# STATE OF GOA v. JOSE MARIA ALBERT VALES @ ROBERT VALES

- **Citation:** [2017] 14 S.C.R. 163
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 2017-08-18
- **Case number:** Criminal Appeal Nos.1427-1428 of2017
- **Bench:** Arun Mishra, Amitava Roy
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/state-of-goa-v-jose-maria-albert-vales-robert-vales-31957
- **Pages:** 39

## Headnote

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - ss.244, 340 and 343 -
Statement of respondent, a prose.cution witness, reco_rded u/s.164,
Cr.P. C by Magistrate - While testifying in the Session's trial,
respondent resiled from. this statement- Sessions Court being prima
facie of the view that the respondent deliberately made contradictory
statements on oath in order to screen/favour the accused in the
session's trial, without conducting any inquiry as permissible u/
s. 340, directed respondent's prosecution by filing complaint against
A
B
c
him uls..193,JPC - Accordingly, a complaint was filed against the D
respondent uls.193,JPC in the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate - .
In the proceedings, prosecution examined three witnesses from the
list apart from the complainant-Sessions Judge - Thereafter,
Magistrate framed charges against the respondent uls.193,IPC -
Application by respondent before Magistrate for dropping· of the
E
proceedings against him, rejected - Revision before Court of
Sessions also rejected - High Court quashed the charges against
the respondent holding it to be premature and in violation of
procedure prescribed uls.244,Cr.P.C. - According to High Court
F
the complaint ought to have been construed to be a case otherwise
than on polite report to which warrant procedure was applicable,
thus, charge could not have been framed against respondent as the
prosecution had not adduced all its evidence at that_ stage, as
required u/s.244,Cr.P.C - Plea of appellant-State before Supreme
Court that in terms of s.343,Cr.P.C the case though registered on a
complaint u/s.340 was to be dealt with as if instituted on a police
G
report, for which the rigour of the procedure u/s.244,Cr.PC was
inapplicable - Held: Approach of High Court is. wholly indefensible,
as uls. 343(1 ), Cr.P. C the procedure prescribedfor cases instituted
otherwise than on police report is not attracted qua a complaint u/
s.340, Cr.P. C. - impugned judgment of High Court is unsustainableTrial Magistrate to proceed from the stage of framing of charge,
H
163
164
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2017] 14 S.C.R.
A
strictly in compliance of s.343(1),CrPC- Penal Code; 1860- s.193Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 - s.476.
Words & Phrases - "Complaint", "inquiry", "investigation",
"police report", "summons-case" and "warrant-case "~Meaning
of - Explained - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - ss.2(d), 2(g),
B 2(h), 2(r), 2(w) and 2(x).
Code of Criminal Procedure, 197 3 -
'Inquiry' and
'Investigation' - Difference between - Discussed.
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - s.195 - Offences u/Cl.(a)
and (b) -· Cognizance of - Conditions for - Held: Vis-a-vis the
c offences enumerated in clause (a), cognizance is permissible only
on a complaint in writing of the public servant concerned or of
some other public servant to whom he is administratively
subordinate- For offences in clause (b), a complaint in writing of
the Court or by such officer of the Court, as that Court may authorise
in writing or of some other Court to which that Court is subordinate
D is an imperative precondition.
E
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973- s.195- Offences under
Cl.(a) & (b)- Summons cases or warrant case- Held:Having regard
to the punishments prescribed therefor, the offences detailed in
clauses (a) and (b), give rise to "summons" as well "warrant-cases".
Penal Code, 1860 - s.193 - Offence under - Summons case
or warrant case '- Held: An offen<:r{.'uls.193 would constitute a
. .
. . ; . ,., .
warrant case.
Code of Crimina(P;ocedure, 1973- Chapter XIX- ss.238243, ss. 244-247- Trial of warrant cases by Magistrate in cases
F
instituted on a police report and in cases instituted otherwise than
on police report - Procedure adopted for - Distinction between -
· Held: The distinction lies in the fact that whereas in the former,
there is no scope for the prosecution to examine any witness at the
stage where the Magistrate is to consider whether a charge is to be
G framed or not, in cases instituted otherwise than on a pol

## Text

_Characters 0–39,967 of 97,101. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39967 for what follows._

[2017] 14 S.C.R. 163
STATE OF GOA
v.
JOSE MARIA ALBERT VALES @ ROBERT VALES
(Criminal Appeal Nos.1427-1428 of2017)
AUGUST 18, 2017
[ARUN MISHRA AND AMITAVA ROY, JJ.]
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - ss.244, 340 and 343 -
Statement of respondent, a prose.cution witness, reco_rded u/s.164,
Cr.P. C by Magistrate - While testifying in the Session's trial,
respondent resiled from. this statement- Sessions Court being prima
facie of the view that the respondent deliberately made contradictory
statements on oath in order to screen/favour the accused in the
session's trial, without conducting any inquiry as permissible u/
s. 340, directed respondent's prosecution by filing complaint against
A
B
c
him uls..193,JPC - Accordingly, a complaint was filed against the D
respondent uls.193,JPC in the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate - .
In the proceedings, prosecution examined three witnesses from the
list apart from the complainant-Sessions Judge - Thereafter,
Magistrate framed charges against the respondent uls.193,IPC -
Application by respondent before Magistrate for dropping· of the
E
proceedings against him, rejected - Revision before Court of
Sessions also rejected - High Court quashed the charges against
the respondent holding it to be premature and in violation of
procedure prescribed uls.244,Cr.P.C. - According to High Court
F
the complaint ought to have been construed to be a case otherwise
than on polite report to which warrant procedure was applicable,
thus, charge could not have been framed against respondent as the
prosecution had not adduced all its evidence at that_ stage, as
required u/s.244,Cr.P.C - Plea of appellant-State before Supreme
Court that in terms of s.343,Cr.P.C the case though registered on a
complaint u/s.340 was to be dealt with as if instituted on a police
G
report, for which the rigour of the procedure u/s.244,Cr.PC was
inapplicable - Held: Approach of High Court is. wholly indefensible,
as uls. 343(1 ), Cr.P. C the procedure prescribedfor cases instituted
otherwise than on police report is not attracted qua a complaint u/
s.340, Cr.P. C. - impugned judgment of High Court is unsustainableTrial Magistrate to proceed from the stage of framing of charge,
H
163
164
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2017] 14 S.C.R.
A
strictly in compliance of s.343(1),CrPC- Penal Code; 1860- s.193Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 - s.476.
Words & Phrases - "Complaint", "inquiry", "investigation",
"police report", "summons-case" and "warrant-case "~Meaning
of - Explained - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - ss.2(d), 2(g),
B 2(h), 2(r), 2(w) and 2(x).
Code of Criminal Procedure, 197 3 -
'Inquiry' and
'Investigation' - Difference between - Discussed.
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - s.195 - Offences u/Cl.(a)
and (b) -· Cognizance of - Conditions for - Held: Vis-a-vis the
c offences enumerated in clause (a), cognizance is permissible only
on a complaint in writing of the public servant concerned or of
some other public servant to whom he is administratively
subordinate- For offences in clause (b), a complaint in writing of
the Court or by such officer of the Court, as that Court may authorise
in writing or of some other Court to which that Court is subordinate
D is an imperative precondition.
E
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973- s.195- Offences under
Cl.(a) & (b)- Summons cases or warrant case- Held:Having regard
to the punishments prescribed therefor, the offences detailed in
clauses (a) and (b), give rise to "summons" as well "warrant-cases".
Penal Code, 1860 - s.193 - Offence under - Summons case
or warrant case '- Held: An offen<:r{.'uls.193 would constitute a
. .
. . ; . ,., .
warrant case.
Code of Crimina(P;ocedure, 1973- Chapter XIX- ss.238243, ss. 244-247- Trial of warrant cases by Magistrate in cases
F
instituted on a police report and in cases instituted otherwise than
on police report - Procedure adopted for - Distinction between -
· Held: The distinction lies in the fact that whereas in the former,
there is no scope for the prosecution to examine any witness at the
stage where the Magistrate is to consider whether a charge is to be
G framed or not, in cases instituted otherwise than on a police report,
after the accused appears or is brought before the Magistrate, the
prosecution is required to adduce all such evidence in support of
his case.
H
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Chapter XXVI - s.340 -
Complaint under - Two essential pre-requisites for - Explained.
STATE OF GOA v. JOSE MARIA ALBERT VALES@ ROBERT
165
VALES
Code of Criminal Procedure; 1973,.... s.340 - Enquiry under -
A
Scope of - Held: Scope of scrutiny 'u/s.340 .is to decide whether on
the materials available the matter requires. inquiry by a criminal
court and whether it is expedient in the interests of justice to have
an inquiry into the offence affecting administration of justice.
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - s.343 - Procedure to be
B
adopted by the Magistrate taking cognizance - Discussed.
Words & Phrases - "as far as may be" - Meaning of - Code
of Cri17Jinal Procedure, 1973 - s.343(1).
Allowing the appeals, the Court
c
HELD: 1.1 A "complaint" is an allegation made orally or in
writing to a Magistrate with a view to take action under CrPC
against some person, known or unknown, who had committed an
offence and does. not i~lude a police report. In contradistinction,
"police report" means i:report forwarded by a police officer to a
Magistrate under Section l73(2), CrPC ~hereas "warrant case" D
is one relatable to an offence punishable with death, imprisonment
. for life or punishment for a t11rm eif eeding two Y.ears, a "summonscase" is one qua an· offence which is not a "war~ant-case". A clear
cut distinction, therefore, has been ordained by ~e CrPC between
a "complaint" and a "police report" as well as a. "warrant-case" E
and a "summons-case". [Para 14) [179-A-C)
1.2 Notably, "inquiry" means every inquiry other than a
trial conductedunder the Code of Criminal Procedure by a
Magistrate or Court. Distinguished from "inguiry", which is to
be undertaken by a Magistrate or a Court, as prescribed,
"investigation" includes all proceedings under the Code for the
collection of evidence conducted by a police officer or by any
person (other than a Magistrate), who is authorized by a
Magistrate in that regard. [Para 15) [179-C-D)
F
2. Sectio~ 195 CrPC deals with prosecution for contempt
of lawful authority of public servants for offences against public
.G
justice and for offences relating to documents given in evidence.
Sub-section (1) thereof, which is relevant for the present pursuit,
clamps an embargo on the cognizance by any court of any offence,
as mentioned therein, in clauses (a) and (b) thereof. Whereas,
vis-a-vis the offences enumerated in clause (a), such cognizance H
166
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2017] 14 S.C.R.
A is permissible only on a complaint in writing of the public servant
concerned or of some other public servant to whom he is
administratively subordinate, in re offences cataglogued in clause
(b), a complaint in writing of the Court or by such officer of the
Court, as that Court may authorise in writing or of some other
Court to which that Court is subordinate, is an imperative
B precondition. The offences detailed in clauses (a) and (b),
having regard to the punishments prescribed therefor, give rise
to "summons" as well "warrant-cases". An offence under Section
193 IPC however would constitute a warrant case. [Paras 16, 17)
[l 79~E-F; 180-G-H)
c
3. A cumulative review of the provisions pertaining to the
cognizance of an offence by the Magistrate on a complaint would
evince that a Magistrate, if he thinks fit, even after the examination
of the complainant and the witnesses present, at the time of taking
cognizance may postpone the issuance of process, if he construes
D it to be fit to either cause an inquiry to be made by himself or
direct an investigation to be made by a police officer or such
other person, as he thinks fit, for being satisfied as to whether or
not, there is sufficient ground for proceeding. A Magistrate,
however, need not examine the complainant and the witnesses,
if a pubic servant acting or purporting to act in the discharge of
E
his official duties or a Court has made the complaint. There is
however no restraint on him to cause an inquiry to be made by
himself even on such a complaint for the purpose of deciding
whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding. This
F
allowance is assuredly to secure the ends of justice and to avoid/
obviate 1~ven the remotest possibility of any avoidable
prosecution. [Para 23) [181-G-H; 182-A-B)
4.1 Chapter XIX is devoted to trial of warrant cases by
Magistrate and enfolds two categories i.e. A -cases instituted on
a police report and B- cases instituted otherwise than on a police
G report. In the former category i;e. cases instituted on a police
report, the successive stages comprehended after the accused
appears or is brought before a Magistrate at the commencement
of the trial, have been detailed. These are accommodated
in Sections 238 to 243. With regard to cases instituted otherwise
than on police report, the procedure is outlined in Sections
H 244 to 247 of CrPC. [Paras 24, 27) [182-C; 183-E-F]
STAIE OF GOA v. JOSE MARIA ALBERT VALES @ROBERT
167
VALES
4.2 The strikingly. distinguishable feature in the procedures
A
to be adopted for cases instituted on a police report and those
instituted otherwise than on a police report, lies in the fact that
whereas in .the former, there is no scope for the prosecution to
examine any witness at the stage where the Magistrate is to
consider whether a charge is to be framed or not, in cases B
instituted othenvise than on a police report, after the accused
appears or is brought before the Magistrate, the prosecution is
required to adduce all such evidence in support of his cas_~,
whereupon the Magistrate may discharge ttie accuse.d, if he is of
the view, for reasons to be recorded on the basis of such evidence,
that no case had been made out against him, which if unrebutted,
would warrant his conviction. However, if the Magistrate is of
c
the opinion, in view of such evide.nce, or also at any previous
stage of the case, that there is ground. for presuming that the
accused has committed an offence triable under the Chapter and
which he is competent to try and adequately punish, he shall D
frame a charge against the accused. Subsequent thereto, if the
accused refuses to plead guilty or does not plead so or claims· to
be tried, vis-a-vis the charge, he would be offered an opportunity
to cross-examine any of the witnesses of the prosecution, whose
evidence had been taken and on which the charge is founded and
if the accused elects to avail this opportunity, the witnesses named
by him would be recalled and after cross-examination and reexamination, they shall be discharged. Thus, not only the
prosecution, in the cases instituted otherwise than on a police
report, would have an opportunity to adduce all such evidence in
support of its case on which, on a consideration whereof, the
accused may be charged or discharged, as the case may be, the
latter can avail the opportunity of cross-examining the witnesses
only after the charge is framed. As Section 246(6) would
authenticate, the prosecution woul.d thereafter have another
chance of examining the remaining witnesses, who understandably,
E
F
if examined, would be subjected to cross-examination and re- · G
examination before their discharge. [Para 28) (184-F-H; 185-AC)
4.3 Chapter XX deals with trial of summons-cases by the
Magistrates in which, after the accused appears or is brought
before the Magistrate, the particulars of the offence of which he H
168
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2017] 14 S.C.R.
A is accused, shall be stated to him and he would be asked whether
he pleads guilty or has any defence to make, but it would not be
necessary to frame a formal charge. If the accused pleads guilty,
the Magistrate would record the plea as nearly as possible in the
words used by him and may, in his discretion, convict him thereon.
B If however, the Magistrate does not convict the accused, he shall
nroceed to hear the prosecution and take all such evidence as
may be produced in support of the prosecution and also hear the
accused and take all such evidence as he would produce in his
defence and record acquittal or conviction, as the case may be.
[Para 291 [185-D-F)
c
5.1 Chapter XXVI pertaining to "Provisions as to offences
affecting the administration of justice", is the center piece of
scrutiny. As per Section 340, CrPC, captioned as "Procedure in
cases mentioned in Section 195", when upon an application made
to it in this behalf or otherwise, any Court is of the opinion that it
D is expedient in the interests of justice that an inquiry should be
made into any offence referred to in clause (b) of sub-section (1)
of Section 195, which appears to have been committed in or in
relation to a proceeding in that Court or as the case may be in
respect of a document produced or given in evidence in a
proceeding in that Court, such Court may after such preliminary
E enquiry, if any, as it thinks necessary: (a) record a finding to that
effect; (b) make a complaint thereof in writing; (c) send it to a
Magistrate of the first class having jurisdiction; ( d) take sufficient
security for the appearance for the nccused before such
Magistrate, or if the alleged offence is non-bailable and the Court
F thinks it necessary so to do, send the accused in custody to such
Magistrate; and (e) bind over any person to appear and give
evidence before such Magistrate. [Para 30) [185-G-H; 186-A-C)
5.2 This power in the eventualities, as enumerated in subsection (2), can be exercised by the Court to which the former
G Court is subordinate within the meaning of Section 195(4). Subsection (3) requires that such a complaint has to be signed by the
authorities as mentioned therein. The two essential prerequisites, as predicated by this provision, are formation of an
opinion (1) even ifprima facie, that an offence referred to Section
195(1)(b) appears to have been committed in or in relation to a
H
STATE OF GOA v. JOSE MARIA ALBERT VALES@ ROBERT
169
VALES
proceeding of the Court or as the case may be in respect of any A
document produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in that
Court and (2) it is expedient in the-interests of justice that an
enquiry should be made into-such offence .. [P_ara 31) [186-D-E)
5.3 It is ~o longer res integra that the preiiminary enquir.y,
as compr:ehended in Section 340, is not obligatory to be B
undertaken by the Court before taking the initiatives as contained
in clauses (a) to (e) while invoking its powers thereunder. Section
341 provides for an appeal against an order either refusing to
make a complaint or making a complaint under Section 340,
whereupon the superior court may direct the making of the
complaint or withdrawal thereof, as the case may be. Section 343
C
delineates the procedure to be adopted by the Magistrate taking
cognizance. [Para 32) [186-F-G)
5.4 As sub-section (1) of Section 343 would unequivocally
testify, a Magistrate _to whom a complaint is made under Section
340 or Section 341 shall, notwithstanding anything contained in D
Chapter XV of the Code i.e. the procedure to be followed by a
Magistrate taking cognizance on a complaint, proceed as far as
may be to deal with the case as if it was instituted on a police
report. [Para 33) [187-C-E)
5.5 At t!te stage of lodging of a complaint under Section E
340 Cr.P.C., the decisive consideration is the satisfaction derived
by the Complaining Court that it was expedient in the interests
of justice ·that an inquiry ought to be made by a Criminal Court
into an offence which otherwise appeared to have been committed
in connection with the proceedings before it and affecting the
F
administration of justice. The language used in Section
340 Cr.P.C. does not make it imperative for a Court to make a
complaint regarding commission of an offence referred to
in Section 195(1)(b) as the Section is conditioned by the words
"Court is of opinion that it is expedient in the interests of justice"
which demonstrate that such a course would be adopted only if in G
the interests of justice, it is required and not otherwise. (Paras
35, 36) [188-A, B-C, D-E)
5.6 In an inquiry held by the Court under Section 340(1),
Cr PC irrespective of the result .of the main case, the only question
is whether a prima facie case is made out which, if unrebutted, H ·
170
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2017] 14 S.C.R.
A may have a reasonable likelihood to establish the specified offence
and whether it is also expedient in the interests of justice to take
such action. Further, at the trial, the reasons recorded in the
order under Section 340(1) should not weigh with the Criminal
Court in coming to its independent conclusion whether the
B offence, as alleged, has been fully established beyond reasonable
doubt and it would be for the prosecution to establish all the
ingredients of such offence and the decision would be based only
on the evidence produced before the Criminal Court during the
trial and its conclusion would be independent of the opinion formed
by the complaining court under Section 340(1). [Para 37) [188C G-H; 189-A-C)
5. 7 The hub of Section 340 is the formation of an opinion by
the Court, before which the proceedings were pending prior to
the complaint, that it is expedient in the interests of justice that
an inquiry should be made into an offence which appears to have
D been committed. Though in order to form such an opinion, the
Court was empowered to hold a preliminary inquiry, it was not
obligatory to do so and even without such preliminary inquiry,
the Court could form such an opinion. The Court, though, even
after forming such an opinion was not obligated to make a
complaint, but once it decides to do so, it has to make a finding to
E the effect that in the fact situation, it is expedient in the interests
of justice that the offence should be further probed into. Absence
of any preliminary inquiry would not vitiate a finding if reached,
that it is expedient in the interests of justice that an inquiry should
be made into the offence which appears to have been committed.
F The preliminary inquiry.contemplated was not for finding as to
whether a particular person was guilty or not but only to decide
as to whether it is expedient in the interests of justice to inquire
into the offence which appears to have been committed. At the
stage of analysis under Section 340, CrPC for the above purpose,
there was no legal obligation to afford an opportunity to the
G persons against whom the complaint could eventually be made.
[Paras 39, 42] [189-E-H; 190-A; 191-A-B)
H
6.1 The salient features of the expression "as far as may
be" engrafted in Section 343, the can be deciphered as: (i) a
Magistrate dealing with a complaint under Section 340 or Section
STATE.OF GOA v. JOSE MARIA ALBERT VALES @.ROBERT
171
VALES
341 has to proceed as far as may be to deal with the case as if it A
were instituted on a police report; (ii) this course the Magistrate
would follow notwithstanding anything contained in Chapter XV.
[Para 51) (195-G-H; 196-A]
~ · 6.2 Noticeably, the expression "as far as may be" assuredly
lends some elasticity, relaxing the otherwise rigour of the B
legislative mandate to deal with the complaint as a case instituted
on a police report. It cannot be gainsaid that in absence of this.
discernible flexibility, the Magistrate would be left with no option
but to construe the complaint under Section 340 or Section 341 to
bf a· case as if instituted on a police report, Section 343(1) thus
clearly marks an exception qua the procedure to be adopted by
C
the Trial Magistrate if the complaint is filed under Section
340 or Section 341,CrPC. To reiterate, barring the perceptible
flexibility as contained in the expression "as far as may be", the
Magistrate is required to deal with the complaint as a case as if
instituted on a police report. Section 343(1), CrPC enjoins the D
Trial Magistrate to deal with the complaint under Section
· 340 or Section 341 by treating it to be a case, as if instituted on a
police report. There is indeed a deeming element ingrained in
the provision. Further, the expression "as far as may be" does
not foreclose wholly, at the same time the discretion of the Trial
Magistrate, if he genuinely feels it necessary, to get additional E
materials on record for his necessary satisfaction to proceed
thereafter as required in law. This element of discretion conferred
on the Trial Magistrate does not either suggest or encourage
any irreverence to the complaining court and the legislative intent
is to ensure against avertable judicial proceedings in the overall
F
interest of justice. The amendment, while secures an expeditious
disposal of the complaint by treating it to be a case instituted on
a police report as far as may be without undergoing the rigour of
the elaborate procedure meant for a complaint case, has with the
conferment of the discretion on the Trial Magistrate, as above
provided the necessary balance to prevent even the remotest G
possibility of a lame prosecution. [Paras 52, 55) [196-B-C; 197E-H; 198-A]
. 7. Judged from the standpoint of interplay between Sections
340 and 343, CrPC, thus the following eventualities may arise:
H
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2017] 14 S.C.R.
A a) When a judicial complaint is based. on materials collected in
the course of preliminary inquiry before the complaint under
Section 340 is filed. This is a situation where in terms of Section
343, the Trial Magistrate shall straightway deal therewith as if it
was instituted on a police report as per Chapter XIX-A of the
B Code.
b) Where the judicial complaint is not preceded by a preliminary
inquiry and there is no material either by way of any statement or
document and the Trial Magistrate genuinely feels in the cause
of justice that even if there is a prima facie satisfaction of the
complaining court that the offence mentioned appears to have
C been committed, he can undertake a summary enquiry and on
•
the completion thereof, may decide on the complaint in accordance
withla.w.
·
c) Where though no preliminary inquiry had been made before ·
filing of the judicial complaint, the facts are so clear and obvious
D in endorsement of the prima facie satisfaction that the offence
had been committed and that it is expedient in the interests of
justice to have the same probed into further by the Trial
Magistrate, the Trial Magistrate shall deal with the case as if it
was instituted on a police report and follow the procedure under
E Chapter XIX-A of the Code. [Para 54) [196-G-H; 197-A-D]
8.1 Reverting to the case in hand, the complaint was filed
by the Trial Court stating that the respondent had committed an
. offence under Section 193 IPC, he having resorted to falsehood
on oath at the trial in order to screen the accused from the crime
F
and to enable him to escape punishment. The offence alleged is
one included in -Section 195(1)(b), CrPC and is otherwise, having
regard to the punishment prescribed, to which, warrant procedure
would be applicable. In course of the arguments, it had transpired
that the Trial Magistrate had examined the complainant and some
other witnesses before framing charge against the respondent
G under the above provision of law. The High Court by the order
impugned however, had sustained the plea of the respondent that
as the complaint ought to have been construed to be a case
otherwise than on police report to which warrant procedure was
applicable, charge could not have been framed as the prosecution
H had not adduced all its evidence at that stage, as required
""'
(.'''
STATE OF GOA v. JOSE MARIA ALBERT VALES @ROBERT
173
VALES
under Section 244 of the Cr.P.C. Significantly, no challenge has · A
been made to the legality and/or the validity of the order
under Section 340 or the complaint on any ground. It has also
not been asserted in the course of arguments that the evidence
already recorded is not sufficient to frame a charge, as had been
done by the Trial Magistrate. [Para 59) [200-D-H)
8.2 In view of the determination as above, the approach of
B
the High Court is wholly indefensible, as in the face of Section
343(1) of the Cr.P.C., the procedure prescribed for cases
instituted otherwise than on police report is not attracted qua a
complaint under Section 340 and/or Section 341, CrPC.
Even
C
assuming that the Trial Magistrate had examined few witnesses
in support of the complaint, it was in the form of a summary inquiry,
to be satisfied as to whether the materials on record would justify
the framing of charge against the respondent or not and nothing
further. Any other view would fly in the face of the ordainment
of Section 343(1) of the Cr.P.C. and thus cannot receive judicial D
imprimatur. The impugned judgment of the High Court in quashing
. the charge framed by the Trial Magistrate and remanding the
case to him to follow the procedure outlined for cases, instituted ·
otherwise than on police report, under Chapter XIX-B is on the
face of it unsustainable in law and on facts. It is thus set asi<Je.
The Trial Magistrate would proceed from the stage of framing of E
charge, strictly in compliance of the letter and spirit of the precept
contained in Section 343(1), CrPC. (Para 60] [201-A-D]
MS. Sheriff. P. C. Damodaran Nair v. State of Madras
AIR 1954 SC 397 : [1954) SCR 1229; Iqbal Singh
Marwah and another v. Meenakshi Marwah and
F
Another (2005) 4 SCC 370: [2005] 2 SCR 708 -
followed.
Godrej & Boyce Manufacturing Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. Union
of India & Ors. (Decision of Bombay High Court) 1992
Crl.L.J. 3752; Mohan Lal Jatia v. Registrar General,
G
Supreme Court of India (2010) Delhi Law Times 335 -
approved.
Pritish v. State of Maharashtra and Others (2002) 1 SCC
253 : [2001) 5 Suppl. SCR 302; Amarsang Nathaji v.
Hardik Harshadbhai Patel and Others (2017) 1 SCC
H
174
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(2017) 14 S.C.R.
A
113 : [2016) 12 SCR 80 ; K. Karunakaran v. T. V.
B
c
D
Eachara Warrier and Anr. (1978) 1 SCC 18 :
[1978] 2 SCR 209 - relied on.
Case Law Reference
[2001] 5 Suppl. SCR 302
relied on
Para 11
[2016] 12 SCR 80
relied on
Para 11
· 1992 Crl.L.J. 3752
approved
Para 12
[1!154] SCR 1229
followed
Para35
[2005] 2 SCR 708
followed
Para 36
[1978) 2 SCR 209
relied on
Para 37
(2010) Delhi Law Times 335
approved
Para 44
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal
Nos.1427-1428 of2017.
From the impugned Judgment and Final Orders dated 05-03-2013
and 30-07-2015 of the High Court of Bombay at Goa in Criminal Writ
Petition No.113 of2012 and Criminal Misc. Application No.35 of2015
respectively.
E
Pratap Venugopal, Dileep Poolakot, Ms. Niharika, Aman Shukla,
Ms.Kanika Kalaiyarasan (for Mis K J John and Co.), Advs. for the
Appellant.
Trideep Pais, Pranav Jain and Gautam Narayan, Advs. for the
Respondent.
F
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
AMITAVA ROY, J. 1. Leave granted
2. The instant assailment of the judgment and order dated
05.03.2013 seeks to annul this verdict of the High Court whereby the
charge framed by the Trial Magistrate against the respondent under
G Section 193 of the Indian Penal Code (for short hereafter to be referred
to as the "IPC") has been set aside, having been held to be prematured
and in violation of the procedure prescribed by Section 244 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, hereafter to be referred to as the
"Cr.P.C./Code"), as all evidence on behalf of the prosecution had not
H
been adduced, the case being one registered on a complaint under Section
STATE OF GOA v. JOSE MARIA ALBERT VALES @ROBERT
175
VALES [AMITAVA ROY, J.]
340 Cr.P.C. and thus otherwise than on police report and the Trial A
Magistrate has been directed to examine the remaining witnesses of the
prosecution and thereafter decide as to whether any case had been
made out against the respondent for framing of charge. ·
· 3. The appellant/State, being aggrieved, has questioned the legality
and correctness of this view contending in substance that in terms of B
Section 343 Cr.P.C., the case though registered on a complaint under
Section 340 thereof, was to be dealt with as if instituted on a police
report for which the rigour of the procedure under Section 244 of Cr.P.C.
was inapplicable.
4. The legal issue raised, being of significant moment and c
consequence in the context of day to day adjudicative,relevance, merits
a riveted attention.
5. We have heard Mr. Pratap Venugopal, learned counsel for the
appellant and Mr. Trideep Pais, learned counsel for the respondent.
6. The factual conspectus is on a limited canvas. It is a matter of D'
record that in Sessions CaseNo.18/2000 - titled State vs, Srikar Naik
Kurade and others, under Sections 120B-and 302 IPC along with Section
'.2.5 of the Arms Act, 1959 tried by the Court of Sessions, Margao, the
respondent was a witness cited by the prosecution. Before his deposition
on oath at the trial, his statement was recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C.
E
by the concerned Magistrate. While testifying in the session's trial, he
resiled from this statement so much so that the Sessions Court was of
the view that the respondent along with two other witnesses, who had
similarly retracted from their earlier statements under Section 164 Cr.P.C.
had tendered false evidence warranting initiation of a proceeding for the
offence under Section 193 IPC. Accordingly, however without conducting
F
any inquiry as permissible under Section 340 Cr.P.C., and in view of the
prima facie satisfaction that the respondent and the other two witnesses
have deliberately made contradictory statements on oath in order to
screen and/or favour the accused in the session's trial, the Sessions
Court by order dated 14.08.2003 directed that they be prosecuted by
G
filing separate complaints against them under Section 193 IPC. While
adopting this course, the Sessions Court recorded that it was not
peremptory to hold an inquiry under Section 340(1) Cr.P.C.
7. Accordingly, a complaint was filed on 29.11.2003 under Section
193 IPC against the respondent by the District and Sessions Judge,
H
176
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2017) 14 S.C.R.
A Margao which was registered as Criminal Case No.380/5/2003/III in
the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate at Margao.
8. The above facts were set out in the complaint with the
elaboration that the statement of the respondent under Section 164 Cr.P. C.
was recorded by the learned Magistrate on 18.02.2000 whereas his
B deposition as PW-22 in the Sessions Case was scripted on 10.10.2002 in
course whereof he was declared hostile and was cross-examined by the
prosecution. The complaint did set out one set of such irreconcilable
versions to highlight the perceived blatant falsehood deliberately resorted
to by the witness for helping the accused to escape punishment. The
document cited six witnesses understandably in addition to the complainant.
c
9. In the proceedings that followed, the prosecution examined
three witnesses from the list apart from the Additional Sessions Judge
who had presided over the session's trial, who were duly cross-examined
on behalf of the respondent whereafter the learned Magistrate instead
of insisting on the examination of the remaining witnesses in the list,
D framed charge against the respondent under Section 193 IPC.
·
10. On 02.07 .2008, the application filed by the respondent before
the Trial Magistrate for dropping of the proceedings against him having
been rejected, he unsuccessfully filed a revision in the Court of the
Sessions Judge, whereafter he took the challenge to the High Court. By
E the impugned order, as aforementioned, the High Court has quashed the
charge framed against the.respondent proceeding on the premise that
the case was one instituted otherwise than on the basis of police report
and the offence being triable by warrant procedure, a rigid compliance
of Section 244 Cr.P.C. was called for. The charge framed by the Trial
F Magistrate was held to be unjustified and prematured and after quashing
the same, it has directed the Trial Court to follow the procedure under
Section 244 Cr.P.C., by examining the remaining witnesses of the
prosecution and thereafter to decide whether any case had been made
out for framing of charge against the respondent. The application filed
by the prosecution seeking a review or recall of this order by the High
G Court, filed belatedly was however rejected, there being no clerical
mistake or any justification to invoke the inherent powers under Section
482 of the Cr.P.C.
11. The learned counsel for the appellant/State, referring to Section
343(1) Cr.P.C. in particular, has urged thatthe High Court had fallen in
H error in interfering with the charge framed against the respondent on the
.STATE OF GOA v. JOSE MARIA ALBERT VALES @ ROBERT
177
VALES [AMITAVA ROY, J.) -
presupposition that the procedure prescribed by Section 244 Cr.P.C. with - A -
full rigidity was applicable to the case in hand. 'It has been argued that in
terms of Section 343(1), a Magistrate to whom a complaint is made
under Section 340 or Section 341, notwithstanding anything contained in
Chapter XV of the Cr.P.C., is required to deal with the case, as if it was
instituted on a police report and thus vis-a-vis the offences mentioned in - i3
Section 195 of Cr.P.C., the Magistrate, on receiving the complaint, has 0
to deal withit under Sections 238 to 243 Cr.P.C. as if it were instituted
on police report to which warrant procedure was applicable. Qua the
delay in filing the Special Leave Petition, it has be.en urged that having
regard io the importance of the legal issue involved as well as the
explanation provided, it ought to be condoned. Reliance has been placed
C
on the decisions of this Court in Pritish Vs. State of Maharashtra and
others1 and 'Amarsang Nathaji Vs. Hardik Harshadbhai Patel and_
~~-
.
12. Per contra;the.Iearned c·ounsel for the respondent has argued
-that having regard to the text of Section 343(1) Cr.P.C. and more -D
particularly the words "as far as may be", the plea that every case
registered on a c~mplaint under Section 340 or Section 34 J Cr.P.C. ought
to be proceeded with as one instituted on p0lice report under Chapter
XIX-A i.e. as p,er the procedure laid down in Sections 238 to 243 is
patently flawed. While endorsing the view taken by th<'. High Court, it
_ has been asserted that the decisions cited on behalfof the prosecution in
support of the contention of applicability of Chapter XIX-A Ct.P. C. are
E
-distinguishable. According to the learned counsel in the face of the inbuilt
flexibility ingrainedjn Section 343(1) Cr.P.C. as is apparent from the
words "as far as maybe" used in the text thereof, it is p~lpably erroneous
to contend that a case contemplated Therein·would have to be invariably -· p
dealt with as one instituted on a police report. Drawing sustenance from
the decision of the Bombay High Court i~ God~er & Boyce
Manufactt}ring Co. Pvt. Ltd,. vs. Union of India & Ors. 3, dwell!ng on
t~e purport of the words "as far as may be", it has been urged that
thereby the le_arned Magistrate was. permitted to a~opt the procedure
envisaged in Section 244 Cr.P.C .. Contending·that the pn'::sent is a case
. -principally founded on the statements of the complainant and the learned
Public ProS$CUtor in 'particular an,d that_ out of the cited witnesses three
1 (2002) 1 sec 253
2 c2011) 1sec113
-' 1992 Crl.L.J. 3752
". •:
G
H
178
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2017] 14S.C.R.
A of them have already been examined, it ought to be proceeded with as
one instituted otherwise than on police report in accordance with the
mandate of Section 244 Cr.P.C. Further the delay of 896 days in filing
the present appeal apart from being inordinate has remained unexplained
for which it is liable to be dismissed jn limine on this count alone.
B
13. We have extended our cautious attention to the contentious
assertions as well as the materials presently available on record. Having
regard to the inter se bearing of the cognate provisions of the Code,
decisively. relevant to address the issue, an overview thereof, is
indispensable. The expressions "complaint", "inquiry", "investigation",
"police report", "summons-case" and "warrant-case" are defined in
C Sections 2(d), 2(g), 2(h), 2(r), 2(w) and 2(x) of the Code respectively
D
E
F
and are extracted hereinbelow for immediate reference:
( d) "complaint" means any allegation made orally or in writing to
a Magistrate, with a view to his taking action under this Code,
that some person, whether known or unknown, has committed
an offence, but does not include a police report.
Explanation.-A report made by a police officer in a case which
discloses, after investigation, the commission of a non-cognizable
offence shall be deemed to be a complaint; and the police officer
by whom such report is made shall be deemed to be the
complainant.
(g) "inquiry" means every inquiry, other than a trial, conducted
under this Code by a Magistrate or Court;
(h) "investigation" includes all the proceedings under this Code
for the collection of evidence conducted by a police officer or by
any person (other than a Magistrate) who is authorised by a
Magistrate in this behalf;
(r) "police report" means a report forwarded by a police officer
to a Magistrate under sub-section (2) of section 173;
G
(w) "summons-case" means a case relating to an offence, and
not being a warrant-case;
H
(x) "warrant-case" means a case relating to an offence punishable
with death, imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term
exceeding two years;
STATE OF GOA v. JOSE MARIA ALBERT VALES @ ROBERT
179
VALES [AMITAVA ROY, J.]
14. As would be evident from the definitions recited, a "complaint" A
is an allegation made orally or in writing to a Magistrate with a view to
take action under the Code against some person, known or unknown,
who had committed an offence and does not include a police report. In
contradistinction, "police report" means a report forwarded by a police
officer to a Magistrate under Section 173(2), whereas "warrant case" is
B
one relatable to an offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life
or punishment for a term exceeding two years, a "summons-case" is
one qua an offence which is not a "warrant-case". A clear cut distinction,
therefore, has been ordained by the Code between a "complaint" and a
"police report" as well as a "warrant-case" and a "summons-case".
IS.Notably, "inquiry" means every inquiry other than a trial
C
conducted under the Code by a Magistrate or Court. Distinguished from
"inquiry", which is to be undertaken by a Magistrate or a Court, as
prescribed, "investigation" includes all proceedings under the Code for
the collection of evidence conducted by a police officer or by any person
(other than a Magistrate), who is authorized by a Magistrate in that D
regard.
16. Section 195 of the Code deaJS with prosecution for contempt
of lawful authority of public servants for offences against public justi):e
and for offences relating to documents given iri' evidence. Sub-:section
( 1) thereof, which is relevant for the present pursuit, clamps an embargo
on the cognizance by any court of any offence, as mentioned therein, in
clauses (a) and (b) thereof. Whereas, vis-a-vis the offences enumerated
in clause (a), such cognizance is permissible only on a complaint in writing
of the public servant concerned orof some other public servant to whom
he is administratively subordinate, in re offences cataglogued in clause
(b ), a complaint in writing of the Court or by such officerofthe Court, as
that Court may authorise in writing or of some other Court to which that
Court is subordinate, is an imperative precondition.
E
F
17. Here, the Court would have to be one in the proceedings
whereof or in relation whereto, the offences set- out in clause (b) are
alleged to have been committed.