# State of Bihar v. Lt. Col. K. S. R. Swami Das Gupta] - **Citation:** [1962] 3 S.C.R. 739 - **Court:** Supreme Court of India - **Decided:** 1962 - **Bench:** B. P. Sinha, P. B. GAJllJNDRAGADKAR, Raghubar Dayal - **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/state-of-bihar-v-lt-col-k-s-r-swami-das-gupta-2474 - **Pages:** 20 ## Headnote ,_ ~raud--R•nami Conveyance in fraud of creditor.-Suit by b•n,am•dar for posseS!ion-Plea ~f.fraud in defence-If barred by ••loppel--Proper approach-Public inter'81-lndian Trusts Act 1882 (2 of 1882) s. 84. _..- The conveyance in mit was tI.e result of a collusive plan between respondent I and respondent 2 to defraud the latter's creditors. The a.izreement was that respondent I was to act as the benamidar for respl)ndent 2 and hfa sons, the appellants. The fraud succeeded and the creditors of respondent 2 were in _... fact defrauded. Thereafter respondent I brought the present suit for declaration of title and recovery of possession against respondent 2 and the appellants on the basis of the conveyance. The latter resisted the suit on the ground that the conveyance wa. fraudulent, unmpported by consideration and passed no title. The High Court in oecond appeal held that the appellants and respondent 2 were estopped from pleading fraud in the suit and decreed the same. The question was whether the view taken bv the High Court was correct and the ~stensible owner was entitled to a decree. Held, that there could be no question of estoppel in a case where both the parties were gu!ity of fraud 1961 State of Bihar v. Lt. Col. K. S. R. Swami Das Gupta], 1961 September 22. 1961 lmmlllli AH• Raa v. Gol/apal/i R""'ali111amvrthi 740 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] Where in a case, •Uch as the present, one of the confederates in fraud seeks a decree on a conveyance that - • resulted from roch faud and the other takes pica of fraud in defence, the matter has to be decided on considerations of public policy. Since o~ of the panie1 must succeed in any event, the proper approach for the Court to adopt would be the one that was less injurious to public interest, namely, to allow the plea of fraud to be rat.cd in defence and, if upheld, allow the properties to remain \vhcre they were, than to dercee a suit based on a fraudulent claim. It could make no difference in such a case if the •uit was based on a deed of conveyance and not a contract. Vodiana Kamayya v. Gudiaa Kamayya, (1917) 32 M.J.J. ~84, Kep1'la Kotayyar Naidu v. Chi:rapur Maha/ak•hmama, ( 1933) I.LR. 56 Mad. 646 and Mutho K .R.A.R.P.L. Arunachalam Clvdtiar v. Ranga•wamy Chettiar, (1936) I.L.R. 59 Mad. 289, disapproved. Jlef"g v. Sadler a1td Moor<, [19371 2 K.B. 158, T. P. Petherperumal Chttly v. R. Muniandi Seri: Civil Appeal No. 76 of 1959. Appeal from the judgment and decree dated Nov()mbor 1(\, 1951, of the Madras High Court in Second Appeal No. 1656 of 1947. T. V. R. Tatacliari, for the appellants. K. N. Rajagopal Sastri and T. Satyanarayana, for the respondent No. 1. 1961. September 22. The Judgment of the Court was delh·crcd by GAJENDRAGADKAR, J.-Tbis is an appeal by a certificate granted by the High Court of llfadras..._ against its judgment and di>cree in Second Appeal No. 1656of1947. The appeal arises out of Original T -· 3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 741 Suit No. 27 of 1939 filed by respondent 1 Gollapalli Ramalingamurthi against respondent 2 Immani Venkanna and his four sons appellants 1 to 4. The appellants and respondent 2 are members of an undivided Hindu family. The ~ase for respondent l was that he had purchased the properties described in the Schedule attached to his plaint on April 1, J 936 in a sale held by the Official Receiver in the insolvency of respondent 2. A registered sale deed was accordingly issued in favour of respondent 1 (Ex. P. 4) on September 21, 1936. In pursuance of the said sale respondent 1 obtained possession and enjoyment of ~uch properties after part ## Text _Characters 0–39,343 of 40,329. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39343 for what follows._ 3 s.c.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 73g prayed for. It is clear that the approp.riate w:it ~n • - the circumstances of the present oase 1s a writ Ill the nature of mandamus and we modify the order made by the High Court to this extent that a writ in the nature of mandamus be issued directing the appellant-Government to cancel its order on the Collector made on June IO, 1954 and restraining the Government and the Forest Officer from inter- -,. fearing with the petitioner's possession over 245.69 acres of land in village Singpur which he possesses as tenant. - The appeal is dismissed with coat8. Appeal dismissed. IMMANI APPA RAO AND OTHERS v. GOLLAPALLI RAMALINGAMURTHI AND ORS. (B. P. SINHA, C. J., P. B. GAJllJNDRAGADKAR and RAGHUBAR DAYAL, JJ.) ,_ ~raud--R•nami Conveyance in fraud of creditor.-Suit by b•n,am•dar for posseS!ion-Plea ~f.fraud in defence-If barred by ••loppel--Proper approach-Public inter'81-lndian Trusts Act 1882 (2 of 1882) s. 84. _..- The conveyance in mit was tI.e result of a collusive plan between respondent I and respondent 2 to defraud the latter's creditors. The a.izreement was that respondent I was to act as the benamidar for respl)ndent 2 and hfa sons, the appellants. The fraud succeeded and the creditors of respondent 2 were in _... fact defrauded. Thereafter respondent I brought the present suit for declaration of title and recovery of possession against respondent 2 and the appellants on the basis of the conveyance. The latter resisted the suit on the ground that the conveyance wa. fraudulent, unmpported by consideration and passed no title. The High Court in oecond appeal held that the appellants and respondent 2 were estopped from pleading fraud in the suit and decreed the same. The question was whether the view taken bv the High Court was correct and the ~stensible owner was entitled to a decree. Held, that there could be no question of estoppel in a case where both the parties were gu!ity of fraud 1961 State of Bihar v. Lt. Col. K. S. R. Swami Das Gupta], 1961 September 22. 1961 lmmlllli AH• Raa v. Gol/apal/i R""'ali111amvrthi 740 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] Where in a case, •Uch as the present, one of the confederates in fraud seeks a decree on a conveyance that - • resulted from roch faud and the other takes pica of fraud in defence, the matter has to be decided on considerations of public policy. Since o~ of the panie1 must succeed in any event, the proper approach for the Court to adopt would be the one that was less injurious to public interest, namely, to allow the plea of fraud to be rat.cd in defence and, if upheld, allow the properties to remain \vhcre they were, than to dercee a suit based on a fraudulent claim. It could make no difference in such a case if the •uit was based on a deed of conveyance and not a contract. Vodiana Kamayya v. Gudiaa Kamayya, (1917) 32 M.J.J. ~84, Kep1'la Kotayyar Naidu v. Chi:rapur Maha/ak•hmama, ( 1933) I.LR. 56 Mad. 646 and Mutho K .R.A.R.P.L. Arunachalam Clvdtiar v. Ranga•wamy Chettiar, (1936) I.L.R. 59 Mad. 289, disapproved. Jlef"g v. Sadler a1td Moor<, [19371 2 K.B. 158, T. P. Petherperumal Chttly v. R. Muniandi Seri: Civil Appeal No. 76 of 1959. Appeal from the judgment and decree dated Nov()mbor 1(\, 1951, of the Madras High Court in Second Appeal No. 1656 of 1947. T. V. R. Tatacliari, for the appellants. K. N. Rajagopal Sastri and T. Satyanarayana, for the respondent No. 1. 1961. September 22. The Judgment of the Court was delh·crcd by GAJENDRAGADKAR, J.-Tbis is an appeal by a certificate granted by the High Court of llfadras..._ against its judgment and di>cree in Second Appeal No. 1656of1947. The appeal arises out of Original T -· 3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 741 Suit No. 27 of 1939 filed by respondent 1 Gollapalli Ramalingamurthi against respondent 2 Immani Venkanna and his four sons appellants 1 to 4. The appellants and respondent 2 are members of an undivided Hindu family. The ~ase for respondent l was that he had purchased the properties described in the Schedule attached to his plaint on April 1, J 936 in a sale held by the Official Receiver in the insolvency of respondent 2. A registered sale deed was accordingly issued in favour of respondent 1 (Ex. P. 4) on September 21, 1936. In pursuance of the said sale respondent 1 obtained possession and enjoyment of ~uch properties after partitioning them with Rayudu, the brother of respondent 2. In October, 1938, however, the appellants and respondent 2 trespassed on the said properties and so respondent 1 had to file the present suit claiming a declaration of his title in regard to the said properties, and asking for their possession and for past and future mesne profits. That in brief is the nature of the suit from which the present appeal :. arises. The claim thus made by respondent I was resisted by respondent 2 and the appellants on several grounds. It was urged by respondent ;l -~ that the transfer in favour of respondent I was benami and that respondent 1 was not the real owner of the properties. In support of this case . ·-> respondent 2 gave, what according to him, was the antecedent history of the sale in favour of respondent I. He alleged that he had sustained heavy losses in business conducted by him with the result that he was indebted to the extent of Rs. :::5,000. Apprehending that the suit properties would be lost to the family at the instance of his creditors he and his junior mother-in-law .,.-Kanthamani Seshamma approached respondent l's father-in-law Suryaprakasa Sastrulu for advice and on his advice respondent 2 executed a collusive and nominal mortgage deed for Rs. 1,000 (Ex. P. 9) in favour of respondent l on June 16, 1933. Simi1961 Immani Appa Rao v. GollapaUi Ramalingamurthi Gajendragad!r.ar J. 1961 l'111Mni AJ>la Ra1 v. Gol/Dpllili Ram4ling'111urthi 742 SUPREME OOURT REPORTS !1962] larly, on tho same advice a similar nominal transfer deed was executed in favour of respondent l on August 6, 1939, (Ex. P. 12) after the properties covered by the said document had been released from an oarlier non-possessory mortgage (Ex. P. 11) which had been executed on July 21, l!l30. Thus, according to respondent 2 tho documents executed in favour of respondent l were nominal and collusive and were not supported by any consideration. Hospondent 2 further alleged that the execution of the said collusive documents between him and respondent l ca.me to the knowledge of some of -. .,,. his creditors and \.hat led to an insolvency petition ,., against respondent 2 by one of his creditors in I.P. No. 91 of 1933. This petition was filed in tho Court of the Subordinate Judge at Elloro on September 15, 1033, aga.inst respondent 2. In these insolvency proceedings respondent 2 was adjudicated insolvent and the Otlicial Receiver, appointed to take charge of respondent 2's pruperlies, brou~ht the said properties to s>1.lc bUhject to the aforesaid nominal mortgages in favour of ' respondent 1. Kantham>iui Scshamma purchased tho aaid properties with her own money but benami in the name of respondent 1 on condition that -- respondent l would re-convey the said properties to the family of respondent 2 whenever ca.lied upon to do so. Tho allega.tion of respondent 1 that ho ha.d obtained possession of tho properties was~- denied, and it was urged that respondent 1 had no title to tho properties and was entitled to no relief in the suit filed by him. That is tho su bstancc of the pleas raised by respondent 2 and the appellants joined respondent 2 in making tho Bame pleas by their separate wri \.ten sta. temont. At the trial three issues were tried as pre.:.~ liminary issues; they were ill81los 5, 8 and 9. Issues · 8 and 9 were in regard to the court fees payable on the claim madti ia the plaint and regarding the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Court. The Court • • < -- 3S.C.R . SUPREME COURT REPORTS found that it had jurisdiction to try the suit and it valued the subject-matter of the suit at Rs. 2,411-7-2 on which additional court fees was paid by respondent I. Issue 5 was as to whether the sale in favour of respondent 1 bound the shares of the appellants in the family properties. The learned trial judge answered this issue in favour of the appellants purporting to follow the Full Bench decision of the Madras High Court in Ramasastru!u v. Balakrishna Rao('). According to the said decision the right of respondent 2 as the father of the appellants and manager of the undivided Hindu family to sell the shares of his eons for purposes binding on the family did not vest in the Officiitl Receiver on his insolvency, and so the sale effected by the Offioial Receiver in favour of respondent 1 did not, and could not, in law bind the shares of the appellants in the properties conveyed. After these findings were recorded respondent 1 applied for the amendment of his plaint and the said amendment was allowed. By this amendment respondent 1 alleged that the suit properties were the self-acquired properties of respondent 2 and so the appellants had no interest therein. On this alternative plea it was urged by respondent I that the properties sold by the Official Receiver to respondent I conveyed the entire properties which belonged to respondent 2 alone. In addition to this alternative claim made by an amendment respondent 1 also made an alternative prayer that he should be either given possession of the whole of the properties or I/5th of the properties according as the properties are found to be separate properties of respondent 2 or are held to be properties of the undivided family consisting of respondent 2 and the appellants. These alternative grounds taken by respondent I by virtue of the amendment were traversed by respondent 2 and the appellants in their additional written statements. (I ) J.L.R. 1943 Mad. 83. 1961 lmmani Ap;a RarJ v. Gollapalli Ramalingamurthi Gaj1nd,.a1adkar J. 19~1 lmmani Appa Rao v. GollapaUi Rcmalin1amur1hi GaJttUhagadki..r J. 744 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] .• 'Vhen tho suit went to trial on tho amended plca;a Rao ... 'Go11.,a/li RlllU/1rs l«lftlUtAi G4i••1•i~a< ]. • 748 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] action respondent l seeks to obtain possession of the properties on tho ground that a. deed of conveyance hBB been passed in his favour by the Official Receiver. Thue both tho parties are confederates in the fraud and are equally guilty. Respondent 2 and the appolla.nta seek to resist respondent l's claim to recover p ssession of the properties conveyed t-0 him on the ground that the conveyance is void having been effected for a fraudulent purpose which has been carried out. They urge that it has not been supported by any consideration and no title has passed in favour of the transferee. R~spondont l meets this challenge to his title by pleading that respondent 2 who participated in the fraud cannot be allowed to plead his own fraud in support of his refusal to part with the poSicssion of the properties, and he urges that there is a conveyance duly executed in his fa.your on which the Court must act without permitting respondent 2 to challenge its validity. The High Court h9.s upheld the plea of respondent l and has not allowed either respondent 2 or tho appellants to plead tho fraud in support of their defence. fo this decision right? That is tho question which falls to be decided in the present appeal. Reported decisions bee.ring on this question show that consideration of this problem often gives riso to what may be described as a. battle of legal maxims. Tho appellants emphasised that the rloctrino which is pre-eminently applicable to the present case is ex dolo malo non oritur actio or ex turpi causa non orit·ur actio. In other 'vords, they contondod that the right of action cannot arise out of fraud or out of transgrossion of law; and according to them it is necessary in such a case that posses:iion should rest where it lies inpari delicto potior est conditio pussiiknties; where each party is equally in fraud tho law favours him who is actually in possession, or where both parties aro equally guilty the estato will lie where it falls. On the other hand, respondent 1 argues that the proper maxim to apply is nemo allegaRS suam turpitudinum audiendum eat, ... -" - - 3 s.c.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 749 whoever has first to plead turpitudinum should fail; that party fails who first has to allege fraud in which he participated. In other words, the principle inv-oked by respondent 1 is that a man cannot plead his own fraud. In deciding the question as to which maxim should govern the present case it is necessary to recall what Lord Wright, M. R. observed about these maxims in Berg v. Sadler and Moore (1). Referring to the maxim ex turpi cauaa non oritur actio Lord Wright observed that "this maxim, though veiled in the dignity of learned language, is a statement of a principle of great importance; but like most maxims it is much too vague and.much too general to admit of application without a car!Jful consideration of the circumstances and of the various definite rules which have been laid down by the authorities". Therefore, in deciding the question raised in the present appeal it would be necessary for us to consider carefully the true scope and effect of the maxims pressed into service by the rival parties and to enquire which of the maxims would be relevant and applicable in the circumstances of the case. It is common-ground thl\t the approach of the Court in determining the present dispute must be conditioned solely by considerations of public policy. Which principle would be more conducive to, and more consistent with, public interest, that is the crux of the matter. To put it differently having regard to the fact that both the parties before the Court are confederates in the fraud, which approach would be less injurious to public interest. Whichever approach is adopted one party would succeed and the other would fail, and so it is necessary to enquire as to which party's success would be less injurious to public interest. Out of the two confederates in fraud respondent I wants a decree to be passed in his favour and that means he wants the active assistance of the Court in reaching the properties possession of (1) [1937] 2 K. B. 158, 162 .. 1111 Immani Appa.Rao v. Gollapalli Ramalingamurthi G~1ndra14Ulkar J. 1961 !""""'" Appa Raa v. Go//apal/i Ramaf;ritantt11thi Gajttul1a1ad~ar 'J. 750 SUP~EME COURT REPORTS [1962) which ho.s been withheld from him by respondent 2 and the appellants. Now, if the defenoo raised by t.he appellants is shut out respondent I would be entitled to a decree because there is an ostensible doed of conveyance which purports to convey title to him in respect of the properties in question; but, in the circumstances, passing a decree in favour of respondent I would be actively assisting respondent I to give effect to the fraud to which ho was a party and in that sense the Court would be allowed to bo used as an instrument of fraud, and that is clearly and patently inconsistent with public interest. On the other hqnd, if the Court decides to allow the plea of fraud to be raised the Court would be in a position to hold an enquiry on the point and determine whether it is a case of mutual fraud and whether tho fraud intended hv both the parties has been effectively carried out. If it iR found that both the partieR are equallv guilty and that the fraud intended by them has been carried ont the position would bo that tho party. raising the defence is not askiniz the Court's al!llistance in any active manner; all that the y wonld incidentally be assisted in retainin~ th<:>ir posseB8ion; but t.his assistance is of a purely pa!!Sivo character and all that the Cour~ is doing in effect is that on the facts proved it proposes to allow possession to rest where it lies. It appears to us that this latter course is less injurio1rn to public interest than the former. There can be no question of estoppel in such a case for the obvious rca8on that the fraud in riucstion was agr<>ed by both the parties and both pi.rties have aesisted each other in carrying out the frstud. When it is said that a person cannot . " 3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 751 plead his own fraud it really means that a person cannot be permitted to go to a Court of Law to seek for its assistance and yet base his claim for the Court's assistance on the ground of his fraud. In this connection it would be relevant to remember that respondent 1 can be said to be guilty of a double fraud; first he joined respondent 2 in his fraudulent scheme and participated in the commission of fraud the object of which was to defeat the creditors of respondent 2, and then he committed another fraud in suppressing from the Court the fraudulent character of the transfer when he made out the claim for the recovery of the properties conveyed to him. The conveyance in his favour is not supported by any consideration and is the result of fraud; as such it convevs no titile to him. Yet, if the plea of fraud is not allowed to be raised in defence the Court would in substance be giving effect to a document which is void ab initio. Therefore, we are inclined to hold that the paramount consideration of public interest requires that the plea of fraud should be allowed to be raised and tried, and if it is upheld the estate should be allowed to remain where it rests. The adoption of.,this course, we think, is less injurious to public interest than the alternative course of giving effect to a fraudulent transfer. This question has been the subject matter of judicial decisions in most of our High Courts; and it appears that the consensus of judicial opinion with the exception of the Madras High Court is in favour of the view which we have taken. In Bombay the principle that in dealing with a C?ntest between two participants in fraud possess10n should be allowed to remain where it rests appears to h!l.ve been consistently accepted until Cilief Justice Sir Lawrence Jenkins struck a note of dissent in Sidlingappa Bin Ganeshappa v. Hirasa Bin Tukasa (1 ). Thereafter the correctness of (I) (1907) I. L. R. 31 Bom. 405. 1961 Immani Appa R:io v . Gollapalli Ram!llingamurthi Gajendragadkar J. JHI l"""""iAJ>P•R"° •• Golioptdli Remati.,amurthi • 752 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] this judgment wa.s sometimes doubted in the subsequent decisions of tho said High Court [Vide : Lakshman Balvant Kl1isti v. Vasudev Jlfohoniraj Pande(')] and finally the Full Bench of the said High Court reversed the said decision of Sir La.wrcnco Jenkins in Gv.ddap;;a Chikkappa Kurbar v. Balaji Ramji Dange ('). Sinco then the decision of tho Full Bench has beon consistently followed in the Bombay High Court. The same viow has been accepted by the Calcutta, Allahabad, Nagpur and Patna High Courta [Vide : Pre.omath Kaer v. Kazi M alwmt.d Shazid{•). Emperor v. Abdid Sheikh('), Vilayat llusain v. Misran ('), Nau·ab Singh v. Daljit Sfrigh ('), Qader Baksh v. llakim ('), Bishu:anath s/o Karunashanker Shukla v. Surat Singl1 alias Chhuttu Singh s/o Bhabhut Singh ('), and J. C. Field Electric Supply v. J(. Agaru:ala (')(Case of illegal contra.ct)]. In Madrna tho earlier decisions of the High Court appear to havt1 taken the same view [Vide: Venkataramana v. Viramma (10), Yaramati Krishnayya v. Chundm Papayya (") and Raghavalu Chetty v. Adinarayana Chett11 ('')]. In the case of l'odiana Kamayya v. Gv.dita Mamayya (13), however, a Division Bench of the Madras High Court upheld the view that a person who lfti.s conveyed property bcnami to another for the purpose of effecting a fraud on his creditors cannot, where the fraud has been effected, set up the benami <'haracter of the transaction by way of defence in a suit by tho transferee for possession under tho conveyance. Since then this view has prevailed in the Madras High Court [Vide : Keppv.la Kotayyar Naidu v. Chitrapu Mahalak.shmamma (") and J.fothu K. R. A. R. P. L. Aruna~halam Chettiar v. Ra11gae avoided by his.own fraud;" and Holroyd, J., added t11at "a deed may be a.voided on the ground of fraud, but then tho objection must come from & person neither. party nor privy to it, for no man can allege his own fraud in order to invalidate hi.a own deed", This decilion has, however, been commented on by Taylor in hiB "Law of Evidence". According to Taylor "it Mems no1v clearly aettled that a party is not ostopped by his deed from a.voiding it by proving that it was oxeouted for a fraudulent, illef.!al or immoral purpose ( ')". Tho learned e.utbor then refers to tho case of Rober~ ( 1 ) and adds "in the subscqucn t case of Prole v. ·Wiggins ('} Sir Nioholai! Tindal observed that this deoilion rested on the· fact that the defcnoo set up waa inconsistent with the deed". Taylor then add1 that "the oase, however, oan scarcely bo supported by this cireumstanoe, for in an .a.otion of ejootmen• by the grantee of an annuity to recover premisea (II (1819) 106 E. R. 401. (21 Taylor's "~w of.~vi4e~e", Vol. I, Hlh Ed. p. 97, i-roJ'&l'h 93. (31 ( 1937) 3 Bma. N.;r 2SS, 6 L.J.C.P. 2, 43 R.R. 621. ·\ .. 3 s.c.R. s UPREME OOURT REPORTS 755 on which it was secured, the grantor was allowed to show that the premises were of less value than the annuity, and consequently, that the deed required enrolment, although he had expressly covenanted in the deed that the premises were of greater value ......... ". According to the learned author "the better opinion seems to be that where both parties to an indenture either know, or have the.means of knowing, that it was executed for an iJnmoral purpose, or in contravention of a statute, or of public policy, neither of them will be estoppcd from proving those facts which render the instrument void ab initio; for although a party will thus in certain cases be enabled to take advantage of his own wrong, yet this evil is of a trifling nature in comparison with the flagrant evasion of the law that would result from the adoption of an opposite rule" (P. IJ8 ). Indeed, according to Taylor, although illegality is not pleaded by the defendant nor sought to be relied upon by him by way of defence; yet the Court itself, upon the illegality appearing upon the evidence, will take notice of it, and will dismiss the action Ex turpi causa non oritur actio. No polluted hand shall touch the pure fountain of Justice" (P. 93). · · To the same effect is the opinion of Story: (1) "In general, where parties are concerned in illegal agreements or other transactions, whether they are rrwla proliibita or rrwla in se, Courts of Equity following the rule of law as to participators in a common crime will not interpose to grant any relief, acting upon the known maxim In pari delicto potior et1t ronditio defendentis et possidenti~. The old cases often gave relief, both at law and inequity, where the party would othe:rwise derive an advantage from his inequity. But the mod,ern doctrine has adopted a more severely just and probably politic and moral rule, which is, to leave the parties where it finds them giving no relief and no countenance to claims of this sort". (1) Story's Equity Jurisprudence. Volt ll $. 421; English edition by Randell, 1920, S. 298. 196.I lmmani Appa R"'\ •• Gollapalli Ramalin1-.thi. Gajendr°'adkarlJ." IHI JtffnM11; Appa Rao Y, Gollap