# STATE OF BIHAR v. RAMESHWAR PRATAP NARAIN SINGH AND OTHERS

- **Citation:** [1962] 2 S.C.R. 382
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1962
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal Narain Sin:h CIVIL APPELLATE No. 27 of 1960
- **Bench:** B. P. Sinha, A. K. Sarkar, K. c. DAS GUPTA, N. Rajagopala Ayyangar, J. R. Mudholkar
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/state-of-bihar-v-rameshwar-pratap-narain-singh-and-others-2260
- **Pages:** 13

## Headnote

Mela-Right of ex-proprietors to hold Melas after abolition of
proprietory tenures-Enactment empowering State Government to
hold such Me!as-If violative of fundamental rights-Legislative
competence-Acquisition without public purpose-Constitution of
India, Arts. r4, I9, JI, 3rA, 246-Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950
(Bihar Act 30 of z950), ss. 4, 6-Bihar Land Reforms Amendment
Act, 1959 (Bihar Act XV I of z959), ss. 4, 7A, 78, 7C.
After the estates and tenures of proprietors or tenureholders had passed to and became vested. in the State by virtue
of the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950, the Revenue Authorities
interfered with the rights of those ex-proprietors and ex-tenureholders to hold Melas on lands which were occupied by them
thereafter as occupancy raiyats and collected toJ!s from such
Melas on behalf of the Government wherepon those intermediaries made applications to the High Court for writs restraining
the Government from such interference which were allowed by
the High Court. During the pendency in this Court of these
appeals preferred by the Officers of the State of Bihar against
the order of the High Court the Bihar Land Reforms Amendment Act, 1959, was passed amending the Bihar Land Reforms
Act of 1950 with retrospective effect by which the word Mela was
added after the words jalkars, hats and bazars in s. 4, cl. (b) of
the amended Act. Further amendments provided inter alia that
the State Government and not the intermediaries except with
the consent of the State Government shall have the right to
hold such Melas.
The main question arising for decision in
these appeals and certain other applications made to this Court
under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India was whether the
amending legislation violated Arts. 14, 19 and 31 of the Constitution.
Held, that the Bihar Land Reforms Amendment Act, 1959,
is a law providing for the acquisition. by the State of rights in
an "estate" within the meaning of Art. 31A of the Constitution
and even if it is assumed that it abridges the rights conferred
by Arts. 14, 19 and 31 of the Constitution its provisions are not
void on that ground.
The amending legislation was within the legislative competence of the Legislature under Art. 246 of the Constitution
and after its amendment the legislative list permitted the State
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
383
Legislature to enact a law of acquisition even without a public
purpose.
State of Bihar
v.
The State of Bihar v. Sir Kameshwar Singh, [1952] S.C.R.
889, considered.
Ra:meshwar Pratap
JURISDICTION: Civil
Appeal Narain Sin:h
CIVIL
APPELLATE
No. 27 of 1960
WITH
Civil Appeals Nos. 574, 92, 411 and 285 of 1960,
351 of 1959 and Petitions Nos. 20 and 106 of 1960.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and
order dated August 6, 1957, of the Patna High Court
in M. J. C. No. 57 of 1956.
Lal Narayan Sinha and S. P. Varma, for the appellants (in C. A. No. 27 of 1960).
D. Goburdhan, for respondents Nos. 1 to 7.
K. K. Sinha, for the appellant (in C. A. No. 574 of
1960).
D. P. Singh, for the respondent.
D. P. Singh, for the appellants (in C. A. No. 92
of 1960).
D. Goburdhan, for the respondents.
R. C. Prasad, for the appellants (in C. A. No. 411
of 1960).
L. K. Jha, S. K. Jha and K. K. Sinha, for the respondents.
S. P. Varma, for the appellants (in C. A. No. 285 of
1960).
L. K. Jha, R. K. Garg and S. C. Agarwal, for the
respondent.
S. P. Varma, for the appellant (in C. A. No. 351
of 1959).
R. K. Garg and S. 0. Agarwala, for the respondents.
•
Tarkeshwar Dayal, K. K. Sinha and R. 0. Prasad,
for the petitioners (in Petition No. 20 of 1960).
Lal Narayan Sinha and S. P. Varma, for respondent No. 1.
R. K. Garg and S. C. Agarwala, for the petitioner
(in Petition No. 106 of 1960).
S. P. Varma, for respondent No. 1.
State of Hihar
384
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1962]
1961.
April 25.
The judgment of the Court was
delivered by
v.
DAS GUPTA, J.-The common question which ariRamesh'."a' Pratap ses for decision in this group of cases is as regards the
Nararn Singh validi

## Text

April 25.
382
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
STATE OF BIHAR
v.
RAMESHWAR PRATAP NARAIN SINGH
AND OTHERS.
(B. P. SINHA, c. J., A. K. SARKAR, K. c. DAS GUPTA,
N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR and J. R. MUDHOLKAR JJ.)
Mela-Right of ex-proprietors to hold Melas after abolition of
proprietory tenures-Enactment empowering State Government to
hold such Me!as-If violative of fundamental rights-Legislative
competence-Acquisition without public purpose-Constitution of
India, Arts. r4, I9, JI, 3rA, 246-Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950
(Bihar Act 30 of z950), ss. 4, 6-Bihar Land Reforms Amendment
Act, 1959 (Bihar Act XV I of z959), ss. 4, 7A, 78, 7C.
After the estates and tenures of proprietors or tenureholders had passed to and became vested. in the State by virtue
of the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950, the Revenue Authorities
interfered with the rights of those ex-proprietors and ex-tenureholders to hold Melas on lands which were occupied by them
thereafter as occupancy raiyats and collected toJ!s from such
Melas on behalf of the Government wherepon those intermediaries made applications to the High Court for writs restraining
the Government from such interference which were allowed by
the High Court. During the pendency in this Court of these
appeals preferred by the Officers of the State of Bihar against
the order of the High Court the Bihar Land Reforms Amendment Act, 1959, was passed amending the Bihar Land Reforms
Act of 1950 with retrospective effect by which the word Mela was
added after the words jalkars, hats and bazars in s. 4, cl. (b) of
the amended Act. Further amendments provided inter alia that
the State Government and not the intermediaries except with
the consent of the State Government shall have the right to
hold such Melas.
The main question arising for decision in
these appeals and certain other applications made to this Court
under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India was whether the
amending legislation violated Arts. 14, 19 and 31 of the Constitution.
Held, that the Bihar Land Reforms Amendment Act, 1959,
is a law providing for the acquisition. by the State of rights in
an "estate" within the meaning of Art. 31A of the Constitution
and even if it is assumed that it abridges the rights conferred
by Arts. 14, 19 and 31 of the Constitution its provisions are not
void on that ground.
The amending legislation was within the legislative competence of the Legislature under Art. 246 of the Constitution
and after its amendment the legislative list permitted the State
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
383
Legislature to enact a law of acquisition even without a public
purpose.
State of Bihar
v.
The State of Bihar v. Sir Kameshwar Singh, [1952] S.C.R.
889, considered.
Ra:meshwar Pratap
JURISDICTION: Civil
Appeal Narain Sin:h
CIVIL
APPELLATE
No. 27 of 1960
WITH
Civil Appeals Nos. 574, 92, 411 and 285 of 1960,
351 of 1959 and Petitions Nos. 20 and 106 of 1960.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and
order dated August 6, 1957, of the Patna High Court
in M. J. C. No. 57 of 1956.
Lal Narayan Sinha and S. P. Varma, for the appellants (in C. A. No. 27 of 1960).
D. Goburdhan, for respondents Nos. 1 to 7.
K. K. Sinha, for the appellant (in C. A. No. 574 of
1960).
D. P. Singh, for the respondent.
D. P. Singh, for the appellants (in C. A. No. 92
of 1960).
D. Goburdhan, for the respondents.
R. C. Prasad, for the appellants (in C. A. No. 411
of 1960).
L. K. Jha, S. K. Jha and K. K. Sinha, for the respondents.
S. P. Varma, for the appellants (in C. A. No. 285 of
1960).
L. K. Jha, R. K. Garg and S. C. Agarwal, for the
respondent.
S. P. Varma, for the appellant (in C. A. No. 351
of 1959).
R. K. Garg and S. 0. Agarwala, for the respondents.
•
Tarkeshwar Dayal, K. K. Sinha and R. 0. Prasad,
for the petitioners (in Petition No. 20 of 1960).
Lal Narayan Sinha and S. P. Varma, for respondent No. 1.
R. K. Garg and S. C. Agarwala, for the petitioner
(in Petition No. 106 of 1960).
S. P. Varma, for respondent No. 1.
State of Hihar
384
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1962]
1961.
April 25.
The judgment of the Court was
delivered by
v.
DAS GUPTA, J.-The common question which ariRamesh'."a' Pratap ses for decision in this group of cases is as regards the
Nararn Singh validity of the Bihar Act No. XVI of 1959 (Bihar
Das Gupta J. Land Reforms Amendment Act, 1959), in so far as it
amends with retrospective effect sections 4 and 6 of
the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950, to be indicated
later, and inserts the new sections, s. 7B and s. 7C in
that Act. It appears that sometime after the Bihar
Land Reforms Act became law and action was taken
under section 3 thereof by the State Government issuing notifications, declaring that the estates or tenures
of proprietors or tenure-holders, specified in the notifications had passed to and become ·vested in the
State, the Revenue authorities. started interfering
with the rights of those ex-proprietors and ex-tenureholders to hold Melas on lands of which they were
thereafter in occupation as occupancy raiyats under
the State and started settling rights to realise tolls
from such Melas on behalf of the State Government.
Aggrieved by this action taken by the Revenue authorities on behalf of the State Government applications
were made by several of these erstwhile intermediaries
-now occupancy raiyats-to the High Court of Patna
for writs restraining the Government and its officers
from such interference with their rights.
Five such applications have given rise to the five
appeals which are numbered as C. A. No. 351 of 1959,
C. A. No. 27 of 1960, C. A. No-. 92of1960, C. A. No.
285 of 1960 and C. A. No. 411 of 1960. The High
Court held that in view of the provisions of s. 6 of the
Bihar Land Reforms Act (before its amendment) and
the fact that the provisions made ins. 4(a) of the Act
about the consequences that would ensue on the vesting of an estate or tenure in the State were "subject
to" the provisions of s. 6, the State had no right to
hold Melas on the Bakasht lands of the ex-intermediaries-now occupancy raiyats. Accordingly the High
Court allowed the applications and issued writs as
prayed for.
Against these orders of the High Court
the State of Bihar and its officers have prefArred the
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
385
five appeals mentioned above, after obtaining special
1961
leave from this Court.
State of Bihar
Some time after special leave was obtained by these
v.
appellants the Bihar Legislature enacted in 1959, theRa,,mhwar Pratap
Bihar Land Reforms Amendment Act, 1959, (Bihar Narnin Singh
Act XVI of 1959).
This Act amended inter alia section 4, cl. (b) of the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950,
Das Gupta J.
by adding the word "Mela" after the words "jalkars,
hats, and bazars" and by omitting the words "subject
to the subsequent provisions of this Chapter" in cl. (a)
of section 4. It also amended section 6 of the 1950
Act by substituting for the words "Notwithstanding
anything contained in tllis Act" the words "subject to
the provisions of sections 7A and 7B".
Of theses. 7B
provides that "Where on any land deemed to be settled with the intermediary under the provisions of section 5, section 6 or section 7, a Mela was being held by
the intermediary at any time within 3 years of the
date of vesting, the right to hold such Mela on such
land shall, with effect from such date, vest in the
State and notwithstanding anything contained in any
law, the State shall have and the intermediary shall
not, except with the consent of the State Government
have the right to hold such Mela on such land or to do
anything which may prejudicially a.ffect such Mela".
Section 7C contains provisions as regards settlement
of ha.ts, bazars or melas referred to in s. 7 A and sect.ion 7B and provides inter alia that settlements will
be made with the outgoing intermediary or his heir
after application is received from him and if there are
several of them who apply for settlement, with the
most suitable of them. The Amending Act made the
amendments mentioned above, except the insertion of
s. 70, retrospect.ive, with effect from the date of enftctment of the parent Act.
The Amending Act had
already been passed, when several other applications
under Art. 226 of the Constitution for similar relief
against the interference by the Government with the
intermediaries' right to hold Melas came up for consideration before the High Court. The High Court rejected these applicants' at.tack against the validity of the
Amending Act and held that in view of the provisions
386
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[191\2]
'96'
now made the applicants were not entitled to any
State of Bihar relief.
Civil Appeal No. 574 of 1960 has been preferv.
red by one of such applicants on a certificate granted
Rameshwa. l'ratap by the High Court.
Narain Singh
The two applications under Art. 32 of the Constitution were filed in this Court for writs of mandamus
Das Gupta J. against the State of Bihar and its officers restraining
them from interfering with the applicant's right. to
hold melas on their lands. Both of these were filed
after the Bihar Land Reforms Amendment Act, 1959,
had become law.
It is obvious that if the Amending Act is va.lid
legislation, in so far as it amends with retrospective
effect s. 4 and s. 6 of the 1950 Act as mentioned above
and inserts section 7 B, the ex-intermediaries have not
and the State has the right to hold melas on the
Bakasht lands. The main question therefore is w hether this is a valid legislation. To answer this question we have to examine in the first place whether the
Bihar Legislature which enacted the Amending Act
had on that date the legislative competencfo under
Art. 246 of the Constitution to do so; and secondly,
whether the law was void bf·cause of the provisions of
Art. 13 of the Constitution. The Amending legislation
was clearly within Item 42 of the Concurrent List,
being a law as regards acquisition of property.
Mr. Tarkeshwar Dayal, who appeared on behalf of
one of'the ex-intermediaries submitted that this was
really not a matter of land reform; the purpose of the
Amending legislation being only to augment the revenue of the State. It is true that the law by taking the
right to hold melas from certain persons and giving it
to the State is likely to augment the revenues of the
State. It may well be that this object of augmenting
the revenues was one of the main purposes behind the
Amending legislation. That however is no reason to
think that this legislation is not also concerned with
land reform. It is however unnecessary for us to
c01rnider this quest.ion further, for whether it is a law
as regards land reform or not, it is clearly and entirely
as regards acquisition of propert.y.
The question of
the legislature having attempted legislation not within
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
387
its competence by putting it into the guise of legislai961
tion within its competence does not even arise. The
State of Biha,
conclusion that necessarily follows is that the amendv.
ing legislation was within the legislative competence llam.,hwa. P.atap
of the Bihar Legislature under Art. 246 of the
Narnin Singh
Constitution.
This brings us to the main question in controversy.
Das Gupta J.
viz., whether the amending legislation is void on the
ground that it violates Arts. 31, 19 and 14 of the Constitution. A complete answer to this question is fur.
nished in favour of the State if this is a law within
the saving provisions of Art. 31A. Art. 31A was
enacted in the Constitution by the Constitution (First
Amendment Act) with retrospective effect from the
commencement of the Constitution. It was further
amended by the Constitution (Fourth Amendment)
Act, also with retrospective effect from the date of
the commencement of the Constitution. This Article
provides inter alia, that notwithstanding anything
contained in Art. 13, no law providing for the acquisition by the State of any estate or of any rights
therein ............... shall be deemed to be void on the
ground that it is inconsistent with or takes away or
abridges any of the rights conferred by Arts. 19, 31
and 14 of the Constitution. Is the amending legislation a law "providing for the acquisition by the State
of any estate or of any rights therein?" Two arguments have been advanced on behalf of the ex-intermediaries to convince us that it is not such a law.
The first argument is that what the amending legislation provides for is not "acquisition" at all within the
meaning of Art. 31A as it is not "acquisition" for a
public purpose. It has been urged that the purpose
is a mere augmentation of revenue.
It does not appear to us that when the right of
holding the Mela is taken over by the State the only
purpose is the augmentation of revenue. There is
scope for thinking that the legislature believed that
rilelas would be better run and be more in the interests
of the general pJ!blic when run by the State than
when they ~~.e,;:L~;ft witho11t control in the hands of
private indivciduitls, With whom the profit motivo is
388
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1962]
'96'
likely to be the sole guiding principle. It is unnecessary however to answer this question for, in our opinState of B1har
v.
ion, a law, may be a law providing for "acquisition"
Rameshwar Prntap even though the purpose be hind the acquisition is not
Narain Singh a public purpose.
It is important to notice that the Constitution
Das Gupta J. (Fourth Amendment) Act made important alterations
in Art. 31 also. One of the amendmentB of Art. 31
was that clause 2 now provides that no property shall
be compulsorily acquired, (1) save for a public purpose
and (2) save by authority of a law which contains
provisions for compensation for the property acquired
and either fixes the amount of compensation or specifies the principles on which and the manner in which
t,he compensation is to be determined and given.
Then, Art. 31A provides inter alia that a law providing for "acquisition" will not be void on the ground
that it is inconsistent with or takes away or abridges
a right conferred by Art. 31. Reading the two articles
together as they stand after the fourth amendment of
the Constitution it becomes obvious that when Art.
31A speaks of a law of "acquisition" it contemplates
a law which may be for acquisition, though not for a
public purpose and lays down that even though this
will be in violation of the fundamental right guaranteed by the first part of Art. 31(2) the law will not
be void be ca use of such violation.
The question whether the validity of a law for
compulsory acquisition of property by the State can
be challenged on the ground that the "acquisition" is
not for a public purpose had to be considered by this
Court even before the amendment of Art. 31(2) as
mentioned above in The State of Bihar v. Sir Kameshwar Singh (1).
Art. 31(2) as it then stood did not in
so many words provide that no acquisition can be
made save for a public purpose; but it was a.:rgued on
behalf of the State that such a provision was implicit
in the words of Art. 31(2). This argument was rejected by Mahajan and Chandrasekhara Aiyar, JJ., but
it was accepted by Patanjali Sastri, C. J., and Das, J.,
both of whom held that the requirement of public
(1) (1952] S.C.R. 889.
2 S.C:R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
389
purpose being a condition for compulsory acquisition
'96'
laid down by Art. 31(2) the law was saved in spite of Slate of Bihar
the violation of such condition by Art. 31( 4) and also
v.
Art. 31A. J\fokherjea, J., also said that the require- Rameshwar Praiap
ment of public purpose was a condition implied in the
Narain Singh
provisions of Art. 31(2).
His Lordship then added:
Dns Gupla j.
"For my part, I would be prepared to assume that
cl. (4) of Art. 31 relates to everything t!iat is provided
for in clause (2) either in express terms or impliedly
aud consequently the question of the existence of a
pu blio purpose does not come within the purview of
an inquiry in the present case." It was in this state
of judicial opinion that Art. 31(2) was amendf!d by the
Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act as mentioned
above and the requirement of public purpose was expressly made a condition for compulsory acquisition
by the State. The basis for the argument that the
questi•m whether there was a public purpose or not
i~ open to judicial review in spite of Art. 31A has
therefore disappeared.
It is worth noticing in this connection that in Sir
Kameshwar Singh's case (1 ) the argument that quite
apart from anything in Art. 31(2). as it then stood no
la\v of ac·quisition could be made except for a public
purpose was sought to be reinforced by the words
i:1 Item 36 of the State List and Item 42 of the
Concurrent List: These items read as follows:-
"36. Acquisition or' requisitionihg of property,
except for the purprn;es of the Union, subje9t to the
prnvisions of entry 42 of List III."
"42. Principles Oll· which compensation for property acquired or requisitioned for the purposes of
the Union or of a Stat" or for any other public purpose is to be determined, and the form and the
manner in which Huch compensation is to be
give1i."
The argument 011 the baHis of these t1ntries was
that the Su1te legislatures had no power to make a
la.w for itC<JUisition of property without fulfilling tho
condition uf μublic 1H1rpo80. The Constitution (oeventh
Amcnr.lmcnt) Ad which c:rnie iutu force on the lHt
(r) [i952] S.C.R. 889.
50
390
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962)
I96I
day of November, 1956, deleted Entry 36 of the State
List and substituted for the former phraseology of
State of /Ji/tar It
42 f h C
L'
h
d '
· 't'
v
em
o t e oncurrent 1st t e wor s 'acqu1s1 ion
Ramesltw~r Pratap and requisition of property". It is quite- clear that
Narain Singh after its amendment the legislative list permits the
State legislature to enact a law of acquisition even
Das Gupta J. without a public purpose; and that the only obstacle
to such a law 'being enacted without a public purpose
is the provisions of Art. 31(2). That obstacle also
disappears if the law in question is one within
Art. 31A.
It was next contended that the acquisition of the
right to hold the Mela, for which the amending Act
provides is not acquisition, in any case, of "rights"
"in any estate" within the meaning of Art. 31A as
defined in cl. 2(b) of the same Article. It was argued
that this definition includes only rights of persons who
are intermediaries and unless tho raiyat whose rights
are being acquired is an intermediary, that is, a per-
. son between the State and the tiller of the soil, his
rights are not rights within the definition of "rights
in relation to an estate"; and consequently, a Jaw
providing for acquisition of the rights of such a
raiyat is not a law within the saving provisions of
Art. 31A. It is pointed out that on the d1J,te the
Amending Act was passed the ex-intermediaries had
ceased to exist as intermediaries and had become
occupancy raiyats under s. 6 of the parent Act. What
were being acquired therefore, it is argued, were not
rights of intermediaries but rights of raiyats who had
ce,i,sed to be intermediaries. It has to be noticed that
the impugned provisions amending s. 4 and s. 6 and
s. 7(b) have been given retrospective effect so that the
parent Act of 1950 has to be read as containing on
the very date of its enactment provisions in these
sections not as originally enacted but as they stood
after the amendment of 1959. In deciding whether
rights of raiyats were being acquired or not we have
to forget what happened in consequence of the unamended s. 6.
Projecting ourselves to the date September 25, 1950, when the President's assent to the
Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950, was published in the
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
391
Gazette and reading the Act as containing s. 4 and
z96z
s. 6 as amended and also s. 7(b) it cannot but be held
State of Bihar
that what were being acquired by means of these
v.
provisions of the amending legislation giving retros- Rameshwar Prntap
pective effect were certain rights of the intermediaNarnin Singh
ries. These intermediaries had not on September 25,
1950, ceased to be intermediaries and the fact that
Das Gupta J.
under the unamended provisions of section 6 they
later on became occupancy raiyats should not be
allowed to confuse the fact that the acquisition of
certain properties by the amending legislation being
itself with effect from September 25, 1950, what was
being provided for was acquisition of intermediaries'
rights.
Even if it be assumed that what the amending
legislation provided for was the acquisition of raiyats'
rights, there is no justification for holding that these
rights were not "rights in any estate" within the
definition of cl. 2 of Art. 31A. Clause 2(b) is in these
words:-
"the expression 'rights' in relation to an estate,
shall include any rights vesting in a proprietor,
sub-proprietor, under-proprietor, tenure-holder, raiyat, undcr-raiyat or other intermediary and any
rights or privileges in respect of land revenue."
The contention on behalf of the ex-intermediaries
is that the rights of raiyats who are not intermediaries, in the sense of being middlemen between the
State and the tiller of the soil, are not within this
definition. This contention does not however stand
a moment's scrutiny, for the simple reason, that it is
well known that ordinarily at least, a raiyat or an
under-raiyat is not a person, who can be called an
intermediary.
It is reasonable to think that the
word "raiyat" was used in its ordinary well-accepted
sense, of the person "who holds the land under the
proprietor or a tenure-holder "for the purpose of cultivation" and the word "under-raivat" used in the
equally well-accepted and ordinary· sense of "a person who holds land under a raiyat for the purpose of
cultivation." It is necessary to remembP,r in this
392
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
ro6r
connection that Art. 31A as first enacted by the Constitution (First Amendment) Act did not contain these
Stale of Bihar
v.
words "raiyat, under-raiyat"; and that after the First
Rameshwar Pratap Amendment the definition ran thus:-
Narain Singh
"the expression 'rights', in relation to an estate
shall include any rights vesting in a proprietor,
Das Gupta f,
sub-proprietor, under-proprietor, tenure-holder or
other intermediary and any rights or privileges in
respect of land revenue."
It was the Fourth Amendment which in the year
1956 inserted the words "raiyat, under-raiyat "immediately a£t,er the words "tenure-holder". At that
time laws had already been passed in most of the
States for the acquisition of the rights of intermediaries in the estates; rights of raiyats or under-raiyats
who might answer the description "intermediary"
were also within the definition because of the use of
the word "or other intermediary". The only reason
for specifically including the rights of "raiyats" and
"under-raiyats" in the· definition could therefore be to
extend the protection of Art. 31A to laws providing
for acquisition by the State Governments of rights of
these "raiyats" or "under-raiyats". In the circumstances and in the particular -setting in which the words
"raiyat" or "under-raiyat" were introduced into the
definition, it must be held that the words "or other
intermediary" occurring at the end, do not qualify or
colour the meaning to be attached to the tenures
newly added.
Another contention raised in support of the argument that the impugned law is not for acquisition of
a right in an estate is that the right to hold a Mela is
not a right in the lands at all. This contention is
wholly unsound. Holding a hat, or bazar or mela is
only a mode of user by the owner of his land. Just
as he can enjoy the land belonging to him in other
ways, he can use it for the purpose of having a concourse of people-buyers and sellers and others for a
hat, or bazar or mela-subject, as in the case of other
user to the requirement that no nuisance is created
and the legal right of others are not infriEged. Consequently, the right to hold a Mela has always been
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
393
considered in this country to be an interest in land,
an interest which the owner of the land can transfer state of Bihar
to another along with the land or withont the land.
v.
There can be no doubt therefore that the right of the llam,,hwar hatap
proprietor of an estate to hold a Mela on his own land
Narain Singh
is a right in the "estate, being appurtenant to his
Das Gupta ].
ownership of the land; so also the right of a tenureholder, who it has to be remembered is the owner of
the land subject only to the payment of rent to the
proprietor, to hold a mela on land forming part of the
tenure. It is true that a licence to hold a Mela on
another's land in which no interest is transferred is
not an interest in land; but there is no question here
of the acquisition of any licence to hold a Mela at another person's land. The argument that the impugned
law was not a Jaw for acquisition of a right in the
"estate" because the right to hold a mela was not a
right in the land must therefore be rejected.
Lastly, it was contended that long before the date
of the amending Act the "estates" had ceased to exist
as a consequence of the notifications issued under
s. 3 of the Parent Act and consequently whatever
was being acquired in 1959 could not be a right in an
"estate". Here also we have to take note of the fact
that the impugned provisions of the Amending Act
were made retrospective with effect from the date of
the original enactment so that we have to project
ourselves to September 25, 1950, the date of the original enactment, and consider whether on that date the
law provided for acquisition of a right in an "estate".
Undoubtedly the "estates" did exist on that date and
so the acquisition retrospectively provided for from
that date was acquisition of a right in an estate.
Even if we ignore the fact that the impugned provisions of the Amending Act were given retrospective
effect there is no warrant for saying that what was
being acquired was not a right in an "estate".
"Estate" was defined in the Bihar Tenancy Act to
mean "any. land included under one entry in any of
the generaL registers of revenue-paying lands and
revenue-free lands, prepared and maintained under
the la.w for the time being in force by the Colle~tor of
394
SUPB,EME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
1961
a District". It is not disputed before us that in spite
of the fact that in consequence of notifications under
State of /Jihoi-
"
section 3 of the Act the "estates" had become vested
llamcshwar Pratap in the State, these registers continued to be maintainNarain Singh ed at least up to the date of the Amending Act and
even later. The position therefore is that the "estates"
Das Gupta J. have become vested in the State but have still not
ceased to be "estates".
We have therefore come to the conclusion that the
impugned provisions of the Amending Act is a law
providiug for the acquisition by the State of rights in
an "estate" within the meaning of Art. 31A of the
Constitution and consequently even if we assume that
they are inconRistent with or take away or abridge
any of the rightH conforred by Arts. 14, 19 and 31
they are not void on that ground. The conclusion
cannot therefore ho escaped that the ex-intermediaries have not and the State has the right to hold
melas on the Bn.kasht lands of which they have become occupany raiyats under the provisioμs of s. 6.
We therefore allow t.he appeals by the State and
set aside the order of the High Court for the issue
of writs and order that the applications under Art. 226
made before the High Court be dismissed.
\Vo also
dismiss the two petitions under Art. 32 of the Constitution filed in this Court, and also Civil Appeal
No. 574 of 1960.
In the eircnmstanees of the case, we rn:tke no order
as to eosts.
Appeals by the State allowed.
C. A. No. 574 of 1960 and Petitions 'under
Art. 32 disrnissed.