# STATE OF BIHAR AND ANOTHER v. UMESH JHA

- **Citation:** [1962] 2 S.C.R. 687
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1962
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 425of1957
- **Bench:** J. L. Kapur, K. Subba Rao, M. HrnAYATULLAH, J. C; Shah, Raghubar Dayal
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/state-of-bihar-and-another-v-umesh-jha-2284
- **Pages:** 8

## Headnote

Land Reform-Vesting of estate in the State-Enactment em·
powering collector to set aside anticipatory settlement-Constitu·
tional validity-Amendment-Effect-Bihar Land Reforms Act,
r950 (Bihar 30 of r950), as amended by Bihar Land Reforms
(Amendment) Act, I959 (Bihar I6 of z959), s. 4(h)-Constitution of
India, Arts. I4, I9, 31, JIA.
Section 4(h) of the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950, as
amended by the Bihar Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1959.
which empowers the Collecfor to annul anticipatory transfers of
land designed to defeat the object of the Act, is protected by
Art. 31A of the Constitution although it does not by itself provide for the acquisition by the State of any estate or of any
rights therein or for the extinguishment or modification of any
such rights and its constitutional validity cannot be questioned
under Arts. 14, 19 and 31 of the Constitution since the Act of
which it is an integral part, is itself directed to that end and is
protected by that Article.
Thakur Raghubir Singh v. State of Ajmer, [1959) Supp. I
S.C.R. 478, applied.
On a true construction of s. 3 of the Amending Act, the
second proviso to s. 4(h) cannot be retrospective in operation
and therefore, in respect of an order of annulment made by the
Collector before the Amendin·g Act came into force the previous
sanction obtained from the State Government would be suffi.
cient, but subsequent confirmation by the State Government
would be necessary in the case of an order made after the
Amending Act came into force.

## Text

2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS,
687
STATE OF BIHAR AND ANOTHER
v.
UMESH JHA
(J. L. KAPUR, K. SUBBA RAO,
M. HrnAYATULLAH, J. C; SHAH and
RAGHUBAR DAYAL, JJ.)
Land Reform-Vesting of estate in the State-Enactment em·
powering collector to set aside anticipatory settlement-Constitu·
tional validity-Amendment-Effect-Bihar Land Reforms Act,
r950 (Bihar 30 of r950), as amended by Bihar Land Reforms
(Amendment) Act, I959 (Bihar I6 of z959), s. 4(h)-Constitution of
India, Arts. I4, I9, 31, JIA.
Section 4(h) of the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950, as
amended by the Bihar Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1959.
which empowers the Collecfor to annul anticipatory transfers of
land designed to defeat the object of the Act, is protected by
Art. 31A of the Constitution although it does not by itself provide for the acquisition by the State of any estate or of any
rights therein or for the extinguishment or modification of any
such rights and its constitutional validity cannot be questioned
under Arts. 14, 19 and 31 of the Constitution since the Act of
which it is an integral part, is itself directed to that end and is
protected by that Article.
Thakur Raghubir Singh v. State of Ajmer, [1959) Supp. I
S.C.R. 478, applied.
On a true construction of s. 3 of the Amending Act, the
second proviso to s. 4(h) cannot be retrospective in operation
and therefore, in respect of an order of annulment made by the
Collector before the Amendin·g Act came into force the previous
sanction obtained from the State Government would be suffi.
cient, but subsequent confirmation by the State Government
would be necessary in the case of an order made after the
Amending Act came into force.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION:
Civil Appeal No.
425of1957.
Appeal from the judgment and order dated February 21, 1956, of the Patna High Court in Misc. Judicial Case No. 53 of 1955.
B. K. P. Sinha and D. P. Singh, for the appellants.
L. K. Jha and R. 0. Prasa,d,, for the respondent.
1961. May 3. The Judgment of the Court was
delivered by
May 3.
State of Bihar
\',
Umesh .J ha
Sttbba Rao J.
688
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
SuBBA RAO, J.-This appeal by certificate raises
the question of the construction of s. 4(h) of the Bihar
Land Reforms Act, 1950 (Act 30 of 1950) (hereinafter
referred to as the Act),. as amended by the Bihar
Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1959 (Bihar Act 16
of 1959) (hereinafter called the Amel1ding Act).
The facts giving ri~e to the appeal lie in a small
compass. Plots Nos. 383 and 1033 are tanks in village
Lakshmipur alias 'l'arauni in the District of Darbhanga. The respondent claims to have taken settlement of the said plots in the year 1943 from the landlords of Raghopur Estate of which the said plots
formed a part. After the coming into force of the Act,
the said Estate vested in the St.at~ of Bihar. Thereafter, one Sheonandan Jha and some other villagers
of Lakshmipur filed a petition before the Collector
alleging that the alleged settlement was not true, and
that in fact the settlement was nominally effected
only after January 1, 1946. The Additional Collector,
Darbhanga, in exercise of the powers conferred on
him under s. 4(h) of the Act, held that the said settlement was actually made after January 1, 1946, and
that it was only a paper transaction; having annulled the said settlement, the Additional Collector, Ly
his order dated January 18, 1955, called upon the
respondent to give up possession of the said plots by
January 30, 1955.
Aggrieved by the said order, the
respondent filed a petition in the High Court of Judicature at Patna under Art. 226 of the Constitution for
a rule in the nature of a writ of mandamus or any
other appropriate writ cancelling the order of the
Additional Collector dated January 18, 1955, and restraining the appellants from interfering with his possession of the said two plols. That petition came to
be decided by a division bench of the High Court;
and the learned Judges by·their order dated February
21, 1956; held that the Additional Collector had no
jurisdiction to entertain n,nd decide the question whether the settkmont, which was prima facie shown to
have been made before ,Jarnrnry I, 1946, was actually
made after that date. On the basis of that finding,
the order of the Additionn,l Collector was set aside.
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
689
The State of Bihar and the Additional Collector of
Darbhanga have preferred the present appeal against
tho said order.
Learned counsel for the State contends that s. 4(h)
of the Act has been amended with retrospective effect,
that under the amended section the Collector has
power to decide whether a transfer is made before
1946 or thereafter, and that, therefore, the order of
the High Court can no longer be sustained.
Learned counsel for the rcsponden t, while conceding the retroactivity of the amendment, relies upon the
second proviso added by the amendment to s. 4(h)
and contends that under the said proviso the order of
tho Collector cannot take effect nor possession taken
thereunder, unless the said order has been confirmed
by the State Government and that in the instant case
there has not been any such confirm11tion. Further
he questions the constitutional validity of the said
section on the ground that it infringes the fundamental right of the respondent under Arts. 14, 19
and 31 of the Constitution and is not saved bv Art.
31 A thereof.
•
The second contention of learned counsel for the
respondent may be disposed of first. Under Art. 31A
of the Constitution, no law providing for the acquisition by the State of any estate or of any rights t.herein or the extinguishment or morlification of any such
rights shall be deemed to be void on tho ground that
it is inconsistent with, or t'l.kes a1rny or abridges any
of the rights conforred by Art. 14, Art.. 19 or Art. 31.
The question is whether s. 4(h) of the Act is such a
law as to be hit by Art. 31A of the Constitution. Section 4(h) of the Act confers power on a Collector, inter
alia, to make inquiries b respect of any transfer of
any land comprised in an estate and to cancel the
same if he is satisfied that such transfer was made
any-time after January 1, 1946, with the obj,'ct of
defeating any provisions of the Act or causing los:; to
the State or obtaining compensation thereunrl•,r. It
is said that the section ex proprio vigore docs nc,t provide for acquisition by the State of any estafe or of
r961
Statt of Bihar
v.
Uniesh ]ha
Subba Rao j.
196c
Slate of Bihar
v.
U111esh ] ha
Subba Rao J.
690
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
any rights therein or for the extinguishment or modification of any such rights and, therefore, is not protected by Art. 31A of the Const.itution. This argument in effect disannexes s. 4(h) of the Act from the
setting in which it appears and seeks to test its validity independently of its interaction on the other provisions of the Act.
Section 4(h) is an integral part of
the Act, and taken out of the Act it can only operate
in vacuum. Indeed, the object of the section is to
offset the anticipatory attempts made by landlords to
defeat the provieiob.s of the Act. Suppose the Collector
c11ncels a transfer of land by the owner of an estate
under the said, section; the said land automatically
vests in the State, with the result that the rights of
the transferor and the transferee therein are extinguished. The said result accrues on the basis that the
said land continued to be a part of the estate at the
time the Act came into force. That apart, the section
is a part of the Act designed to extinguish or modify
tlw rights in an estate, and the power conferred on a
Collector to cancel a transfer of any land in an estate
is only to prevent fraud and to achieve effectively the
object of the Act.
This question was directly raised
and answered by this Court in Thakur Raghubir Singh
v. State of Ajmer ('). There, the const,itutional validity of the Ajmer Abolition of Intermediaries and
Land Reforms Act, 1955 (Ajmer III of 1955) ands. 8
thereof was att11cked. Section 8 of the said Act con ..
forred a power on (,Im Collector to cancel a lease or
contract, if he was satisfied that it was not made or
entered into in the normal course of management,
but in anticipation of legislation for the abolitfon of
intermediaries. Repelling the said contention, Wanchoo, J., speaking for the Court, observed thus:
"The provision is not an independent provision;
it is merely ancillary in character enacted for carrying out the objects of the Act more effectively ......
..... .Such cancellation would"sub-serve the purposes
of the Act, and the provision for it therefore be an
integral part of the Act, though ancillary to its
main object, and would thus be protected under
Art. 31A(l)(a) of the Constitution."
(r) [1959] Supp. I S.C.R. 478, 482.
I
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
691
The same reasoning applies to s. 4(h) of the Act, and
for the same reasons we hold that s. 4(h) of the
Act is likewise protected by Art. 31A of the Constitution.
The first question turns upon the interpretation of
the relevant provisions of the Amending Act.
To
appreciate the argument it would be convenient to
read the material provisions of the said Act.
Section 3.
Amendment of section 4 of Bihar Act
XXX of 1950.-In section 4 of the said Act,-
(iv) in clause (h)-
(a) the words, figures and commas "made at any
time after the first day of January, 1946," shall be
omitted.and shall be deemed always to have been
omitted;
(b) after the words "if he is satisfied that such
transfer was made," the words, figures and commas
"at any time after the first day of January, 1946,"
shall be inserted and shall be deemed al ways to
have been inserted; and
(c) the words "and with the previous sanction of
the State Government" shall be omitted;
(v) to elause (h) as amended above, the following
provisos shall be added, namely:-
"Provided that an appeal against an order of the
Collector under this clause, if preferred within sixty
days of such order, shall lie to the prescribed a.uthority not below the rank of the Collector of a district
who shall dispose of the same according to the prescribed procedure:
Provided further that no order annulling a transfer shall take effect nor shall possession be taken in
pursuance of it unless such an order has been confirmed by the State Government."
After the said amendment the relevant part of the
section reads:
The Collector shall have power to make inquiries
in respect of any transfer including the settlement
......... if he is satisfied that such tral'.sfer was made
at any time after the first day of January, 1946,
with the object of defeating any provisions of this
Act or causing loss to the State or obtaining higher
Stale of Bihar
v.
Umesh ]ha
Subba Rao ].
Stat• of Bihar
v.
Umesh }ha
Subba Rao ]. •
692
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
compensation thereunder, the Collector mav, after
giving reasonable notice to the parties concerned to
appear and be heard and with the previous sanction of the State Government annul such transfer,
disposses~ the person claiming under it and take
possession of such property on such terms as may
appear to the Collector to be fair and equitable.
The main differences material to the present enquiry
between the section n,s it was before the amendment
and (,hereafter are that. under the unamended section
it was a moot point whether the Collector had the
power to set aside a transfer, whether it was effected
before or after January 1, 1946; w hcreas under the
amended section such a power is c!eitrly and express.
ly conferred on him: while under the original section,
the Collector had to lake the previous sanction of th<1
State Government before he made the order annulling
a trnnsfor and dispossessing the perwn claiming under
it, under the amended section the order made by the
Collector shall neither take effect nor can he t11ke
possession before his order is confirmed. The short
question is whether the second proviso, added by the
Amending Act, is retrospective iu operation, that is,
whether the order of the Collector made before the
Amending Act, though made wit.h the previous sanction of the State Government, would still require for
its ta.king effect a. subsequent confirmation by the
State Government.
Learned Counsel for the State contends th11t the
amendments made bys. 3(iv)(a) and (b) are retrospective, but the amendment made by s. 3(v) of the
Amending Act is prospective. This contention appears
to be sound, both in letter as well as in spirit. The
different phraseology used in els. (a) and (b) of subs. (iv) of s. 3 of the Amending Act in the matter of
omissions supports it. While in cl. {a) the omission
shall be deemed always to have been omitted, iu cl. (c)
the words mentioned therein sha,ll only be omitted
indicating by contrast that the omission in the former
is expressly made retrospective while in the latter it
is necessarily prospective. If that be the trne construction, the condition of previous sa,nction would
'
..
...
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
693
continue to operate in respect of the Collector's order
made before the 11,mend:nent can:.0 into force. If the
proviso be given a retrospective operation, it directly
comes into conflict with the result brought about by
cl. (c) of sub-s. (iv) of s. 3 of the Amending Act. An
order with the previous sanction of the Government
may have been passed and possession also taken by
the Collector, yet a further confirmation by the
Government should be sought for to revalidate it.
This construction would not only attribute to the
Legislature redundancy but would also enable a party
to seek for restoration of the land taken possession of
by the Collector on the basis of a technicality. Even
in a case where possession has not been taken by the
Collector, the said anomaly would persist, for two sanctions would be required. The alternative construction
makes the working of the section smooth and avoids
the introduction of the said incongruity and, there.
fore, we prefer to accept it, particularly when it is
consistent with the plain meaning of the words used
in the section. The result is that in respect of an
order already made by tho Collector before the Amending Act, the previous sanction obtained would suffice,
and in respect of an order made after the Amending
Act, a subsequent confirmation by the State Gqvernment is required.
Even so, it is argued by learned counsel for the
respondent that the High Court, presumably in
view of its acceptance of the respondent's pre!i .
minary point, did not consider the question whether. the inquiry had been made by the Collector
in strict compliance with the provisions of the
section, and whether the previous sanction of the
State Government was obtained before he made
the said order. In the affidavit filed in support of the
petition in the High Court there is no specific allcga.
tion that no such inquiry has been made or that no
such sanction has been obtained. Nor did the counsel
for the appellant raise the said question in the argu.
ments before the High Court.
In the circumstances
we do not think that this Court is justified in allowing
88
Staid of Bihar
v.
Umesh }ha
Subba Rao ].
State of Bihar
v.
Umesh ]h•
Subbo Rao ].
May 3.
694
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962)
the respondent to raise the said question for the first
time before us.
We, therefore, reject this plea.
In the result we set aside the order of the High
Court and allow the appeal. But, in the circumstances of this case, we direct the parties to bear their own
costs here and in the High Court.
Appeal allowed.
DELHI ADMINISTRATION
v.
RAM SINGH
(K. SUBBA RAo, RAGHUBAR DAYAL and
J. R. MUDHOLKAR, JJ.)
Criminal Law-Immoral traffic-Enactment for suppressionSpeciat police officer appointed under the Act- Investigation of offences under the Act-Exclusion of powers of station-house oj)icer-
"Dealing with offences under the Act"-Suppression of Immoral
Traffic in Women and Girls Act, r956 (ro4 of r956), ss. 2(i), 8, r3(2)
-Code of Criminal Procedure, r898 (Act V of r898), ss. 5, r56,
55r.
Jhe respondent was prosecuted for an offence under s. 8 of
the Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act,
1956, and a charge-sheet was presented before a First Class
Magistrate in Delhi by a sub-inspector, who, as the officer in
charge of the Police Station, had investigated the case. On an
objection raised by the respondent, the Magistrate quashed the
charge-sheet on the ground that only the special police officer
appointed under the Act was competent to investigate the offences under the Act.
Held, (Mudholkar, J.. dissenting), that since the Suppression
of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act, 1956, created new
offences and prescribed the procedure for dealing with them, it
was a complete code in itself and to that extent the provisions
of the Act must prevail over those of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1898; that as the Act provided for the appointment
of a special police officer for dealing with offences under the Act
in the area within his jurisdiction, be and his assistant police
officers were the only persons who could investigate offences
under the Act committed within that area, and that police officers not specially appointed as special police officers could not