111t1 of Andhr11 Praduh y. Cheemalapati G11n1Jwa•a ttaa Muihtlkar J. /96J Stat1 of Arulhrtt Pradesh •• Cheema(apati Ga~swara RH Mudholkor I• 316 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL. charges may be tried together. It also permits that charges could be framed against an accused person in the alternative if the court thinks fit. Thus, this is a special provision available in case of doubt and is neither subject to the limitations prescribed by s. 233 nor those of the other preceding provisions. Now, if the respondent No. 1 were alone tried upon the second, third and the fourtli charges the provisions of s. 235(1) could have been pressed in aid if the allegations were that the offe111ces were so con· nected together as to form one and the same transaction and the validity of the trial would not have been open to any attack. Similarly if the second respondent were alone tried on the second charge his trial would not have been open to any objection if the allegation were that the offences were so connected together as to form the same transaction. Here, however, we have a case where the prosecution alleges that there was additionally a conspiracy to which apart from the two respondents the approver and some other persons were parties and where in both the respondents were tried together. A conspiracy must be regarded as one transaction and, therefore, a single individual charged with it could be tried with the aid of s. 235(1) for all the acts committed by him in furtherance or in pursuance of the conspiracy without the limitations imposed by s.234(1). For, where all the acts are referable to the same conspiracy their connection with one another is obvious. The only provision in the Code which permits the joint trial of more than one person is s. 239 and what we have to see is whether under that provision the two respondents could have been jointly tried for the offences with which they were charged. Let us, therefore, examine closely the provision1 of 3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 317 1. 239.