# STATE OF BOMBAY v. UMARSAHEB BURANSAHEB INAMDA

- **Citation:** [1962] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 711
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1962
- **Case number:** CRIMINAL ArPELLATE JURISDICTION : Crimi· nal Appeal No. 237 of 1959
- **Bench:** S. K. Das, K. SUBBA RAo, Raghubar Dayal
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/state-of-bombay-v-umarsaheb-buransaheb-inamda-2338
- **Pages:** 5

## Headnote

Criminal Procedure Code-Offences commitl.ed in purBttance
of Criminal conspiracy-One trial, if ptrmislible-Defecl in
framing the charge, if curable-Code ~f Criminal Prowlurt
1898 (Act V of 1898), ss.222 (2), 235, 537,
The respondents were charged and tried at the same
trial with the offences of Criminal conspiracy and breach
of trust committed in pursuance thereof during a period of
more than one year.
The question arising for decision was
whether, in the framing of the charge, contravention or the
provisions of sub-s.(2) of s.222 which allowed a combined
charge with respect to the amount embezzled within a period
of one year, vitiated the triaJ.
Held, that the defect in the charge did not lead to any
prrjudice t> the accused and therefore did not vitiate the trial
in view of the ·provisions of s. 537 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure.
When ail the offences committed in pursuance of a
conspiracy are committed in course of the same transaction
this can be tried together at one trial in view of s. 235(1) of
1he Code of CrimiI1al Procedure which provides 1h11t if hi one
tHI -
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••Wu l!lll)al J.
712 Stn'REME COURT REPORTS (1962] SUPP.
series of ar.!S so connected togethrr a1 to form the same
transaction, more offences than one 4fC co1nmittcd Uy the
same person, he may be charged with and tried at one trial
for evtry such offence.
Kadiri Kanhahammad '- The Stat• of Madl'tll, A. I. It..
1960 S. C. 661, followod.
CRIMINAL ArPELLATE JURISDICTION : Crimi·
nal Appeal No. 237 of 1959.
Appeal from the judgment and order datwl
February 10 and 11 of 1959, of the Bombay Hig':l
Court in Criminal Appeal No. 1023/59 with Crinal Appeals Nos. 1048 and 1049 of 1958.
H. R. Khanna and P. D. Me1um, for the appellant.
S. 0. Patwardhan. J.B. Dadachanji, O.C. Mathur
and Rauinder Narain, for the respondent No. 1.
1962. January 23. 'fhe Judgment of the Court
was delivered by
RAOHVBAR
DAYAL, J.-This appeal, on a
ccrtifirate grantfd by the High Court of Bombay,
rai;;;is the question whether the contravention of the
provisions of eub-s. (2) ofs. 222 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, hereinafter called the Code,
in the framing of the charge against an aecu.sed,
vitiates the trial.
The facts leading to the appeal, in brief', are aa
follows.
The respondents were charged and tried
at tho tiamo trial of the offences under 1. 120B read
with s. 406, I.P.C., and of an offence under s. 406
I. P. C., committed in pursuance of the criminal
conspirncy t.hey had entered into. They were also
tried, but ·acquitted of other offenciis oharged with.
They appealed against their conviction of the
offence under s. 120-B read withs. 406, I.P.C., and
of the offence under s. 406, I.P.C. The charge under
B. 406, I.P.C., was with respect to the commission of
Lreaoh of trust of a sum of Ra. 2,18,369/- between
the period March 6, 1949, and June 30, 1950.
It
was contended before the High Court that the
charge framed contravened the provisions of sub-
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
713
s. (2) of s. 222 of the Code which allowed a combined
charge with respect · to the amount embezzled
within a period of a year. The High Court agreed
with this contention and, holding the trial void,
set aside
the
conviction of
the respondents
and acquitted them of those offences.
The High
Court, however, maintained the order of acquittal
1s respect of the other offences.
The State of
Bombay (now Maharashtra) has filed thi8 appeal
against the order setting aside the conviction of the
respondents.
It is not necessary for us to determine in this
appeal the general question whether the contravention of the provisions of sub-s. (2) of s. 222 of thA
Code, in the frnming of the chlirge, will always make
the trial void, as, in this particular case, the offence
under s. 406, I.P.C., charged against the respondents
was said to have been committed in pursuance of
a criminal conspiracy entered into by them. It w

## Text

2 S.O.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
711
they undoubtedly are given power to provide for
termination of employment and suspension or dis·
missal for misconduct, there is nothing inconsistent
with the spirit of the Schedule or with the object of
the Act. Therefore, we are not satisfied that the
authorities below were in error in holding that it
was competent to them to make the additional
provision in the Standing Orders as prescribed by
paragraph 11 (7).
In the result, the appenl fails and is dismissed.
No order as to costs.
Appeal dismisseJl.
STATE OF BOMBAY
v.
UMARSAHEB BURANSAHEB INAMDA
(S. K. DAS, K. SUBBA RAo and RAGHUBAR
DAYAL, JJ.)
Criminal Procedure Code-Offences commitl.ed in purBttance
of Criminal conspiracy-One trial, if ptrmislible-Defecl in
framing the charge, if curable-Code ~f Criminal Prowlurt
1898 (Act V of 1898), ss.222 (2), 235, 537,
The respondents were charged and tried at the same
trial with the offences of Criminal conspiracy and breach
of trust committed in pursuance thereof during a period of
more than one year.
The question arising for decision was
whether, in the framing of the charge, contravention or the
provisions of sub-s.(2) of s.222 which allowed a combined
charge with respect to the amount embezzled within a period
of one year, vitiated the triaJ.
Held, that the defect in the charge did not lead to any
prrjudice t> the accused and therefore did not vitiate the trial
in view of the ·provisions of s. 537 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure.
When ail the offences committed in pursuance of a
conspiracy are committed in course of the same transaction
this can be tried together at one trial in view of s. 235(1) of
1he Code of CrimiI1al Procedure which provides 1h11t if hi one
tHI -
f'lw B_.,,C_t
c. .. 1,1'.
v.
B. K. P"""'
G 4i""'°"""4r J.
.i••
81.,. •1 a.w._,
..
,, • .,,.JW
..... .-..1--
••Wu l!lll)al J.
712 Stn'REME COURT REPORTS (1962] SUPP.
series of ar.!S so connected togethrr a1 to form the same
transaction, more offences than one 4fC co1nmittcd Uy the
same person, he may be charged with and tried at one trial
for evtry such offence.
Kadiri Kanhahammad '- The Stat• of Madl'tll, A. I. It..
1960 S. C. 661, followod.
CRIMINAL ArPELLATE JURISDICTION : Crimi·
nal Appeal No. 237 of 1959.
Appeal from the judgment and order datwl
February 10 and 11 of 1959, of the Bombay Hig':l
Court in Criminal Appeal No. 1023/59 with Crinal Appeals Nos. 1048 and 1049 of 1958.
H. R. Khanna and P. D. Me1um, for the appellant.
S. 0. Patwardhan. J.B. Dadachanji, O.C. Mathur
and Rauinder Narain, for the respondent No. 1.
1962. January 23. 'fhe Judgment of the Court
was delivered by
RAOHVBAR
DAYAL, J.-This appeal, on a
ccrtifirate grantfd by the High Court of Bombay,
rai;;;is the question whether the contravention of the
provisions of eub-s. (2) ofs. 222 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, hereinafter called the Code,
in the framing of the charge against an aecu.sed,
vitiates the trial.
The facts leading to the appeal, in brief', are aa
follows.
The respondents were charged and tried
at tho tiamo trial of the offences under 1. 120B read
with s. 406, I.P.C., and of an offence under s. 406
I. P. C., committed in pursuance of the criminal
conspirncy t.hey had entered into. They were also
tried, but ·acquitted of other offenciis oharged with.
They appealed against their conviction of the
offence under s. 120-B read withs. 406, I.P.C., and
of the offence under s. 406, I.P.C. The charge under
B. 406, I.P.C., was with respect to the commission of
Lreaoh of trust of a sum of Ra. 2,18,369/- between
the period March 6, 1949, and June 30, 1950.
It
was contended before the High Court that the
charge framed contravened the provisions of sub-
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
713
s. (2) of s. 222 of the Code which allowed a combined
charge with respect · to the amount embezzled
within a period of a year. The High Court agreed
with this contention and, holding the trial void,
set aside
the
conviction of
the respondents
and acquitted them of those offences.
The High
Court, however, maintained the order of acquittal
1s respect of the other offences.
The State of
Bombay (now Maharashtra) has filed thi8 appeal
against the order setting aside the conviction of the
respondents.
It is not necessary for us to determine in this
appeal the general question whether the contravention of the provisions of sub-s. (2) of s. 222 of thA
Code, in the frnming of the chlirge, will always make
the trial void, as, in this particular case, the offence
under s. 406, I.P.C., charged against the respondents
was said to have been committed in pursuance of
a criminal conspiracy entered into by them. It will
therefore suffice, for the purpose of this case, to
consider whether such a defect in the charge vitiates
the present trial.
Section 222 of the Code is one of the sections
in Chapter XIX which deals with Form of Charges.
Sections 221, 222 and 223 deal with what should be
mentioned in thP charge. The whole object of the
charge is to inform both the prosecution, and the
accused particularly, of the accusation the prosecution has to establis'ii and the accused has to meet.
So long as the accused knows fully what accusation
he has to meet, any error in the narrat.ive of the
rharge Ut!ed not be fatal to the trial. Sections 225,
23:?, 535 and 537 save the trial from being vitiated
unless of course the accused has been prejudiced and
failurtJ of justice has taken place.
Sections 233 to 239 deal with the joinder of
charges, and t.bey speak not only of an aocnsed
'1ein~ charged with offences, but of such charges
1968
State of Bor:nbay
••
Umarsalub
Bt1ratuaheb lnamda
Jl.agJ~ubar Doyal 1,,
1961
81•'4 •f Bo.U41
••
u-1-.b
.... ....,,,.1-d.
714
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS (1962] SUPP.
hcini;r tried separately or jointly. Section 233 states
that for nvery distinct offence of which any person
is accused, there sha.11 be a. separate cha.rge a.nci
every such charge sha.11 be tried sepa.rately, except
in the cases mflntioned in 88. 234, 235, 236 and 239.
It is clear tha.t the genera.I rule is that there should
be a separate trial for e~h distinct offence or
which a person is accused.
It follows that each
item of property of which an accused is alleged to
havc committed breach of trust, constitutell one
distinct offence and that, in general, it would be
necessary to have as many trials as there be distinct
offenc~s of criminal breach of trust committ.ed by
the accused. Buts. 222(2) provides that when the
aooused is charged with criminal breach of trust,
the charge may be with respect to the grOBB sum
embezzled within a period of one year and that the
charged Ro framed shall be doemed to be a charge of
one offonoo within the meaning of s. ;/:14.
The
charge framed in the prosent case was with reRpect
to the groBB sum cm hczzled within a period of more
than twelve months, the pPriod bl>ing between
March fi, 1949 and June :10, 1950.
The charge
therefore was in contravention of the provisions of
A. 222(2).
This defect in the charge, however, did
not lead to 1my prejudice to the accuse<l in the trial
and thero·fore did not vitiate tho trial, in view of
the provisions of s. !i3i of the Code.
'l'ho charge could have been split up into two
charges, one with respect to the offence of criminal
breach of trust comm itied with respect to the
a.mount cmbl'zzlcd bet ween March
fi, l!H!l and
March 5, 1950 and the other with respect to the
a.mount embezzled between March fl, 1!150 a.nd
,June :lO 1950. The two offences of criminal breach
of trust could have been tried toget.her in thr.
present C:\Se, as the offences were said to have boon
committed in pursuance of the criminal conspiracy
entered into by the accused.
All the oft'eno611
..
2 S.C~R.
SUPREME COURT REp0RTS
715
committed in pursuance of the conspiracy are
committed in the course of the same transaction
and therefore can he tried together at one trial, in
view of sub-s. ( 1 \of s. 235 of the Code which pro·
vides that if in one series of acts so connected
together as to form the same transaction, more
offences than one are committed by the same person,
he may be charged with and tried at one trial for
every such offence, It is therefore clear that no
prejudice was caused to the accused by the defect
in the charge.
A similar view has been taken by this Court
in Kadiri Kunhahammad v. The State of Madras(').
We may further point out that the High Court
should not have expressed its opinion or passed any
order with respect to the acquittal of the respondents
for the other offences when the order of acquittal
was not before it for consideration and when it had
held the entire trial to be void on acco11nt of the
contravention of the provisions of sub-a. (2) of
s. 222.
We therefore hold that the trial of the
respondents was
legal and therefore allow the
appeal and set aside the order of the High Court.
Their appeal airainst their conviction has not bet>n
heard on merits and therefore we remand the case
to the High Court for further hearing aocordinll' to
law.
(1) A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 661 .
1982
State of Bombay
v.
Umarsaheb
Buran.saheb Inamda
Raghuhar Dayal J.