# STATE OF GUJARAT v. JAMNADAS G. PABRT AND ORS. ETC

- **Citation:** [1975] 2 S.C.R. 330
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1974-10-03
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 1366-1367 of 1974
- **Bench:** Y. V. Chandrachud, R. S. Sark.Wa
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/state-of-gujarat-v-jamnadas-g-pabrt-and-ors-etc-6299
- **Pages:** 11

## Headnote

Gll}arat P1111dayat Act (1 of 1961) S. 17 (2) am/ 303 A·-Scop1 of
Jnterprttal/on of statute3--Meanlng of 'by reason of', 'to hold tlectio11s' an«
'expedient'
S~tion 11;(2) of the Gujarat Panchayata Act, 1961, provides that tht normal
term of a paDC:hayat Is s yean from the date or its first meeting and that the tcm
llOuld be extended by the State Government b7 a period not exceeding one year i•
the aggregate,
The s.yeair term of the Talulca Panchayat! and the Distri61 Panchayats in tll.1
appellant-State were due to eiipire on February 28, 1973 and March 31, 1973 res·
pectively. They were extended first upto August 31, 1973 and September 30, 1973
and then upto February 28, 1974 :md January 1974. Widespread disturballlie3 broke
out in the State and the Governor promulgated an Ordinance by which the Slab
Government was given power to extend the terms of pancbayata for 2 years imtead
of 011e. On l"ebrllary 9, 1974, the State Ministry m!igned and the President of India
assumed all function,, of the State Government. The terms of the panchayal were
extended upt<> 31st March 1974.
The State legislature was dissolved on March IS, 1974 and.Parliament pa!Mtl
the ·oujarat Slate Legislature (Delegation of Powers) Act, 1974. Under s. 3 of this
Act, the President enacted Gujarat Panchayats (Amendment) Act, 1974 which i•·
sened s. 303A in the 1961 Act. On March 31, 1974, the Government iMued a notiAcation under s. 303A, that wh1:reas the State Government la satisfied that a situatioa
exists by reason of disturbances whereby It iJ not expedient to hold e/ections for the
reconstitution of the panchayats, the State government orders that all the powers
and duties of taluka panchayats should be exercised by the Taluka Development
Officer and or the District paJ!JCbayats by the District Development Officer.
, The respondents who are presidents of panchayats successfulJy challenlJCd tae
notification in the High Court, on the basis that the condition precedent to lhe 1x1r·
clae of the power under the section was not satisfied.
Allowing the appeal to the Court,
HELD : (1) An analysis of s. 303A(l) shows that before a declaration co11lll
be made thereunder, two requirements must be rulfilled : (a) existenee of a 6ituatio11
by reason of disturbances in the State; and (b) the satisfaction of the State 1o~er•·
ment relatable to such a situation, that it is not expedient to hold election,, for tho
reconstitution of a panchayat after the expiry of its term. The first requirement is
an objective fact, which, if disputed, must be established objectively as a condition
precedent to the exercise of the power; and the l!CCond is an opb ion 01
inference drawn from that
objective
fact. It is a matter of !ubjective
satisfaction of the government and is not justiciable. Once a rea110nabl•
nexus between such satisfaction and the facts comtituting the first requirement is
shown, the exercise of the power by the government, not being colourable or mofi.
vated by ·extraneollll considerations, is not open to judicial review. (33,H-336BJ
(2) If the languago of a statute is susceptible of two constructions, the 0111
f11!fils the object i~ to be prefe:rred to the 11lternative which frustratell it (337H]
(3) In vfow of the particiilara stated in the Counter-affidavit it is clear that tli1
disturbances in the State condnued throulliout March 1974. Assumina that tho
disturbances abated after the dissolution o:t the AS9Clllbly on March 1,, 1974 th•
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OUJAltAT v. JAMNADAS (Sarkaria, 1.)
331
abnormal situation, which was the direct result of the dhturbances must have cont!·
nued to exist throughout March 1974. The section speaks of the existence of a si·
tuation 'by reason of' disturbances. The expression indicates that the 'disturbances'
. and the 'situation' must be proximately connected as cause and effect. It is sufficient
if the situation ls the immediate outcome of the disturbances and that it subsist&.
[3360-H)
(4) The phrase 'to bold electio

## Text

330
STATE OF GUJARAT
v.
JAMNADAS G. PABRT AND ORS. ETC.
October 3, 1974
(Y. V. CHANDRACHUD AND R. S. SARK.WA, JJ.J
Gll}arat P1111dayat Act (1 of 1961) S. 17 (2) am/ 303 A·-Scop1 of
Jnterprttal/on of statute3--Meanlng of 'by reason of', 'to hold tlectio11s' an«
'expedient'
S~tion 11;(2) of the Gujarat Panchayata Act, 1961, provides that tht normal
term of a paDC:hayat Is s yean from the date or its first meeting and that the tcm
llOuld be extended by the State Government b7 a period not exceeding one year i•
the aggregate,
The s.yeair term of the Talulca Panchayat! and the Distri61 Panchayats in tll.1
appellant-State were due to eiipire on February 28, 1973 and March 31, 1973 res·
pectively. They were extended first upto August 31, 1973 and September 30, 1973
and then upto February 28, 1974 :md January 1974. Widespread disturballlie3 broke
out in the State and the Governor promulgated an Ordinance by which the Slab
Government was given power to extend the terms of pancbayata for 2 years imtead
of 011e. On l"ebrllary 9, 1974, the State Ministry m!igned and the President of India
assumed all function,, of the State Government. The terms of the panchayal were
extended upt<> 31st March 1974.
The State legislature was dissolved on March IS, 1974 and.Parliament pa!Mtl
the ·oujarat Slate Legislature (Delegation of Powers) Act, 1974. Under s. 3 of this
Act, the President enacted Gujarat Panchayats (Amendment) Act, 1974 which i•·
sened s. 303A in the 1961 Act. On March 31, 1974, the Government iMued a notiAcation under s. 303A, that wh1:reas the State Government la satisfied that a situatioa
exists by reason of disturbances whereby It iJ not expedient to hold e/ections for the
reconstitution of the panchayats, the State government orders that all the powers
and duties of taluka panchayats should be exercised by the Taluka Development
Officer and or the District paJ!JCbayats by the District Development Officer.
, The respondents who are presidents of panchayats successfulJy challenlJCd tae
notification in the High Court, on the basis that the condition precedent to lhe 1x1r·
clae of the power under the section was not satisfied.
Allowing the appeal to the Court,
HELD : (1) An analysis of s. 303A(l) shows that before a declaration co11lll
be made thereunder, two requirements must be rulfilled : (a) existenee of a 6ituatio11
by reason of disturbances in the State; and (b) the satisfaction of the State 1o~er•·
ment relatable to such a situation, that it is not expedient to hold election,, for tho
reconstitution of a panchayat after the expiry of its term. The first requirement is
an objective fact, which, if disputed, must be established objectively as a condition
precedent to the exercise of the power; and the l!CCond is an opb ion 01
inference drawn from that
objective
fact. It is a matter of !ubjective
satisfaction of the government and is not justiciable. Once a rea110nabl•
nexus between such satisfaction and the facts comtituting the first requirement is
shown, the exercise of the power by the government, not being colourable or mofi.
vated by ·extraneollll considerations, is not open to judicial review. (33,H-336BJ
(2) If the languago of a statute is susceptible of two constructions, the 0111
f11!fils the object i~ to be prefe:rred to the 11lternative which frustratell it (337H]
(3) In vfow of the particiilara stated in the Counter-affidavit it is clear that tli1
disturbances in the State condnued throulliout March 1974. Assumina that tho
disturbances abated after the dissolution o:t the AS9Clllbly on March 1,, 1974 th•
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OUJAltAT v. JAMNADAS (Sarkaria, 1.)
331
abnormal situation, which was the direct result of the dhturbances must have cont!·
nued to exist throughout March 1974. The section speaks of the existence of a si·
tuation 'by reason of' disturbances. The expression indicates that the 'disturbances'
. and the 'situation' must be proximately connected as cause and effect. It is sufficient
if the situation ls the immediate outcome of the disturbances and that it subsist&.
[3360-H)
(4) The phrase 'to bold elections', understood in a wide sense, will include
all stegs such as delimitation of the constituencies, the compilation of electoral
rolls ete which Ille a necessary preliminary to the actual conduct of elections, whereas
in a restricted sense, it would cover only the actual holding of elections. The word
'expedient' baa also several shades of meaning. It could not be contended for the
respondenti; that the phrase should be understood in the restricted sense, that is,
that power under s. 303A is exercisable on]y after the completion of preparatory
stePs preliminary to the holding of an election, and that since that stage bad not yet
been reached in tlie present case, ·the power coulll not be exercised. Section 303A
bas been designed to enable the Government to get over a difficult situation surcharged with dangerous potentialities and hence the Court must construe
the
expression therein, in keeping with the context and object of the 'provision, In their
widest amplitude, and eschew a!I interpretation which attenuates the power or
impain it& efficacy. Tbv Rtatute places no fetter on the discretion of the government
in the exercise of tbv power. [338B-E, GJ
·
(S) Further the Court cannot sit in appeal over the opinion of the State
Government as to the inexpediency of holding elections. All that the Court could
enquire was, whether the condition precedent, which is, an objective facl to the
exercise of the power existed. (338E-FJ
·
.
(6) The respondents could not also contend that the impugned notification
is not relatable to the situation existing by reason of the disturbances and that the
power was exercised for an extraneous reason, namely, that the terms of the pancbayat& were expiring on March 31, 1974, because;
(a) the reference· to the terms of the pancbayats in the impugned notification
is .only the recital of a feet which coll5tituted another facel of the situation arisinc
out of the disturbances; [339B-CJ
(b) the real and dominant reason for the exercise of the power is contained
in the 2nd paragraph of the notification namely, the existence of a situation by reason
of the disturbances; and [339B-C]
(~) the counter-affidavit on behalf of the appellant pleaded that the disturbances continued also in March 1974 and that it was not expedient in the circumstances to bold elections and that die effort& made by the government to bold elections
were thwarted by the supervention of the disturbances. [339D-EJ
(7) The purpose of s .. 17(2) is to ensure the continuity of the pancbayats,
where as the object of s, 30~A is to confer powers regarding dissolution or pan.
cbayats in special situations. Therefore, even if the Government bad the power
under s. 17(2) to extend the tenru; of the panchayats beyond March 31, 1974,
it could not be said in the circumstances of the case that in choosins to act.
under s. 303A government acted maliciously. In the counter-affidavit on behalf of
the government, it wu stated that one of the demands of the agitators was that the
tenm of the panchayats should not be extended fui;:ther, This weighed with the
government in deciding that it was no~ polltlc in the then prevailing conditions
to extend the terms of the panchayats. Thus the government exercised il!I powers
under s. 303A only because of the peculiar situation arising out of the disturbanru.
-
[339H, 340 D-F]
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1366-1367 of
1974.
From the Judgment and Order ciated the 26th June, 1974 of the
Gujarat High Co.urt in Spl. Civil Appls. Nos. 420 and 411 of 1974.
N. M. Phadke, M. N. Shroff and J. R,Nanawati, for the Appellants
(In both the appeals).
·
332
SUPREME COUllT REPORTS
[1975] 2 s.c.R.
J, M. Nanawati, P. H . .Parekh, Sunanda 11handare and Manju
Jaitley, for Respondent No. 1 (In CA No. 1356/74).
. M. C. Bhandare, P. Jl. Parekh, 81.nanda Bhandare and Martju
Jaitley, for Respondents Nos. 1 and 9 (in ~A No. 1357/74).
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
SARKAIUA, J.,-The main question that arises in these two appe.als
direct against the common judgment, dated June 26, 1974 of the High
Court of Gujarat, is, whether the Notification dated March 31, 19.74
(for short, the impugned notification) issued by the State Ge vernm~nt
is invalid on the ground that the condition precedent to the exercise
of the power under s. 303A of the Gujarat Panchayats Act, 1961, (for
short, the Panchayats Act) is not satisfied.
The Panchayats Act provided for three-tiers of Panchayats They
were, in the descending ordel' : District Panchayats, Taluka Panchayats
and Gram P,anchayats. The Act provided for indirect election to
Taluka Panc)l.ayats and partly indirect and partly direct election to
~he District Panchayats on the basis of Adult franchise
Under s. 17
(2) as amended by Gujarat Act, 8 of 1968, the n_ormal term of a panchayat was jive years from the date of its first meeting. This te!m
could be ext¢nded by the State Government by a period not exceedmg
in aggregate .one year.
The last election to Taluka Panchayats tcok place in February,
1968 and the Panchayats were constituted on February 28, 1968.
Their term was due to expire on February 28, 1973. Similarly, the fiveyear term o( the District Panchayats wa~ due to expire on March 31,
1973. By a Resolution dated April 12, 1973, the State Go".Crnment
appointed a high level Committee headed by Jhinabhai Darji to suggest
basic reforms in the Panchayati Raj set-up. On the interim recc.mmendation of thl.s Committee the: State Government extended the terms of
Taluka Panchayats upto Au.gust' 31, 1973 and those of Distirct Panchayats upto September 3,0, 1973. The Jhinabhai Darji Committee
submitted its final report on. September 30, 1972. Thereupon, the
Gujarat (Amending) Act 9 of 1973 was passed. It came,into force
on April 23, .1973. This Amending Act made' far-reaching changes in
tile original .(\ct. The indire:ct elections to the Taluka Panchayats were
abolished an~ provision was, made for direct elections to all the Panchayats. As. it was. not possible {or administrative reasons to hold
elections in "Elccordance with the amended Act, the State Government
by an order dated June 21, 1973, extended the term of Taluka Panchayats and District Panchayats till August 31, 1973 anCI September 30, 1973
respectively.: By another Order, dated October 3, 1973, the terms of
both these Panchayats were again extended upto February 28, 1974.
Thus the po\ver of the Sta.ti: Government to extend the term of the
Taluka Panc'hayats under s. 17(2) of the Act had exhau$ted itself.
Jn the fir~rweek of January, 1974, widespread disturbances broke
out in the State of Gujarat.. There was public agitation against the
State Govcrbment demandir1g its resignaticn and the dissolution of
the Gujarati Assembly.
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.GUJARAT v. JAMNADAS (Sarkaria, /.)
333
.
On.January 26, 1974, the Governor of Gujarat promulgated Ordinance 1of1974. It substituted in sub-s. (2) ofs. 17 of the Act the words
"two years" for the words "one year". Under the 'amended provision
the Government got the power to extend the term of a Panchayat by
two years in the aggregate beyond its normal term of five years.
As a result of the mounting public agitation, the State Ministry
tendered its resignation on Febru'ary 9, 1974. On the same date, the
President of India by a proclamation under Article 366 of the Cc mtitution assumed all the functions of the State Governn"ent.
By an order dated February 27, 1974, issued under s. 17(2) as
amended by Ordinance 1 of 1974, the terms of the Taluka Par:chayats
and District Pai:J.chayats. were again extended upto March 31, 1974.
The State Legislature was dissolved on March 16, 1974. Parliament thereafter passed the Gujarat State Legislatu1e (Dele~2.ticn of
Powers) Act, ll of 1974 which vested with effect from Match 27, 1974
powers of the State Legislature in the PJesident of India. In exercise
of his powers under s, 3 of this Act, the President enacted Gujarat
Panchayats (Amendment) Act 8 of 1974 which came into force on
March 31, 1974. It inserted s. 303A in the Panchayat Act which
provides :
"303A.(1)
Notwithstanding anything contained in this ·
Act or the rules or by-laws made thereunder, if at any time,
.the State Government is satisfied that a· situatien · exists b)'
re~on of disturban.ces in the whole or any part of the State of
Gujarat, whereby-
.
.
(i) *
*
•
•
. (ii). It is not possible or expedient to hold-elections for the
re-constitution ofa panchayat on the expiry of its term;
the State Government may, by notification in the Official
Garette; make a declaration to that' effect.
.
(2) A notification issued under sub-rection(I) in relatic.n
to any panchayat shall remain in force. for such period, not
exceeding six months, as may be specified therein :
Provided that if the State Government Is of the opinion
that it is necessary so to do, it may, by ·order and for reasons.
to be mentioned thereill', extend, from time to time; the period
so specified, so, however, that the notification .shall not in
any case remain in force for ·more than one year in the aggre-
. gate.
~3) On the issue o~ a notification under sub-section (l) in
relation to arty panchayat,-
. ·
(a) all the ~m~
of such pa!lcltaya:t shall vacate their
office as such mcm~
·
. .
· · (b) all the powers o-4 duties of 111ch panchayat shall,
during the period whtD nch notiftcAtion is in force, be
.334
SUl'ltEME COURT REPORTS
[1975] 2 s.C.It.
ex-.rcised and p~rform0d by such _offi~r .of the
State
G:>v~rnm•mt as it may, by order, specify m that behalf.
(4) The State G:>wrnment shall, before the expiry C?f the
A
p~riod sp~cified in the notification issued under sub-section(!)
or extend~d under th~ proviso to sub-section (2), as the case
miy b~, take steps for the purp:>se of reconstituting the panchayat in the manner provided in this Act."
B
Purp)rting to act under s. 303-A, the G:ivernment issued on March
31, 1974, the impugn~d ne>tification :
"No KP/74-81/PRN (HLC)/4-JHI-Whereas the terms of all
Taluka and District Pancliayats in the State of Gujarat except
that of the Dangs District Panchayat expire·on 31st March, 1974;
C
And Whereas the G:rn::rnment of Gujarat is satisfied that
a situation exists by reason of disturbances in the whole of the
State of Gujarat whereby it is not expedient to hold elections
for the re1:·)nstitution of any of the taluka and district panchayats whose. term expires on the aforesaid date;
Now, therefore. in exercise of the powers conferred by
· Sectior. 303A of the Gujarat Panchayats Act 1961 (Guj. VI of
1962), the G:>v<:rnm•mt of Gujarat hereby-
(1) makes a declaration that a situation exists by reason of
<iisturbances in the whole of the State of Gujarat whereby· it
is not expedient to hold elections for the reconstitution of any
of the taluka and district panchayats whose term expires on
31st March, 1974 on the expiry of their term;
(2) directs that the: declaration made as aforesaid shall
remain in force for a p~riod ofgjx-m.onths; and
(3) orders that all the powers and duties of each of the
taluka and district panchayats whose term expires on 31st
March 1974, shall, witl). effect from the expiry.of their term· till
this notification is in force, be exercised and performed,-
(i) in relation to a taluka over which the taluka panchaya.t concerned had authority immediately befort the
expiry of its term, by the Taluka Development Officer
posted under the taluka panchayat concerned; and
(ii) in r~lation to a district over wh;ch the district panchayat concerned had authority immediately before the
expiry of its term, by the District Development Officer posted
under the district panchayat conccrmd.
By order and irt the name of the Governor of Gujarat
R. B. SHUKLA,
Secretary to Government."
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GUJARAT v.' JAMNADAS (Sarkaria, /,)
, ..
Two writ petitions und~r Articles 226 of the Constituticn i~re.
filed in the High Cou rt< Gujarat to challenge the aforesaid nctificatfon.
One of these was filed by the President of Barcda District Panchayat
Baroda etc. and the oth r by the President of Jamnagar District Panchayat and ors. The petitions were heard by a Division Btnch which
by a common judgment accepted the same hclding that the in.rugned
notification "was illegal, invalid and bad in law because the c< r.d1ticn
precedent to the exercise of the power under s. 303A viz., holding el~c
tions for the reconstitution of the Panchayats on the expiry ct their
terms has not been satisfied". Against that judgment, the Statll ::of
Gujarat has preferi:ed these ·appeals on the str,ngth of a certificate.
granted by the High Court.
· ·
·
The High Court held· that "election" within the contemplation of
section 303A(l) is restricted to the process of the actual ccr.duct of
the election, commencing with the issue of the notificatic n calling
the election and terininating with the declaraticn of the mult ct the
election. In its view the delimitation of constituencies er wards
preparation of electoral rolls. and framing of rules for conducting elec:
tions, being stages plior tc the election, do not fcrm part of tht: rrccess
of holding election. With this narrow construction of the phrase
"to hold elections", the High Court approached the problem thus :
"A reading to s. 303-A makes it clear that the two o bjectivo
facts are (1) the. factum of disturbances in the. State by reascn
of which a situation exists· and (2) holding of elections for
reconstitution of panchayats. Both these factors arc open to
judicial roviow. The satisfaction of the Government with
regard. to the existence of a situation by reason of the di&turbances or in respect of non~possibility or inexpediency of
.holding elections is subjective and not open to judicial review.
The holding of elections for the reconstitution of Panchayats
is an objective fact. The constitution of the panchayats is not
only the objective fact but holding .of election thereto is an
also objective matter. The State Government has to establish
both these points to justif) invocaticn cf pcwer under s. 303A
and to justify the legality of the impugned notification. In the
instant case the condition p1ecedent ot hclding elections fc r the
reconstitution of the panchayats is not fulfilled. The stage of
holding elt:ctions for the 'reconstitution of the panchayats had
not reached at the time when the impugned n<ttification was
issued. On that date it was not possible to hold elections because
preliminary stage~ in connection· with electicns were not cc mpleted. Constitution of wards, reservation of seats for wcmen,
scheduled caste and scheduled tribes and voters' lists were not
formed or made or prepared. In absence of all th.ese preliminary
matters, the question of holding of elections cannot arise."
We are unable to agree with this rcl!iSoning. An analysis of s.303A
(1) would show that before a declaration refo1red to in that sub-section
can be made, two requirements ~ust ·be .fulfilled : (I) existence of a
situation by reason of a disturbanecs in tho whole or any part of tho
State ; (2) the satisfaction of tho State Government rclatable to such
336
SUPREME COURT !REPORTS
[1975] 2 s.c.R.
a situation, that it is 11Dt expedient to hold elections for the reconstitution of a panchayat on the expiry of its term. The first requirement is an objective fact and the second is an opinion or inference
drawn from that fact. The first requirement, if disputed, must be
established objectively as a condition precedent to the exercise of the
power. The second is a matter of subjective satisfaction of the
Governmont and is not justiciable. Once a reasonable nexus between
such satisfaction and the facts constituting the first requirement is shown,
the exercise of the power by the Government, not ~ing colourable or
motivated by extraneous considerations.is not open to judicial review.
Thus the question that could be objectively Gonsidered by the Court
in this case was : Did a situation arising out of disturbances exist in
the State of Gujarat on the date of the impugned notification ?
The fact that there were serious disturbances throughout the State
of Gujarat in January and in the first fortnight of March, 1974, has
not
b~en seriously disputed by the learned Counsel for the respondents. From the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the State,
it .,appears that these disturbances continued throughout March, 1974.
Shri Satyendra Shah, Joint Secretary to Government of Gujarat has
sworn that "disturbances on a wide scalo occurred in all parts of the
State-both in the urban as well as in the rural areas, resulting in l.oss
of hum·ut life and considerable damage to property. This ultimately
resultod in the resignation of tho Ministry on the 9th February 1974
and the issuance by the President of India of a Proclamation under
article 3S6 of the Constitution assuming to himself all the functions
of the State Government .......•.. The disturbances continued also
in March, 1974."
In a further affidavit it is stated that an agitation for dissolution
<>fthe Panchayats, whose normal terms of office had expired, continued
even in the last days of March, 1974. An instance of Kutch Panchayat
which on a.ccount of such agitation, was unable to assemble for the
budget meeting at Bhuj has been cited. Even Shri Jamnadas Pabri,
one of the writ petitioners, who was the President of that Panchayat,
was not able to attend his office, on account of these abnormal co.ndi-
:tions in February and March 1974, except for one day.
In view of th~se particulars stated in the counter-affidavit it is
-claar that th: disturbance5 in the State of Gujarat continued throughout M1rch 1974, and even. on the date of issue of the impugned noti-
'fh:1tion the situation in the State was anything but normal.
Assuming that the disturbances had abated after the dissolution
of th~ State Assembly on March 15, 1974, the abnormal situation in
th~ State. which was the direct product of the disturbances, continued
to eicist throughout March 1974. Sufficient time was
therefore.
required for the situation to limp back to normalcy.
It is to be notod
that s. 303A(l), speaks of the existence of a situtation "by reason of"
disturbance&. The expression "by reason of" indicates that the 'disturbances' and the 'situation' must be proximately connected as cause
and
effect.
The
'situation'
envisaged
by ·this
sub-section
:th,refore, m 1y not necessarily be coterminous with tho disturbanc:es'.
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GUJARAT v,, JAMNADAS (Sarkaria, /,)
33.7 '
It is sufficiont if the situation is the immediate outcome .of the disturbances, and it subsists.. The situation after such massive and violont
disturbances would c:Ontinue to bo"disturbod'~ for some time evon after
tho abatement or overt eessation of the distl.irbances.
Mr. Phadke, learned Counsel for the appellant-State contends that
since the satisfaction of the Government as to the inexpediency of
holding elections was not a justiciable matter, the giving. of a wido
or narrpw meaning to tho phrase "to hold elections" in s; 303A wollld
not affect the point at iSsue. . The High Court, it is contended, erred
in trca~ing the completion of the preliminaries, Sl\Ch as compilation
.of electoral rolls and formation . of constituencios, ·virtually as a .
coq.dition precede11t to. the. exercise of the· power, though the only
condition procedcnt laid '1own by tho statute which could . bo tostod
by objective-standards was the oxistence of tho situation. created by
the disturbances.
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Mr. Nanawati, learned .Counsel for the respondents (who~ argu- ·
ments have boen adopted by Mr. BJiandaro, appearing for :respondonts
1 and 9), submitted that the High Court was right in hol<ling that tho
protiminaries such as delimitation of constituencies etc. belong to a
stage. anterior to the conduct of elections and therefore do not fall
within the anibit of the phrase "to hold elections". The point pressed
into argument, is that. s. 303A presupposed that the election machinery
was ready and all the prellininary steps for holding the elections, such
as oompilation of. tho voter&' lists and formation of wards etc., had
been completed but the process of election had not yet started when
disturbances' intorvenod. Since that stago had not yet reached, the
power could l)Ot be exercised.
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It may bo romembcred. that s. 303A is in the nature of an emergency
provision. . It was designed to tide over a crisis of unprecedented magnitude. "Roasons for the Enactment" issued by the Governmont
run as follows:-
. ''The oxtended terms of the Taluka and District Panchayata
in the State of Gujarat expire on 31st March, 1974. These Pancha1ats hav~ been fbiict1oning for moro than one year after the
expiry ofthei,r normal tonn offive yoars. However, the recent
. disturbances in tho State have cre8led. an atmosphere which is
congonial neither to the . c0ntinuanco of these panchayats for
a f~her Jl!'riod nor for holding f;lections for their reconstitution.·
It is; therefore, considered necessary to entrust the administration
of, these. panchayats temporarily to officers appointed by .the
State Governmont: ..••... The present measure seeks to ..... .
. • • • .. empower tho State Government •... for carrying on tho
administration of the affairs of panchayats in certain special
circumstances .... "--
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Now it is .well-settled that if. the _language of a statute is susooptfblo
of two constr,uctions, the o~,wlUch fulfils its object is to be preferred
to tho alternative which-frustrates it. Thia canon is of ~ilr
significanco whilo interpreting an omorf)Ollcy measuro of the ltjnd before
33i
SUPREME COURT Rl!PORTS
[1975] 2 s.c.R.
us. In a r(:cent English case Cannon Street Ltd. v. Singer & Friedlander
Ltd. (I) While considering the uncertain language in a statutory
instrument made under an Act with the long title "An Act to authorise
measures to counte; inflation". Meggary J. refused to put on it a
construction which would make the countering of inflation "so capricious and easily escapable".
In the provision under consideration the phrase "to hold elections"
can be understood both in a wide and a narrow sense. Its wide connotation will include all steps such as the delimitation of constituencies,
the compilation of electoral rolls etc. which are a necessary preliminary to the actual conduct of elections. In the restricted sense, this
phrase would cover only the actual holding of elections. Again, the
word "expedient" used in this provision, has several shades of meaning.
In one dictionary sense, "expedient" (adj.) means "apt and suitable
to the end in view", "practical and efficient" ; "politic" ; "profitable" ;
"advisable'', "fit, proper arid suitable to the circumstances of the
ci~e". In another shade, it means a device "characterised by mere
utility rather than principle, conducive to a special advantage rather
titan to what is universa.Uy right" (see Webster's New Int~rnational
Dictionary).
Sinco s. 303A has been designed to enable the Government to get
over a difficult situation surcharged with dangerous potentialities,
the Court must construe the aforesaid phrases in keeping with the
conto11t and object of this provision, in their widest amplitude.
Under the provision the Legislature has given to the . Government
a discretionary power to meet the challe,nge of an extraordinary
situation arising out of the disturbances. .The Court thorefore would
eschew an interpretation which attenuates that power or impair its
efficiency.
Nor would the Cott.tt $it in appeal over the opinion of the State
Government as to the "inexpedie11.cy of h0lding elections". The
statute has made that mattor the sole preserve of the Government. All
that the C0urt could enquire '\'{as, whether the condition precedunt
which is an objective fact to ithe exercise of this power, existed. By
no stretch of imagination could it be said that the power under s. 303
is ·exercisable only after the completion of preparatory steps preliminary to the holding of an election. The statute places no such
fetter on the discrotion of the Government to the exercise of the power.
We, therefore, negative tho contentions canva&sed by Mr. Nanawati.
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. Le?.rned Counsel for the respondents next contended that it has
been. the positive caso of tho State that the preliminaries to the holding of elections required substantial time and that was why Ordinance
1 of 1974 promulgated on January 25, 1974 h?.d c0nferred p0wer on
tho State Government to extend the terms of District and Taluka
Panchayats by one year more with effect from March 31, 1974 and
February 25, 1974, respectively. With reference to the first preamble
H
of the impugned notification, it is contended, that it shows that tha power
(I) (1974) 2 W. L. R. 545 (Ch. D.)
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GUJARAT v. JAMNADAS (Sarkaria, /.)
339
was exercised not because of any situation arising out of the disturbances. but for an extraneous reason, namely, that the terms of all
Taluka and District Panchayats were expiring on the 31st March
1974. In thi11 viow of the matter, says the Counsel, the impui:necl
notHication is not relatable to the situation existing by reason of tits
disturbances.
This contention also is devoid of force. Iri the first place, the opening paragraph of the impugne~ notificaticn is a recital of z. fr.ct Y.hich
constituted another fact of the situation arising out of the disturbances.
Secondly, the real and dominant reason for the exercise cf the pcwer
is contained in the 2nd paragraph of the notification (reproduced earlier
in the judgment). The circumstances and reasons which weighed with
the Government in issuing the impugned notification hr.Ve been set
out in the counter-affidavits of the Joint Secretary, Mr. Sh,-,h.
We
have referred to the same earlier. We will hcwever like to point out
that although it was stated therein that Government. on being so advised, was of the view that after the 31st March 1974, the Gcvcrnment 011.
account of the cessation of the operaticn cf Ordinance I cf 1974,
would have no power to extend the terms of the Panchayats further,
it was pleaded that as "the disturbances contim:cd also in March 197<1,
it was felt by the Government that it was not expedient ;n the thell
circumstances to hold elections to the Taluka and District Panche:yats.
In para 6c of the counter, the Joint Secretary has explained ho-ir
the efforts made by the Government to hold the electic ns were tt,wartcd
by the supervention of the disturbances. Avers he :
"I dony that no efforts were at all made to hold elections
ef the Taluka Panchayats or the District Panchayats before
March 31, 1974. In fact the process of holding elections was
initiated as early as in August 1973, whr.n the Development Ccmmissioner called for the proposals for the delimitation cf cc nstituencies from the Collectors. The Development CC'mmissioner
had also instructed Collectors to consult tah ka P~.r:d.E.yats
and district Panchayats while formulating the proposals cf delimitation of the constituencies. An Assistant Develcrment
Commissioner visited most of the districts to expedite the fr rnn:-
lation of those proposals. In the meantime, the terms of tatuka
panchayats and district panchayats w~.s first extended upto 28-21974 and then extended upto 31-3-1974 as set out hcre:n above.
However, due to widespread disturbances throughout the
State of Gujarat, the situation was such that it was not exredicnt to hold elections for the reconstitution of any of the talukii
and district panchayats."
In the eounter it is also 1tate.d that one of the cfemands of the a!itators was that the terms of the panchayats, who had served more thall
their normal terms, should not be extended further. That weighed
with the Government in deciding that it was liot pC'llitic in th: then
p1evailing conditions to extend the terms of tho pa.nchayats which 011
account of the extensions had already been continued fer a preiod of
7-Jd2SSSup.CI/7S
340
SUPREME COURT REPO'.RTS
[1975] 2 s.c.R.
about sev,m years. The Joint Secretary made this point in the co11nter
by citing .illustration of Baroda Corporation thus :
"The example of Baroda Municipal Corporation where the
term of that bod1 was extended for the seventh year and where
cJrporators had to resign per pressure was also in the mind
of the Gwl}rnment. The Government accordingly decided in
the overall interast of the State and the Panchayati Raj not to
extend the terms of taluka and district panchayats ."
The averm~nts in Paragraphs 2 and 6C (quoted above) in the
co:mter-affidavit: of the Joint s~cretary between themselves furnish
a comulete answer to the contention advanced on behalf of the Respondents.
The further point canvassed by Mr. Nanawati is that even assuming there were two powers with the Government in a situation where
elections could not b} held, in whatever sense the word election is
canstrued, resort to a more dra~tic and undemocratic provision itself
exhibits m'l\ice in law. This argument was advanced before the High
Court, also, and was negatived. We also do not find any merit in
it.
The Constitutional validity of the provisions of ss. 303A and s.
17(2) has not been assailed before us. As rightly point out by Mr.
Phadke, S. 17(2) and 303A operate in separate fields. Their objects
&li'O also diff;rent. Whereas the purpose of s. 17(2) is to ensure the
continuity of the panchayat:s, the object of s. 303A is to confer powers
regarding dissolution of panchayats, in the special situation created
by the disturb1nces and to enable the Government to carry on the administration of the affairs of the panchayats through State officers,
pending their reconstitution. It has been repeatedly averred in categoric1l term~ in the counters that the Government exerdsed its power
under s. 303A in view of the peculiar situation arising out of the disturbances. Even if the Government had the power undet s. 17(2) to
'xten4 the term~ of the panchayats beyond March 31, 1974, it could
not be said in the circumst1nces of the case, that in choosing to act
under s. 303A, it had acted maliciously, the operational fields of these
two prvvisions being so different and divergent. We would, therefore,
overrule this contention, als9.
Thllse, then, are the raasons in support of our Order, announced on
27th s~ptemb~r. 1974, whereby we had allowed these appeals and
set aside the judgmr.nt of the High Court, leaving the parties to bear
their own costs throughout.
W i hopJ that the G:>vornm1Jnt will ta~ prompt measures to hold
the e!ections,expeditiously aild will not use this judgment as an excuse
to postpone the elcct!<>ns indefinitely. On 27th September, 1974,
when we decla~ed ·our or~or, wt. had asked Counsel for the State
Governm,nt to impren upon his clients the need, especially in the present climate!, to preserve the democratic processes.
V.P.S.
Appeals Allowed.
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