# STATE OF BIHAR ----·---~-· v. RAMESH SINGH . August 2; 1977

- **Citation:** [1978] 1 S.C.R. 257
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1976-02-18
- **Bench:** N. L. Untwalia, P. N. Sidnghal
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/state-of-bihar-v-ramesh-singh-august-2-1977-7270
- **Pages:** 5

## Headnote

.: CirinJi11al Procedure Code 1973-Sections 226, 227 and 228.
Te~tr for discharging an accused-Presumption of innocence-Difference
betwetn cake for conviction or case for proceeding further •
At J.00 A . .M. on the 26th of November 1973 SmL Tara Devi, wife of respondent. a professor of Economics, in Munshi Singh College, .l\fotihari
in
State cf Bihar, was found burning in the Kitchen of their house. She died as
a result ·of excessive bum injuries on her person. The brother of Tara. Devi ·
rushed to the spot and found that respondent and his brother were standing
near tte burning body of Tara Devi but were not taking any steps to extinguish
tho f.re.
He lodged the F.I.R. at Police Station charging the respondent for
having conimitted the offences under s. 302 and 201 of Penal COO.e.
Charge
sheet l',as submitted against him by the police and the case was committed to
Sessicns Court for trial of the respondent u/s. 209- of Cr.- P.C.- 1973. _
The Sessions Judge discharged the accused under s. 227 of Cr. P. Code· 1973
on the r:round that there was not sufficient ground for proceeding with the trial
agaill!t respondent and he was discharged in accordance with section 227.
The State of Bihar \vent in revision before ·Patna High Court, which wa<s
dismi!o;ed by the High Court.
AUc,,·ing the appeal by special leave 7
HEID : ( 1) Under s. 226 of the Code the prosecutor white opening the
case t.as got to describe the charge against the accused and State
by what
evidence he proposes to prove the gujlt of the accused. Thereafter. comes at
the. initial stage, the dtJty of the Court to consider tho record of the case and
the documents submitted therewith. The Judge has then to pass an order either
u/s. 227 or u/s. 228 ·of Code. · [259C, DJ
A
B
c
D
E
. li the _Judge
considers that there is not sufficient ground
for proceeding
agai~1 the accused7 he shall discharge the accused and record hi'i reasoll9 for
so doing as enjoined bys. 227. If on the other hand. the Judge is of opinion
that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence
d~:
F
(a) .•...........•••••
(b) is exclusively triable by the court, he shall frame in writing a char£e
agaimt the accused as provided in s. 228.
Reading the two provisions together in juxta a position at the initial stage
of lbe trial; the truth, veracity and effect of the eviednce which the prosecutor
proposes to adduce are not to be meticulously judged. Nor is any weight to
be. attached to the probable defence of the accused. [259E-F]
. l'be standard of test and judgment v.·hich is to be fi~ally · applied before
recording a finding regarding the guilt or otherwise of accused.
is
not
ex~y to be applied at the stage of deciding ,the matteIT under s. 227 and 228
of the Code. [259G]
G
Streng suspicion against the accused, if it remains in the re~ion of suspicion.
cannot tate the place of proof of bis guilt at the conclusion of trial. But at .
the· initial stage, if there is a strong suspicion which leads the court_ to think
H
that there is a ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence
then it is not open to the court to say that there is no sufficient ground for
·proceeding against the accused.
It is only ·for
the
purpose, of deciding
A.
B
c
'D
E
F
G
H
•
·~
258 .'
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1978) l S.C.R.
prbna facie "'·hether the court should_ proceed with · the - trial - or not. The
evidence \\·hich the Prosecutor proposes to adduce to prove the guilt of the
accused even if fully accepte.d before .it is challenged in cross..examinatiM or
rebutted by the defence evidence, if any,. cannot show that the accused comm:tted
the offence. then there \\·ill be no sufficient ground for proceeding '\Vith
the
trial. l259H, 260A·Bl
- • • -
- •
If the scales of pan as to the guilt or innocence of the accused are scmething like even, at the conclusion of the trial, then, on the theory of benefit
of doubt the· case is .to end in his acquittal.
But if on th~ other hand, if U So
at the initia

## Text

•
257
STATE OF BIHAR
----·---~-·
v.
RAMESH SINGH .
August 2; 1977
[N. L. UNTWALIA AND P. N. SIDNGHAL, JJ.]
.: CirinJi11al Procedure Code 1973-Sections 226, 227 and 228.
Te~tr for discharging an accused-Presumption of innocence-Difference
betwetn cake for conviction or case for proceeding further •
At J.00 A . .M. on the 26th of November 1973 SmL Tara Devi, wife of respondent. a professor of Economics, in Munshi Singh College, .l\fotihari
in
State cf Bihar, was found burning in the Kitchen of their house. She died as
a result ·of excessive bum injuries on her person. The brother of Tara. Devi ·
rushed to the spot and found that respondent and his brother were standing
near tte burning body of Tara Devi but were not taking any steps to extinguish
tho f.re.
He lodged the F.I.R. at Police Station charging the respondent for
having conimitted the offences under s. 302 and 201 of Penal COO.e.
Charge
sheet l',as submitted against him by the police and the case was committed to
Sessicns Court for trial of the respondent u/s. 209- of Cr.- P.C.- 1973. _
The Sessions Judge discharged the accused under s. 227 of Cr. P. Code· 1973
on the r:round that there was not sufficient ground for proceeding with the trial
agaill!t respondent and he was discharged in accordance with section 227.
The State of Bihar \vent in revision before ·Patna High Court, which wa<s
dismi!o;ed by the High Court.
AUc,,·ing the appeal by special leave 7
HEID : ( 1) Under s. 226 of the Code the prosecutor white opening the
case t.as got to describe the charge against the accused and State
by what
evidence he proposes to prove the gujlt of the accused. Thereafter. comes at
the. initial stage, the dtJty of the Court to consider tho record of the case and
the documents submitted therewith. The Judge has then to pass an order either
u/s. 227 or u/s. 228 ·of Code. · [259C, DJ
A
B
c
D
E
. li the _Judge
considers that there is not sufficient ground
for proceeding
agai~1 the accused7 he shall discharge the accused and record hi'i reasoll9 for
so doing as enjoined bys. 227. If on the other hand. the Judge is of opinion
that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence
d~:
F
(a) .•...........•••••
(b) is exclusively triable by the court, he shall frame in writing a char£e
agaimt the accused as provided in s. 228.
Reading the two provisions together in juxta a position at the initial stage
of lbe trial; the truth, veracity and effect of the eviednce which the prosecutor
proposes to adduce are not to be meticulously judged. Nor is any weight to
be. attached to the probable defence of the accused. [259E-F]
. l'be standard of test and judgment v.·hich is to be fi~ally · applied before
recording a finding regarding the guilt or otherwise of accused.
is
not
ex~y to be applied at the stage of deciding ,the matteIT under s. 227 and 228
of the Code. [259G]
G
Streng suspicion against the accused, if it remains in the re~ion of suspicion.
cannot tate the place of proof of bis guilt at the conclusion of trial. But at .
the· initial stage, if there is a strong suspicion which leads the court_ to think
H
that there is a ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence
then it is not open to the court to say that there is no sufficient ground for
·proceeding against the accused.
It is only ·for
the
purpose, of deciding
A.
B
c
'D
E
F
G
H
•
·~
258 .'
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1978) l S.C.R.
prbna facie "'·hether the court should_ proceed with · the - trial - or not. The
evidence \\·hich the Prosecutor proposes to adduce to prove the guilt of the
accused even if fully accepte.d before .it is challenged in cross..examinatiM or
rebutted by the defence evidence, if any,. cannot show that the accused comm:tted
the offence. then there \\·ill be no sufficient ground for proceeding '\Vith
the
trial. l259H, 260A·Bl
- • • -
- •
If the scales of pan as to the guilt or innocence of the accused are scmething like even, at the conclusion of the trial, then, on the theory of benefit
of doubt the· case is .to end in his acquittal.
But if on th~ other hand, if U So
at the initial stage of making an order under s. 227 or s. 228 then in si.;b a
situation ordinarily and generally the order which will have to be made. \\"j:i be
one under s. 228 and not under s. 227.
[260C-DJ-_- __ .
·· •
Ninnal Jeet Singh Hoon v. State of JVest Bengal-(1913) 2- SCR 66 has
follo'\\·ed Chandra Deo Singlr v. Prakash Chandra Bose (1964) 3 SCR 639 _M·herein ·it was laid down that the test is whether there is a sufficient ground .. for
. proceeding and not, \\-'hether there is a sufficient g'round for conviction.·, "·:
After setti,ng aside the orders of High Court and Sessions Collrt, the. i:6urt
directed that appropriate charge or charges be framed against the
resP0~1ent
and trial to proceed in accordance with law.
[261HJ
· The Cour observed that nothing stated in the judgment is meant to preil2dice
in the least the case of either party at the trial. ,l259C] :-.· _
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No . .5 I of
1977. - ..
.
. -
~-·
- - . ..
.
' .
·
Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order
.d~ted
18-2-1976 of the Patna High Court in Cr!. Rev. No. 699/75.
U. P. Singh and S. N. Iha, for theAppel!ant. _
B. P. Singh and A. K. Srivastava, for the Respondent.
The fol!owing Judgment of the Court was delivered by
.~ .·
UNTWALIA, J.-The respondent in this appeal by special leave is a
Professor of Economics in Munshi Singh College, Motihari in the S:a,te
of Bihar. · At about 3.00 A.M; on the 26th of November, ':1973,
Smt. Tara Devi. wife of the respondent, was found burning <in. the
kitchen of his house. · A hulla was raised.
Chandreshwar Prasad
Singh, brother of Tara Devi, who is a Professor of Botany in the siid
College and lives nearby came to the scene of occurrence. It i5 uid
he found the respondent and his brotller standing near the bμr11ing
body of Tara Devi but not taking any steps to extinguish the: fire.
Tara Devi died apparently as a result of the extensive burn injuries
on her person. A First Information Report was lodged by Chandf~sh
. war Pra·sad Singh at the Police Station· charging the respondent ;for
having committed the offences under sections 302 and 201 of the P<nal
Code.
Eventually Charge-Sheet was submitted against him br, the
police and the case was committed to the Court of Sessions for trbl of
the respondent under section 209 of the Code of Criminal Proced_CTe,
1973-hereina(ter called _the Code.
·
When the case was opened in the Court of the IIJ rd Additb:ml
Sessions Judge at Motihari in Sessions Trial No. 66/1975 . by the
Additional Public Prosecutor in accordance with section 226 of' the
Code, a pka was raised on behalf of the respondent that there w~;;r;ot
any sufficient ground for proceeding with the trial ag~inst him an:O he
•
1
RIHAR v. RAMESH SINGH ( Untwalia, J.)
259
should be discharged in accordance with section 227. The Additional
A
Sessions Judge accepted the plea and di'scharged the accused by his
order dated April 30, 1975. The State of Bihar-the appellant in this
appeal, went in revision before the Patna High Court to assail the order
aforesaid of the Sessions Court.
The High Court by its order dated
the 18th February, 1976 dismissed the revision. Hence this appeal.
It is neither necessary nor advisable for us to meution in any great
B
detail the facts of the prosecution case against the respondent or refer
to all the materials and the evidence which may be produced by the
prosecutor when a trial proceeds in the Sessions Court. Unnecessary
details in that regard have got to be avoided so that it may not prejudice either the prosecution case of the appellant or the defence of
the rtiSpondent.
Since for the brief reasons to be stated hereinafter
we are going to set aside the orders of the Courts below and direct
C
the trial to proceed against the respondent, we would like to caution
that nothing which may have to be said in support of our order in
this judgment is meant and should be understood to prejudice in the
least the case of either party at the trial.
Under section 226 of the Code while opening the ca·se for the prosetion the Prosecutor ba's got to describe the charge against the accused
D
and state by what evidence he proposes to prove the guilt of the accused. Thereafter comes at the initial stage the duty of the Court to consider the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith
and to bear the submissions of the accused and the prosecution in that
behalf. ·The Judge has to pass thereafter an order either under section
227 or section 228 of the Code. If "the Judge consider that there is
lilOt sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, he shall dis·
E
charge the accused and record his reasons for so doing", as enjoined
by section 227. If, on the other hand, "the Judge is of opinion that
thece is ground for pmmming that the accused has committed
an
G!felilC!! which-
(b) is exclusively triable by the Court, he shall frame in writing a
F
char&e against the accused", as provided in section 228. Reading the
two provisions together in juxta position, as they have got to be, it
would be clear that at the beginning and the initial stage of the trial the
~ruth, veracity and effect of the evidence which the Prosecutnr propose11 to adduce are not to be meticulously judged. Nor is any weight
to be attached to the probable defence of the accused. It is not obli-
~atory for the Judge at that stage of the trial to consider in any detail
G
and weigh in a sensitive balance whether the facts, if proved, would
be incompatible with the innocence of the accused or not. The standard
of test and judgment which is to be finally applied before recording a
finding regarding the guilt or otherwise of the accused is not exactly
to be applied at the stage of deciding the matter under section 22 7 or
section 228 of the Code. At that stage the Court is not to 'see whether
there is sufficient ground for conviction of the accused or whether the
H
trial is sure to end ln his conviction.
Strong suspicion against the
accused, if the ,matter remains in the region of suspicion. cannot take
the !'11ace of proof of his guilt at the conclusion of the trial. But at the
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
260
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1978) 1 S.C.R.
initial stage if there is a strong suspicion which leads the Court to lliink
that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an
offence then it is not open to the Court to say that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.
The presumpion of
the guilt of the accused which is to he> drawn at the initial stage is not
in the sense of the law governing the trial of criminal cases in France
where the accused is presumed to be
guilty unless the contrary is
proved. But it is only for the purpose of deciding prhna facie whether
the Court should proceed with the trial or not. If the evidence which
the Prosecutor proposes to adduce to prove the guilt of the accused
even if fully accepted before it is challenged in cross-examination or
rebutted by the_ defence evidence, if any, cannot show that the accused
committed the offence, then there will be no sufficient ground
for
proceeding with the trial.
An exhaustive list of the circumstances to
indicate as to what will lead to one conclusion or the other is neither
possible nor advisable. We may just illustrate the difference of the law
by one more example. If the scales of pan as to the guilt or innocence
of the accused are something like even at the conclusion of the trial.
then, on the theory of benefit of doubt the case is to end in bis acquittal.
But if, on the other hand, it is so at the initial stage of making an
order under section 227 or section 228, then in such a situation ordinarily and generally the order which will have to he made will be one
under section 228 and not under section 227.
In Nirmaljit Singh Hoon v. The Sta'te of West Bengal and
another(1)-Shelat, J. delivering the judgment on behalf of the majority
fo the Court referred at page 79 of the report to the earlier decisions
of this
Court in Chandra Deo Singh v. Prakash
Chandra Bose(')
where this Court was
held to have laid down with reference
to the similar provisions
contained
in
sections
202
and 203
of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 "that the test was whether
there was sufficient ground for proceeding and not whether there was
sufficient ground for conviction, and observed that where there was·
prim" f<1cie evidence, even though the person charged of an offence in
the complaint might have a defence, the matter had to be left to he
decided by the appropriate forum at the appropriate stage and issue
of a process could not be refused." Illustratively, Shelat J, further added
"Unless, therefore, the Magistrate finds that the evidence led before
him is self-con(radictory, or intrinsically untrustworthy, process cannot
be refued if that evidence makes out a prima facie case."
The fact that Tara Devi died an unnatural death and there were
burn in juries on her person dGes not seem to be in doubt or dispute.
The question to be decided at the trial would be whether the respondent, as is the prosecution case, had murdered her and set fire to her
. body or whether she committed suicide by herself setting fire to
it
This undoubtedly is a serious matter for decision at the trial.
But
at the stage of framing the charge, copious reference to Modi's Medical Jurisprndence and judging the post-mortem report of the Doctor
who performed the autopsy over the dead body of the lady meliculqusly was not quite justified as has been done by the Trial Judge
(I) [197312 S.C.R. 66.
2. [19641 3 S.C.R. 629.
BIHAR v. RAMESH SINGH ( Untwalia, J.)
261
According to the presecution case the respondent was in lo~e with
A
one of his girl students, named, Nupur Ghosh and this led t<>
the
serious differences between the respondent and his wife, the unfortunate Tara Devi, inducing the former to clear the path of his
misad<1enture in the manner alleged by the prosecution.
On the other
hand, the defence, S'1'ems to suggest that the alleged love-affair
of
the respondent led Tara Devi to commit suicide.
Whether
the
respondent will be abk to prove. his defence at the final stage of the
B
trial may not be of much consequence.
Surely the prosecution will
have to prove its case beyond any reasonable doubt.
Although
at
the time of the alleged occurrence were present in the house of the respondent his brother, his brother's wife, and children the prosecution
does not seem to be in possession of any occular testimony of an eye
witness of the occurrence.
The case will 'largely, rather,
wlmlly,
depend upon the circumstantial evidence.
A stricter proof will have
C
to be applied for judging the guilt of the accused with refcr<'nce
to
the various circumstantial evidence against him.
The at this
stage
the Additional Sessions Judge was not right whon he said-"it appears
that there is neither direct evidence nor any circumstantial' evidence
to connect the accus~d with the alleged murder of Tara De\!i".
He
also ought not t6 have referred to tho varying opinions of the Circle
Inspector and the Superintendent of Police, Motihari as to the
subD
mission of Charge-Sheet against the respondent.
Apart from some other circumstances, as it appears, the prosecutiG.B. proposes to prove in this case, and whether it will 'succeed in proving them or not is a different matter, the High Court has enumerated
three circumstances in its impugned order.
We may just add, and
that is only for the purpose of a cursory observation for deciding the
E
matter at this ·stage, that the story of assault on Tara Devi by the respondent a day prior to the occurrence is perhaps sought to be proved
by the evidence of Chandrcshwar Singh, the informant, and it seems,
he would also try to say, rightly or wrongly, that at the time of the
said a>Sault the respondent had giv~n her a threat to kill her.
The
High Coort felt persuaded to take the view that the three circumstantial facts, even if proved, would not be incompatible with the
inno-
-,
cence of the accused and then added "There may be strong suspicion
against the opposite party, but the three circumstances which I have
jui;t mentioned above, cannot be said to be incompatible with
the
defence of the accused."
The said observation of the High Court
is not quite apposite in the background of the law which we
have
enunciated above with refrrence to the provisions of sections
227
and 228 of the Code.
G
F0r the reasons stated above, we set aside the impugned orders
of the High Court and the Sessions Court and direct that appropriate
charge or charges will be framed ag'dinst the respondent and
the
tri~l shall proceed further in accordance with the law.
P.H.P.
Appeal allowed.