# STATE OF BIHAR v. RADHA KRISHNA SINGH & ORS - **Citation:** [1983] 2 S.C.R. 808 - **Court:** Supreme Court of India - **Decided:** 1983-04-20 - **Case number:** Civil Appeal Nos. 494-496 of 1975 - **Bench:** S: MuRTAZA FAZAL Au, A. VAllADARAJAN, V. Balakrishna Eradi - **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/state-of-bihar-v-radha-krishna-singh-ors-8461 - **Pages:** 113 ## Headnote Genealogies considerations to be kept in view while considering.· Evidence Act; 1872-Entries in public records-Prepared by a public officer in discharge of his official duties-Probative value of-Sections 13, 40, 41, 42 and 43-J?ecitale in judgments not inter partes-Section 32-Doctrine of post Iitem motafll-Appreciation of oral evidence in the 1natter of proof of pedigree-Hearsay · evidence seCtio11 60-S.tatement of person deposing a/act known from a different source-How far can be relied on Escheat-State not entering apperance-P/ea-Jf can be arcepted without public notice to persons interested. Interpretation-Dictionaries-How far can be used. Maharaja Hariodra Kishore Singh was the direct descendant of Debi Singh who was the son of Bansidhar Singh. Maharaja Harindra Kish ore Singh died issueless leaving behind vast properties in the states of Uttar Pradesh and :Bihar. The original plaintiff, Bhagwati Prasad Singh was the direct descendant of Ramruch Singh but his relationship with Bansidhar Singh had not been established. The plaintiffs-respondents basing their title as the nearest reversionors of Maharaja Harindra Kishore Singh claimed that they were entitled to immediate possession of the properties after the death of the widows of the Maharaja. The Trial Court held that the plaintiffs had not been able to prove any linkage or connection between Ramruch Singh and Bansidhar Singh. But the majority of the High Court held that all the links were clearly proved by the plaintiffs and that it had been found to their satisfaction that.Ramruch was the ... son of Bansidhar. It also held that Ex. J which Was an entry made by a Public Officer in a register in the discharge of his official duties squarely falls within the four corners of section 35 of the Evidence Act and, is therefore, admissible in evidence. The appellants however, claimed that it was not admissible in evidence. HELD : In a hotly contested point, there is a tendency on the part of an interested person or a party in order to grab, establish or prove an alieged claim, to concoct, fabrica~e or procure false gellc·alogy to suit their ends. In relying on the genealogy Put forward, courts must guard themselves against falling into the trap laid by a series of documents or a labyrinth of seemingly Qld ~enealogies to support their rival clain1s. (820 H, 821 A] . .- < i t "" . l ' The Prillciples governing such cases are•: (i) Geneaiogies admitted or proved to -be old and relied on in previous cases are doubtless relevant and in some cases may even ·be conclusive of the facts proved, but there are several considerations which must be kept In mind viz. : (a) Source of the genealogy and its dependability. (b) Admiosibility of the genealogy under the Evidence Act. (c) A proper use in decisions or judgments on which' reliance is placed. (d) Age of genealogies. (e) Litigations where such · genealogies have been accepted .or rejected. [821 B-E] (2) On the question of admissibility the following tests ·must be A B c adopted ; D · (a) The genealogies of the families concerned roust fall within the four-corners of s. 32(5) or s. 13 of the Evidence Act. (b) They must not be hit by the doctrine of post /item motam. (c) The genealogies or the claiffis cannot be proved by recitals, · E depositions or facts narrated in the judgment which have been held by a long course of decisions to be inadmissible. (d) Where genealogy is proved by oral evidence, the said evidence must clearly shew special means of knowledge disclosing the exact source, time and the circumstl\nces under which the knowledge is acquired, and this must be clearly and conclusively proved. [821 B-HJ The majority view that, Ex. J. is admissible js correct. Se•tion 35 of the Evidence Act requires the following conditions to be fulfilled before a document can be admissible under this section : (I) the document must be in the nature of an entry ln any public or other official book, register or record, (2) it must statð a fact in ## Text _Characters 0–39,961 of 267,617. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39961 for what follows._ A B c D E F G H 808 STATE OF BIHAR v. RADHA KRISHNA SINGH & ORS. April 20, 1983 [S: MuRTAZA FAZAL Au, A. VAllADARAJAN AND V. BALAKRISHNA ERADI, JJ.] Genealogies considerations to be kept in view while considering.· Evidence Act; 1872-Entries in public records-Prepared by a public officer in discharge of his official duties-Probative value of-Sections 13, 40, 41, 42 and 43-J?ecitale in judgments not inter partes-Section 32-Doctrine of post Iitem motafll-Appreciation of oral evidence in the 1natter of proof of pedigree-Hearsay · evidence seCtio11 60-S.tatement of person deposing a/act known from a different source-How far can be relied on Escheat-State not entering apperance-P/ea-Jf can be arcepted without public notice to persons interested. Interpretation-Dictionaries-How far can be used. Maharaja Hariodra Kishore Singh was the direct descendant of Debi Singh who was the son of Bansidhar Singh. Maharaja Harindra Kish ore Singh died issueless leaving behind vast properties in the states of Uttar Pradesh and :Bihar. The original plaintiff, Bhagwati Prasad Singh was the direct descendant of Ramruch Singh but his relationship with Bansidhar Singh had not been established. The plaintiffs-respondents basing their title as the nearest reversionors of Maharaja Harindra Kishore Singh claimed that they were entitled to immediate possession of the properties after the death of the widows of the Maharaja. The Trial Court held that the plaintiffs had not been able to prove any linkage or connection between Ramruch Singh and Bansidhar Singh. But the majority of the High Court held that all the links were clearly proved by the plaintiffs and that it had been found to their satisfaction that.Ramruch was the ... son of Bansidhar. It also held that Ex. J which Was an entry made by a Public Officer in a register in the discharge of his official duties squarely falls within the four corners of section 35 of the Evidence Act and, is therefore, admissible in evidence. The appellants however, claimed that it was not admissible in evidence. HELD : In a hotly contested point, there is a tendency on the part of an interested person or a party in order to grab, establish or prove an alieged claim, to concoct, fabrica~e or procure false gellc·alogy to suit their ends. In relying on the genealogy Put forward, courts must guard themselves against falling into the trap laid by a series of documents or a labyrinth of seemingly Qld ~enealogies to support their rival clain1s. (820 H, 821 A] . .- < i t "" . l ' The Prillciples governing such cases are•: (i) Geneaiogies admitted or proved to -be old and relied on in previous cases are doubtless relevant and in some cases may even ·be conclusive of the facts proved, but there are several considerations which must be kept In mind viz. : (a) Source of the genealogy and its dependability. (b) Admiosibility of the genealogy under the Evidence Act. (c) A proper use in decisions or judgments on which' reliance is placed. (d) Age of genealogies. (e) Litigations where such · genealogies have been accepted .or rejected. [821 B-E] (2) On the question of admissibility the following tests ·must be A B c adopted ; D · (a) The genealogies of the families concerned roust fall within the four-corners of s. 32(5) or s. 13 of the Evidence Act. (b) They must not be hit by the doctrine of post /item motam. (c) The genealogies or the claiffis cannot be proved by recitals, · E depositions or facts narrated in the judgment which have been held by a long course of decisions to be inadmissible. (d) Where genealogy is proved by oral evidence, the said evidence must clearly shew special means of knowledge disclosing the exact source, time and the circumstl\nces under which the knowledge is acquired, and this must be clearly and conclusively proved. [821 B-HJ The majority view that, Ex. J. is admissible js correct. Se•tion 35 of the Evidence Act requires the following conditions to be fulfilled before a document can be admissible under this section : (I) the document must be in the nature of an entry ln any public or other official book, register or record, (2) it must statð a fact in issue or·a releva.nt fñct, F G (3) the entry must be made by a public servant lo the discharge of · H his official duties or in performance of his duties especi*lly enjoined by the law of the country in which the relevant entry is kept. [829 H, 830 A·B] A B c D E F G H • 810 SUPREMB COURT REPORTS {19s~j 2 ·s.c.R. A pcrusel of Ex. J. clearly ·shows that it is a report made by an officer of the GOverment in discharge of his official duties. It was wriitcn by a serishtadar, a Governm~nt officer, on t~e direction of a high gover~ental 1 -....__ authority. Ex. J. being an entry in a Register mad\': by a public officer in th'e discharge of his duties. squarely falls within the four corners of s. 35 of the Evidence Act. It is clear that the officer was entrusted with the task of ascertaining. the possession of various landlords for the purpose of taking suitable steps in the matter. It mentions a number of persons through whom the plaintiffs clain1 their title and, therefore, it relates to a relevant fact. '.fhe question as to whether the relevant fact iS proved or not is quite a different~ matter which has nothing to do with the (ldmissibility of the document but which assumes importance only when the court considers the probative Value of a particular document. In short, all the essential conditions of section 35 --4 are fully complied with. [830 C-E] .. Admissibility of a docume~t is On~ thi~g and its probative vcilue, quite another : a docunient may be admissible and yet mey not carry any Conyiction and weight or its probative value may be nil. [832 AJ In the instant case Ex. J. has no probative value because it does not disclose the source from which the Sheristadar co11ected his facts nor does it show whether he consulted either conteinporary or previous records or entries therein to satisfy himself regarding the co9l-ectness of various statements pertaining to the genealogy of landlords Who were in possession of the lands. Although he has stated that he had taken these facts from an account book, he had not given any description or the nature of the account book and its contents. The fact of the matter, tberefore, is that there was no proper verification by the Sherishtadar regarding the facts stated in· the Report ·from any source. Therefore, it is difficult to place any reli~nce on the document even though,it may be admissible in evidence. [832 c..:01 P.C. Purus/lot/lama Reddiar v. S. •Perumal [1972] 2 SCR 646, applied. Ghulam Rasul Khan v. Secretary of State for India in Council 52 I.A. 201. distinguished. Cuar Shyam Pratap Singh v .. Collector of Etawah A.l.R. 1946 PC 103; Meer Usd-oollah v. Mussumat Beeby Imanian, widow of Shah Khadim Hossain, 1 M.l.A. 19 held inapplicable. A report based on hearsay evidence or on the irtfortnation gi v·en by an illiterate person cannot be admissible even under section 35 of the Evidence Act. [837 G] • · Brij Mohan Singh v. Priya Brat Narain Singh [1965] 3 SCR 861, followed. ' In the instant case the Sherishtdar had to depend on some unknown persons who were not mentioned iri it to gather "his facts and so even if it is ( li1ltAR V, MDiiAKR1sllNA admissible its probathe value would be almost zero. Ex. j, was admissible. because its author is nO longer alive. It contains illformation which· is based on what he may have heard from third parties and therefore much value cannot be attached to such a report. [S38 C, 839 BJ Brain v. Preece Lord, 152 English Reports 1017; Mario Mangini Stur/a & Ors. v. Filippo Tomasso Mattia Freccia, Augustus Keppel Stevenson & Ors., '1880 A A.C. 623; Mercer v. Denne (1905] 2 Ch. 538, referred to. B Briefly stated the law relating to the admissibility and probative value of the Ex. J iS: (i)" The exhibit is clearly admissible under s. 35 of the Evidence Act, and the finding of the High Corlrt oh this point is correct ; (ii) The Sheristadar, started writing EX. J in the year 1810 and ~i;u~pleted it in 1813; (iii) It n1entions names of some persons who, according to the plaintiffs, were.their ancestofs, but on carefully analysing the document it is not very clear as "to how Ramruch Singh was· connected with Bansidhar ·singh ·or Debi Singh. (iv) Its probative value is insignificant and is of no assistance in proving the plaint genealogy~ (v) 1t was a part of the record of Mirzapur·, Collectorate and was sutnmoned therefrom. (vi) A bare perusal of the exhibit sfiows that the Sherisbtadar was directed to embark on· an en.quiry regarding the persons· who" , were in actual possession of lands at the relevant time and it was not a part of his duty to ernb'afk o~any enquirY regarding the title of the persons holding the 'lands, nor did he attempt to do so. "The heading of Ex. J itself shows that it is a report regarding the. possession of Taluqa Majhwa. (841 A-Fl Even if the exhibit is taken into consideratiOn, it will prove not the • c D E F title of the plaintiffs-respondents but only the possession of lands held by G some of thei~ alleged ancestors. In other Words, the· documents will not be any evidence of title in the suit out of ·which tbe present appeals arise which are mainly concerned with the question of title and not with the question of possession. This apart the sche~e followed and the f!10dus operandi adopted by the plaintiffs are based on an incorrect transl.ation and. wrong interpretation or' the meaning of actual words in Persian. [841 G-H] ff Judgments of courts are admissible in evid;,nce_ unde; the provisions ·of sections 40, 41 & 42 of tho Evidence Act. Section 43 provides that those A B • c D E F G H 812 SUPREME COURT REPoRTS tJ9B3) i S.C.R. Ju.dgments which dQ not fall within the four corners of sections 40 to 42 are inadmissible unless the existence of such judgment, order or detree is itself a fact in issue or a relevant fact under some oth~r provisions of Evidence Act. Some Courts have used section 13 to prove the adn1issibility of a judgment as coming under the provisions of section 43. But where there is a specific provision covering the admissibility of a docun1ent it h not open to the Court to call into aid othec general.provisions in order to make a particular document admissible. In other- words, if a judgment is not admissible as not falling within the ambit of sections 40 to 42 it must fulfil _the conditions of section 43; otherwise it cannot be relevant under sectiOn 13 of the Evidence Act. The words "other provisions of this Act" cannot cover section 13 because this section does not deal with judgment.s at all. [860 H, 861 A, 861 C-D] A judgment in rcn1, like judgments passed in probate, insolvency, matrimonial or guardianship. proceedings is admissible in all cases whether such judgn1ents are Inter parteS.or not. Jn the instant case, however, all the docu1nents consisting.of judgn1cnts filed are riot judgn1ents in rem, and therefore, the question of their admissibility on that basis does not a.rise. The judgments filed as Exhibits in this case arc judg.nents in persona111, and therefore, they do not fulfil the conditions mentioned in section 41° of the Evidence Act. [861 E-F] John Cockrane v. Hurrosoondurri Debia & Ors. 6 M.I.A. 494; Jogendro Deb Roy Kut v. Funind10 Deb Roy Kut. 14 ;.-1.1.A. 367; Gujju Lall v. Fatteli Lall ILR 6 Cal. 171; Maharaja Sir Kesha Prasad Singh Bahadur v. Bahuria Mt. Bhagjogna Kuer & Ors .AIR 1937 PC 69, referred to. Gadadlrar Chowdhury and Ors. v. Sarai Chandra Chakravarty and Ors'. 44 CWN 935, Seethapati Rao Dora v. Venkanna Dora & Ors. ILR 4~ Mad, 332; approved. It is also well settled that statements or declarations before persons of competent knowledge made ante liten1 mota111 are receivable to prove ancient rights of a public or general nature. [865 H] ' • The admissibility of such declarations is, however, considerably weakened if it pertains not to-public rights but to purely private rights. It is equally well settled that declarations or staten1ents made "post liten1 1nota1n would not be ad1nissible because in cases or proceedings taken or declarations made ante liten1 1nota1n, the ele1nent of bias and concoction is . elimina"ted. Before however, the staten1ents of the nature mentioned above can be admis;ible as being ante /item n:otam they must not only be before the actual existence of any controversy, but should be n1ade even before the commence .. ment of legal proceedings. [866 C·E] - This position however. cannot hold good of statements made post lite1n 111ota1n which would be clearly inadmissible in evidence. The reaso-':1 for this rule seems to be that after a dispute has begun or a legal proceeding is about to commence, the possibility of bias, concoction or putting up false pleas ~annot be ruled out. [866 G-H] -T - • BIHAR V. RADHAKRISHNA Kalka Prasad and Ors. v. Mathura Prasad !LR 30 All. 510, Hari Bakh v. Babu Lal & Anr. AIR 1924 PC 126; Dolgobinda Paricha v. Nimai Charan Misra & Ors. [1959] Supp. 2 SCR 814; and Ralidindi · Venkata Subbaraju & Ors. v. Chintalpati Snbbaraju & Ors. [1969] 2 SCR 292, referred to. (i) A judgment ifi rem e.g, judgments or orders passed in admirally, probate proceedings, etc, would always be adn1issible irrespective of whether they are inter part es or not ; (ii) judgment in p,.rsonam not inter partes are not at. all adg1issible in evidence except for the three purposes mentioned above. · (iii) On a parity of aforesaid reasoning, the recitals In a judgn1ent like findings given in appreciation of eVidence n1ade or argu· ments or genealogies referred to in the judgrqent would be wholly in admissible in a case where neither the plaintiffs nor the defendants were parties. (iv) The probative value of doCuments which, however ancient they may be, do not disclose sources of their inforn1ation or have not achieved sufficient notoriety, is precious little. (v) Statement!>, .declarations or depositions, etc., would not be admissible if they arc post lite111111otan1. [869 A-F] 813 In the instant ca~e, a detailed examination of the documents shows that the pJaintiff~ as pointed out by the dis~enting judge have not proved that they are in any way directly connected wiih Ramruch Singh, Bansidhar Singh or Debi Singh. The majority on the other hand seems to have been greatly influenced by the age of the documents or thefr nature rather than their contents, ·relevancy and weight. The majority also did not focus attention on the most vital question whether or n.6t the plaintiffs have Proved that Gajraj Singh, the ancertor of the plaintiff, was in any way connected with Ramruch Singh, Devi Singh and Bansidhar Singh. (869 G-H, 870 A-Bl A B c D E F In considering the oral ~vident;:e regarding a pedigree a purely n1athematlcal approach cann'ot be made because where a long line of descent has to b~ proved spreading over a century, it is obvious that the witnesses. who are examined to depose to the genealogy would have to depend on their special · means of kflowledge which may ha\e con1e to them through their ancestors G ..._ but, at the same time, there is great ·risk and a serious danger involved. in relying solely on the evidence of witness given fn.:>n1 pure memory beca~se the witness who ~re interested normally have a tendency to draw more from their imagination or turn and twist the facts which tbey n1ay have heard from th~ir anceStors in order to heIP the parties for whon1 they are deposing. The court, must therefore, safeguard that the evidence of such witness may not be H accepted as it is based purely on imagination or !ln imaginary or illusory source of information rather than special means of knowlege as required by law. TJi.e or~l testimony of the witne§s Qn (hi$ μJ.:,:itter ~s boun<;l to b~ hearsay A B c E F G H 814 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [I 983) 2 s.c.R. and their evidence is admissible as an exception to the general rule where hearsay evidence is not admissible. [888 E-H, 889 A] In ~the appreciation ·of evidence of such witnesses, the principles to be borne in mind are : 1 (1) The relationship or the connection however close it may be, which. the witness bears to the persons whose pedigree is sought to be deposed by him. · · ·(2) The nature and character of the.special means of knowledge .through which the witness has ·come to know about the pedigree. (3) The interested nature of the witness concerned. (4) The precaution which must be taken to rule out any false statement made by th.e witness post /item 1notam or one which is derived not by means of special knowledge but purely from his imagination, and ~ (5) The evidence of the witness must be subetantially corroborated as far as time and memory admit. [889 [B-E] Bahadur Singh & Ors. v. Mohan Singh & Ors. 29 LA. I; Pershad Chowdhry & Ors. v. Rani Radha Chowdharain & Ors. 31 1:A. 160; Abdul GJiaiur & Ors. v. Hussain Bibi & Ors. 58 I.A. 188; Mewa Singh & Ors. v. Basant Singh & Ors. AIR 1918 P.C. 49; Bhojraj v. Sita Ran1 & Ors. AIR 1936 PC 66, referred to. 1 Escheat: When a claim for escheat is put forward by the Government, the onus'• lies heavily on the appellant to pro\'e the absence of any heir of the respondent anywhere in the world. Normally, the court frowns on the estate being taken by escheat unless the essentiat·conditions for escheat are fully and completely sa'isfied~ Fort.her, befor~ the plea of escheat can be entertained, there must be a public notice given by the Government so that if there is any claimant · anywhere in the country, or for that matter in the world, he may come forward to contest·the claim of the State. [919 E•F] In the instant case,, the States of Bihar and Uttar Pradesh merely satisfied themselves by appearing to oppose the claims of the plaintiffsrespondents. Even if they succeeded in showing that the plaintiffs were not the nearest reversioners of the late Maharaja, it does not follow as a logical corollary that the failure of the plaintiffs claim would lead to the irresistible inference that there is no other heif who could at any time come forward to claim the pro~erties. [919 F-G] Dictionaries can always be referred to in order to ascertain -not on~y \h~ meaning of a word ~ut ?ls9 the ~eneral use of it. [842 F] ) BIHAR v. RADllAKRISHNA (Fazal Ali, I.) . 815 Coca-Co/a Company of Canada Ltd. v. Pepsi-Cola Company of Canada r · Ltd., AIR 1942 PC 40 referred to. A < CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos. 494-496 of 1975. From the Judgment and Decree dated the 15th December, 1982 of the Patna High Court in First Appeal Nos. 85, 86 & 87 of 1966 respectively. Dr. L.M. Singhvi, S.C. Mishra, U.P. Singh, S.N. Iha and L.K. Pandey for the Appellant. V.M. Tarkunde, U.R.La/it, D.N. Goburdhan and D. Goburdhan for Respondents Nos. 5-22. Dr. Y.S. Chiiale and Mrs. 'Sobha Dikshit for the State of U.P. S.K. Verma for the Intervener. The Judgptent of the Court was delivered by . . .... FAZAL Au, J. These appeals are directed against a judgment of the Special Bench of the Patna High Court by which the High Court decreed title suit No.5/61 after reversing the Judgment of the trial court. It appears that after the death of Maharaja Harendra Kishore Singh (hereinafter referred to as the 'Maharaja') who died lssueless on the 26th of March 1893, a serious dispute arose about the impartible estate left by him. The Maharaja claimed to be a direct · descendant of Raja Hirday Narain Singh who was the admitted owner of the properties. Several persons came forward with rival claims of being the heirs to the properties left by the Maharaja which consisted of immoveable arid moveable properties, such as lands, houses, jewellery, etc. As a result of the hot contest by. each of the claimants, one suit was filed at Varanasi being T.S. No. 3/55. That stiit was filed by one Ram Bux Singh who claimed to be the nearest reversioner of the late Maharaja. That suit, however, appears to have died its natural death during the preliminary stages aud was ultimately with- . · drawn on April 9, 1956, leaving only three claimants in the field. Another suit was filed on 16th August 1955 in the Court of Sub-Judge, Patna ':)lich was rel;listered as T.S. :t BIHAR v. RADHAKIRSHNA.(Faza/Ali, i.) 817 had passed. We, therefore, need not repeat what has already been fully discussed by the High Court. Suffice it to say that the eventful story . of the present litigation opens with the death of Maharaj a Harendra Kishore Singh which took a more serious turn when his two widows, Maharani Sheoratan Kuer died on March 24, 1896 aμd Maharani Janki Kuer was declared incompetent to manage the estate, as a result of which the management of the entrire estate was taken over by the Court of Wards. As the properties in question were situated in both the States of Bihar and Uttar Pradesh the Courts of Wards ofBihar and Uttar Pradesh jonitly carried on _the management of the properties. Maharani Janki Kuer resided at Allahabad and died _childless on November 27, 1954. After her unfortunate death or even before; interested persons started casting their covetous and avaricious eyes on 'the huge properties left by the late Maharaja and litigation started .by putting forward rival .and conflicting claims thus making strenuous efforts to A B c "turn chance into good fortune". The last and inevitable step of the ·D drama long_ in process reached its climax with the death of Maharani Janki Kuer when as many as four suits, as mentioned above, ·were filed claiming the properties· of the Maharaja, some as reversioners and some as put ri ka putra, etc. We would like to make it clear that the three appeals, i.e., civil appeal Nos. 494 to 496 of 1975, have been filed by the State of Bihar arraying the plaintiffs and other claimants as the respondents in each of the appeals. The pivotal dispute centres round appeal No. 494 between the State. of Bihar, supported by the State of Uttar Pradesh on one side and the plaintiff, Radha Krishan Singh and his champarters on the other. · We, therefore, intend to discuss and analyse the evidence - oral and documentary-only so far as the parties in appea] No. 494 are concerned. Before dealing with the oral, documentary and circumstantial evidence it may be necessary to refer briefly to the background of the _case which has doubtless been fully discussed by the courts below. _Some of the historical aspects, however, have to be reiterated in ·order to understand the view which we take in this case. Coming to the history of the Bettiah Raj, we have to go back to the 17th century. The undisputed position js that Bettiah Ra,j , E F G H A B c D E F G H ' . SIS SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1983) 2. S.C.l!.. was an impartible estate having properties'in the States ofBihar and Uttar Pradesh. The Raj was established by one Raja Ugra Sen as far back as the middle of 17th century and was commonly known as the Riyasat of Sirkar of Champaran, consisting of four parganas, viz,. Majhwa, Simrown, Babra and Maihsi. Raja Ugra Sen was succeeded by Raja Dalip Singh, Raja Gaj Singh and ultimately by Raja Dhrub Singh in the year 1715. Raja Dhrub Singh died in the year 1762 without leaving any male issue, but leaving a daughter named Benga Babui who had married one Raghunath Singh, a Bhumihar Brahmin of Gautam gotra. On the death of Raja Dhrub Singh, his daughter's son, Raja Jugal Kishore Singh entered into possession of the estate of Bettiah Raj and was in possession thereof at the time when the East India Company assumed the Government of the province. The Company could not tolerate any resistance from the Rulers and a battle was fought in the course of which Raja Jugal Kishore Singh was driven into the neighbouring State of Bundelkhand in 1766 and the entire estate o' Bettiah Raj was seized and placed under the management of the officers .of the Company. During the absence of Raja Jugal Kishore Singh, Sri Kishen Singh and Abdhoot Singh who were· the sons · of Prithi Singh and Satrajit Singh respectively and were younger brothers of Raja Dalip Singh, enjoyed the confidence of the Company and were placed incharge of the Bettiah Raj. However, in 1771, the Company reinstated Raja Jugal Kishore Singh obviously because he probably tendered his apologies and made a solemn promise to be Joyal to the Company, as a result of which negotiations started between the Government and Raja Jugal Kishore Singh regarding the estate in question and ultimately he v,:as allotted the Z.amindari of Majwha and Simrown which formed part of the Bettiah Raj estate and Babra and Maihsi were left in the possession of Srikishen Singh and Abdhoot Singh. The East India Company had formally announcecd this arrangment by a decison dated July 24, 1771. Soon thereafter, there was some dispute between Raja Jugal Kishore Singh and the Company, as a result of wh;ch he was again dispossessed by • the Company as he failed to pay the Government revenue. Thus, the entire Sirkar of Champaran passed into the possession of the Government and was held by small farmers on temporary settlements. Raja Jugal Kishore Singh received an allowance for maintenance and died sometime in the year 1783, leaving a son named Bir Kishore Singh who wa> succeeded by his eldest son, Maharaja Anand Kishore Singh ·in 1790. Upon his death, leaving no issue, he was succeeeded ·by his younger brother, Maharaja Nawal Kishore Singh who was ~ucceeded by his eldest son, Rajendra Kishore Sin~h who was - ... ) BIHAR v. RADHAKRISHNA (Fazal Ali, J.) 819. ultimat~ly succeeded by Maharaja Harendra Kishore Singh, whose estate is the subject matter of this suit. On 22nd September, · 1790, Lord Cornwallis recommended to the Board of Revenue that estate of Majhwa and Simrown should be restored ro Raja Jugal Kishore Singh but as he had died by this, time, the Company directed that the· heirs. of Raja Jugal Kishore Singh, Srikishen Singh and Abdhoot Singh be restored the possession of their respective Districts. Bir Kishore Singh, was not at all satis· lied with the decision of the· Board, mentioned above, because he . claimed the entire province (Sirkar·or Champaran) but in obedience to the. order .of tbe Governor-General, he took possession of the parganas of Majhwa and Simrown . . Thereafter, a long-term litigation started between Bir. Kisbore Singh and the heirs of Raja Jugal Kishore Singh in respect of Majhwa · and Simrown and ultimately suits were filed which were followed by A B ' c Memorial to the 'Lieutenant Governor. It appears·that whereas in the D earlier suit, Raja Deoki Nandan Singh's predecessor had pleaded that Raja J ugal Ki shore Singh was the son of Raja Dhrub Singh's duaghter and, therefore, not a member oft.he family of Raja Dhrub Singh, Bir Kishore Singh had pleaded that Raja Jugal Kishore Singh having been adopted by Raja Dhrub Singh· had become a member of his family. It was pleaded in the Memorial that Raja Jugal Kishore · E Singh, who belonged to the Gautam gotra, had been, adopted .by Raja Dhrub Singh who belonged to the Kashyap. gotra, and had been appointed as his successor. To cut the matter short, ·it may be stated that a spate of litigation followed putting forward rival claims to the estate left by Raja Dhrub Singh. It may, however, be noted that in none of the suits instituted in 1895, 1896 and 1905, the question as to whether ·Raja Jugal Kisho.re Singh had become· a member of the family Of Raja Dhrub Singh, by virtue of his adoption as putri ka putra, was · decided despite a plea having been raised in all those suits. As already mentioned, out of the four suits that were filed, one of them was withdrawn. In the present appeals, we are only concerned with two rival claims put forward to the Bettiah Raj on the death of Maharaja Harendra Kishore Singh and bis two widows. In suit No. 25/1958, the claimants were Ambika Prasad Singh and others claim· ing the estate on the basis that as Raja Jugal Kishore Singh succeeded . to the gaddi of Sirkar as the adopted s9n and successor to Raja F H B c D E F G H. 820 SUPREME COURT REPORTS. (1983] 2 S.C.R. Dhrub Singh and not as his daughter's son, Ambika Prasad being nearest among the reversioners was entitled to s1.1cceed to the estate after the death of the widows. The suit of Ambika Prasad Singh was dismissed by the trial court as also by the special Bench of the High Court and some appeals· were brought to this Court by certificate. The said appeals, being civil appeal Nos. 114-119 of 1976, in Sh yam Sunder Prasad Singh & Ors. v. State of Bihar & Ors. (1) came up for hearing before. a Bench consisting of P.N. Bhagwati, A.P.Sen and . E.S. Venkataramiah, JJ. This Court dismissed the appeals and rejected the claim of Ambika Prasad Singh holding that as Raja Jugal Kishore Singh could not'in law be consiqered as putri ka putra his claim to the estate left by Raja Dhrub as being the nearest reversioner, cannot succeed. The claim of Radha Krishan Singh and others in suit ·No. 5 of 1961 was left to be decided by another Bench and it is these appeals that have now been placed before us for hearing. However, it is not necessary for us to make a deeper probe into the early history of Bettiah Raj because in the instant case the relevant genealogy for the purpose of ascertaining the ancestors of the parties starts from Raja Hirday Narain Singh, and· his descendants who have been referred to.in Ex. J, a report of the serishtedar, which appears to be the sheet-anchor of 1he plaintiffs' case. Ex. Q-2, a genealogy filed by the plaintiffs clearly shows that Thakur Hirday Narain Singh, who was the Raja of Bettiah after the death of his father, Thakur Hansraj Singh had five sons. One of his sons was Bansidhar Singh who was alleged to be the ancestor of the plaintiffs. Bansidhar Singh had only one son named Debi Singh. After a brief narration of the facts, mentioned above, before going to the oral, documentary and circumstantial evidence, it may be necessary to state the well established principles in the light of which we have to decide the conflicting claims of the parties. It appears that the plaint genealogy is the very fabric and foundation of the edifice on which is built the plaintiff's case. This is the starting point of the case of the plaintiff which has been hotly contested by the appellant. In such cases, as there is a tendency on the part of an interested person or a party in order to grab, establish or prove an aUeged claim, to concoct, fabricate or procure false genealogy to sujt their ends, (I) !198lj 1SCR1 1 ' / ( < ii1n,.R v. ilAmtAKRISHNA (Fazai Ali,~J.) the courts in relying on the genealogy pμt forward must guard them• selves against falling into the trap laid by a series ·of documents or a labyrinth of seemingly old genealogies to support their rival claims. The principles governing such cases may be summarised thus-: (I) Genealogies admitted or proved to be old and relied on in previous cases are doubtless .relevant and in some cases may even be conclusive of the facts proved but there are several considerations which must be kept in mind by the courts before accepting or relying on the genealogies : (a) Source of the genealogy and its dependability .. (b) Admissibility of the genealogy under the Evidence ·Act. (c) A proper use of the said genealogies in decisions or A B judgments on which reliance is placed. ' D (d) Age of genealogies. (e) Litigations where such genealogies have been accepted or rejected. (2) On the question of admissibility the following tests mu.~t be adopted: • (a) The genealogies of the families concerned must fall within the four-corners of s. 32 (5) or s. 13 of the Evidence Act. (b) They must not be hit by the doctrine of post /item molam. (c) The genealogies· or the claim cannot be proved by E F recitals, depositions or facts narrated in the judgment G which have been held by a long course of decisions to be inadmissible. (d) Where genealogy is proved by oral evidence, the said evidence must clearly show special means of knowH ledge disclosing the exact source, time and the circumstances under which the knowledge is acquired, and this must be clearly and conclusively proved. A B D E F G II 822 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [19s3j 2 s.c.i We shall now proceed to scan and analyse the evidence in the light of the principles adumbrated above referring to the important authorities on the questions arising out of the evidnce, oral and docu- ··y · mentary, Although both the parties have cited a very large number of decisions we would not like to load or crowd this· judgment with all the authorities cited before us and would confine ourselves only to the important and relevant authorities of this Court and those of the Privy Council and we shall refer to the judgments of the High Court only if there is no decision of. the Privy Council or of this Court directly in point. To recapitulate, the plaintiffs-respondents based their title as - ·1 being the nearest reversioners of the Maharaja and claimed . to be entitled to immediate possession after the death of the widows of the Maharaja. The plaintiffs' therefore, claimed to be the direct descen· dants of Gajraj Singh and Ramruch Singh which was the branch of Bansidhar Singh's son which remained in Baraini and after the extinction .of the line of the Maharaja, the properties were fo revert to the descendants of Gajraj Singh. The attempt of the plaintiffs. has been to ·show to the Court that they were . direct descendants of Gajraj Singh who was the son of Ramruch, Ramruch being the son of Bansidhar Singh. )< Thus, for the purpose of this case, Bansidhar Singh may be taken to be admittedly the ancestor of Maharaja Harendra Kishore Singh. .The only point of dispute and the pivotal controversy cen· tres round the question as to whether or not the plaintiffs have proved their case that they were also the direct descendants of Bansidhar Singh so as to claim the-properties in dispute on the death of the Mahraja. Both on the question of genealogy and other matters, a mass of oral and documentary evidence consisting of documents," reports, judgments, plaints, entries in registers, etc., have been pro· duced and will be considered at the relevant stage. The defence of the appellant is of a negative character inasmuch as the defendants-appellants have denied the claims made by the plaintiffs-respondents and but them to strict proof of their case. the defendants, however, have .been fair rnough to concede that Bhagwati Prasad Singh, father of the plaintiff has been proved to be a direct descendant of Gajraj Singh but have flatly denied that Ramrnch Singh, father of Gajraj Singh had any connection either with Debi Singh or Bansidhar Singh. In other words, the . plaintiffs' genealogy, · BIHAR v· RADHAKRISHNA (Fazai Ali, 1.) . 823-. so far as they are-concerned, has been accepted by the appellants, upto the stage of Ramruch Singh. The courts below also <;>n a consideration of the oral and documentary evidence have endorsed the stand takeri by the defendants that Bhagwati Prasad Singh has been proved to be the direct descendant of Gajraj Singh being 7th in that line. It is well settled ·that when a case of a party is based on a genealogy consisting of links, it is incumbent on the party to prove every link thereof and. even if one link is found to be missing then in the eye of law the genealogy cannot be said to have been fully proved. In the instant case, although the plaintiffs have produced oral and documentary evidence to show that Ramruch Singh and Debi Singh were brothers being the sons of Bansidhar Singh tbis position was ·not accepted by the trial court as also by M.M. Prasad, J. wh0 dissented from the other two Judges constituting the Special Bench who had taken a contrary view and had held that the plaintiffs had fully prove_d the entire genealogy set-up in the plaint, This, therefore, makes our task easier because we need not discuss in detail the evidence and documents to show the connection of the plaintiffs upto the stage of Gajraj Singh though we may. have to refer to the evidence for the purpose of deci~ing the main issue, viz., whether or· not Gajraj Singh was the son of Ramruch Singh and Ramruch Singh a brother of Debi Singh and son of Bansidhar Singh. Before going into the evidence; we would like to exiract the findings of the courts -below_ on the question of title. The trial court had clearly held that the plainiffs had not been able to prove any linkage or connection between Ramruch and Bansidhar but the majority judgment consisting of G ~N. Prasad and Mukherji, JJ. dis· agreed with this finding and held that all the links were cleariy proved by the plaintiffs an.d it has been proved to their satisfaction that Ramruch Singh was ·the son· of Bansidhar Singh. On this point the finding of the majority may be extracted thus "I have considered the oral and documentary evidence adduced by the parties on the point of genealogy and in A B c .D -E F G my opinion, it has been well established by the evidence H adduced in.tJJ,is case on- behalf of the plarutiffs of Title Suit No. 5of1961 that BansidharSingh·was a common ances· tor of Maharaja Harendra Kishpre Singh and Bhagwati StlPREME COuRT REPORTS (1983) 2 s.c.ti.. Prasad Singh (father of plaintiffs 1 to 8 of Title Suit No. A 5of1961)." (Vol. VIII, p. 247, para 109)· B c D E F G H M.M~ Prasad,}.