# STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH v. KOLLA SREERAMA MURTHY

- **Citation:** [1963] 1 S.C.R. 184
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1963
- **Case number:** CIVIL APPELLATE JURISIDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 368 and 369 of 1961
- **Bench:** B. P. Sinha, P. B. Gajendr, Agadkar, K. N. WANCnoo, N. Raja.Gop.Ala Ayyangar, T. L. Venkatarama Aiya.R
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/state-of-andhra-pradesh-v-kolla-sreerama-murthy-2534
- **Pages:** 12

## Headnote

Sales Tax-Delivery order-Endoraement--Properly in
good& paaaea on taking delivery by tho laat endoraet-E//ectOriginal holder of delivery order, if liable to pay salea tazMadras General Sales taz Act, 1939 (Mad. IX of 1939). s. J.
The respondent was a dealer.in gunny hags. He purchased gunnies from the ¥ills on terms of a wri1ten contract
which was on a printed form. The Mills after receiving a
part of purchase price, issued "delivery orders" directing the
delivery of goods as per the contract. Instead of taking deli-.
very himself the respondent endorsed the delivery orders and
these passed through several hands before the ultimate hol·
der of the delivery order presented it to the Mills and obtaiJ'.!e<!
delivery of the gunnies from them.
•
l

1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
185
At the date of the contract for purchase, the goods
which wne the subject matter of the purchase were not appropriated to the contract so that there was no ccmpleted sale
since no property passed but only an agreement of sale.
The Sales Tax Officer assessed the
respondent and
collected sales tax on the said transactions. The question was
whether the transactions were or were not "Sales of goods"
within s. 3 the Madras Sales Tax Act, 1939, so as to enable
the turnover represented by these sales to be brought to tax
under the Act, or were mere sales or transfers of delivery
orders: and further what was the effect of the property in the
goods passing to the ultimate endorsee of the delivery order.
Held, that the principle laid down in Butterworth v.
Kingway Motors Ltd., which is the basis of the decision in the
case of Bayyana Bhimayya v. State of Andlua Prariesh, would
equally apply to the facts of the present case .
Bayyana Bhimayya v. Government of Andlira Praaesh,
(1961) 3 S. C.R. 267 and Butteiworth v. Kingway Motors Ltil.
( 1954) 2 All E. R. 694, applied.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISIDICTION: Civil Appeal
No. 368 and 369 of 1961.
Appeals from the judgment and decree dated
June 27, 1957, of the Andhra Pradesh High Court
in S. A. Nos. 194 and 195 of 1954.
K. N. Rajgopal Sastri and P .. D. Menon, for the
appellants.
A. V. Viswanatha Sastri and T. Satyanarayana,
for the respondents.
1962. April 2. The Judgment of the Court was
delivered by
AYYANGAR, J.-These two appeals are before
us by virtue of certificates of fitness granted by the
. High Court of Andhra Pradesh under Art. 13 "} (I) ( c)
of the Constitution. The State of Andhra Pradesh
is the appellant in both the appeaJs and one Kolla
Sreerama Murthy-a dealer in gunnies-is the respondent in each of them and the point involved
relates to the liability of the respondent to Sales
1962
SMeof
Andhra Pradesh
•
v.
Koll a Sreerama
Murthy
Ayyangar J,
1951
Stal1 of
And~ra Prad1sh
••
Xolla Sf'urama
MurtJi1
AyyangarJ.
•
186
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS (1963]
Tax in respect of the transactions to which we shall
later refer.
Civil Appeal No. 368 of 1961 arises out of
original suit No. 268 of 1951 in the file of the
Distrint Munsif's Court, Rajahmundry by the respondent for setting aside an assessment and obtain
refund of a sum of Hs. 2,941/7 /- which was partly
the sum assessed and collected as sales-tax for the
assessment year 1947-48, while Civil Appeal No. 369
of 1961 is from a similar suit praying for dentical
reliefs in respect of the year 1946-47, the amount of
which refund was sought however being Rs.1,631/12/-.
The basis of the suits
briefly was that the
transactions whose turnover was included in bis
assessment, were not "sales of goods" within the
Madras General Sales Ta-x Act 1939 (Mad. IX of
1939) and that consequently the assessment\ to tax
and recovery of the same were illegal and without
jurisdiction. Both the suits ~ere decreed by the
District Munsif-a decision which was affirmed by
the 8ubordinate Judge of Rajahmundry on appeal
by the 8ta.te and by the High Court of Andhra
Pradesh on further appeal also by the State. It is
from these two judgments and decrees in the two
second appeals tha.t the present appeal

## Text

1181
Stai. f
A.tu/''" PraJ1•h
••
BuvVti'u 8aloromi
lied''
-
U'ane"'1o J.
184
SUPREME COURT RE.PORTS [1963]
him to grant a mining lease to any
one.
It follows therefor" that the
mining leases
granted in this case were granted by persons who
he.d no right to the minerals and therefore confer
no rights on the respondents to claim as of right
from the Government that they should be granted
a mining lease under the l:tulea.
In view of the above decision appeal No. l!52
must be allowed and appeal No. 25a must fail.
We th11refore allow appeal No. 252 and setting
aside the order of the appeal court dismiss the writ
petition with costs to the State throughout. Appeal
No. 253 is hereby dismissed but in the circumstances parties will bear their own costs.
0. A. No. 252 of 1958 alkJwed.
0. A. No. 253 of 1958 dismissed.
STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH
v.
KOLLA SREERAMA MURTHY
(B. P. SINHA, c. J., P. B. GAJENDR,AGADKAR, K. N.
WANCnoo, N. RAJA.GOP.ALA AYYANGAR and
T. L. VENKATARAMA AIYA.R, JJ.)
Sales Tax-Delivery order-Endoraement--Properly in
good& paaaea on taking delivery by tho laat endoraet-E//ectOriginal holder of delivery order, if liable to pay salea tazMadras General Sales taz Act, 1939 (Mad. IX of 1939). s. J.
The respondent was a dealer.in gunny hags. He purchased gunnies from the ¥ills on terms of a wri1ten contract
which was on a printed form. The Mills after receiving a
part of purchase price, issued "delivery orders" directing the
delivery of goods as per the contract. Instead of taking deli-.
very himself the respondent endorsed the delivery orders and
these passed through several hands before the ultimate hol·
der of the delivery order presented it to the Mills and obtaiJ'.!e<!
delivery of the gunnies from them.
•
l

1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
185
At the date of the contract for purchase, the goods
which wne the subject matter of the purchase were not appropriated to the contract so that there was no ccmpleted sale
since no property passed but only an agreement of sale.
The Sales Tax Officer assessed the
respondent and
collected sales tax on the said transactions. The question was
whether the transactions were or were not "Sales of goods"
within s. 3 the Madras Sales Tax Act, 1939, so as to enable
the turnover represented by these sales to be brought to tax
under the Act, or were mere sales or transfers of delivery
orders: and further what was the effect of the property in the
goods passing to the ultimate endorsee of the delivery order.
Held, that the principle laid down in Butterworth v.
Kingway Motors Ltd., which is the basis of the decision in the
case of Bayyana Bhimayya v. State of Andlua Prariesh, would
equally apply to the facts of the present case .
Bayyana Bhimayya v. Government of Andlira Praaesh,
(1961) 3 S. C.R. 267 and Butteiworth v. Kingway Motors Ltil.
( 1954) 2 All E. R. 694, applied.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISIDICTION: Civil Appeal
No. 368 and 369 of 1961.
Appeals from the judgment and decree dated
June 27, 1957, of the Andhra Pradesh High Court
in S. A. Nos. 194 and 195 of 1954.
K. N. Rajgopal Sastri and P .. D. Menon, for the
appellants.
A. V. Viswanatha Sastri and T. Satyanarayana,
for the respondents.
1962. April 2. The Judgment of the Court was
delivered by
AYYANGAR, J.-These two appeals are before
us by virtue of certificates of fitness granted by the
. High Court of Andhra Pradesh under Art. 13 "} (I) ( c)
of the Constitution. The State of Andhra Pradesh
is the appellant in both the appeaJs and one Kolla
Sreerama Murthy-a dealer in gunnies-is the respondent in each of them and the point involved
relates to the liability of the respondent to Sales
1962
SMeof
Andhra Pradesh
•
v.
Koll a Sreerama
Murthy
Ayyangar J,
1951
Stal1 of
And~ra Prad1sh
••
Xolla Sf'urama
MurtJi1
AyyangarJ.
•
186
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS (1963]
Tax in respect of the transactions to which we shall
later refer.
Civil Appeal No. 368 of 1961 arises out of
original suit No. 268 of 1951 in the file of the
Distrint Munsif's Court, Rajahmundry by the respondent for setting aside an assessment and obtain
refund of a sum of Hs. 2,941/7 /- which was partly
the sum assessed and collected as sales-tax for the
assessment year 1947-48, while Civil Appeal No. 369
of 1961 is from a similar suit praying for dentical
reliefs in respect of the year 1946-47, the amount of
which refund was sought however being Rs.1,631/12/-.
The basis of the suits
briefly was that the
transactions whose turnover was included in bis
assessment, were not "sales of goods" within the
Madras General Sales Ta-x Act 1939 (Mad. IX of
1939) and that consequently the assessment\ to tax
and recovery of the same were illegal and without
jurisdiction. Both the suits ~ere decreed by the
District Munsif-a decision which was affirmed by
the 8ubordinate Judge of Rajahmundry on appeal
by the 8ta.te and by the High Court of Andhra
Pradesh on further appeal also by the State. It is
from these two judgments and decrees in the two
second appeals tha.t the present appeals have been
brought.
It was common ground that the respondent
was a "dealer" within the · Madras Sales Tax Act
(which for convenience we shall call the Act) being
"a person who carries on the business of buying or
selling goods", and .that the transactions whose
legal cha.racter is now in dispute were put through
by him by way of business. Section 3 of the Act
which is the charging section-enacts that "every
dealer shall pay for each year a tax on his total
turnover for such year". "Turnover" is defined in
the Act as:
" •rurnover' means the aggregate amoun~
rs.o.R.
SUPREME OOORT REPORTS
187
for which goods are bought or sold, or supplied or distributed, by a dealer either directly
or through another, on his own account or on
account of others whether for cash or for
deferred· payment or other valuable consideration provided that the proceeds of the sales by
a person of agricultural or horticultural ·produce grown by himself or grown on any land
in which he has an interest whether as owner,
ttsufructuary mortgagee, tenant or otherwise
shall be excluded from his turnover".
and clauses ( c) and (h) of s. 2 of the Act define
"goods" and "sale" respectively thus :
'' 'Goods'
means all kinds of movable
property other than actionable claims, stocks
and shares and securities and includes all
materials, commodities and articles · including
those to be used in the construction, fitting
out improvement 6r repair of immovable
property or in the fitting out, improvement or
repair of movable property and also. includes
all growing crops, grass and things attached
'to or forming part of the land which are
agreed to be severed befo~e sale or under the
contract of. sale".
''Sa.le with all its grammatical variations·
and cogriate expressions means every transfer ·
of the proper~y in goods by one person to
another in the course of trade or business for
casli or for deferred payment or other valuable consideration and includes also a transfer
of property in good~ involved in the execution
of a works contract, but does not include a
mortgage, hypothecation, charge OJ.'. pledge".
The only matter therefore which is in controversy
between the parties is as ·to whether the transactions to whose details we sh&ll present1y refer,
whio~ the respondent admittedly entered into; wel'A
1961
---
s1,11 o/
Antlhto Praclesli
v.
Koll a 8111rom1
.MUllh:J
.d.»0111• J.
J962
Sta!e of
.1fndhra J'radesh
..
KolJa Srurama
Munhy
4Jyan.:..ar J.
188
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963]
or were not "sales of goods" within the Madras
General Sales Tax Act (Act IX of 1939) so as to
enable the turnover represented by these sales to
be brought to tax under the Act.
We shall now set out the nature of the transactions which the learned Judges of the High Court
have held have not resulted in "a S!l.le of goods" by
the respondent so as to attract the tax under the
charging section in respect of the "turnover" represented by such sales.
'l'he respondent is, as
stated e1trlier, a dealer in gunny bags.
The gunny
bags dealt with by him were those ma1,ufactured in
two mills known as Chittivalsa and Nellimerla Mills
both situnted in Chittivalsa in Visakhapatnam
District. The purchase by the respondent from the
mills was on terms of a written contract which was
on printed form.
We shall set out the relevant
terms of one of the sample contracts for understanding the point involved, as it is common ground
that evPry contract f'ntered into by the respondent
with the mills was in this form.
These contracts
were entered into by brokers acting for the respondent and who sent him "bought·notes" setting out
the terms npon which the purchases had been
effected from the mills, and one of these Ex. Al,
filed in 0.S. 268 of i DGl, has been treated as typical.
It rMites the purchase on behalf of the respondent
of 30,0C:O bags from the Chittivalsa mills, specifies
the description of the goods, the manner of their
packing and the fact that delivery was to be affec·
ted within a period of three months.
The buyer
was required to make a deposit of Rs. 1 5/- per bale
within 24 hours after the contract was banded over
to him and the respondent fulfilled this requirement.
The Mills having thus received a part of the purchase price, they issued. "delivery orders" directing the
deiivery of goods as per the contract and these were
handed over to the bltyer on his honouring a hundi
for the value of tho goods, the buyer.in this case
being the respondent.
It was common ground that
=
..
I S.C.R.
SUPREME COUR'l
1 REPORTS
, 189
by the date when the delivery orders were issued,
there were gpods answering the contract description
and of quantity sufficient to comply with the relativeterm in the contract, in the godown of the mills
wherefrom on the terms of the contract, delivery
was to be effected. It \YaS open to the buyer himself to have gone to the mills and taken delivery of
t.he goods, but this was not done and it is the
departure in this respect that has given rise to the
legal controversy involved in these appeals. Instead of taking delivery himself, the respondent
(and this appears to have been the practice of others
as well) endorsed the delivers orders and these
passed through several hands before the ultimate
holder of the delivery order presented it to the
mills and obtained delivery of the gunnies from
them. It need hardly be stated that s,t each endor-
. sement of the delivery order the price of the bales
represented by the quantity specified in the delivery
order would be collected by the successive endorsers
which would, in most cases, include the profit., if it
was a rising market. The case in the Courts below
as well as before us was argued on the basis of this
pattern of dealing.
The learned trial Judge and
the appellate Courts including the learned Judges
of the High Court came to the conclusion that on
these facts there was no ''sale of goods" by the
respondent, because the transaction so far as he was
concerned consisted merely of the endorsement of
the delivery order issued by the mills and that the
fact that the ultimate endorses of the delivery order
got delivery of the goods from the mills was treated
as irrelevant for considering whether by the transfer
of the delivery order <_X>upled with the delivery of
the goods to such endorsee, there was in fact a
completed sale effected by the respondent. Put in
~nother form the argume~t which was upheld by
the .Courts below was t'iat the transactions entered
into by the respondent were mere sales or transfers
of delivery · or~41lr& and· not any "sale of goods" so
7962
Stale of
.4.ndhla Pradesh
v.
Kol/a Sf'eerama
Murthy
Ayyanzar J.
1961
Sl•ll of
.diulira Praihsh
v.
Kolla Sre1r•RG
Murlly
A.1)angar J.
190 . SUPREME COURT REPORTS f1963]
as to bring them to charge under s. 3 of the Act.
It is the correctness of this conclusion that is in
controvery in these appeals.
·
It is unnecessary for us to canvass in detail
the argument whicti found favour with the Courts
below by reason of the judgment of this Court in
Bayyana Bkimayya versus Governrrum,t of Andhra
Pradesh (1), where the points. urged in favour of
the respondent were considered and repelled. The
correctness of this deci&ion was not disputed before
us.
Dealing with the transaction involved in the
succeEsive endorsements of the delivery orders
issued to the purchaser from the Mills, this Court
said:
"In so far as the third parties were concerned they had purchased the goods by
payment of an extra price, and the transaction must, in law and in fact, be considered a
fresh transaction of sale between the appellants and the third parties. A delivery order
is a do!mment of title to goods { vide S. 2( 4)
of the sale of Goods Act), and the possessor of
such a document has the right not only to
receive the goods but also to transfer it to
another by endorsement or delivery. At the
moment of delivery by the Mills to the third
parties, there. were, in effect, two deliveries,
one by the Mills to the Appellants, represented in so 'far as the Mills were oonoemed by
the appellants' agents, the third parties and
the other, by the appellants to t.he third
parties as buyers from the appellents. Theae
two deliveries might synchronise in point of
time, but were separate in point of faot and in
the eye of law. If a· dispute arose as to the
goods delivered under the kutoha delivery
(I) (1961] 3 S C. R. ?o1
I S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
i91
order to the third parties again~t the Mills,
action could lie at the instance of the appellants. · ~ .... 'he third parties could proceed on
breach of contract only against the appellants
and not against the Mills. In our opinion,,
there being to separate transactions of sale,
tax was payable at both tho points, as has
been correctly pointed out by the tax authorities and the High Court".
The position would appear to be this.
At the
date of tht-~ contract for J>uchase by the respondent
the goods which were the subject of the purchase
were not appropriated to the contract, so that there
was no completed sale since no property passed,
•
but only an agreement. for sale. -Whether or not
the goods which were the subject of the agreement
for sale were in existence on the date of the agreement, they were 'existing goods on the date the
delivery order was iss)led, and they _would have
been appropriated to the contract and property in
the appropriated goods would have. passed to the
respondent if he bad cared to present the delivery
order at the Mills godown. The respondent however
without taking delivery himself, en9ersed the delivery order and enabled his endoraee to take delivery
and that endorsee (and it makes no difference to
the prinoiple if a further endorsee from him did so)
took delivery of the goods a.nd the goods became
appropriated to the contract and property in goods
passed to him. One view to take, and it was this
that found favour with the ,Courts below~ was that
since no goods had been appropriated to the re.spondent'fl contract before the
delivery orders were
endorsed, the successive endorsements o.f the delivery
orders were not ''sales of goods" but were merely
transfers of the delivery order as some pa.per,
though this was of some value in that it enable the
endorsee to approach the mills and obtain delivery
. of the goods. The result of the aooeptanoe of this
196Z
State of
Andhra P1adesh
v.
Kalla Srtn:ama
Murthy
Ayyangar J.
1962
State of
Andhra Pradesh
••
Kalla Sreerama
Mur1h,
A,JYangor J.
192 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1963]
view would be to eliminate the respondent altogether from the cha.in and so to spe~k, treat the
ultimate cndorsee as the purchaser from the mills.
Naturally if that was correct the respondent would
have effected no purchase of the goods nor, of
course, any sale of goods, there being only one transaction of sale by the mills to the ultimate endorsee
of the delivery order. In Dayyana's ca.S<J this Court
held that this was not a correct understanding of
the legal effect of the endorsment of the delivery
orders. No doubt, without an appropriation of goods
to an agreement for sale the're cannot be a completed contract in which the property in the goods
passes to the purchaser and unless property in the
goods passes, there is no sale. But the question is
what is the effect of the property in the goods passing to the ultimate endorsee of the delivery order.
In thie connection reference could usefully be
made to the decision in Butterworty v. KingBway
Motor8 Ltd. ('). It was a case where a hirer of a
motor-car under a hire-purchase agreement under
which the necessary payments of instalment etc. had
not been made and so his title had not matured(i.e.
where the title remained in the owner) transferred
the vehicle or such rights as he possessed in it, to
o1 he1·s and the ultimate tra.nsfere paid the balance
of the purchase price to the owner and thus acquired title to the motor-car. The question before the
Court related to the effect of thil! completion in the
title of the ultimate transferee on the legal position
of the intermediate parties. Pearson J. dealing
with this matter expressed himself in these terms :
"The various purported sales all took
place at times when Bowma.ker, Ltd. were
still the owners of the car, so that all the
purported sellers in this rather long chain
had no title to it at the times when the
purported sales were made. But on or about
(I) [195*] 2 All B. R. 694.
F
I S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT R.EPORTS
193
July 25, 1952 Miss Rudolph acquired a good
title from Bowmaker, Ltd., or, at any rate,
made payment to Bowmaker, Ltd. which extinguished their title and induced them to relinquish .any claim which they had to the car.
I think that the right view is that Miss Rudolph acquired the title as between her and
Bowmaker, Ltd. but I further hold on authority
that the title so acquired went to feed the
previously defective titles of the subsequent
buyers and ensured to their benefit ............ "
We consider that it is this principle that forms the
basis of the decision of this Court in Bayyana's case
and that it would equally apply to the facts of the
present case.
Learned Counsel for the respondent placed
some reliance on the penultimate paragraph of the
judgment in .Bayyana's case where
this Court
referring to the judgments now under appeal
stated:
''The facts were different, and the Division Bench itself in dealing with the case,
distinguished the judgment under appeal.
observing that there was no scope for the
application
of the principles laid down
in the judgment under appeal, because in the
cited case, 'the property in the goods did not
pass from the Mills to the assessee and there
was no agreement of sale of goods to be
obtained in future between the assessee and
the third party'. "
We are unable to read this observation as a decision
by this Court that the High Court was right in distinguishing the earlier decision.
'{he circumstance
that in Ba.yyana's case basides the contract of purchase of the gunny bags there was a further agreement that the mills would give delivery of the
goods to the nominees of the purchaser does not
really affect the principle, in view of the admitted
1961
State of
Andh1 a Prades!t
v.
Kolla Sreerama
Murihy
Ayyangar J.
1962
State of
J.nihra Pre d•~ A
••
Kol/a Sre,,ama
Mur1h,
-
194
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963]
fact that on the uncontradicted evidence in this
case, it was the common understanding of the
parties that the mills would honour the endorsement of the delivery order and deliver the goods
contracted for to the endorsee who produced it.
Learned Counsel for tlie respondent made a
suggestion that in the present case there was no
proof that the goods represented by the contract
had been delivered to the ultimate endorsee, with
the relllllt that the appellant had not established a
"sale of goods" at any stage.
No doubt, if on the
facts there was no delivery of the goods to the last
holder of the delivery order, the entire fabric on
which the case for the appellant rests would disappear. There is however no factual basis for this
submission. This fact was not alleged by the respondent at any stage of the proceedings starting from
the plaint in the Court of the District Munsif right
up to the statement of the case in this Court and
besides, all the Courts have proceeded on the basis
that such delivery was effected to the last f ndorsee
of the delivery order but they held that rnch delivery did not become a sale by the respondent so as
to attract the liability to tax under s. 3 of the Act.
We have therefore no hesitation in rejecting this
argument.
Before concluding, however, it is necessary to
refer to one matter. O. S. 268 of 1951 was filed on
July 25, 1951 and the plaint in O.S. 309 of 1951 on
September 6, 1951.
Even, however, before that
date, on May 15, 1951 the Madras General Sales
Tax Act, 1939 was amem!ed by Madras Act VI of
1951 by which, inter alia, 8. ISA was added to the
parent Act. This sectio:Q : uns:
"No suit or other proceeding shalJ, except
as expressly provided in. this Act, be instituted
in any Court to set aside or modify any asseasment made under this Act."
1 s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
I95
No plea based upon the bar contained ill this section
was raised before any Court right up to the High
Court a.nd not even in the grounds of appeal to
this Court or even in the appellant's statement of
the case as originally filed.
At the beginning of
1962 however the appellant applied to this Court
for leave to urge additional grounds and in pursuance of the leave· so granted it has raised a point
that the suit should have been dismissed by the
Courts below as not maintainable, being barred by
the section just now set out. In answer to this new
plea the respondent put forward two objections: ( 1)
that on a. proper construction of s. ISA particularly
taken in conjunction with the other amendment
effected by Act VI of 1951 by which s. ISA was
inserted in the parent Act, the section had no retrospective effect and could be invoked only in the
case of those assessments which wera completed
after. the new section came into force. (2) In the
alternative, he raised the contention t.hat if s: ISA
barred even suits in respect of illegal assessments
which had been completed and had become final,
the provision was unconstitutional as violative of
rights guaranteed by Art. 19,I){f) & (g). Though we
heard arguments of lea.med Counsel in relation to
these points, we consider it unnecessary to make
any pronouncement on them in view of the conclusion tltat we have reached on the merits of the
appeals.
The result is that these appeals succeed and
are allowed with coats. Hearing fee one Set.
Appeals allowe,d.
1962
State of
.4.ntlhra Pr a ties\
v.
Eolia Sreerama
Murthy
A.yyangor J.