# STATE OF BDIAR v. UNION OF INDIA & ANR

- **Citation:** [1970] 2 S.C.R. 522
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1969-09-19
- **Bench:** M. lIIDAYATULLAH, J. C. Shah, V. Ramaswami, G. K. Mitter, A. N. Grover
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/state-of-bdiar-v-union-of-india-anr-4856
- **Pages:** 12

## Headnote

Constitution of India, Art. 131-Private party whether can be implec.d·
ed in a suit under Article-Article is meant to settle only disputes between
parties memioned in els. (a) (h) and (c)-Court can give 'declaratory
decree simpliciter.
The State of Bihar filed a number of suits in this Court under Art.
-131 of the Constitution in connection with the delayed delivery of iron
and steel materials for its Gandak project. In six of the suits the defendants were: The Union of India (Defendant No. 1) and Hindustan Steel
Ltd. (Defendant No. 2).
In six other suits the defendants were: The
Union of India (Defendant No. 1) and The Indian Iron & Steel Co. Ltd.
(Defendant No. 2). The prayers in all the suits were that decrees for
specific •urns of mJney be passed either against the Union of India or the
second defendant.
Identical preliminary issues were set down folr consi·
deration in all the suits, namely : (I) whether the cause or causes of action
in this suit a.re within the scope of Art. 13! of the Constitution? (2)
\'ibether the suit is within the scope of Art. J.31 of the Constitution in
view of a non-State viz. defendant No. 2, having been made a party to
the suit? (3) Whether the suit is barred by the provisions of s. 80 C.P.C.
for want of notice to defendant No. 1.
HELD: (i) The specification of the parties in Art. 131 is not of the
inclusive kind. The express words in els. (a), (b) and (c) of the Article
exclude the idea of a private citizen, a firm or a corporation figuring as a
disputant either alone olr even along with a State or with the Government
of India in the category of a party to the dispute. 'I he contents of the
corresponding section, of the Government of India Act,
1935 namely
s. 204, and the legislative history culminating in the adoption of Art. 131
of the Constitution support the oonclusion that so far as the parties to
a dispute are concerned, the framers of the Constitution did intend that
they could only be the constituent units of the Union of India and the
Government ot India itself arrayed on one side or the other either singly
or jointly with another unit or the Government of India. For other types
of controversies or disputes special provision has been made in the sonstitution e.g. in Art. 143 257, 262 and 290 A dispute in which ~private
party is involved must be brought before a court other than thts Court
having jurisdiction over the matter. [526 D-F; 530 B; 531 C, F, H; 532
Cl
The United Provinces v.
The Governor-General in Council,
(1939]
F.C.R. 124 and State of Seraikella and Others v.
Union of India and
anothei', [151] S.C.R. 474, referred to.
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
The enlarged definition .of 'State' given in Parts III and IV of the Constitution is not attracted to Mt. 131 of the Constitution and a body like the
Hindustan Steel Ltd. could not be considered to be "a State" for the purH
pose of Art. 131 of the Constitution. [532 GJ
Rajasthan State Electricity Board v. Mohan Lal, [1967] 3 S.C.R. 377,
distinguished.
A
B
c
BrHAR STATE v. UNION (Mitter, J.)
523
In view of the above finding on issue No. 2 the suits did not lie in this
Court under Art. 131 of the Constitution and the plaints must be lreturned;
it \\'S.S accordingly unnecessary to decide issues Nos. 1 and 3. [532 H]
Article 131 does not prescltibe that a suit must be filed in the Supreme
Court for the complete adjudication of the dispute envisaged therein or the
passing of a decree capable of execution ~n the ordinary. way ~ de:rees of
other courts are.
Once this· Court has given a declaration of its rights to
the aggrieved party the function of the Court under Art. 131 is over. [525
C-FJ
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Civil Misc. Petitions Nos. 512, 513,
574 & 575, 578 & 579, 581 & 582, 583 & 584, 587 & 588, 605
& 606, 609 & 610 and 1466 and 1467 of 1969.
Applications by defendant No. 1 for rejection of plaints and
for stay of the hearing of tit> suits.
Original suits Nos. 3 of 1967, 1 and 3 to 9 of 1968.
Petitions under Art. 131 of the Constitution of

## Text

522
STATE OF BDIAR
v.
UNION OF INDIA & ANR.
September 19, 1969
[M. lIIDAYATULLAH, C.J., J. C. SHAH, V. RAMASWAMI,
G. K. MITTER AND A. N. GROVER, JJ.]
Constitution of India, Art. 131-Private party whether can be implec.d·
ed in a suit under Article-Article is meant to settle only disputes between
parties memioned in els. (a) (h) and (c)-Court can give 'declaratory
decree simpliciter.
The State of Bihar filed a number of suits in this Court under Art.
-131 of the Constitution in connection with the delayed delivery of iron
and steel materials for its Gandak project. In six of the suits the defendants were: The Union of India (Defendant No. 1) and Hindustan Steel
Ltd. (Defendant No. 2).
In six other suits the defendants were: The
Union of India (Defendant No. 1) and The Indian Iron & Steel Co. Ltd.
(Defendant No. 2). The prayers in all the suits were that decrees for
specific •urns of mJney be passed either against the Union of India or the
second defendant.
Identical preliminary issues were set down folr consi·
deration in all the suits, namely : (I) whether the cause or causes of action
in this suit a.re within the scope of Art. 13! of the Constitution? (2)
\'ibether the suit is within the scope of Art. J.31 of the Constitution in
view of a non-State viz. defendant No. 2, having been made a party to
the suit? (3) Whether the suit is barred by the provisions of s. 80 C.P.C.
for want of notice to defendant No. 1.
HELD: (i) The specification of the parties in Art. 131 is not of the
inclusive kind. The express words in els. (a), (b) and (c) of the Article
exclude the idea of a private citizen, a firm or a corporation figuring as a
disputant either alone olr even along with a State or with the Government
of India in the category of a party to the dispute. 'I he contents of the
corresponding section, of the Government of India Act,
1935 namely
s. 204, and the legislative history culminating in the adoption of Art. 131
of the Constitution support the oonclusion that so far as the parties to
a dispute are concerned, the framers of the Constitution did intend that
they could only be the constituent units of the Union of India and the
Government ot India itself arrayed on one side or the other either singly
or jointly with another unit or the Government of India. For other types
of controversies or disputes special provision has been made in the sonstitution e.g. in Art. 143 257, 262 and 290 A dispute in which ~private
party is involved must be brought before a court other than thts Court
having jurisdiction over the matter. [526 D-F; 530 B; 531 C, F, H; 532
Cl
The United Provinces v.
The Governor-General in Council,
(1939]
F.C.R. 124 and State of Seraikella and Others v.
Union of India and
anothei', [151] S.C.R. 474, referred to.
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
The enlarged definition .of 'State' given in Parts III and IV of the Constitution is not attracted to Mt. 131 of the Constitution and a body like the
Hindustan Steel Ltd. could not be considered to be "a State" for the purH
pose of Art. 131 of the Constitution. [532 GJ
Rajasthan State Electricity Board v. Mohan Lal, [1967] 3 S.C.R. 377,
distinguished.
A
B
c
BrHAR STATE v. UNION (Mitter, J.)
523
In view of the above finding on issue No. 2 the suits did not lie in this
Court under Art. 131 of the Constitution and the plaints must be lreturned;
it \\'S.S accordingly unnecessary to decide issues Nos. 1 and 3. [532 H]
Article 131 does not prescltibe that a suit must be filed in the Supreme
Court for the complete adjudication of the dispute envisaged therein or the
passing of a decree capable of execution ~n the ordinary. way ~ de:rees of
other courts are.
Once this· Court has given a declaration of its rights to
the aggrieved party the function of the Court under Art. 131 is over. [525
C-FJ
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Civil Misc. Petitions Nos. 512, 513,
574 & 575, 578 & 579, 581 & 582, 583 & 584, 587 & 588, 605
& 606, 609 & 610 and 1466 and 1467 of 1969.
Applications by defendant No. 1 for rejection of plaints and
for stay of the hearing of tit> suits.
Original suits Nos. 3 of 1967, 1 and 3 to 9 of 1968.
Petitions under Art. 131 of the Constitution of India.
Niren De, Attarney-General, V. A. Seyid Muhammad and
D
B. D. Sharma, for respondent No. l (in all the suits).
D. N. Gupta, for defendant No. 2 (in suits Nos. 3 to 8 of
1968).
D. N. Mukherjee, for defendant No. 2 (in suits Nos. 3 of 1967,
I and 9 of 1968).
E
D. P. Singh, for the plaintiff (in suits Nos. 3 of 1967, 1, 3,
F
G
H
5 and 6 of 1968).
D. Goburdhun, ior the plaintiff (in suits Nos. 4 and 7 of
1968).
U. P. Singh, for the plaintiff (in suit No. 8 of 1968).
R. C Prasad, for the plaintiff (in suit No. 9 of 1968).
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Mitter, J. This group of applications can be divided into
two parts.
The object of one group is to get the plaints in nine
suits filed in this Court rejected while that of the other group is
to stay the hearing of the suits.
The suits are all of the same
pattern in each of which the State of Bihar figures as the plaintiff.
The Union of India is the first defendant in all of them while
the second defendant in six is Hindustan Steel Ltd. and in three
others the Indian Iron and Steel Company Ltd.
The cause of
action in all the suits is of the same nature.
Briefly stated the
plaintiff's case in all the suits is that "due to the negligence or
deliberate action of the servants of both aefendants there was a
short ~eliver~ of fron and steel mat.erial .ordered b)'. the planitiff
to vanous sites m the State of Bthar m connectJon with the
524
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1970) 2 S.C.R.
construction work of the Gandak Project". As the goods were
in all cases booked by rail for despatch to the project site, both
defendants are sought to be made liable for short delivery, the
first defendant as the owner of the railways and the second defendant as the consignor of the goods U'lder contract with the ~tate
of Bihar for supply of the material. In each case there is a prayer
for a decree for a specific sum of money to be passed either
against the first defendant "or alternatively against the second
defendant".
Normally all suits of this kind are instituted all
over India in different courts beginning from the courts of the
lowest jurisdiciton to the High Courts exercising original jurisdiction.
The only distinguishing feature of this series of suits
from others of everyday occurrence in different courts is that a
State is the plaintiff in each case.
Ill all suits of a similar nature
which are filed in courts other than this Court,
a notice
under s. 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure is an es5ential prerequisite.
No such notice has been served in any of these cases.
The applications were set down for trial of three issues sought
to be raised by way of preliminary issues. They are as
follows :-
1. Whether the alleged cause or causes of action
in this suit are within the scope of Art. 131 of the
Constitution ?
A
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2. Whether this suit is within the scope of Art.
E
131 of the Constitution in view of a no,n'-State, viz .• defendant No. 2, having been made a party to the suit ?
3. Whether the suit is barred by th~ provisions of
s. 80 C.P.C. for want of notice to defendant No. I ?
The question before this Court is, whether the dispute in
these cases is within the purview of that aritcle (quoted in the
foot-note. It must be noted that the article confers jurisdiction on
this
Court
to
the
exclusion
of
all
other
courts
in
any dispute between the parties mentioned therein. There
is
however
an
over-riding
provision
that
such
jurisdiction is subject to the provisions of the Constitution and our
attention was drawn to a few of these provisions where the disputes specified are to be adjudicated upon in entirely different
•Art. 131. Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, the Supreme
Coill't shall, to the e~clusion of any other court, have original jurisdiction in any
disputeF
G
( a) between the Government and one or more States; or
H
(b) between the Government of India and any State or States on
one side and one or more ot1er States on the other; or
(c) between tv,ro or more States,
A
B
c
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H
ll!HAR STATE v. UNION (Mitter, !.)
525
manner.
The most important feature of Art. 131 is that it makes
no mention of any party other than the Government of Indi~ 01
any one or more of the States who can be arrayed as a disputant.
The other distinguishing feature is that the Court is not required
to adjudicate upon the disputes in exactly the same way as ordinary
courts of law are normally called upon to do for upholding the
rights of the parties and enforcement of its orders and decisions.
The words in the article "if and in so far as the dispute involves
any question (whether of law or fact) on which the existence or
extent of a legal right depends" are words of limitation on the
exercise of that jurisdiction.
These words indicate that the di!-
putes should be in respect of legal rights and not disputes of a
political character.
Moreover this Court is only concerned to
give its decision on questions of law or of fact on which the existence or extent of a legal right claimed depends.
Once the Court
comes to Its conclusion on the cases presented by any disputants
and gives its adjudication on the facts or the points of law raised,
the function of this Court under Art. 131 is over.
Art. 131
does not prescribe that a suit must be filed in the Supreme Court
for the complete adjudication of the dispute envisaged therein
or the passing of a decree capable of execution in the ordinary
way as decrees of other courts are.
It is open to an aggrieved
party to present a petition to this Court containing a full statement of the relevant facts and praying for the declaration ot its
rights as against the other disputants.
Once that is done, the
function of this Court under Art. 131 is at an end.
The framers
of the Constitution do not appear to have contemplated the contingency of a party to an adjudication by this Court under Art.
131 not complying with the declaration made.
Our law is not
without instances where a court may be caJled upon to make an
adjudication of the rights of the parties to an agreement or an
award simpliciter on the basis of such rights without passing a
decree.
A case in point is s. 33 of the Indian Arbitration Act.
Further, all adjudications by a court of law even under a decree
in a suit need not necessarily be capable of enforcement by way
of execution.
Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877 now
replaced by s. 34 of the new Act enables a person entitled to
any legal character or to any right as to any property to institute a suit against any person denying or interested to deny his
title to such character or right without asking for any funher
relief subject to the limitations prescribed by the section.
We
If and in so far as the dispute involves any quesfon (wh(!ther of law or fact) on
whic11 the existence or extent of a legal right depends:
Provided that the said jurisd ction shall not extend to a dispute arisinz out
of any treaty, a~reement, coven~nt, cn~agcment, sanad o;- other simila;- inst1u.
ment which havin!'!, been entered into or excncatcd before the commenct'n1~nt of
th•! constr11ction, contiues in op~r.ttio:l after such commenc..::m..::nt, or whid1
provides th1t the said jurisC:.:.::ation shall not extend to such a dispute.
526
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1970] 2 S.C.R.
need not however Jay much stress on this aspect of the case as
we are only concerned to find out whether the suits can be entertained by this Court.
Clauses (a), (b) and (c) of the article specify the parties who
can appear as disputants before this Court.
Under cl. (a) it is
the Government of India and one or more States under cl. (b)
it is the Government of India and one or more States on one side
and one or more other States on the other, while under cl. (c)
the parties can be two or more States without the Government of
India being involved in the dispute.
The spec;fication of the
parties is not of an inclusive kind.
The express words of els.
(a), (b) and (c) exclude the idea of a private citizen, a firm or a
corporation figuring as a disputant either alone or even along
with a State or with the Government of India in the category of
a party to the dispute.
There is no scope for suggesting that a
private citizen, a firm. or a corporation can be arrayed as a party
by itself on one side and one or more States including the Government of India on t~e other.
Nor is there anything in the
article which suggests a claim being made by or preferred against
a private party jointly or in the alternative with a State or the
Government of India.
The framers of the Constitution appear
not to have contemplated the case of a dispute in which a private
citizen, a firm or a corporation is in any way involved as a fit
sul:>ject for adjudication by this Court under its exclusive original
jurisdiction conferred by Art. 131.
Like many of the provisions of our Constitution this article
h:;d a fore-runner in the Government of India Act, 1935. Section 204 of that Act provided for conferment of original jnrisdiction on the Federal Court of India. That section ran as
follows :-
"(l) Subject to the provisions of this Act, the Federal Court shall, 'to the exclusion of any other court,
have an original jurisdiction in any dispute between
any two or more of the following parties, that is to say,
the Federation, any of the
Provinces or any of the
Federal States, if and in so far as the dispute involves
any question (whether of law or fact) on which the existence or extent. of a legal right depends :
Provided that the said jurisdiction shall not extend
to-
( a) a dispute to which a State is a party, unless the
dispute--
(i) concerns the interpretation of this Act or of an
Order in Council made thereunder, or the extent of the
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
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BIHAR STATE v. UNION (Mitter, !.)
527
A
legislative or executive authority vested in the Federation by virtue of the Instrument of Accession of that
- State; or
(ii) arises under an 'agreement ~ade under Part VI
of this Act in relation to the administration in that
B
State of a Jaw of the Federal Legislature, or otherwise
concerns some matter with respect to which the Federal Legislature has power to make laws for that State;
or
c
D
F
G
H
(iii) arises under an agreement made after the establishment of the Federation, with the approval of His
Majesty's Representative for the exercise of the functions
of the Crown in its relations with Indian States, between that State and the Federation or a Province, being
an agreement which expressly provides that the said
jurisdiction shall extend to such a dispute;
(b) a dispute arising under any agreement which
expressly provides that the said jurisdiction shall not
extend to such a dispute.
(2) The Federal Court in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction shall not pronounce any judgment other
than a declaratory judgment."
Clause (a) of the proviso to the section defined the categories
of disputes which might be raised before the Federal Court while
clause (b) permitted the parties to provide for the exclusion of
such jurisdiction in the agreement in respect whereof the dispute
arose. It will be noted that the scope of the dispute under subcl. (i) of cl. (a) was limited to the interpretation of the Government of India Act or Order in Council or to the extent of legislative or executive authority vested in the Federation while under
sub-cl. (ii) the dispute had to relate to the administration in a
State
of
a
law
of
the
Federal
Legl.slature
or otherwis~ concerned with some matter relating to the legislative competency of the said legislature.
Under sub-cl. (iii) the dispute
could only be one under an agreement made after the establishment of the Federa.tion between the State and the Federation or
a Province subject to the condition therein specified.
A dispute
of the nature which is raised in this serks of a cuoe was outside
the ken of s. 204 of the Government of India Act.
It may not be out of place to trace the origin of s. 204.
The
proceedings of the Joint Committee on Indian Constitutional Re-
528
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1970] 2 s.c.R.
form,
Session 1933-34, Vol. I, Part II, paragraph 309 read
as follows:
"A Federal Court is an essential element in a Federal Constitution.
It is at
once the interpreter and
guardian of the Constitution and a tribunal for the determination of disputes between the constituent units of
the Federation.
The establishment of a Federal Court
is part of the White Paper scheme, and we approve
generally the proposals with regard to it.
We have,
however, certain comments to make upon them, which
we set out below."
The report of the Joint Committee on Indian Constitutional Reform, Session 1933-34, Vol. I, Part I contained two paragraphs
bearing on this matter.
Paragraph 322 was a reproduction of
paragraph 309 quoted above. Paragraph 324 ran as follows
"324. It is proposed that the Federal Court shall
have an original jurisdiction in-
(i) any matter involving the interpretation of the
Constitution Act or the determination of any •ights or
obligations arising the;·eunder, where the parties to the
dispute are (a) the Federation and either a Province or
a State, or (b) two Provinces or two States, or a Province and a State;
(ii) any matter involving the interpretation of, or
arising under, any agreement
entered foto after the
commencement of the Constitution Act between the
Federation and a Federal Unit or between Federal Units,
unless the agreement otherwise provides.
This jurisdiction is to be an exclusive one, and in
our opinion rightly >o, since it would be altogether inappropriate if proceedings could be taken by one Unit
of the Federation against another in the Courts of either
of them.
For that reason we think that, where the
parties are Units of the Federa:ion or the Federation
itself, the jurisdiction ought to include not only the
interpretation of the Constitution Act, but also the interpretation of Federal laws, by which we meant any
laws enacted by the Federal Legislature."
It is clear from the above that the framers of the Government of India Act, 1935 thought that the Federal Court should
8
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F
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A
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1)
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F
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BIHAR STATE V. UNION (Mitter, J.)
be the :tribunal for the determination of disputes between the
constituent units of the Federation and it sought to lay down the
exact nature of the dispute which that Court could be called upon
to examine and decide.
The Constitutional Proposals of the Sapru Committee show
that they had the said report and the said proceedings of the
Committee in their mind when they advocated the strengthening
of the position of the Federal Court in India and widening its
jurisdiction both on the original side and the appellate side but
maintaining at the same time that it should "act as an interpreter
ad guardian of the Constitution, and as a tribunal for the
determination of disputes between the constituent units of the
Federation."
It is also to be noted that under s. 204 of the Government
of India Act, 1935 the Federal Court's jurisdiction was limited
to the pronouncement of a declaratory judgment.
Art. 109 of the Draft Constitution of India prepared by the
Constituent Assembly was in the same terms as Art. 131 of the
Constitution as it came into force i,n 1950. The proviso to the
original article was substituted by the new proviso in the year
1956 as a result of the Seventh Amendment by reason of the
abolition of the Part B States and the changes necessitated thereby. Reference was made at the Bar in this connection to the Debates in the Constituent Assembly, Vol. IV, 13th July 1947
to 21st July, 1947. They however do not throw any additional
light.
So far as the proceedings of the Joint Committee on Indian
Constitutional Reform and the report of the Committee on the
same are concerned, they make it clear that the object of conferring exclusive original jurisdiction on the Federal Court was
that the disputes of the kinds specified between the Federation
and the Provinces as the constituent units of the Federation,
should not be left to be decided by courts of law of a particular
unit but be adiudicated upon only by the highest tribunal in the
land which would be beyond the influence of any one constituent
unit.
Although Art. 131 does not define the scope of the disputes
which this Court may be, called upon to determine in the same
way as section 204 of the Government of India Act, and we
do m>t find it necessary to do so, this much is certain that the legal
right which is the subject of dispute must arise in the context of the
Constitution and the Federalism it sets up. However, there can
530
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1970] 2 s.c.R.
be no doubt that so far as the parties to the dispute are concerned, the framers of the Constitution did intend that they
could only be the constituent units of the Union of India and
the Government of India itself arrayed on one side or the other
either singly or jointly with another unit or the Government of
India.
There is no decision either of the Federal Court of India or
of this Court which throws much light on the question· before us.
Reference was made at the Bar to the case of The United Pro·
vinces v. The Governor-General in Council(') where the United
Provinces filed a suit against the Governor-General in Council for
a declaration that certain provisions of the Cantonments Act,
1924, were ultra vires the then Indian Legislature. A claim was
also made that all fines imposed and realised by criminal courts
for offences committed within the cantonment areas in the United
Provinces ought to be credited to the provincial revenues and that
the plaintiffs were entitled to recover and adjust all such sums
wrongly credited to Cantonment Funds since 1924. The Goverpor-General in Council contended inter alia that the dispute was
not one which was justiciable before the Federal Court. On the
question of jurisdiction, Gwyer, C.J. was not inclined to think
"that the plaintiffs would in any event have been entitled to the
declarations for which they originally asked, in.proceedings against
the Governor-General in Council". According to the learned
Chief Justice "their proper course would have been to take pro·
ceedings against a named Cantonment Board, though . . .. such
proceedings could not have been brought to this Court." He
was of the view that it was competent for the court to entertain
a suit for a declaration "that s. 106 of the Act of 1924 was ultra
vires," and said that as the dispute between tl::e parties depended
upon the validity ·of the assertion of the Province to have the
fines under discussion credited to provincial revenues and not
to the Cantonment funds the dispute involved a question of the
existence of a legal right.
According to him the question might
have been raised in proceedings to which a Cantonment Board
was a party but "it was convenient to aU concerned that it should
be disposed of in the proceedings before the court."
The only other Indian case cited at the Bar in this connection
\Vas that of the State of Seraikella and others v. Union of India
and another( 2 ) where Mahajan, J. expressed the view that s .. 80
of the Code of Civil Procedure would not affect suits instituted
in the Federal Court under s. 204 of the Government of India
Act.
01 [1939]
F.C.R 124.
(2) [!951] S.C.R. 474.
A
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BIHAR STATE v. UNION (Mitter, J.)
531
Our attention was drawn to some provisions of the American
Constitution and of the Constitution Act of Australia and sevei-al
decisions bearing on the interpretation of provision which are
somewhat similar to Art. 131.
But as the similarity is only
limited, we do not propose to examine either the provisions referred to or the decisions to which our attention was drawn. In
interpreting our Constitution we must not be guided by decisions
which do not bear upon provisions identical with those in our
Constitution .
The Constitution makes special provisions for settlement of
certalli disputes in a manner different from that laid down in
'C
Art. 131. For instance, Art. 143 gives an over-riding power
to the President of India to consult the Supreme Court when he
is of the view that the question is of such a nature and of such
public importance that it is expedient to do so.
Under cl. (1)
9f that Article the President is empo~ered to obtain the opinion
of the Supreme Court upon any question of law or fact which
0
has arisen or is likely to arise and is of such a nature and of
-such public importance that the President considers it expedient
to obtain such opinion. In such a case the Court after giving
such hearing as it thinks fit has to report to the President its
opinion thereon.
Clause (2) of the article shows that this power
of the President over-rides the proviso to Art. 131 .
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Art. 257 provides for control of the Union over the States
in certain cases.
Under clause (2) thereof the executive power
of the Union also extends to the giving of c\irections to a State
as to the construction and maintenance of means of communication ueclared in the direction to be of national or military importance.
Under cl. ( 4) where such directions are given and
"costs have ·been incurred in excess of those which would have
been incurred in the discharge of the normal duties of the State
if such direction had not been given," the Government of India
must pay to the State such sum as may be agreed, or, in default
of agreement, as may be determined by an arbitrator appointed by
the Chief Justice of India, in respect of the extra costs so incurred by the State.
Again, when there is a dispute or complaint with regard to
the use, distribution or control of the waters of, or in, any interstate river or river valley cl. (2) of Art. 262 gives Parliament the
power by law to provide that neither the Supreme Court nor any
other court shall exercise jurisdiction in respect of such dispute or
complaint as is referred to in clause ( 1). Such a law ousts the
jurisdiction of the court which would normally be attracted by
532
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1970] 2 S.C.R.
Art. 131.
Art. 290 contains a provision somewhat similar to
Art. 257(4) with regard to certain expenses and pensions and
makes the same determinable by an arbitrator to be appointed
by the Chief Justice of India.
Apart from these special provisions a dispute which falls
within the ambit of Art. 131 can only be determined in the
forum mentioned therein, namely, the Supreme Cour of India,
provided there has not been impleaded in any said dispute any
private party, be it a citizen or a firm or a corporation along
with a State either jointly or in the alternative.
A dispute in
which such a private party is involved must be brought before
a court, other than this Court,
having
jurisdiction over the
matter.
It was argued by counsel on behalf of the State of Bihar
that so far as the Hindustan Steel Ltd., is concerned 1t is 'State'
and the suits in which the Government of India along with
Hindustan Steel Ltd. have been impleaded are properly filed within Art. 131 of the Constitution triable by this Court in its original
jurisdiction. Reference was marle to the case of Rajasthan State
Electricity Board v. Mohan Lal('). There the question arose
between certain persons who were permanent employees of the
Government of •he State of Rajasthan and later placed at the
disposal of the State Electricity Board and one of the questions
was whether the appellant Board could be held to be 'State' as
defined in Art. 12.
This Court by a majority held that the
Board was "other authority" within the meaning of Art. 12 and
therefore was a 'State' to which appropriate direction> could be
given under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution.
It will be
noted that under Art. 12 all local or other authorities within
the territory of India or under the control of the Government of
India are 'States' for pu.rposes of Part m which defines and deals
with the Fundamental Rights enshrined in the Constitution.
The
expression ''the State" has the same meaning in Part IV of _the
Constitution under Art. 36.
No reason was shown as to why
the enlarged definition of 'State' given in Parts m and IV of the
Constitution would be attracted to Art. 131 of the Constitution
and in our opinion a body like the Hindustan Steel Ltd. cannot
be considered to be "a State" for the purpose of Art. 131 of the
Constitution.
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
In the result we hold that the suits do not lie in this Court
under Art. 131 of the Constitution and issue No. 2 must be answered in the negative.
It is not necessary to give any answer
H
to issue No. 1 nor to issue No. 3.
On the view we take the
(I) [1967]
3 S.C.R.
377.
A
B
Tl!HAR STATE V, UNION (Mitter, J.)
533
plaints must be returned for the purpose of presentation to courts
having jurisdiction av.er the disputes.
Let the plaints be returned
for presentation to the proper court after endorsing on them
the date of presentation of the plaints in this Court and the date
on which they were returned.
We make no order as to costs ot
these applications.
G.C.