# STATE OF BOMBAY (NOW MAHARASHTRA) v. NARUL LATIF KHAN

- **Citation:** [1965] 3 S.C.R. 135
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1965-02-22
- **Bench:** P. B. Gajendragadkar, Raghubar Dayal, V. Ramaswami
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/state-of-bombay-now-maharashtra-v-narul-latif-khan-3385
- **Pages:** 10

## Headnote

135
Departmental Enquiry-Charge-sheeted officer desiring to produce oral evidence-Refusal to record such evidence on the ground
that the case against the officer rested on documents alo:ie--S'lfc~
refusal whether amounts to denial of reasonable opportumty--C~vt!
Serv'ices <Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules r. 55- ConsPtution of India, Art. 311(2).
The appellant who was in the service of a State Government
asked for long leave which was refused. Subsequently he asked for
ten days' leave which was granted. On the expiry of the leave period
he did not join duty on the ground that he was seriously ill. The
Government refused to accept the plea and instituted a departmental inquiry against him. The respondent wanted to produce oral
evidence in support of his plea including the evidence of doctors
who treated him, but the enquiry officer refused to record oral evidence on the ground that the case against the appellant rested on
ciocuments alone and therefore no oral evidence was necessary. On
the report of the enquiry officer the State Government ordered the
compulsory retirement of the respondent. The latter filed a suit in
which he claimed inter alia that the constitutional provision in
Art. 311 had been contravened. The trial judge held against him but
the High Court decided in his favour. The State Government appeal·
ed to the Supreme Court with certificate.
The narrow question to which the Court had to address itself
was whether it was obligatory on the enquiry officer to give a reason·
able opportunity to the respondent to lead oral evidence and examine
his doctors.
HELD: (i) The Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal)
Rules provide in r. 55 that if the charge-sheeted Officer so desires or
if the authority concerned so directs an oral enquiry shall be held.
This provision is mandatory and is based on considerations of natural
justice and fair play. Therefore when the respondent expressed his
desire to the enquiry officer that he wanted to lead evidence in support of his plea, it was obligatory on the enquiry officer to have fixed
a date for recording such oral evidence and give due intimation to
the respondent in that behalf. p 43 D-Fl
(ii) Though an enquiry officer would be justified in conducting
the enquiry in such a way that its proceedings are not allowed to
be unduly or deliberately prolonged, it would be impossible to accept
the
ar~ument that if the charge-sheeted officer wants to lead
oral eviden.ce the enquiry officer can say that having regard to the
charges agams_t the officer he would not
hold any oral enquiry
r143 Hl
(iii) In the _present case the witnesses whom the respondent
wanted to examme ~ould. undoubtedly have given relevant evidence.
He wanted to examme his doctors but the enquiry officer failed to
!five him an opportunity to do so. That introduced .a fatal infirmity
m the whole ~nqmry as the respondent had not been given a reasonable opportunity to defend himself within the meeting of Art. 311(2) .
. The appeal of the State Government had therefore to be dismissed. P44 A, Cl
136
SUPREME
COURT
REPORTS•
(1965] 3 S.O.R.

## Text

A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
STATE OF BOMBAY (NOW MAHARASHTRA)
v.
NARUL LATIF KHAN
February 22, 1965
[P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.J., RAGHUBAR DAYAL AND
V. RAMASWAMI, JJ.]
135
Departmental Enquiry-Charge-sheeted officer desiring to produce oral evidence-Refusal to record such evidence on the ground
that the case against the officer rested on documents alo:ie--S'lfc~
refusal whether amounts to denial of reasonable opportumty--C~vt!
Serv'ices <Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules r. 55- ConsPtution of India, Art. 311(2).
The appellant who was in the service of a State Government
asked for long leave which was refused. Subsequently he asked for
ten days' leave which was granted. On the expiry of the leave period
he did not join duty on the ground that he was seriously ill. The
Government refused to accept the plea and instituted a departmental inquiry against him. The respondent wanted to produce oral
evidence in support of his plea including the evidence of doctors
who treated him, but the enquiry officer refused to record oral evidence on the ground that the case against the appellant rested on
ciocuments alone and therefore no oral evidence was necessary. On
the report of the enquiry officer the State Government ordered the
compulsory retirement of the respondent. The latter filed a suit in
which he claimed inter alia that the constitutional provision in
Art. 311 had been contravened. The trial judge held against him but
the High Court decided in his favour. The State Government appeal·
ed to the Supreme Court with certificate.
The narrow question to which the Court had to address itself
was whether it was obligatory on the enquiry officer to give a reason·
able opportunity to the respondent to lead oral evidence and examine
his doctors.
HELD: (i) The Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal)
Rules provide in r. 55 that if the charge-sheeted Officer so desires or
if the authority concerned so directs an oral enquiry shall be held.
This provision is mandatory and is based on considerations of natural
justice and fair play. Therefore when the respondent expressed his
desire to the enquiry officer that he wanted to lead evidence in support of his plea, it was obligatory on the enquiry officer to have fixed
a date for recording such oral evidence and give due intimation to
the respondent in that behalf. p 43 D-Fl
(ii) Though an enquiry officer would be justified in conducting
the enquiry in such a way that its proceedings are not allowed to
be unduly or deliberately prolonged, it would be impossible to accept
the
ar~ument that if the charge-sheeted officer wants to lead
oral eviden.ce the enquiry officer can say that having regard to the
charges agams_t the officer he would not
hold any oral enquiry
r143 Hl
(iii) In the _present case the witnesses whom the respondent
wanted to examme ~ould. undoubtedly have given relevant evidence.
He wanted to examme his doctors but the enquiry officer failed to
!five him an opportunity to do so. That introduced .a fatal infirmity
m the whole ~nqmry as the respondent had not been given a reasonable opportunity to defend himself within the meeting of Art. 311(2) .
. The appeal of the State Government had therefore to be dismissed. P44 A, Cl
136
SUPREME
COURT
REPORTS•
(1965] 3 S.O.R.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No.
1040!
A
63.
C. K. Daphtary, Attorney General, M. S. K. Sastri and R. H.
Dhebar, for the appellant.
C. B. Agarwala and A. G. Ratnaparkhi, for the respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered byB
Gajendragadkar, C.J. The short question of Jaw which arises
in this appeal is whether the appellant, the State of Bombay (now
Maha_rashtra), shows that its predecessor State of Madhya Pradesh
(heremaHer called the Government) had given a reasonable
opportunity to the respondent, Narul Latif Khan, to defend himsel~ ~efore it passed the final order on June 6, 1952 compulsorily C
retm~g hllll under Article 353 of the Civil Service Regulations.
By this order, the respondent was compulsorily retired and in relaxation of Art. 353, the Government was pleased to allow
the respondent to draw a compassionate allowance equal to the
pension which would have been admissible to him had he been
D
invalidated.
This order was challenged by the respondent by filing a suit
in the Court of the first Additional District Judge at Nagpur. In
his plaint, the respondent alleged that the impugned order whereby he was compulsorily retired, was invalid and; he claimed a
declarationthat it was ultra vires and inoperative. He also asked E
for a declaration that he was entitled to be, restored to the post
which he held on July 6, 1950, and that he should be given all
pay, allowances, increments and promotions to which he would
have been entitled if he had been permitted to continue in service.
In the result, the respondent asked for a decree for Rs. 62,237 with
interest, at 6 per cent per annum from the date of the suit till realisaF
tion.
' This claim was resisted by the appeilant on several grounds.
The principal ground on which the appellant challenged the respondent's claim, however, was that he had been given a reasonable opportunity to defend himself, and so, the impugned order G
was perfectly valid, and legal. Several other pleas were also raised
by the appellant. On these pleas, the learned trial Judge framed
appropriate issues. The issue with which we are concerned in the
present appeal, however, centll!'ed round the
qu~stion as to
whether the Constitutional provision prescribed by Art. 311 affording protection to the respondent had been contravened. The trial H
Judge made a finding against the respondent on this issue. He
also recorded his findings on the other issues with which we are
not directly concerned in the present appeal. In regard to the money
claim made by the respondent, the learned trial Judge made a finding
that in case he was held entitled to such relief, a decree for
Rs. 37,237 may have to be passed in his favour. In view of his
conclusion that the impugned order was valid, no question arose
Sl'ATE v. NARUL LATfE (Gajendragadkar, O.J.)
137
A for making such a decree in favour of the respondent. The respondent's suit, therefore, failed and was di~missed.
The respondent then took the matter in appeal before the
High Court of Judicature at Bombay, Nagpur Bench. The High
Court has, in substance, held that the constitutional provisions
prescribed by Art. 311 have not been complied with by the appelB !ant before it passed the impugned order against the respondent.
It has found that the departmental enquiry which was held suffered
from the serious infirmity that the enquiry officer did not hold
an oral enquiry and did not allow an opportunity to the respondent to lead his oral evidence.
It has also held
that
C the second notice served by the appellant on the respondent calling upon him to show cause why the report made by the
enquiry officer should not be accepted and appropriate punishment should not be inflicted on him, was defective, and that also
made the impugned order invalid. The High Court appears to have
taken the view that the impugned order does not show that the apD pellant had taken into account the explanation offered by the respondent in response to the second notice issued by the appellant.
As a result of these findings, the High Court has reversed the conclusion of the trial Court on the main question and has found that
the impugned order is invalid and inoperative. On that view, the
High Court considered the money claim made by the respondent,
E
and it confirmed the finding of the trial Court that the respondent would be entitled to a decree for Rs. 37,237. In fact, the
alternative finding recorded by the trial Court in respect of the
amount to which the respondent
would be entitled in case he
succeeded in cliallenging the validity of the impugned order, was
not questioned before the High Court In the result, the High
F
Court allowed the appeal and passed a money decree for Rs. 37,237
in favour of the respondent in terms of prayer (A) of
paragraph 31 of the plaint. The appellant then applied for and
obtained a certificate from the High Court and it is with the
said certificate that it has brought the present appeal before this
Court. That is how the main .question which falls for our deciG sion is whether the constitutional provision prescribed by Art. 311
has been complied with by the appellant beforr ;t passed the
impugned order.
At this stage, it may be relevant to refer to some material
facts. The respondent was appointed as Extra Assistant CommisB
sioner in 1926 and since then he had been holding various offices
in the State service of the then Madhya Pradesh Government. In
1950, he was holding the post of a Treasury Officer at N~gpur. It
appears that privilege leave for over a year was due to him and
he had applied for four months' privilege leave. On June 12, .1950,
Government informed him that his request fer leave was rejected
and he was told that no further application for leave would be
entertained in future. On July 7, 1950, the respondent proceeded
138
SUPREME
COURT
REPORTS
(1965) 3 S.C.R.
on casual leave for two days, and on July 8, 1950 he renewed A
his application for four months' leave on medical grounds. This
application was accompanied by a certificate given by Dr. Dange.
Government, therefore, decided to constitute a Medical Board for
examining the respondent in order to decide whether leave on
medical grounds should be granted to him. Accordingly, the respondent appeared before a Special Medical Board on July 22,
E
1950. The Medical Board, however, could not come to a decision
as to whether the respondent should be granted leave on medical
grounds for four months. It recommended that the respondent
should get himself admitted in the Mayo Hospital, Nagpur, for
observation and investigation. In accordance with this report,
Government asked the respondent to get himself admitted in the
C
Mayo Hospital in time, so that the Board could examine him on
August 8, 1950. The respondent refused to go to the Mayo Hospital and pressed that he should be allowed to go to Calcutta
to receive medical treatment from experts. It appeus that on July
26, 195Q, the respondent received a telegram from Raipur stating
that his daughter was dangerously ill there. He, therefore, made D
another application on the same day requesting for ten days' leave
to enable him to go to Raipur and see his ailing daughter. On
July 31, 1950, Government granted the respondent's
request.
Accordingl(y, the respondent went to Raipur.
From Raipur he
renewed his application for four months' leave on Medical grounds
and produced certificates from Dr. Bhalerao and Dr. Kashyap.
E
That led to a lengthy correspondence between the respondent and
the Government which shows that Government insisted on his
appearing before the Medical Board and the respondent was not
prepared to go to Nagpur because he alleged that he was seriously
ill and could not undertake a journey to Nagpur. Ultimately, on
September 9, 1950, Government called upon the respondent to F
resume his duties within three days from the receipt of the ssid
letter failing which he was told that he would be suspended and
a departmental enquiry would be started against him. On October
4, 1950, the respondent wrote a lengthly reply setting forth his contentions in detail. Since he did not resume his duties, Government
decided to suspend him and start a departmental enquiry against G
him. Mr. S. N. Mehta, I.C.S., was accordingly appointed to hold
the enquiry. On November 29, 1950, Mr. Mehta wrote to the respondent that Government had directed him to conduct. the departmental enquiry, and called upon the respondent to attend his office
on December 7, 1950, at 11.00 a.m. The respondent, however, did
not appear before him and wrote to Mr. Mehta that owing to his
H
illness, he' was unable to appear before him. He again pleaded that
he was seriously ill.
On January 15, 1951, Mr. Mehta served the respondent with
a charge-sheet. Three charges were framed against him. The first
charge was that he had deliberately disobeyed the orders of Government when he was asked to get himself admitted in the Mayo
I
STATE V. NARUL LATIF (Gaje,1ulragadkar, 0. J.)
!39
A Hospital for observation and investigation. The second charge was
that he had failed to report for duty even though
~o leave was
sanctioned to him by Government and he was specifically ordered
by Government to report for duty. The third charge was that he had
persistently disobeyed the orders of Government and he had
thereby shown himself unfit to continue a~ a me~ber of the State
B Civil Service. Material allegations on which rehance was placed
against the respondent in support of ihese charges were also
specified under the respective charges.
The respondent was, however, not prepared to appear before
Mr. Mehta and he raised several technical contentions. Ultimately,
C he sent his written statement and denied all the charges .. His case
appears to have been that he had not deliberately disobeyed any
of the orders issued by Government. In regard to his getting
admitted in the Ma yo Hospital, he seems to have taken the plea that
when he was allowed to go on casual leave to see his ailing daughter
at Raipur, it was clear that he could not have got himself admitted
D in the Mayo Hospital so as to enable the Medical Board to
examine him on August 8, 1950. In respect of the charge that he
had persistently refused to obey the orders of Government, his
case was that he was dangerously ill and that he genuinely apprehended that if he undertook a journey to resume his duty, he
might even collapse. He requested the enquiry officer to allow him
E
to appear by a lawyer whom he would instruct to cross-examine
the witnesses whom the Government would examine against him.
He also stated that he wanted to give evidence of his own doctors
who would depose to his ailing condition at the relevant time.
F
It appears that Mr. Mehta wanted to accommcdate the respondent as much as he could and when he found that the respondent was not appearing in person before him, he in fact fixed
a date for hearing at Raipur on September 21, 1951 where he happened to be camping. On that date, the respondent appeared
before Mr. Mehta and Mr. Mehta made a note as to what transG pired on that date. The note shows that "the whole case was discussed with the respondent. His plea was that he should be allowed
to appear through a counsel, but it was explained to him in detail
that as far as the case can be seen from Government side at present, it does not involv_e the taking up oral evidence. He agreed that
he would not press for this facility. He would, however, like to
H give a detailed answer to the charge-sheet. He also undertook to
appear in person regularly in future". Thereafter, Mr. Mehta
required the respondent to file his detailed written statement. and
in fact, the respondent did file his detailed written statement containing the pleas to which we have already referred. On November
8, 1951, Mr. Mehta wrote to the respondent that he would be glad
to hear him in person in case he wished to make an oral statement on November 20, 1951, and when the respondent did not
140
SUPREME
COURT
REPORTS
(1965) 3 S.C.R.
appear on the said date, Mr. Mehta proceeded to examine the docuA
mentary evidence showing the failure of the respondent to comply
with the orders issued by Government and made his report on
November 24, 1951. He found that the three charges framed against
the respondent were proved. In his report, Mr. Mehta observed
that "the conduct of the respondent and the language used by him
from time to time in his communications discloses an attitude of B
disobedience and insubordination which no Government can tolerate from its subordinate officers". We may incidentally observe
that the comment thus made by Mr. Mehta in regard to the communications addressed by the respondent to him appears to, us to
be fully justified but, in our opinion, this aspect of the matter
cannot have any material bearing on the question with which we
C
are concerned. The validity of the impugned order must be judged
objectively without considering the impropriety of the language
used by the respondent or the reluctance shown by him to appear
before Mr. Mehta.
In his report, Mr. Mehta has also observed that when the D
respondent met him, he explained to him that the case did not
involve recording of any oral evidence as it was based on documents only. Mr. Mehta adds that according to the impression he
got at that time, the respondent was satisfied that in the circumstances, the assistance of a counsel was unnecessary. It is, howE
ever, plain from the several letters written by the respondent to
Mr. Mehta that he was insisting upon an oral enquiry and that
he wanted to examine his doctors to show that he was so ill at
the relevant time that he could not have resumed his duties. On
March 2, 1951, the respondent wrote to Mr. Mehta stating, inter
a/ia, that he wished to put in the witness-box a few high-ranking F
Government officers and the doctors whom he had consulted about
his illness. Earlier .on January 20, 1951, he had written to
Mr. Mehta requesting him to conduct an oral enquiry as laid
down in paragraph 8(iv) G.B. Circular 13. Similarly, on April 23,
1951, he again informed Mr. Mehta that in his opinion the institution of the departmental enquiry after suspending him was illegal
G
and had, caused him grave injury, and he added that oral and
documentary evidence will be produced in defence.
It does appear that Mr. Mehta explained to the respondent
that so far as Government was concerned, it rested its case merely
on documents and did not think it necessary to examine any wit' B
nesses, and thereupon the respondent agreed that he need not have
· the facility of the assistance of a lawyer. But it is clear from the
remarks made by Mr. ~ehta in the order sheet on September 21,
1951, a~d the ob~ervahons made by him in his report that the
only pomt on which the respondent agreed with Mr. Mehta was
that he need not ?e allowed the assistance of the lawyer in the
departmental enqmry. We have carefully examined the record in
STATE v. NARUL LATIF (Galjenaragadkar, c. J.)
141
A this case and we see no justification for assuming that the respondent at any time gave up his demand for an oral enquiry in the
sense that he should be given permission to cite his doctors in
support of his plea that his failure to resume his duties was due
to his 111-health. The char11e agains~ him was that. he had. deliberately disobeyed the Government orders, and 1t 1s conceivable
B
that this charge could have been met by the respondent by showing that though he disobeyed the orders, the disobedience was in
no sense deliberate because his doctors had advised him to lie in
bed; and thus considered, his desire to lead medical evidence cannot be treated as a mere subterfuge to prolong the enquiry. It is
true that the respondent did not give a list of his witnesses; but
C he had named his doctors in his communications to Mr. Mehta,
and in fact Mr. Mehta never fixed any date for taking the evidence
of the witnesses whom the respondent wanted to examine. If
Mr. Mehta had told the respondent that he would take the evidence of his witnesses on a specified date and the respondent had
failed to appear on the said date with his witnesses, it would have
D
been an entirely different matter. Therefqre, the position is that
Mr. Mehta did not hold an oral enquiry and did not give an '-'P·
portunity to the respondent to examine his witnesses and so, the
question which arises for our decision is: does the failure of
Mr. Mehta to hold an oral enquiry amount to a failure to give
a reasonable opportunity to the respondent within the meaning
E
of Art. 311?
F
G
H
The requirements of Art. 311(2) have been considered by this
Court on several occasions. 'At the relevant time, Art. 311(2) provided that no person to whom Art. 311 applies shall be dismissed
or removed or reduced in rank until he has been given a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to
be taken in regard to him.--It is common ground that the impugned
order of compulsory retirement attracts the provisions of Art.
311 (2). If it appears that the relevant statutory rule regulating the
departmental enquiry which was held against the respondent made
it obligatory on the enquiry officer to hold an oral enquiry if the
respondent so demanded, then there would be no doubt that the
failure of the enquiry officer to hold such an oral enquiry wou Id
introduce a serious infirmity in the enquiry and would plainlv
amount to the failure of_ the appellant to give a reasonable opportunity to the respondent. This position is not disputed by the
learned Attorney-General· and is indeed well-settled. So, the
narrow question to which we must address ourselves is whether it
was obligatory on Mr. Mehta to hold an oral enquiry and give a
reasonable oppcrtumty to the respondent to lead oral evidence
and examine his doctors. We will assume for the purpose of this
appeal that in a given case, Government would be justified in
placing its case against the charge-sheeted officer only on documents and may be under no obligation to examine any witnesses,
142
SuPREHE
COURT
REPORTS
(1965) 3 s.c.L
though we may incjjentally observe that even in such cases, if the A
officer desires that the persons whose reports or orders are bemg
relied upon against him should be offered for cross-examination,
it may have to be considered whether such an opportunity ought
not to be given to the officer; but that aspect of the matter we
will not consider in the present appeal. Therefore, even if it is
lSsumed that Gc·vernment could dispense with the examination of B
witnesses in support of the charges framed against the respondent,
does the relevant rule make it obligatory on the Enquiry Officer
to hold an oral enquiry and give the respondent a chance to exH '"ine
his witnesses or not?
This question falls to be considered on the constructicn of 0
rule 55 of the Civil Servif:es (~::Jassification, Control and Appeall
Rules. This rule reads thus: -
"Without prejudice to the provisions of the Public
Servants lnquirie> Act, 1850, no order of dismissal,
removal or reducticn shall b.: passed on a. member of a
service (other than an order based on facts which have
led to the conviction in a Criminal Ccurt or by a Court,
Martial) unless he has bee;i infor.ned in writing of the
grounds on which it is proposed to take act:on, and has
been afforded an adequate opportunity of defe11qjng-himself. The grounds on which it is proposed to take action
shall be reduced to the form of a definite charge or
charges, which sha11 be communicated to the ·person
charged together with a statement of the allega(1cns on
which each charge is basd and of any other circumstances which it is proposed to take into consideration
in passing orders on the case. He shall be required within
a reasonable time, to put in a written statement of his
defence and to state whether he desires to be heard in
person. If he so des'res or if the authority concerned so
direct, an oral enquiry shall be held. At that enquiry era!
evi:lence shall be heard as to such of the allegations as are
not admitted. and tlae person charged shall be entitled to
cross-examine the witnesses, to give evidence in person
and to have such witnesses called. as h~ inay wish, provided that the officer conducting the enquiry may, for special and sufficient reason t0 be recorded in writing, refuse
to call a witness. The proceeding" shall contain a sufficient record of the evidence and a statement of the findings and the grounds thereof."
It appears that the Government of Madhya Pradesh had issued a
Circular explaining this Rule. The Circular contained Rule 8
which is relevant. Tt provides that "particular attention is invited
to the provisions regarding oral enquiry. In case the person charged
desires that an oral enquiry shculd be held. the authority holdin~
the departmental enquiry has no option to refuse it". The High
D
F.
F
G
H
STATE V. NAIIUL LATIF (Gaj~ndragaakar, 0.J.)
143
A Court seems to have based its conclusion substantially, if not
entirely, on this rule. We do not propose to adopt that course. The
rule may be no more than a circular issued by Government and
we do not propose to examine the question as to whether it baa
the force of a statutory rule. Our decision would, therefore, be
based on the construction of Rule 55 of the Civil Services Rules
B which admittedly applied and wh'ch admittedly is a statutory rule.
The relevant clause in this Rule provides that the officer
charge-sheeted shall be required within a reasonable time to put
in a written statement of his defence and to state whether he
desires to be heard in person. This clause has been complied with
c in the present proceedings. Mr. Mehta· gave notice to the respondent to appear before him in person on the 20th November,
1951 and the respondent did' net appear on that date. Jt is the
next clause on which the decision of the present appeal depends.
This clause _lays down· that if he, that is to say the charge-sheeted
officer. so desires or if the authority concerned so directs, an •lral
D
enquiry shall be held. In our opinion, it is plain that the requirement that an oral enquiry shall be held if the authority concerned
so directs, or if the charge-sheeted officer so desires is mandatory.
fnjeed, t~is requirement is plainly based upon considerations of
natural justice and fairplay. If the charge-sheeted officer wants
to le;id his own evidence in support of his plea, it is obviously
essential that he shculd be given an opportunity to lead such eviE
dence. Therefore, we feel no hesitation in holding that once the
respondent expressed his desire to Mr. Mehta that he wanted to
lead evidence in support of his plea that his alieged disobedience
of the Government o•ders was not deliberate, it was obligatory on
Mr. Mehta to have fixed a date for recording such oral evidence
and give due intimation to the respondent in that behalf.
F
G
It is true that the oral enquiry which the enquiry officer
is bound to hold can well be regulated by him in his discretion.
If the charge-sheeted officer starts cross-examining the departmental witnesses in an irrelevant manner, such cross-examination
can be checked and controlled. If the officer desires to examine
witnesses whose evidence may appear to the enquiry officer to be
thoroughly irrelevant, the enquiry officer may refuse to examine
s:.ich witnesses; out in doing so, he will have to record his spec'al
and sufficient reasons. In other words, the right given to the charge.
sheeted officer to cross-examine the departmental witnesses or
examine his own witnesses can be legitimately examined and conH
trolled by the enquiry officer; he would be justified in conductiny
the enquiry in such a way that its proceedings are not allowed to
be unduly or deliberateiy prolonged. But, in our opinion, it would
be impossible to accept the argument that if the charge-sheeted
cfficer wants to lead oral evidence, the enquiry officer can say
that having regard to the charges framed against the officer, he
would not hold any oral enquiry. In the present case, the witnesses
[41
SUPREJl!ll
COURT
RlilPOR'rS
[19tlfij 3 S,U,lt
whom the respondent wanted to examine would undoubtedly hwc A
given relevant evidence. If the doctors who treated the respondent
had come and told the enquiry officer that the condition of the
respondent was so bad that he could not resume work, that undoubtedly woul::I have been a relevant and material fact to consider in deciding whether the charges framed against the respon·
dent were proved. Even if we disapprove of the attitude adopted B
by the respondent in the ccurse of this enquiry and condemn him
for using .extravagant words and making unreasonable contentions
;n his communications to the enquiry officer, the fact still remains
that he wanted to examine his doctors, and though he intimated to
Mr. Mehta that he desired to examine his doctors, Mr. Mehta
failed to give him an oppo:tunity to do so. That, in our opinion,
C
introduces a fatal infirmity in the whole enquiry which means
that the respondent has not b~en given a reasonable opportunity
to defend himself within the meaning of Art. 311(2). On that view
of the matter, it is unnecessary to consider whether the High Court
was _right in its other conclusions that the second notice served
by tlie appellant on the respondent was defective and that ·the
D
final order was also defective Inasmuch as it did not appear that
the appellant had taken into account the representation made by
respondent
It is not disputed by the learned Attorney-General that if we
hold that the enquiry conducted by Mr. Mehta contravened the
E
mandatory provision of r. 55, the decision of the High Court
cuuld be sustamed on that ground alone.
In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.
Appeal dismissed.
F
•