# State of Bihar v. Ramtahwar Pralap Narain Singh, A.l.R

- **Citation:** [1962] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 829
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1962
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/state-of-bihar-v-ramtahwar-pralap-narain-singh-a-l-r-2573
- **Pages:** 48

## Headnote

!96J
K°CTiJUiJ
K•~itomall
••
Slal1 of Knalo
S:JO SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
Puru•hothaman Nambudiri v.
Stal< of Kera/a, [1962)
Supp. I S.C.R. 753, followed.
(II) The Act which made certain deductions from the
compensation payable to the landholders under Ch. II and
to others who
held excess land under Ch. III cannot be
struck doY.n as a piece of colourable legislation which is beyond the competence of the State Legislature, and it cannot
be said that any device has been employed in the Act to take
away the moneys of the landbwners or the versons from whom
excess land is taken away for the purpose of adding to the
revenue of the State.
Section 80 'of the Act provides for the Constitution of an
agriculturist rehabilitation fund for the purpose of rendering
help by way of loan, grant or otherwise to persons affected by
the Act and eligible for the same under the rules but rr. 161
(a) (III) and 161 (b) (Ill) are so framed as to take within
their scope even persons not affected by the Act. Those rules
are ultra viru of s. 80 and must be struck down.
(Ill) The lands held by ryotwari pattadars in the
area which came to the State of Kerala by virtue of the
States Reorganisation Act from the State of Madras are not
•estates' within the meaning of Art. 31A(2J(a) of the Constitution and therefore the Act is not protected under Art. 31A
( 1) from attack under Arts.
14, 19 and 31 of the Constitution.
State of Bihar v. Ramtahwar Pralap Narain Singh, A.l.R.
1961 S.C. 1649, referred to.
(IV) The reasons which call for exemption of tea,
coffee and rubber plantations. from certain provisions of the
Act equally apply to areca and pepper plantations and there
is no intelligible differentia related to the object and purpose
of the Act which would justify any distinction in the ca•e of
tea, coffee and rubber plantations as against areca and pepper plantation~. The provisions in the Ac.t rc.!ating to plantations are violative of Art. 14 of the Conslltut10n.
The provisions relating to plantatioru cannot be severed
from the Act and struck down only by themselves. The whole
Act must be struck down as violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution so far as it applied to ryotwari fands in those areas
of the State which were transferred to 1t from the State of
Madras.
(V) The manner in which ceiling. has been.fixed. under
s. 58( l) is violative of the fundament~l r.•ght enshrined m A~t.
14 of the constitution and as that sect1?n ';8 the basis of entire
Ch. III the whole chapter must fall with 11;
(1) S.C.R. SUPREME OOURT REPORTS
831
(IV' The manner in which progressive cuts have been
imposed on the purchase price under s. 52 and the market
value under s. 64 in order to determine the compensation payable to lando\vners or intermediaries in one case and to persons from whom excess land is taken in another, results in discrimination and cannot be justified on any intelligible
differentia which has any relation to the objects and purposes
of the Act. The provision as to compensation is all pervasive
and the entire Act must be struck down a• violative of Art. 14
of the Constitution in its application to ryotwari lands which
have come to the State of Kerala from the State of Madras.
Per Sarkar, J .-Sections 52 and 64 of the Act which provide for payment of Compensation at progressively smaller
rates for larger valuations of the interests acquired are not invalid as offending Art. 14 of the Constitution. The provisions in
the act making a discrimination in favour of tea, coffee, rubber
and cardamom plantalion and also in favour of cashew plantations cannot be upheld. Sections 3(viii), 57 (1) (d) and 59
(2) are therefore invalid. These are however severable from
the other parts of the Act and the whole Act cannot be held
to be bad merely because those provisions are bad.
Per Ayyangar, ].-Properties held on ryotwari tenures
and the interest of the ryot in such lands would not be "estates" for the purposes of Art. 31A(2) as it stood even after the
Fourth Amendm

## Text

_Characters 0–39,884 of 84,358. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39884 for what follows._

!96J
K°CTiJUiJ
K•~itomall
••
Slal1 of Knalo
S:JO SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
Puru•hothaman Nambudiri v.
Stal< of Kera/a, [1962)
Supp. I S.C.R. 753, followed.
(II) The Act which made certain deductions from the
compensation payable to the landholders under Ch. II and
to others who
held excess land under Ch. III cannot be
struck doY.n as a piece of colourable legislation which is beyond the competence of the State Legislature, and it cannot
be said that any device has been employed in the Act to take
away the moneys of the landbwners or the versons from whom
excess land is taken away for the purpose of adding to the
revenue of the State.
Section 80 'of the Act provides for the Constitution of an
agriculturist rehabilitation fund for the purpose of rendering
help by way of loan, grant or otherwise to persons affected by
the Act and eligible for the same under the rules but rr. 161
(a) (III) and 161 (b) (Ill) are so framed as to take within
their scope even persons not affected by the Act. Those rules
are ultra viru of s. 80 and must be struck down.
(Ill) The lands held by ryotwari pattadars in the
area which came to the State of Kerala by virtue of the
States Reorganisation Act from the State of Madras are not
•estates' within the meaning of Art. 31A(2J(a) of the Constitution and therefore the Act is not protected under Art. 31A
( 1) from attack under Arts.
14, 19 and 31 of the Constitution.
State of Bihar v. Ramtahwar Pralap Narain Singh, A.l.R.
1961 S.C. 1649, referred to.
(IV) The reasons which call for exemption of tea,
coffee and rubber plantations. from certain provisions of the
Act equally apply to areca and pepper plantations and there
is no intelligible differentia related to the object and purpose
of the Act which would justify any distinction in the ca•e of
tea, coffee and rubber plantations as against areca and pepper plantation~. The provisions in the Ac.t rc.!ating to plantations are violative of Art. 14 of the Conslltut10n.
The provisions relating to plantatioru cannot be severed
from the Act and struck down only by themselves. The whole
Act must be struck down as violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution so far as it applied to ryotwari fands in those areas
of the State which were transferred to 1t from the State of
Madras.
(V) The manner in which ceiling. has been.fixed. under
s. 58( l) is violative of the fundament~l r.•ght enshrined m A~t.
14 of the constitution and as that sect1?n ';8 the basis of entire
Ch. III the whole chapter must fall with 11;
(1) S.C.R. SUPREME OOURT REPORTS
831
(IV' The manner in which progressive cuts have been
imposed on the purchase price under s. 52 and the market
value under s. 64 in order to determine the compensation payable to lando\vners or intermediaries in one case and to persons from whom excess land is taken in another, results in discrimination and cannot be justified on any intelligible
differentia which has any relation to the objects and purposes
of the Act. The provision as to compensation is all pervasive
and the entire Act must be struck down a• violative of Art. 14
of the Constitution in its application to ryotwari lands which
have come to the State of Kerala from the State of Madras.
Per Sarkar, J .-Sections 52 and 64 of the Act which provide for payment of Compensation at progressively smaller
rates for larger valuations of the interests acquired are not invalid as offending Art. 14 of the Constitution. The provisions in
the act making a discrimination in favour of tea, coffee, rubber
and cardamom plantalion and also in favour of cashew plantations cannot be upheld. Sections 3(viii), 57 (1) (d) and 59
(2) are therefore invalid. These are however severable from
the other parts of the Act and the whole Act cannot be held
to be bad merely because those provisions are bad.
Per Ayyangar, ].-Properties held on ryotwari tenures
and the interest of the ryot in such lands would not be "estates" for the purposes of Art. 31A(2) as it stood even after the
Fourth Amendment of the Constitution.
Where an existing law in relation to land-tenures in force
in an area contains a definition of an 'estates' and that defini ..
tion excludes the interest of a ryotwari proprietor, the very
words of Art. 3 IA(2) of the Constitution negatived the applicability of its provisions to that tenure.
Ram R4m Narain Medhi, v. Stale of Bombay, [1959] Supp.
I S.C.R. 489 and Atma Ram v. State of Punjab, [1959] Supp.
1 S.C.R. 748, referred to.
Section 2(39) which by definition excludes pepper and
arcca plantations from the category of the pl~ntations named
in it which are exempted from the operative provisions of the
impugned Act, s. 58 for the determination of the ceiling in
respect of different individuals who are brought within the
scope of the enactment and ss. 52 and 64 for determining the
compensation payable to the several classes of persons whose
lands arc acquired under the Act are all violative of the
guarantee of equal protection of laws nuder Art. 14 of the
Constitution.
O:BIGINAL JURISDICTION: Petitions Nos. 114
and 115 of 1961.
Petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution of
India. for enforcement of Fundamental Rights.
191JI
Karimbil
Kunhikoman
v.
Stale of K11ala

1961
Ka,imhil
Kunhil:om ..
Y.
Stat. of Kna/•
W011<hoo J.
•
836 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962) SUPP.
devices has taken away money, which should have
gone to land-owners or to those from wh')m excess
lands wero being acquired. The attack is based on
the facts that in s. 52 of the Act compensation pay·
able to a land-owner is reduced aft.er the pur·
chase prioe to be paid by the tenant to whom the
land is to be a<isigned has been &~ccrtained, and
that in s. 64 of the Act the oompemation payable
to a pereon from whome cxoosR land is takPn is
reduced by cPrtain percentage after the market
value of tho land has been determined. It is urged
that by these devices the State is acquiring money
which should properly have gone to the land-owner
to whome compensation is payable under s. 52 and
to the person who surrenders excess land to whom
compensation is p<i.yable under s. 61.
There is no
doubt that certain deductions are made from the
purchase price payable by the tenant under s. 45
and from th~ market value before componstion is
arrived at for payment to the land-owner under s. 52
and to the person surrendering excess land under
s. 6!. But if one looks at the purpose and object
of the Act it will be clear that the main provisions
of the Act are clearly within the legislative competence of the State
lll~islature under item 18 of
List II and item 42 of List III. The scheme of
the Aet so far as Chap. JI dealing with extinction
of the land-owner's right is concerned Is that
the land-own<>r's
right vested
in the
State
under ss. 41 and 42 on a day to be notified by \he
Government in that behalf. Thereafter, s. 4:l
provides that cultivating tenants of the landH which
have vested in the ::itate shall have a right to
assignment of the right, title and interest so vestrd
in the State on payment of a certain price which i11
calculated under s. 45 and is called the purchase
price. After the purchase price is determined, the
compensation to be paid
to the
land-owner
is provided bys. 52 and thero is reduction in the
purchase priee for the purposes of given compensation. It is howover obvious that the object of
Chap. II ia to vest proprietorship in the land in the
I
. • •
(1) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
837
cultivating tenants and for that purpose
Chap.
II provides for carrying out the object in two stages.
In the first stage, the property of the landowner
is vested in the State. Thereafter
the tenant is
given the right to acquire that property from the
State. What price the tenant is to pay for j;he
land is worked out under s. 45 and what compensation the State is to pay to the !and-owner is
worked out under s. 52, which however reduces
the purchase price arrived at under s. 45 for the
purpose of giving compensation.
It is however
clear that tenants are not bound to apply to acquire the land which they hold as tenants and where
they do not do so, s. 44 (3) provides that they become the tenants of Government and shall be liable
to pay to the Government the rent payable in respect of the land from the date on which the right,
title and interest over the land vested in the Government. It cannot therefore be said that the scheme
which provides for two stages, namely, first acquisition by .Government and secondly assignment to tenants is a camoflage devised for the purpose of taking
away the money which would otherwise have been
payable to the land-owner in case the interest of the
landowner was directly transferred to the cultivating
tenants. It is also clear that there is bound to be a
time lag between the acquisition underss. 41 and 42
and the assignment to tenants under s. 43 and the
subsequent sections and in the meantime the Government would be the owner of the right11 acquired.
Clearly, therefore Chap. II of the Act envisages first
the acquirement of the land-owner's interest by the
State for which compensation is payable under
s. 52. Thereafter the State will assign to such culti-.
vs.ting tenants as may apply the rights acquired by
the State and there is likely to be an interval between the two transactions. Besides some cultivating tenants may not apply at all and that pa.rt
of the property will remain with the State Government. In these circumstances it cannot be said
that the scheme evoh·ed in Chap. II is a device for
1961
Kari .. hil
Kunl,;J;-
v.
Stat. of KwoLt
w.,,,,... J.
11141
KtJrilfChil
E wahjkontat1
••
ill.U of Ktr•liJ
W.""lico J.
838 SUPREME COURTLREPORTS [1962) SUPP.
taking away :my part of the money to the landowner from the tf'nant to whom his interest may
eventually ho assigned.
Besides the adequacy of
componsat.ion provided under s. 52 for acquisition
by the Stato of the intorest of the land-owner
cannot be challanged on the ground that the compenHation provided by the law is not adequate :
see Art. 31 (2). It is only because the compensation prodded under s. 52 is
1L percentage of the
purchase price as culculated under s. 45 that it
appears as if tho State is taking away a part of
the compensation due to the landowner. Section
52 is however only a met hod for determining
compenAation and the whole compensation duo to
the land-owner is to be foun<l in s. 52 and it cannot
therefore be said that any part of the compensation is being taken away by the State.
Similarly the scheme of Chap. HI which provides a ceiling is that any laud in excess of the
ceiling shall vest in the Go\·ernment under s. 62.
Thereafter thr land so vested in Government can
be assigned undrr s. 70 to porsons who do not possess any land or possess land less than 5 acres of
double crop nilam or its equivalent. It i~ true
that Government may assign the lands to those
who apply under s. 70 but it is not bound to do so
and here again there will be a timP lag between the
vesting of the excess land in the Government under
s. 62 and its· assignment to those who are eligible
under s. 70.
The charge that in this Chapter there
is a device for taking away the compensation due to
the Jami-owner is baaed on the fact that s. 72 the
person to whom the land is assigned under s. 70
has to pay 55 per cent. of the market value of the
land while the person from whom tht' excPss land is
taken is not always paid 55 per cent. of the market
value, inasmnch 1\8 the percentage goes down to 25
per cent. of tht> mn.rket value in certain circumstan ·
ces.
But here again the compensation is provided
entirely under s. 64 and it is that section which sets
out the manner in whioh the compensation is to be
I
I

1961
Karimbil
Kunlrikcm4n
v.
Stal# of ~ttola
Wi111clloo J.
840 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962) SUPP.
challenged in view of Art. 31(2), and there is
therefore no justification for saying that the
money due to the landowner or the persr,n from
whom the excess land is acquired is being taken
away by the State. That argument would only be
poSBible if the compensation was the whole amount
arrived at under s. 45 or under s. 7:! and frorn that
the Government deducted money due to the land·
owner. That however is not so and the compensation
to which tho landowner or the person from whom
the excess land is acquired is to be found only in
.ss. 52 and 64 and there is thus no question of
taking away any money dne to the landowner.
Further, whatever unfairness might appear
because of the difference between as. 45 an::! 52 on
the one hand and BB. 64 and 72 on the other and
the manner in which the compensation is shown as
a percentage of the purchase price or the market
value is removed by the provision in s. 80 of the
Act. That section provides for the constitution
of an agriculturist rehabilitation fund in which the
surplus, if any, of the purchase price r.ftcr the disbursement therefrom of the compensation is to he
put along with other moneys. This surplus does
not to go to the revenues of the State and t.he State
cannot be sr.id to have taken away for its own purpose any part of the compensation. Further s. 80
provides that the fund shall be utilised for rendering help by way of loan, grant or otherwise to
persons affected by the Act who are eligible for the
same in accordance with the rules framed by the
Government. The fund therefore created under
s. 80 of the surplus, if any, is to be utilised for
rendering help to peraons affected by the Act.
That in: our opinion clearly means either the landowners whose rights are affected by Chap. II or
the persons from whom exec~& land is taken under
Cht.p. III. The surplus money therefore is to be
utiliiled for the benefit of the persons affected by
the Act as indicated above. This section l\lFo
'
..
ii
(1) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
8•1
provides that the Government will frame rules with
respect to the persons affected and their eligibility
for help from the fund. Our attention in this
connection has been drawn to f he eligibility rules
framed under this section for the administration
of the fund, and in particular to r. 161 which
provides for eligibility for grants and loan. That
rule in our opinion goes beyon9 the scope of s. 80
in so far as it provides for making of grants
or loans to persons not affected by the Act.
We may in this connection refer to r. 161 (a)(i)
and (ii) and r. 161 (bl (i) and (ii) which are
so framed as to take within their scope even persons not affected by the Act., though r. 16l(a)(iii)
and r. 16l(b)(iii) are with respect to persons who
may be affected by the Act. Rule 16l(a)(i) and (ii)
and r. l6l(b)(i) and (ii) in so far as they take in
persons not affected by the Act are uUra vires of
the provisions of s. 80 and must be struck down on
that ground and may have to be replaced by more
suitable rules. But the rules which have been
actually framed will not affect the provisions of
s. 80 which clearly show that the ·fund is for the
benefit of those who are affected by the Act,
namely, those who are affected by Chapters II and
III of the Act, i.e., those landowners whose rights
have been acquired under ss. 41 and 42 and those
persons from whom excess land is taken away
under s. 62.
Section 80 thus clearly shows that
any surplus that may arise is not tflken away by
the State for its own revenue purposes but is meant
to be used for the benefit of those affected by the
Act and therefore even the a.pparent result of the
difference between ss. 45 and 52 and ss. 64 and 72is taken away by the constitution of the fund
under s. 80, and it cannot be said at all under the
circumstances that any device has been employed
in the Act to take away the moneys of the landowners or the persona from whom excess land is
taken away for the purpose of adding to the revenue of the State. We are therefore of opinion that
1961
Karim11il
Kunkikoman
v.
State of i·tralo
Waneho1 J.

(I) S.C.R.
FIUPREME COURT REPORTS
843
It will be seen therefore that so far as the
meaning of the word " estate " is concerned, there
was no change in sub-cl.(a)and the only change was
with respect to the inclusive part of the definition
of the word "estate". The word " estate has !I.II
along been defined to have the same meaning in relation to any local area as that expression or its local
equivalent has in the existing law relilting to landtenures in force in that area. It is also remarkable that the word " intermeiliary" does not
occur in sub-cl. (a) thouirh it occurs in sub-cl. (h).
The definition in sub-cl. (a) is self-contained and
there is no scope for importing any idea of intermediary in the definition from s11b-cl. (b ).
The
reason why the words "other intermediary " are
used in sub-cl. (b) which defines rights in relation
to an estate, is that that sub-clause mentions a
number of intermediaries as such, like sub-proprietors, under-proprietors, tenure-holders b11t does
not give a complete enumeration of all intermediaries that may be existing in estates all over
India and therefore uses the words "other intermediary " to bring in all kinds of intermediaries
existing in an estate. As an example we may
piention that formerly in Uttar Pradesh there were
fixed rate tenants in the permanently settled districts who were also intermediaries and it iB such
persons or their likes who were brought in within
the sweep of the definition of rights ill' relation to
an estate by the use of the wo1ds "other interm&-
diary". Therefore, when the words "raiyat, under
raiyat" were added in sub-cl. (b) in 1955, it WSB
further enumeration within a class already there;
further as held in The State of Bihar v. Rameshwar
Prafap Narain Singh ( 1 ), their inclusion in the
circumstances and in the particular setting showed
that the words " or other intermediary" did not
necessarily qualify or colour the meaning to be
attached to these new tenures. The meaning of
the word "estate" has however to be found in
(1) AJ.R. 1961 S.C. 1si~.
1961
liarimhil
Kunhikomon
••
Stall of K'11fJ/&
Wa11<hoo J.
1961
A'o•i,,,hil
A"imhsko11UJJt
••
-'"'"of Ktrol•
w .. ,,.,. J,
844 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (l!l62] SUPP.
sub-cl. (a) and it is the words used in that sub-clause
only which will determine its meaning irrespective
of whether any intermediary exiRted in an estate
or not. Tho meaning of the word " estate " in
eu b-cl. (al is the same as it might be in the existing
law relating to land-tenure in force in a particular
area. Where therefore there is an existing law in
a particular area in which the word "estate" as
such is defined the word would have that ml'aning for that area and there is no necessity then
for looking for its local equivalent. But if in existing law of a particu Jar area the word " estate " as
such is not defined, but there is a definition of
some othor term which in that aroa. is the local
equivalent of the word " estate " then the wor<l
" estate " wo uld have the
meaning
assigned
to that term in tho existing law in that area.
In order, howrvcr, that one may he ablo to say
that~ a particular term in an existing law in a
particular area is a local equivalent of tho word
" estate " used in sub-cl. (a) it is necessary to have
some basic idea of the meaning of the word
" estate " for that purpose. 'lhat basic idea seems
to be that the person holding tho estate should be
the proprietor of the eoil and should be in direct
relationship with the State paying land-revenue to
it, when it is not remitted in whole or in part. If a
tenn therefore is defined in any existing law in a
local area which corresponds to this basic idea of
an estate that term would be a local equivalent of
the word " estate " in that area. It is unnecessary
to pursue the matter further because this aspect
of the case has also been considered in Writ
Petition No. 105 of 1961.
It may be added that !IS the definition of the
word "estate" came into the Constitution from
January 26, 1950, and is based on existing law
we have to Jor,~ into law existing on Ja.naary 26,
1950, for the parpose of finding out the meaning
of the word "estate" in Art. 31A.
(1) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
845
Let us therefore look at state of the law as it
was in the State of Madras on January 26, 1950, for
the area from which these petitions come was then
in the district of South Canara, which was th~n
a part of the Province of .Madras, which became
the State of M1dras on January 26, 1950. The
usual feature of land-tenure fa Madras was the
ryotwari form but in some districts, a l:indlord
class had grown up both in the northern and
southern parts of the Presidency of Madras as it
wa~ before the Constitution.
The permanent
settlement was introduced in a part of the Madras
Presidency in 1802.
There were
also various
tenures arising out of revenue free grants all ovc1·
the Province (see Chap. IV, Vol.
IH of land
Systems of British India by Baden Powell) and
sometimes iu some districts both kinds of tenures,
namely, landlord tenures and the ryotwari tenurp,s
were prevalent. There were various Acts in force
in the Presidency of Madras with respect, to
landlord tenures while ryotwari tenures were
governed by the Standing Orders of the Board of
Itevenue.
Eventually,
in 1908, the Madras
legislature passed the Madras Estates Land Act,
No. I of 1908, which was later amended from time
to time.
It contains a definition of the word
"estate" as such ins. 3(2) and when the Constitution came into force the relevant part of the definition was as followe :-
"Est.ates' means :-
(a) any permanently settled estate or
temporarily settled zamindari;
(b) any portion of such
permanently
settled estate or temporarily settled zamindari which is separately registered in the
office of the Collector;
(c) any unsettled palaiyam or jagir;
(d) any inam village of which the grant
bes'been'made, confirmed or recognised by the
.!Britiah
Government, ·notwithstanding'"that
1961
Korimbtl
Kunhiknman
v.
Stab of Ktrala
Wa11ch110 J.
1961
.Karim6Jl
K~nA&komon
'·
)tat. of Kno/o
w..,1 .. 1.
846 SUPREME COURT REPOR'r8 (1962] SUPP.
subsequent to the grant, the village has been
partitioned among th• grantees or tho successors-in-title of the grantee or grantees."
This Act applied to the entire Presidency of Madras
except the Presidency town of Madras, the district
of Malabar and the portion of the Nilgiri district
known as South East Wynaad. It thus applied
to the district of South Canara from where these
petitions come. So far therefore as the District
or South Canara was concerned,
there was an
existing law which defined the word "estate" for
that local area. Shortly before the Constitution
eamo into force the Madras legislature had paSBed
the Madras Estates (Abolitio!l and Conversion into
Ryotwari) Act No. XXVI of 1948.
That Act
provided for the abolition of estates subject to
certain restrictions with which we arc not concerned. It also provided for repeal of the Madras
Permanent Settlement Regulation, 1802, and the
Estates Land Act of l!l08 to the extent and from
the date on which notifications were made under
s. 3 of that Act. There was thus no repeal of Act
I of 1908 by the Act of 1948, and it is not in
dispute that Act No. l of 1908 was in force on
January 26, 1950, in large pints of the Province
of Madras including South Canara, and is still in
force in auch parts of it as have not been notified
under s. 3 of the Act of 1948. Therefore, we reaoh
the position that when Art. 31 became applicable
from January 26, 1950, Act No. 1 of 1908 was still
in force in large parts of the Madras State and it
contained ii definition of the word "estate" as
suoh. Further, Act I of 1908 was clearly a law
of land-tenures as a brief review of its provisions
will ehow. Section 6 of the Act conferred ocou-.
panoy rights on tenants of certain lands in "estates"
as defined in the Act of 1908.
Chapter II dealt
with the general rights of landlords and tenants.
Chapter III dealt with provisions relating to rate
of rent payable by tenants and provided for
enhancement, reduction. commutation, alteration
-
-
(l) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
847
and remission of rent.
Chapter IV dealt with
pattas and muchilikas.
Chapter V provided for
payment of rent and for realisation of arrears of
rent.
Chapter VI provided the
procedure for
recovery of rent. Other Chapters dealt with other
matters including Chap. X which dealt with relinquishment and ejectment. It is clear therefore
that the Act of 1908 was a law relating to landtenures. Therefore, we reach the posit.ion that in
a law relating to land-tenures which was in force
in the State of Madras when the Constitution came
into force the word "estate" was specifkally defined.
This law was in force in the whole of the State of
Madras except some parts and was thus in force in
the area from which the present petitions come.
This area was then in the south Canara district of
the State of Madras. We are therefore of opinion
that the word "estate" in the circumstances can only
have the meaning given to it in the Act of 1908 as
amended up to 1950 in the State of Madras as it
was on the date the Constitution came into force.
We have already said that the Act of 1908 dealt
with landlord tenures of Madras and was an existing law relating to land-tenures. The other class
of land-tenures consisted of. ryotwari pattadars
which were governed by the Board's Standing
Orders, there being no Act of the legislature with
respect to them. The holders of ryotwari pattas
used to hold lands on lease from Government. The
basic idea of ryotwari settlement is that every bit
or land is assessed to a .certain revenue. and assigned
a survey number for a period of years, which is usually thirty and each oocupant of such land holds it
subject to his paying t.he land-revenue fix·,d on that
land. But it is open to the occupant to • •· Hnquish
his land or to take new land which has been relinquished by some other occupant or become otherwise
·available on payment of a11sessment, (see Land
Systems of British India by Baden-Powell, Vol. III,
Chap. IV, s. II, p. 128). Though, theoretically, according to some authorities, the occupant of ryotwari
11111
Karimhil
Kunhikoman
••
SM, of Korala
Wanchoo J.
1961
Ka•imhil
Ku1ahi1onw1~
••
81411 of K~ala
Ji' Q'lthH J.
848 SUPREME OOURT REPORTS fl 962] SUPP.
land held it under an annual lease (see Maeleanc,
Vol. I Revenue Settlement, p. 104). it appears that
in fact the Collector had no power to terminate tho
tenant's holding for any cause whatever except
failure to pay the revenue or tho ryot's own relin·
quishmcnt or abandonment. The ryot is generally
called a tenant of Government but he id not a
tenant, from year to year and cannot ho oust.ad as
long ns he p»ys the land-revenue assessed. He has
also tho right to sell 01· mortgage or gift the land or
lease it and the transferee becomes liable in his place
for the revenue.
Further, the lessee of a ryotwari
pattadar has no rights except those conferred under
the lease and is generally a sub-tenant at-will liable
to ejectmcnt at the end of each year.
In the
llfa11U11I of Admini.stmtion, as quoted by Bad!'nPowell, in Vol. III of Land Systems of British India
at p. 129, the ryotwari tenure is summarised as that
"of a tenant of tho State enjoying a tenant-right
which can be inherited, sold, or burdened for debt
in precisely the same manner as a proprietary right
subject alway~ to payment of the revenue due to
the Stat.a''. Though therefore the ryotwari pattadar is virtually like a proprietor and has many ·of
the advantages of such a proprietor, he could still
relinquish or abandon his land in favour of tho government. It is because of this position that the
ryotwari pattadar was never considered a proprietor
of the land under ltis patta, though he had many
of the advantages of a proprietor. Considering,
however, that the Act of 1908 was in forr,o all over
tho State of Madras but did not apply to lands held
on ryotwari settlcmt>nt and contained a definition
of the word "estate" which was also applicable
throughout the State of l\Ia<lras except tho areas
indicated above, it is clear that in the existing law
relating to land-tenures the wor<l "estate" did not
include the lands of ryotwari pat! adars, however
valuable might be their rights in lands as they
eventually came to ho recognised.
(1) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
849
Turning now to the district of South Canara
and the areas from .which the present petitions come
it appears that originally the ryotwari settlement
was not inforce in this area and two kinds of tenures were recognised, namely, mulawargdar and
Sarlcarigeniivargdar. It is, however, unnecessary to go
into the past history of the matter, for it is not in
dispute that the ryotwari system was introduced
in South Canara district in the early years of this
century. The history will be found in the Book
"Land Tenures in the Madras Presidency" by
S. Sunderaraja Iyengar, II Edn., pp. 45-47, where
it is said that "after the introduction of the ryotwari system into South Canara, no distinction now
exists between the wargadar, the mulawargadar and
kudutaledar and they are all ryotwari pattadars",
Therefore, when the Constitution came into force
the ryotwari p11ttadars of S'outh Canara were fo.
the same position as the ryotwari pattadars
of the rest of the State of Madras. Further, as the
Act of 1908 was in force in South Canara also,
though there may not be many estates as defined in
that Act in this area it follows that in this area also
the word "estate" would have the same meaning as
in the Act of 1908 and therefore ryotwari pattadars
and their lands would not be covered by the word
"estate". Further, there can ·be no question of
seeking for a local equivalent so far as this part of
the State of Kera.la which has come to it from the
former State of Madras is concerned. We are
therefore of opinion that lands held by ryotwari
pattadars in this part which has come to the State
of Kerala by virtue of the States ReorganiSation Act
from the State of Madras are not estates within the
meaning of Art. 3 lA (2)( a) of the Constitution arid
therefore the Act is not protected under Art. 3IA(l)
from attack under Arts. 14, 19 and 31 of the
Constitution.
. 1961
. Karimhil
!lunhikoman
V•
Stat1o1Kerala
, Wanchoo J.
1961
.Karimhil
.Kunhikoman
v.
· State of Kerala
Wanchoo J.
""~
-~ -·--·
856 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
Re. (4) .
The next contention on behalf of the petitioners
is that the Act m<tkes a discrimination between areca
and pepper plantations on the one hand and certain
other plantations on the other and should therefore
be struck down as violative of Art. 14 of the
Constitution. Section 2(39) of the Act defines
"plantation" to mean any land used by a person
principally for the cultivation of tea, coffee, rubber
or cardamom or such other kind of special crops as
may be specified by the Government by notification
in the gazette. Areca and pepper plantations have
however not been included in this definition. It is
urged on behalf of the petitioners that in this part
of the State there are a large number of areca and
pepper plantations which are practically run on the
same lines as tea, coffee and rubber plantations and
there is no reason why discrimination should be made
between areca and pepper plantations on the one
hand and tea, coffee and rubber plantations on the
other. The discrimination is said to arise from the
provisions of s. 3 and s. 57 of the Act. Section 3(viii)
which occurs in Chap. II dealing with the acquisition
of the interest of landowners by tenants excepts
tenancies in respect of plantations exceeding thirty
acres in extent from the application of that chapter.
The result of this ia that tenants in plantations
exceeding thirty acres in extent cannot acquir
the interest of the landowners with respect to such
plantations and the landowners continue to own
such planations as before. Further s. 57 which is
in Chap. III provides for exemption of all plantations
whatever their extent from the provisions of that
Chapter. Thus the ceiling area provided in s. 58
will not apply to plantations which will be left out
in calculating the ceiling area for the purpose of
s.58. Further, s.59(2) provides that in calculating the
ceiling area any cashew estate if it was a cashew
estate on April, 11, 1957 and continued as such at the
•
(i) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPOR1i'S
851
..
commencement of s. 59 (provided the cashew estate
was principally planted with cashewnuts tree and be
a contiguous area not below 10 acres) will continue
to bff owned or held as before, though ·the ceiling in
such cases would be reduced to half of that provided
in s.58. These provisions inter alia confer benefits on
those who hold plantations as defined in s. 2(39)
and also on those who have cashew estates as
defined in the Explanation to s. 59(2). The contention
on behalf of the petitioners is that there is no
reason why the same benefits which have been
conferred on plantations as defined in the Act
should not be conferred on those who hold areca
and pepper plantations, and that there are no
intelligible differentia which would justify the State
· legislature in treating the pepper and areca plantations differently from
rubber, tea and coffee
plantations.
Article 14 has been the subject of consideration
by this Court on a number of occasions and the
principles. which govern its application have been
summarised in Shri Ram Krishna Dahnia v. Shri
Justice S. R. Tendolkar (1), in these words :-
"(a) that a law may be constitutional even
though it relates to a -single individual if,
on account of some special circumstance~
or reasons applicable to him and not
applicable to others, that single individual
may be treated as a class by himself;
(b) that there is always a presumption in
favour of the constitutionality of an
enactment and the burden is upon him
who attacks it . to show that there has
been a
clear
transgression
of
the
constitutional principles ;
( c) that it must
be · presumed that the
legislature understands
and correctly
appreciates the need · of its own people
that its laws are directed to problem~
(I) [1959] S.O.R. 279, 297,
Karimbil
Kunhikoman
v.
State of Kera(a
Wanchoo J.
1961
Ka1imbil
Kunhikoman
V,
St ;le of Kerala
w~nchoo J.
852 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
(d)
made manifest by experience and that
its discriminations are based on adequate
grounds;
that the legislature is free to recognise
degrees of harm and may confine its
restrictions to those cases where the need
is deemed to be the clearest ;
( e) that in order to sustain the presumption
of constitutionality the court may take
into consideration matters of common
knowledge, matters of common report,
the history of the times and may assume
every state of facts which can
be
conceived
existing
at
the
time of
legislation ; and
(f) that while good faith and knowledge of
the existing conditions on the part of a
legislature are to be presumed, if there is
nothing on the face of the law or the
surrounding circumstances brought to
the notice of the court on which the
cla.ssification may reasonably be regarded
as based, the presumption of constitutionality cannot be carried to 1.he extent of
always holding that there must be some
undisclosed and unknown reasons for
subjecting certain individuals or corporations
to
hostile
or
discriminating
legislation."
The petitioners rely on cl. (f) of this summary and
contention is that there is nothing to show either in
the Act or even in the affidavit filed un behalf of 1.he
State in reply to the petitions or in the circumstances brought to the notice of th'l court that the classification in this case which excludes areca and
pepper plantations and includes tea, coffee and
rubber plantations is a. proper classification based
on intelligible differeiitia which are related to the
obj Jets and purposes of the Act.
( l) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
853
This brings us to .a consideration of the
reasons which may have impelled the legislature to
treat plantations as a class differently from other
lands. The objective of land reform including the
imposition of ceilings on land holdings is to remove
all impediments which arise from the agrarian
structure inherited from the past in order to increase agricultural production, and to create conditions
for evolving as speedly as possible an agrarian
economy with a high level
of efficiency and
productivity (see p. 178 of the Second Five Year
Plan). It is with this opjee:t in view that ceiling on
land.holdings has been imposed in various States.
Even so, it is recognised that some exemptions will
have to be granted from the ceiling in order that
production may not suffer. This . was considered
in the Second Five Year Plan at p. 196 and three
main factors were taken into account in deciding
upon exemptions from the ceiling, namely :·--
(!) integrated
nature of
operations,
especially where industrial and agricultural
work are undertaken as a composite enterprise,
(2) specialised character of operations,
and
(3) from
the
aspect
of
agricultural
production the need to ensure that efficiently
managed farms which fulfil certain conditions
are notbroken up.
·
Bearing these criteria in mind it was recommended
in the Second Five Year Plan (see p. 196) that the
following categories of 'farms may be 1>xempted from
the operation of ceiling namely :
"(l) tea, coffee and rubbei: plantation;
(2) orchards
where
they
constitute
reasonably compact areas ;
1961
Karimbil
Kunhikoman
v.
.State of·Kera/a
WanchooJ.
1961
Karimbil
Kunhikoman
v.
State oj Kera/a
Waachoo J.
854 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
(3) specialised farms engaged in cattle
breeding, dairying, wool raising etc ;
(4) sugarcane farms operated by sugar
factories; and
(5) efficiently
managed
farms which
consist of compact blocks, on which heavy
investment or permanent structural improvements have been made and whose break-up
is likely to lead to a fall in production."
The same view has been reiterated in Chap. XIV
of the Third Five Year Plan dealing with Land
Reform and ceiling on agricultural holdings and
para
28
thereof
refers to
the
grounds of
exemption envisaged by the Second Five Year Plan.
rt:is obvious therefore that when the State legislature in this case exempted tea, coffee, rubber and
cardamom plantations from the ceiling under Chap.
III and treated plantations of over 30 acres as a
special case for the purpose of Chap. II, it must
have had the principles enunciated above in mind to
differentiate them from ordinary cultivation of other
crops. If that bo so, the question immediately
arises whether there is any reason for treating areca
and pepper plantations differently. If there is none
and ,areca and pepper plantations stand so far as
these conditions are concerned on the same footing
as tea, coffee and rubber plantations there will
clearly be a discrimination against them by the
provisions of the Act referred to above.
Turning now to pepper plantations, first, we
may refer to the information contained in Farm
Bulletin No. 55 relating to pepper cultivation in
India issued by the Farm Inform<ition Unit, Directorate of Extension, Ministry of Food and Agriculture, New Delhi in September 1959. It appears
from this bulletin that Kerala is the most important
pepper producing State in India, where pepper is
cultivated on an organised :plantation scale ovllr
(1) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
855
fairly extensive areas.
There are three ·distinct
regions of the pepper growing belt, namely, ( 1) The
Travancore and Cochin region. (2) The Malabar and
South Canara region, and (3) the Coorg and North
Canara region.
Though pepper is essentially a
homestead garden crop, growers were· encouraged to
grow it on plantation scale since 1928 when the
price of pepper rose to about Rs. 700/- per candy.
Since then there has been a further rise in the price
of pepper with the result that new homestead gardens and plant11tions have sprung up and pepper
cultivation has extended a good deal.