# STATE OF ASSAM v. RANGA MAHAMMAD AND ORS

- **Citation:** [1967] 1 S.C.R. 454
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1966-09-21
- **Bench:** K. SUBBA RAo, M. Hidayatijllah, S. M. Sikri, J.M. Shelat, G. K. Mitter
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/state-of-assam-v-ranga-mahammad-and-ors-3858
- **Pages:** 9

## Headnote

CoMtllurion o/ India, Am, 233 and 235-'Postin/( of DI.strict Judgu
under Ari. 233-Whether includes transfers or only first appointment to
cadre or on promotion-Whether conndtatlon wider Art. 233 with High
Court mandatory-Whether 'trans/et can only be ordered by High Court
wider Art. 235-Courr'• power to expunge remaru from a /ud1ment-Whe11
exercised.
The respondent, filed petitions under Arts. 226 and 227 in the Assam
High Coun asking tha.t notifications by the 51,•.e Government of the transfer of one District & Sessions Judge and the appointment and posting of
another be quashed on the ground that the High Coun alone could make
the transfers and, in any e'-eot, the High Court was to be consulted and
was not consulted before the impugned orders were made. The Hi~h Court
held that there was no consultation with regard to the posting of one of
the District Judges and that bis transfer wu irregwar as the High Court
alone could have ordered it; and furthermore that the transfer of the
other District Judge was for a like reason also irregular. Holding, however, that none of the District Judges could be said to occupy wrongly
the office of District & Sessions judge, the High Court declined the writ
of quo warranJo and dismissed the petition, but without costs to the State
Government. One of the learned Judges of the High Court who compriJed
the Division Bench that heard the petitions, in a separate but concurring
judgment, passed some scathing remarks on the action of the Government
which he described as ma/a fide and actuated by some ulterior motive.
On being moved by the State Government, the High Court granted
cenificates under Art. 132 of the Constitution to appeal to the Supreme
Court on the ground that the judgment involved the
interpretation
of
Arts. 233 and 235 of the Constitution.
By these appeals the State Government sought a reversal of the opinion of the High Court on the two.
Articles.
Three questions arose for decision in the appeal:- (a) who Is to order
transfer of a District Judge-the State Government or the High Coun;
(b) is the provision regarding consultation in
Art.
233 mandatory or
directory and if the former, whether the High Court was not in fact consulted; and (c) wehther the remarks complained of about the State Government made by the learned Judge should be expunged.
HELD: (i) Under Art. 233 the Governor is oaly concerned with the
appointment, promotion and posting to the cadre of district Judges but
not with the transfer of District Judges already appointed or promoted
and posted to the cadre.
The latter is a mattor of control of District
Judges which is vested in the High Court under Art. 235. [460 GJ
The word pos'ing means either to station some one at a place or
to assign someone to a post, /.~. a position or a job, especially one to which
a penon ls appointed. Jn Art. 233 it bean the second meaning. The word
occurs
in
associ3tion with
the
words
'appointment'
and
'promotion' and takes its colour from them. These words indicate the stage when
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ASSAM v. R. MAHAMMAD (Hidayatul/ah, J.)
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a person first gets a position or job and 'posting' by association means the
assignment of an appointee or ,Promotee to a position in ~e cadre of District Judges.
The word 'postm11' cannot be understood m the sense of
'transfer' when the idea of appomtment and pr9motion is invoh-ed in the
combination. This meaning is quite out of place because 'transfer' operates
at a stage beyond appointment and promotion. Transfer, thereforo, fallll
within the control vested in the High Court.
[460 C-0)
State o/ West Bengal v. Nripendranath Bagchl, [1966) I S.C.R. 771,
referred to.
(ii) As the High Court acting under Art. 235 and ·not the State Government is the authority to make transfers, no question can arise o~ a
consultation on this account. In the present case, however, consultat1on
as required by Art. 233, was necessary before one of the District Judges
was promoted and posted as a District .

## Text

STATE OF ASSAM
v.
RANGA MAHAMMAD AND ORS.
September 21, 1966
[K. SUBBA RAo, C. J., M. HIDAYATIJLLAH, S. M. SIKRI,
J.M. SHELAT AND G. K. MITTER JJ.]
CoMtllurion o/ India, Am, 233 and 235-'Postin/( of DI.strict Judgu
under Ari. 233-Whether includes transfers or only first appointment to
cadre or on promotion-Whether conndtatlon wider Art. 233 with High
Court mandatory-Whether 'trans/et can only be ordered by High Court
wider Art. 235-Courr'• power to expunge remaru from a /ud1ment-Whe11
exercised.
The respondent, filed petitions under Arts. 226 and 227 in the Assam
High Coun asking tha.t notifications by the 51,•.e Government of the transfer of one District & Sessions Judge and the appointment and posting of
another be quashed on the ground that the High Coun alone could make
the transfers and, in any e'-eot, the High Court was to be consulted and
was not consulted before the impugned orders were made. The Hi~h Court
held that there was no consultation with regard to the posting of one of
the District Judges and that bis transfer wu irregwar as the High Court
alone could have ordered it; and furthermore that the transfer of the
other District Judge was for a like reason also irregular. Holding, however, that none of the District Judges could be said to occupy wrongly
the office of District & Sessions judge, the High Court declined the writ
of quo warranJo and dismissed the petition, but without costs to the State
Government. One of the learned Judges of the High Court who compriJed
the Division Bench that heard the petitions, in a separate but concurring
judgment, passed some scathing remarks on the action of the Government
which he described as ma/a fide and actuated by some ulterior motive.
On being moved by the State Government, the High Court granted
cenificates under Art. 132 of the Constitution to appeal to the Supreme
Court on the ground that the judgment involved the
interpretation
of
Arts. 233 and 235 of the Constitution.
By these appeals the State Government sought a reversal of the opinion of the High Court on the two.
Articles.
Three questions arose for decision in the appeal:- (a) who Is to order
transfer of a District Judge-the State Government or the High Coun;
(b) is the provision regarding consultation in
Art.
233 mandatory or
directory and if the former, whether the High Court was not in fact consulted; and (c) wehther the remarks complained of about the State Government made by the learned Judge should be expunged.
HELD: (i) Under Art. 233 the Governor is oaly concerned with the
appointment, promotion and posting to the cadre of district Judges but
not with the transfer of District Judges already appointed or promoted
and posted to the cadre.
The latter is a mattor of control of District
Judges which is vested in the High Court under Art. 235. [460 GJ
The word pos'ing means either to station some one at a place or
to assign someone to a post, /.~. a position or a job, especially one to which
a penon ls appointed. Jn Art. 233 it bean the second meaning. The word
occurs
in
associ3tion with
the
words
'appointment'
and
'promotion' and takes its colour from them. These words indicate the stage when
-454
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ASSAM v. R. MAHAMMAD (Hidayatul/ah, J.)
455
a person first gets a position or job and 'posting' by association means the
assignment of an appointee or ,Promotee to a position in ~e cadre of District Judges.
The word 'postm11' cannot be understood m the sense of
'transfer' when the idea of appomtment and pr9motion is invoh-ed in the
combination. This meaning is quite out of place because 'transfer' operates
at a stage beyond appointment and promotion. Transfer, thereforo, fallll
within the control vested in the High Court.
[460 C-0)
State o/ West Bengal v. Nripendranath Bagchl, [1966) I S.C.R. 771,
referred to.
(ii) As the High Court acting under Art. 235 and ·not the State Government is the authority to make transfers, no question can arise o~ a
consultation on this account. In the present case, however, consultat1on
as required by Art. 233, was necessary before one of the District Judges
was promoted and posted as a District .Judge.
Chandra Mohan v. U.P:"[1967] ~ S.C.R. 77, referred to.
(iii) The power to expunge is an extraordinary power and can be m:ercised only when a clear case is made out. Although the opinion of this
Court may be that the learned Judge need not have made the remarks
complained of, it could not be said that in malting them he acted with
stich impropriety that the ei<traordinary
powers should
be
exercised.
[462 DJ
Crv1L APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos. 1367 and
1368of1966.
Appeals from the judgment and order dated April 19,
1966 of the Assam High Court in Civil Rules Nos. 171 and 236
of 1965.
Purshottam Trikamdas, A. K. Sen, Naunit Lal and Vineet Kumar,
for the appellant (in both the appeals).
Sa~ioo Prasad, Vinoo Bhagat and s. N. Prasad, for respondent
No. 4 (in both the appeals).
·
The Judgment ofthe Court was delivered by
Hldayatullah, J. These are two appeals by certificate against
a common judgment of the High Court of Assam & · Nagaland
at Gauhati, dismissing· two writ petitions filed by one Ranga
Maharnmad against D. N. Deka and B. N. Sarma, District & Sessions Judges respectively of Lower and Upper Assam Districts
questioning the transfer of the former from Jorhat to Gauhati
and the appointment and posting of the latter at Jorhat. The petitioner had asked that the relevant notifications by the Government be ,quashed on the ground that the High Court alone could
make the transfers and, in any event, the High· Court had to be
consulted and was not consulted before making the orders. The
petitions were heard and disposed of by a Divisional Bench consisting of Chief Justiee Mehrotra and Mr. Justice S, K. Dutta.
456
SUPREME COURT llEPORTS
(1967) I S.C.R.
The Chief Justice held that there was no consultation with regard
:o the posting of Deka, that the transfer of Deka to Gauhati
was irregular as the High Court alone could have ordered it, and
that the transfer of B. N. Sarma was for a like reason also irregular.
Holding, however, that none of the District Judges could be
said to occupy wrongly the office of District & Sessions Judge
the High Court declined the writ of quo warranto. The petitions
were accordingly dismissed but without cost to the State Government. In a separate but concurring judgment Dutta J. passed some
scathing remarks
on the action of the Government which he
described as ma/a fide and actuated by some ulterior motive. The
High Court on being moved by the State Government granted
certificates under Art. 132 of the Constitution on the ground that
the judgment -involved the interpretation of Arts. 233 and 235
of the Constitution.
By these appeals the State Government seeks
the reversal of the opinion of the High Court on the interpretation of Arts. 233 and 235 of the Constitution. The main contention is that the High Court was, in fact, consulted and, alternatively, that the power to transfer District Judges lies with the State
Government and not with the High Court. The State Government also asks for the expunction of the remarks of Mr. Justice
Dutta above-mentioned.
The State of Assam consists of only three Sessions Divisions.
They are : The Upper Assam Districts, the Lower Assam Districts
and the Cachar Districts with Jorhat, Gauhati and Silchar respectively as the Headquarters of the three District Judges. The
Government of Assam with the concurrence of the High Court has
made the Assam Judicial Service (Senior) Rules and rule 5 deals with
recruitment.
In the Senior Judicial Service of the State there are
two grades-Senior Grade I and Senior Grade Il. Grade I has
four posts earmarked for Registrar, and three District Judges,
and Grade II consists of the Additional District Judges.
Under
sub-rule (i) of rule 5 the Chief Justice of the High Court fills the
post of the Registrar by virtue of Art. 229 of the Constitution of
India preferably from Grade I or Grade II of the Service. and
under sub-rule (ii) the other posts of the cadre are filled by the
Government in consultation with the High Court. but not more
than one-third of the posts in each Grade of the cadre may be filled
up by direct recruitment. The other posts are filled up by promotion from Grade II of the cadre or Grade I of the Assam Judicial
Service (Junior) respectively.
One would think that with so few posts in the cadre and places
there would be little scope for disagreement but unfortunately
there was.
On December 6, 1962 the Chief Justice appointed
A. Rahman, District Judge, Gauhati, as Registrar and recommended
that B. N. Sarma, Additional District & Sessions Judge be promoted and appointed District Judge, Gauhati, and in B. N. Sarma's
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ASSAM v. R. MAHAMMAD (Hidayatullah, J.)
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place D. C. Sharma should be appointed as Additional District
& Sessions Judge. This proposal was accepted by Government.
It appears, however, that one Medhi, District Judge, was retiring
and there was a vacancy. It also appears from the correspondence
which has been placed in our hands that there was some
conversation on the telephone between the Chief Justice and the
Finance Minister regarding R. C. Choudhury (Joint
Secretary
Legal Department) whom the Minister suggested for officiation
in that vacancy and the Chief Justice expressed his willingness to
receive him. Later by a D. 0. letter of January 5, 1963 the Chief
Justice pointed out that the Rules did not permit this to be done.
He observed that not more than one-third of the District Judges
could be recruited from the Bar and as Choudhury could only
be recruited as a member of the Bar there was no vacancy for direct
recruitment. The Minister who had accepted the telephone conversation as final and was about to issue the necessary notification
replied that as Sharma was to continue for a year, Sharrna's post
could be given to Choudhury and suggested reconsideration of
the case. The Chief Justice replied that the question was not of
filling Sharrna's vacancy but Medhi's and that Choudhury could
not be transferred from the Legal
Department to the Judicial
Service because appointments as District & Sessions Judges must
be made in accordance with Art. 233 of the Constitution. He
explained that an appointee had to be either a person in the Judicial
Service of the Union .or the State or an Advocate of 7 years' standing and that persons from other services .could not be transferred and
appointed as District Judges. He ended by saying that he could
have taken Choudhury as a member of the Bar if the High Court
recommended him, but Rule 5(ii) of the Assam Judicial Service
(Senior) Rules, which reserved two out of the three posts for promotees, was in the way. He declined to take Choudhury directly from the Legal Department and recommended D. N. Deka's
name for promotion as District Judge to hold the charge at
Jorhat.
This letter apparently nettled the Minister for his letter of the
24th January was worded somewhat strongly. It seems that the
Minister thought that the Chief Justice was retreating from a position previously accepted by him. He traced the history of the
correspondence and the conversations and expressed his amazement at the change of opinion. He pointed out that the intention was not to transfer Choudhury but to give him judicial experience and observed that the constitutional provisions could not
be invoked when Choudhury had put in seven years' practice at
the Bar and was qualified. He concluded by saying :
·~1 am sorry, that I have to write all this but you will
understand that I have no other alternative in view of the
embarrassing situation created by your letter. I would
458
SUPllBMB COURT llBPOR.TS
(1967] 1 S.C.R.
still request you to consider whether non-cooperative and
A
embarrassing attitude of this nature is in the interest of the
State. I do not propose to enter into any further controversy regarding appointment of Shri
Choudhury which
I feel is also not good in the interest of the administration."
Thus ended the episode of Choudhury but the result of the unpleasantness it occasioned was unfortunate
in other respects.
The Chief Justice wrote on February 7, 1963 observing that there
was no question of adopting any non-cooperating or embarrassing
attitude and that all the points raised by the Minister could be
explained satisfactorily.
He, however, saw
no point in saying
more as Choudhury's name was to be dropped.
He enquired why
Rahman was not released although it had no connection with the
other matter and the appointment of the Registrar was entirely
.a matter for the Chief Justice. He requested that Rahman be
released soon and recommended the appointment of B. N. Sarma
as District Judge in his place.
He also suggested S. C. Barua's
transfer from Cachar to Gauhati. In the vacancy of Medhi he
recommended D. N. Dcka's promotion and recommended his
transfer to Jorhat. A notification was issued on June 22, 1963
appointing Deka as District Judge with Headquarters at Jorhat.
Nothing was done regarding the other recommendations. ·On
September 7, 1963, this is to say, exactly seven months after the
last letter of the Chief Justice, the Secretary to the Government of
Assam wrote to the Registrar that the State Government after careful consideration could not accept the suggestion about the transfer
of Barua and proposed the transfer of B. N. Sarma to Jorhat and
of Deka to Gauhati immediately as Jorhat was without a District
Judge for months. The Registrar, in reply, wrote back to say that
the matter had become stale and the High Court would like to
reconsider the matter. Some letters were exchanged but they are
not on the file of this Court. On January 22, 1964 the Registrar
of the High Court wrote to say that B. N. Sarma should go to Silchar, Barua to Jorhat and Delia to Gauhati. To this a final
reply was given by the Government on February 19, 1964 informing
the High Court that the recommendations were not acceptable except
as to Deka's transfer from Jorhat to Gauhati.
B. N. Sarma was
accordingly transferred to Jorhat leaving Barua where he was.
Notifications transferring Deka and Sarma were issued the same
day.
One Ranga Mahammad of Gauhati then filed two petitions
in the High Court of Assam under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution questioning the jurisdiction of Deka, District & Sessions
Judge, Jorhat. He
averred that the High Court was not consulted regarding Deka's appointment and posting at Gauhati.
By the second petition he questioned the transfer of B. N. Sarrna
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ASSAM v. R. MAHAMMAD (Hidayatullah, /.)
45 9'
to Jorhat. On rule being issued in the two petitions, Government
put in a detailed return pointing out that it had acted within its
powers and had also consulted the High Court. The High Court
did not accept the submissions of the State Government. The
State Government now appeals.
Three questions arise and they are : (a) who is to order transfer of a District Judge-the State Government or the High Court;
(b) is the provision regarding consultation "in Arts. 233 and 235
mandatory or directory and if the former, whether the High Court
was not in fact consulted; and (c) should the remarks of Mr. Justice
Dutta about the State Government be expunged ?
The answer to the first question depends on a true construction of Arts. 233 and 235 of the Constitution. The text of these
articles is set out below.* The question we have posed resolves
itself into a question of a very different but somewhat limited form,
namely, whether the power to transfer District Judges is included
in the 'control' exercisable by the High Court over District Courts
under Art. 235, or in the power of "appointment of persons to be
and the posting and promotion, of district Judges" which is to
be ext;rcised by the Governor under Art. 233, albeit in consultation with the High Court. If the sense of the matter be the former,
then the High Court and if the latter, the Governor, would possess
that power. The right approach is, therefore, to enquire what
is meant by "posting" and whether the term does not mean the
initial posting of a District Judge on appointment or promotion
to a vacancy in the cadre,
permanent or temporary. If this be
the meaning, as the High Court holds, then the transfer of District
Judges already appointed or promoted and posted in the cadre
must necessarily be outside the power of the Governor and fall
to be made by the High Court as part of the control vested in it
by Art. 235.
"233. Appointment of district Judges.
(1) Appointments of persons to be, and the posting and promotion of, district
Judges in any State shall be made by the Governor of the State in
consu1tation with the High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to
such State.
(2.) A person not already in· the service of the Union or of the State shaH
only be eligible to be appointed a district judge if he has been for not
Jess than seven years an advocate or a pleader and is recommended by
the High Court for appointment."
"23S. Control over Subordinate Courts.
The control over district courts and courts subordinate thereto including
the posting and promotion of, and the grant of lea.Ve to, persons belonging to the judicial service of a State and holding any post inferior to the
post of district Judge shall be vested in the High Court; but nothing in
this Article shall be construed as taking away from any such person any
right of appeal which he may have under the law regulating the conditions of his serviCe or as 'authorising the High Court to deal with him
otherwise than in ·accordance with the conditions of his service prescribed
under such law."
' I
-460
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1967] I S.C.R.
The history of the Arts. 233-237 in Chapter VI (Subordinate
A
Courts) of Part VI of the Constitution, was considered elaborately
in the State of West Bengal & Anr. v. Nripendranath Bagchi( 1) and it
was pointed out that the articles were intended to make the High
Court the sole custodian of control over the judiciary except in
so fl\r as exclusive jurisdiction was conferred upon the Governor
in regard to the appointment and posting and promotion of District
B
Judges. Therefore, unless the transfer of a District Judge can be
said to be a "posting" of a District Judge the High Court must
obviously enjoy the exclusive power .
. .
In its ordinary dictionary meaning the word 'to post' may
denote either (a) to station some one at a place, or (b) to assign
someone to a post, i.e. a position or a job, especially one to which
a person is appointed. See Webster's New Word Dictionary
(1962). The dispute in this case has arisen because the State Government applies the firi;t of the two mearlings and the High Court the
second. In Art. 233 the word 'posting' clearly bears the second
meaning. This word occurs in association with the words "appointment' and 'promotion' and takes its colour from them. These
words indicate the stage when a person first gets a position or job
and 'posting' by association means the assignment of an appointee
or promotee to a position in the cadre of district Judges. That a
special meaning may be given to a word because of the collocation
of words in which it figures, is a well-recognised canon of construction. Maxwell ("On Interpretation of Statutes" I Ith Edn. p. 321
and the following pages) gives numerous examples of the application of this principle, from which one may be given here. The
words 'places of public resort' assume a very different meaning
when coupled with 'roads and streets' from that which the same words
would have if they were coupled with 'houses'. In the same way
the word 'posting' cannot be understood in the sense of 'transfer'
when the idea of appointment and promotion is involved in the
combination. Jn fact
this meaning is quite out of place bccause
'transfer' operates at a stage beyond appointment and promotion.
If 'posting' was intended to mean 'transfer' the draftsman would
have hardly chosen to place it between "appointment" and "promotion" and could have easily used the word 'transfer' itself. It
follows, therefore, that under Art. 233, the Governor is only
concerned with the appoint,ment, promotion and posting to the cadre
of district Judges but not with the transfer of district Judges already
appointed or promoted and post~d ~o the cadre.. 'f!te latter _is
obviously a matter of control of d1stnct Judges which 1s vested m
the High Court. This meaning of the word 'posting' is made all
tho more clear when one reads the provisions of Arts. 234 and
235.
By the first of these articles the question of appointment is
{I) (1966] I S.~. 171.
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considered separately but by the second of these articles posting
and promotion of persons belonging to the judicial service of the
State and holding any post inferior to the post of a district Judge
is also vested in the High Court. The word 'post' used twice
in the article clearly means the position or job and not the station
or place and 'posting' must obviously mean the assignment to a
position or job and not placing in-charge of a station or Court.
The association of words in Art .. 235 is much clearer but as the word
'posting' in the earlier article deals with the same subject matter,
it was most certainly used in the same sense and this conclusion
is thus quite apparent.
This is, of course, as it should be. The High Court is in the
day to day control of courts and knows the capacity for work of
individuals and the requirements of a particular station or Court.
The High Court is better suited to make transfers than a Minister.
For however well-meaning a Minister may be he can never possess
the same intimate knowledge of the working of the judiciary as
a whole and of individual Judges, as th.e High Court. He must
depend on his department for information. The Chief Justice :ind
his colleagues know these matters and deal with them
p~rsonally.
There is less chance of being influenced by secretaries who may
withhold some vital information if they are interested themselves.
It is also well-known that all stations are not similar in climate and
education, medical and other facilities.
Some are good stations
and some are not so good. There is less chance of success for a
person seeking advantage for himself if the Chief Justice and his
colleagues, with personal information, deal with the matter, than
when a Minister deals with it on notes and information supplied
by a secretary. The reason of the rule and the sense of the matter
combine to suggest the narrow meaning
accepted by us. The
policy displayed by the Constitution has been in this direction as
has been explained in earlier cases of this Court. The High Court
was thus right in its conclusion that the powers of the Governor
cease after he has appointed or promoted a person to bQ a district
Judge and assigned him to a post in cadre. Thereafter, transfer
of incumbents is a matter within the control of District Courts
including the control of personi presiding there as explained in
the cited case,
As the High Court is the authority to make transfers, there was
no question of a consultation on this account. The State Government w;i,s not the authority to OFd~r the transfers. There was,
however. need for Q91lsl!ltatimt bllfori: D, N:. Deka was promoted
and posted as a District Judge. That such a consultation is mandatory has been laid down qirite definitely in the recent decision
of this Court in Cha11dra Molra11 v. U. P.(1) On this part of the case
it is sufficient to s!lY that there \Vas no consultation.
(I)° U967J I ~:c.~ Tl,
462
SUPRl!MI! COURT REPORTS
(1967] I S.C.R.
This brings us to the question whether the remarks of Mr.
Justice Dutta should be expunged. There is no doubt that the
State Government and the High Court were working together till
Choudhury's name was suggested. This is not the first time when
cordiality was ruined because a Secretary's name was suggested by
the Minister and was not acceptable to the High Court. The Assam
High Court's stand has been completely vindicated by Chandra
Mohan's case cited above. Choudhury could not be transferred
from another department and under the rules he could not be
recruited from the Bar as there was no vacancy. Consultation
loses all its meaning and becomes a mockery if what the High Court
has to say is received with ill-grace or rejected out of hand. In
such matters the opinion of the High Court is entitled to the highest
regard.
We have considered very carefully the questi.on of expunging
Mr. Justice Dutta's remarks. The power to expunge is an extraordinary power and can be exercised only when a clear case is made
out. That another Judge in Mr. Justice Dutta's place would not
have made those comments is not the right criterion. The question
is whether Mr. Justice Dutta can be said to have acted with impropriety. Although we think that Mr. Justice Dutta need not
have made the remarks we cannot say that in making them he
acted with such impropriety that the extraordinary powers should
be exercised.
The appeals accordingly fail and are dismissed but there will
be no order about costs.
R.K.P.S.
Appeals dismissed.
MISSup.C.l./66-JS-4-67--GIPF.
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