# STATE OF GUJARAT v. SURI SHANTILAL MANGALDAS & ORS

- **Citation:** [1969] 3 S.C.R. 341
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1969-01-13
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 1377 of 1968
- **Bench:** M. Hidayatullah
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/state-of-gujarat-v-suri-shantilal-mangaldas-ors-4873
- **Pages:** 33

## Headnote

J. C. SHAH,
V. RAMASWAMI,
G. K. MITTER AND A. N. GROVER, JJ.J
Bombay Town Planning Act (27 of 1955), ss. 53 and 61-Compensation at market value on a date many years before the date of extinction
o/ ownerS' title-If violative of Art. 31(2) of Constitution after Fourth
Amendment-Acquisition for town plcnning----lf protected by Art. 31(5)
(b)(ii).
By a resolution dated April 18, 1927, the Borough Municipality of
Abmedabad declared its intention of making a town-planning
scheme
JJDder the Bombay Town Planning Act, 1915. A plot of land measuring
18,219 sq. yards belonging to the first respondent was covered by the
scheme.
In the draft scheme the plot was reconstituted into two plotsone plot measuring 15,403 sq. yards reserved for the first respondent and
the other, measuring 2,817 sq. yards reserved for the Municipality. The
arbitrators were appointed to decide various matters made little progress.
In 1955, the 1915-Act was repealed by the Bombay Town Planning Act.
1955 which received the assent
of President on August 1, 1955,
and
came into force on April 1, 1957.
By s. 90(2) of the 1955 Act, the
proceedings preparing a scheme commenced under the repealed Act was
continued.
Under the 1955 Act, on the coming into forc.e of the scheme
all lands which are required by the local authority, unless otherwise determined in the scheme, by the operation of s. 53(a) vest absolutely therein
free from all encumbrances.
By cl. (b), ownership in a plot belonging
to a person is substituted by the owne'rship in the reconstituted plot, his
ownership in the original plot is extinguished and simultaneously therewith
he becomes the owner of a reconstituted plot subject to the rights settled
by the Town Planning Officer. The reconstituted plots, having regard to
the .exigencies of the scheme need not be of the same dimensions as the
original land and are generally smaller. Section 67 provides that the difference between the market value df the plot with all the buildings and works
thereon at the date of the declaration of the intention to make a scheme
and the market value of the plot as reconstituted on the same date and
without reference to the improvements contemplated in the scheme is to
be the compensation due to the owner. Section 71, which is a corollary
to s. 67, provides, inter alio that if the owner of the origina1 land is not
allotted a plot at all, he shall be paid the value of the original plot at the
date of the declaration of intention to make a scheme.
The Town Planning Officer informed the first respondent that Rs. 25,411 were awarderi
to him as compensation. He filed a petition in the High Court, challenging the validity of the Act on the ground that it violated Art. 31 (2) of
the Constitution. The High Court declared ss. 53 and 67 of the Act ultra
vires and declared the town planning scheme invalid as a coronary.
In appeal to this Court on the questions, (I) whether the Act was
exempt from the operation of Art. 31(2), because its object was promotion of public health and fell within the terms of Art. 31 (5)(b) (ii), and
(2) whether the Act specifies the 'principles on which compensation is to
be determined and the guarantee under Art. 31 (2) is on that account not
infringed,
342
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(!969] 3 S.C.R.
. HELD: (I) Section 53(a) of the Act is a law for compulsory acquisi- A
tlon of land;. 1t cannot. be said .th~t because the object of the Act is to
promore J?Ubhc health 1t falls w1th1D the exception of Art. 31(5)(b)(iiJ.
The prmc1pal objects of town planning legislation no doubt are to provide
for planned and controlled development and use of land in urban areas
~ith special 're&:a.r~ to requirements of better living conditions and sanitation; but acqu1s1t1on of property for such purposes could not be made
under laws coming within the purview of Art. 3!(5)(b)(ii) without payment of compensation.
[354 F, G]
B
Dy. Com111issioner and Collector, Kamrup
v.
Durga Nath Sarma,
[1968] I S.C.R. 561, followed.
(2) The legislature s

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STATE OF GUJARAT
v.
SURI SHANTILAL MANGALDAS & ORS.
January 13, 1969
[M. HIDAYATULLAH, C.J.,
J. C. SHAH,
V. RAMASWAMI,
G. K. MITTER AND A. N. GROVER, JJ.J
Bombay Town Planning Act (27 of 1955), ss. 53 and 61-Compensation at market value on a date many years before the date of extinction
o/ ownerS' title-If violative of Art. 31(2) of Constitution after Fourth
Amendment-Acquisition for town plcnning----lf protected by Art. 31(5)
(b)(ii).
By a resolution dated April 18, 1927, the Borough Municipality of
Abmedabad declared its intention of making a town-planning
scheme
JJDder the Bombay Town Planning Act, 1915. A plot of land measuring
18,219 sq. yards belonging to the first respondent was covered by the
scheme.
In the draft scheme the plot was reconstituted into two plotsone plot measuring 15,403 sq. yards reserved for the first respondent and
the other, measuring 2,817 sq. yards reserved for the Municipality. The
arbitrators were appointed to decide various matters made little progress.
In 1955, the 1915-Act was repealed by the Bombay Town Planning Act.
1955 which received the assent
of President on August 1, 1955,
and
came into force on April 1, 1957.
By s. 90(2) of the 1955 Act, the
proceedings preparing a scheme commenced under the repealed Act was
continued.
Under the 1955 Act, on the coming into forc.e of the scheme
all lands which are required by the local authority, unless otherwise determined in the scheme, by the operation of s. 53(a) vest absolutely therein
free from all encumbrances.
By cl. (b), ownership in a plot belonging
to a person is substituted by the owne'rship in the reconstituted plot, his
ownership in the original plot is extinguished and simultaneously therewith
he becomes the owner of a reconstituted plot subject to the rights settled
by the Town Planning Officer. The reconstituted plots, having regard to
the .exigencies of the scheme need not be of the same dimensions as the
original land and are generally smaller. Section 67 provides that the difference between the market value df the plot with all the buildings and works
thereon at the date of the declaration of the intention to make a scheme
and the market value of the plot as reconstituted on the same date and
without reference to the improvements contemplated in the scheme is to
be the compensation due to the owner. Section 71, which is a corollary
to s. 67, provides, inter alio that if the owner of the origina1 land is not
allotted a plot at all, he shall be paid the value of the original plot at the
date of the declaration of intention to make a scheme.
The Town Planning Officer informed the first respondent that Rs. 25,411 were awarderi
to him as compensation. He filed a petition in the High Court, challenging the validity of the Act on the ground that it violated Art. 31 (2) of
the Constitution. The High Court declared ss. 53 and 67 of the Act ultra
vires and declared the town planning scheme invalid as a coronary.
In appeal to this Court on the questions, (I) whether the Act was
exempt from the operation of Art. 31(2), because its object was promotion of public health and fell within the terms of Art. 31 (5)(b) (ii), and
(2) whether the Act specifies the 'principles on which compensation is to
be determined and the guarantee under Art. 31 (2) is on that account not
infringed,
342
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(!969] 3 S.C.R.
. HELD: (I) Section 53(a) of the Act is a law for compulsory acquisi- A
tlon of land;. 1t cannot. be said .th~t because the object of the Act is to
promore J?Ubhc health 1t falls w1th1D the exception of Art. 31(5)(b)(iiJ.
The prmc1pal objects of town planning legislation no doubt are to provide
for planned and controlled development and use of land in urban areas
~ith special 're&:a.r~ to requirements of better living conditions and sanitation; but acqu1s1t1on of property for such purposes could not be made
under laws coming within the purview of Art. 3!(5)(b)(ii) without payment of compensation.
[354 F, G]
B
Dy. Com111issioner and Collector, Kamrup
v.
Durga Nath Sarma,
[1968] I S.C.R. 561, followed.
(2) The legislature specified in the 1955 Act, principles
for determination of compensation.
The principles· for determination of compen- ·
sation cannot be said to be irrelevant, nor can the compensation determined, be said to be illusory.
Being a principle relating to compensation, C
a challenge to that principle, on the ground that a just equivalent of what
the owner was deprived of is not provided, is excluded by Art. 31(2)
after the Constitution Fourth Amendment Act. [370 DJ
(a) It was not necessary to provide for compensation for the entire
land of which a person is deprived, because, the concept that the lands
ve•t in the local authority when the inrention to make a scheme is notified
is against the plain inrendment of the Act.
A part of the plot or even the D
whole plot belonging to an owner may go to form a reconstituted plot
which may be allotted to another person or may be appropriated to public purposes under the scheme. No process actual or notional of transfer
is contemplated in that appropriation. The lands covered by the scheme
are subjected by the Act to the power of· local authority to re-adjust titles,
but no reconstituted plot vests at any stage in the local authority un1e.ss
it is needed for a purpose of the authority; and when land is so required
on the coming into force of the scheme, compensation is
paid
to the E
owner of the land.
[356B, F-H]
( b) The Act specifies the principles on which the compensation is tc
be determined and given.
Specification of principles means laying down
general guiding rules applicable to all pe'rsons or transactions governed
the'reby. Compensation determined on the basis of market value prevailing
on a date anterior to the date of extinction of interest is still determined
on a principle specified. Whether an owner of land is given a reconstituted plot or not. the rule fdr determining what is to be given as recompense
remains the same.
It is a principle applicable to all cases in which by
virtue of the o~ration of the Town Planning Act a person is deprived of
land whether in whole or in part.
[357H-358B]
(c) By Art. 31(2) as it originally stood, exercise of the power to
legislate for compulsory acquisition was subject to the condition that the
law for compulsory acquisition for public purposes eit~er fixed the amount
o'f the compensation or specified the principles on which, and the manner
in which, the compensation was to be determined and given.
This Court
in Bela Banerjee'.• case [1954]
S.C.R. 558 and
Subodh Gopa/'s
case,
F
G
fl 954] S.C.R. 587. held that 'compensation' meant a
'just equivalent'.
But after the Fourth Amendment Act, adequacy of compensation fixed
b}' the Legislature or awa'rded according to the principles specified by the
legislature for determination is ~ot justiciable.
I~ d~s not me3.!1. how~ve~, H
that something fixed or determined by the apphcatton of specified prn~c1ples which is illusory or can in no sense be regarded as compensation
must be upheld by the courts, for to do so, would be to grant a charter
of arbitrariness, and permit a device to defeat a constitutional guarantee.
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GUJARAT v. SHANT!LAL
343
But compenstion fixed or determined on principles specified by the Legis·
lature cannot be permitted to be challenged on the indefinite plea that it
is not a "just or fair' equivalent.
Principles may be challenged on the
ground that they are irrelevant to the determination of compensation, but
not on the plea that what is awarded as a result of the application of those
principles is not just or fair compensation.
Such a challenge will be in
clear violation of the constitutional decla'ration that adequacy of compensation provided is not justiciable. [366 A-DJ
Observations contra in P. Vajravelu Mudaliar v. The Special Deputy
Collector, Madras, [1965] I S.C.R. 614, obiter.
Union of India v. Metal Corporation of India Ltd.
[1967] I S.C.R.
255 overruled, because (i) Parliament had specified in the Metal Corporation of India (Acquisition of Undertaking) Act, 1965, the principles for
determining compensation of the undertaking, (ii) those principles expressly
related to the determination of compensation payable, (iii) they were not
irrelevant to the determination of compensation, and (iv) the compensation was not illusory.
[370C]
( d) The statute which permits the property of an. owner to be compulsorily acquired by payment of market value at a date which is many
years before the date on which the title of the owner is extinguished cannot be attacked on the ground of unreasonableness, because, a law made
under Art. 31(2) is not liable to challenge on the ground that it violates
Art. 19(1 )(f). [370 HJ
Smt. Sitabati Dehi v. State of West Bengal,
[1967]
2 S.C.R.
749.
followed.
(e) The validity of the statute cannot depend upon whether
in
a
given case it Dperates harshly.
If the scheme came into force within a
rca!lonable time from the date on which the declaration of intention to
make the scheme was notified, it could not he contended that fixation of
compensation according to s. 67 i would make the seheme invalid.
The
fact that con<;iderable time elapsed cannot be a ground for declaring the
section ultra i·ires. f371 B]
(f) If s. 71 read with s. 67 lays down a principle of valuation, it cannot be st'ruck down on the ground that, because of the exigencies of the
scheme, it is not possible to allot a reconstituted plot to an O\vner of land
covered by the scheme.
[371 D]
(g) The n1ethod of determining compensation in
respect of lands
which are subject to the town planning scheme is prescribed in the Town
Planning Act nnd when power is given under the statute to do a certain
thing in a certain way, it must be done in that way or not at all. Therefore, unlike Va;rc;velu Mudaliar's case, ·where the State Government could
re•ort to one of two methods-the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 or the Land
Acquisition (Madras Amendment) Act, 1961,-and therefore arbitrarily,
1n the present case, the local authority can only act under the Town Planning Act for purposes of town planning, and the'refore does not violate
Art. 14.
[372 D-E. HJ
Taylar v. Taylor, [1875] I Ch. D. 426, applied.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1377 of
1968.
.
Appeal from the judgment and order dated January 24, 1968
of the Gujarat High Court in Special Civil Application No. 837
of 1960.
344
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1969] 3 S.C.R.
N. S. Bindra, S. K. Dholakia and S. P. Nayar, for the appellant.
M. C. Chagla and /. N. Shroff, for respondent Nos. 1 to 3.
HIDAYATULLAH, C. J., delivered a Separate Opinion.
The
Judgment of SHAH, RAMASWAMI, MITTER and GROVER JJ was
delivered by SHAH, J.
'
.
Hidayatullah,
C.J.
I have read the weighty judgment
proposed to be delivered by my brother Shah and I find myself so
much in agreement with it that I consider it unnecessary for me to
express myself. However, it is proper for me to say a few words in
explanation since I was a party to P. Vajravelu Mudaliar's case(')
and the obiter pronouncement of some opinions there. That case
was heard with N. B. Jeejeebhoy's case(').
One was a postConstitution (Fourth Amendment) case and the other a preConstitution case. The judgment in the two cases were delivered
on the same day. It appears that the reasoning in the two cases
was not kept separate and the whole of the matter was discussed
in a case in which it was not n.~cessary for the ultimate conclusion.
Because of the close ;iroximity of. the decisions, it escaped me that
the discussion was in the wrong case and the other merely followed
it. My brother Shah has not made the two cases to fall in their
proper places. It is certainly out of the question that the adequacy
of compensation (apart from compensation which is illusory or
proceeds upon principles irrelevant to its determination) should
be questioned after the Amendment of the · Constitution. The
Amendment was expressly made to get over the effect of the earlier
cases. which had defined compensation as _just equivalent. Such a
question could not arise after the amendment. I am in agreement
that the remarks in P. Vajravelu's case(') must be treated as obiter
and not binding on us.
I am also of the opinion that the Metal
Corporation case(') was wrongly decided and should be overruled.
Shah, J.
In a writ petition field by the first respondent Shantilal Mangaldas the High Court of Gujarat has declared ss. 53 and
67 of the Bombay Town Planning Act 27 of 1955, ultra vires,
insofar as they authorise the local authority, 2nd respondent in
this appeal, to acquire lands under a town-planning scheme, and
as a corollary to that view has declared invalid the City Wall
Improvement Town Planning Scheme No. 5 framed in exercise of
the powers conferred under the Act.
By Resolution dated April 18, 1927, the.Borough Municipality
Qf Ahmedabad which was a local authority under the Bombay
Town ·Planning Act 1 of 1915 declared its intention to make a
town-planning scheme known as "The City Wall Improvement
· (1) [1965] 1 S.C.R. 614.
(2) (1965] lS.C.R. 636.
(3) (1967] I S.C.R. 255.
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GUJARAT v. SHANTILAL (Shah, /,)
345
Town Planning Scheme" in respect of a specified area. A plot
of land No. 221 measuring 18,219 square yards belonging to the
first respondent was covered by the scheme.
The Provincial
Government sanctioned the intention to make the scheme, and a
draft scheme was then prepared under which the area of plot
No. 221 was reconstituted into two plots--Plot No. 176 measuring
15,403 square yards reserved for the first respondent and Plot No.
178 measuring 2,816 square yartls reserved for the local authority
for constructing quarters for municipal employees. The draft
scheme was sanctioned by the Government of Bombay on August
7, 1942.
On August 13, 1942, the Government of Bombay
appointed an arbitrator under Act 1 of 1915 to decide matters
set out in s. 30 of the Act. From time to time several arbitrators
were appointed, but apparently little progress was made in the
adjudication of matters to be decided by them under the act.
The Bombay Town Planning Act 1 of 1915 was repealed by
s. 90 of the Bombay Town Planning Act 27 of 1955 with effect
from April l, 1957.
By s. 90(2) making of any scheme commenced under the repealed Act was to be continued and the provisions of thd new Act were to have effect in relation to the publication, declaration of intention, draft scheme, final scheme,
sanction, variation, restriction, proceedings, suspension and
recovery to be made or compensation to be given. The arbitrator
appointed under Act 1 of 1915 was designated "Town Planning
Officer" under Act 27 of 1955, and the proceedings under the
City Wall Improvement Town Planning Scheme were continued
before him.
On August 23, 1957, the Town Planning Officer
informed the first respondent that Rs. 25,411 were awarded to him
as compensation for plot No. 178.
The first respondent then filed a petition in the High Court
of Gujarat (which bad jurisdiction after reorganization of the
State of Bombay) challenging the validity of Act 27 of 1955 and
acquisition of plot No. 178 on the plea that the Act infringed the
fundamental right of the first respondent guaranteed by Art.
31 (2) of the Constitution.
The scheme was sanctioned by the Government of Gujarat
on July 21, 1965, and the final scheme came into operation on
September 1, 1965. The High Court entered upon an elaborate
analysis of the provisions of the Act and held :
"Section 53 read with section 67 in so far as it authorises acquisition of land by the local authority under
pending schemes continued under section 90 of the new
Act must, therefore, be held to be violative of Article
31 (2) and the acquisition of petitioners' lands in the
3 46
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[!969] 3 S.C.R.
various petitions under the City Wall Improvement
Town Planning Scheme No. 5 must be held to be invalid.",
and on that view the High Court did not consider the other contentions raised on behalf of the first respondent.
With certificate granted by the High Court, this appeal is preferred by the
State of Gujarat.
The declaration of intention, preparation of the draft scheme
and proceeding for preparation of the final scheme , were made
under Act 1 of 1915. Intimation of the amount of compensation
determined to be payable to the first respondent was however given
under Bombay Ad 7.7 of 1955 and the scheme was also sanctioned ..
But bys. 90 of the .kt as amended by Gujarat Act 52 of 1963,
continuity of the operations for making and implementing the
Town Planning Scheme is maintained.
The principal objects of the towin planning legislation are to
provide for ~lanned and controlled development and use of land
in urban areas. Introduction of the factory system into methods of
manufacture, brought about a great exodus of population from
the village into the manufacturing centres leading to
congestion
and overcrowding, and cheap and insanitary dwellings were hurriedly erected often in the vicinity of the factories. Erection of
these dwelJings was generally subject to little supervision or control
by local authorities, and the nev.; dwellings were built in close and
unregulated proximity with little or no regard to the requirements
of ventilation and sanitation. Necessity to make a planned development of these new colonies for housing the influx of population in sanitary surroundings was soon felt. The Bombay Legislature enacted Act 1 of 1915 with a view to remedy the situation.
The Bombay Town Planning Act 27 of 1955 is modelled on
the same pattern as Act 1 of 1915, but with one important
variation. By Ch. II of the new Act it is made obligatory upon
every local authority to carry out a survey of the area within its
jurisdiction and to prepare and publish in the prescribed manner
a development plan and submit it to the Government for sanction.
A development plan is intended to lay down in advance the manner in which the development and improvement of the entire area
within the jurisdiction of the local authority are to be carried out
and regulated, with particular reference to-
(a) proposals for desigr.ating the use of the land,
for the purposes such as (1) residential, (2) industries
(3) commercial, and ( 4) agricultural;
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GUJARAT V. SHANTILAL (Shah, J.)
(b) proposals for designation ofland for public purposes such as parks, play-grounds, recreation grounds,
open spaces, schools, markets or medical, public health
of physical culture institutions;
( c) proposals for roads and highways;
(d) proposals for the reservation of land for the purpose of the Union, any State, any local authority or any
other authority established by Jaw in India; and
(e) such other proposals for public or other purposes as may from time to time be approved by a local
authority or directed by the State Government in that
behalf.
347
By making it obligatory upon a local authority to prepare a development plan under Bombay Act 27 of 1955 it was clearly intended that the Town Planning Schemes should form part of a single
cohesive pattern for development of the entire area over which
the local authority had jurisdiction.
Chapter m of Bombay Act 27 of 1955 relates to the making
of the Town Planning Scheme.
Chapter JV deals with the declaration of intention to make a scheme and making of a draft
scheme.
Chapter V deals with the appointment of Town Planning Officers and the Board of Appeal and their powers. Chapter
VI deals with the splitting up of schemes into sections and preliminary schemes. Chapter VII deals with Joint Town Planning
Schemes and Ch. Vill with finance.
Under Bombay Act 27 of 1955 after a development plan is
sanctioned, the local authority makes a declaration of its intention
to make a scheme and then prepares a draft scheme setting out
the size and shape of every reconstituted plot, so far as may be,
to render it suitable for building purposes and where the plot is
already built upon, to ensure that the building as far as possible
complies with the provisions of the scheme as regards open space.
The scheme may also make provision for lay out of lands; filling
up or reclamation of lands, lay out of new streets, roads, construction, diversion, extension, alteration, improvement ana stopping up of streets, roads and communications; construction, alteration and removal of buildings, bridges and other structures; allotment or reservation of lands for roads, open spaces, gardens, recreation grounds, schools, markets, green belts, dairies, transport
facilities, and public purposes
of all kinds; drainage, lighting;
water-supply; preservation of objects of historical or national interest or beauty and of buildings used for religious purposes; imposition of conditions relating to constructions and other matters not
inconsistent with the object of the Act as may be prescribed. The
-·
348
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1969] 3 S.C.R:
draft scheme is published afte~ it receives the sanction of the State
Government The State Government then appoints Town Planning Officer to perform the duties specified in s. 32 of the Act.
An appeal lies to a Board of Appeal against certain decisions which
the Town Planning Officer may make. After the Town Planning
Officer has dealt with the various matters relating to the draft
scheme, and the appeals against his orders have been disposed of,
the State Government may sanction the scheme, and on and after
the date fixed in the notification sanctioning the scheme, the townplanning scheme has effect as if it were enacted in the Act.
In making a town-planning scheme the lands of all persons
covered by the scheme are treated as if they are put in a pool.
The Town Planning Officer then proceeds to reconstitute the plots
for residential buildings and to reserve lands for public purposes.
Reconstituted plots are allotted to the landholders.
The reconstituted plots having regard to the exigencies of the scheme need
not re of the same dimensions as the original land. Their shape,
and size may be altered and even the site of the reconstituted plot
allotted to an owner may be shifted. The Town Planning Officer
may lay out new roads, divert or close existing roads, reserve lands
for recreation grounds, schools, markets, green belts and similar
public purposes, and provide for drainage, lighting, water-supply,
filling up or reclamation of low-lying, swamp or unhealthy areas
or levelling up of land so that the total area included in the scheme
may conduce to the health and well-being of the residents. Since
the town-planning scheme is intended to improve the sanitary conditions prevailing in a locality, the owners of plots are required
to maintain land open around their buildings. The object of the
scheme being to provide amenities for the benefit of the residents
generally, the area in the occupation of the individual holders of
land is generally reduced, for they have to contribute out of their
plots, areas which are required for maintaining the services beneficial to the community.
l!nder the Act the cost of the scheme is to be met wholly or
in part by contributions to be levied by the local authority on each
plot included iQ the final scheme calculated in proportion to the
increment which is estimated to accrue in respect of each plot.
To ensure that no undue hardship is caused and owners of
plots have an opportunity of raising objections to the provisions
of the scheme including its financial provisions, power is conferred upon the Town Planning Officer to entertain and hear
objections against the recO'llstitution of the plots and relating to
matters specified in s. 32 i.e. the physical, legal lliOld financial provisions of the scheme. Only after the objections have been heard
and disposed of, the scheme is published and becomes final.
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The relation between ss. 53 and 67 which have been declared
ultra vires by the High Court and the other related provisions may
now be determined. Section 53 of the Act provides :
"On the day on which the final scheme comes into
force,-
(a) all lands required by the local authority shall,
unless it is otherwise determined in such scheme, vest
absolutely in the local authority free from all encumbrances;
(b) all rights in the original plots which have tie.!n
re-constituted shall determine and the re-constituted
plots shall become subject to the rights settled by the
Town Planning Officer."
Th~ expression "re-constituted plot" is defined in s. 2(9) as meaning a plot which is in any way a)tered by the making of a town
planning scheme, and by the Explanation the word "altered" includes alteration of ownership. By cl. (b) of s. 53 ownership in
a plot belonging to a person is substituted by the ownership in the
reconstituted plot his ownership in the original plot is extinguished
and simultaneously therewith he becomes the owner of a reconstituted plot subject to the rights settled by the Town Planning
Officer. On the coming into force of the scheme all lands which
are required by the local authority, unless otherwise determined
in the scheme, by the operation of s. 53(a), vest absolutely there-
; n free from all encumbrances. The result is that there is a complete shuffling up of plots of land, roads, means of communication, and rearrangement thereof.
The original plots are r~on
stituted, their shapes are altered. portions out of plots are separated. lands belonging to two or more owners are combined into a
;ingle plot, new roads are laid out, old roads are diverted or closed
up, and lands originally belonging to private owners are used for
public purposes i.e. for providing open spaces, green belts dairies
etc.
In this process the whole or part of a land of one person,
may go to make a reconstituted plot, and the plot so reconstructed
may be allotted to another person; and the lands needed for public
purposes may be earmarked for those purposes.
The re-arrangement of titles in the various plots and reservation of lands for public purposes require financial adjustments to
be made. The owner who is deprived of his land has to be compensated, and the owner who obtains a re-constituted plot in surroundings which are conducive to better sanitary living conditions
has to contribute towards the expenses of the scheme.
This is
because on the making of a town planning scheme the value of the
plot rises and a part of the benefit which arises out of the unL8Sup.C.l/u9--4
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(1969] 3 S.C.R.
earned rise in prices is directed to be contributed towards financing of the scheme which enables the residents in that area to more
amenities, better facilities and healthier living conditions. For that
purpose provision is made in s. 65 that the increment shall be
deemed to be the amount by which at the date of the declaration
of intention to make a scheme, the market value of a plot included
in the final scheme, estimated on the assumption that the scheme
has been completed, would exceed at that, the market value of the
same plot estimated without reference to improvements contemplated by the scheme. By s. 66 the cost of the scheme is required
to be met wholly or in part by contributions to be levied by the
local authority on each plot included in the final scheme calculated
in proportion to the increment which is estimated to accrue in respect of such plot by the Town Planning Officer. Section 67 provi·
des:
"The amount by which the total value of the plots
included in the final scheme with all the buildings and
works thereon allotted to a person falls short of or
exceeds the total value of the original plots with all the
buildings and works thereon of such person shall be deducted from or added to, as the case may be, tha contributions leviable from such persons, each of such riots
being estimated at its market value at the date o the
declaration of intention to make a scheme or the date
of a notification under sub-section (1) of section 24 and
without reference to improvements due to the alteration
of its boundaries."
~·
Section 67, it will clearly appear, is intended to make adjustments
between the right to compensation for loss of land suffered by the
owner, and the liability to make contribution to the finances of
the scheme; and s. 71 is a corollary to s. 67. Section 71 provides :
"If the owner of an original plot is not erovided with
a plot in the final scheme or if the contribution to be
levied from him under section 66 is less than the total
amount to be deducted therefrom under any of the provisions of this Act, the net amount of his loss shall
be payable to him by the local authority in cash or in
such other way as may be agreed upon by the parties."
The provision~ relating to payment of compensation and recovery of contributions are vital to the successful implementation
of the scheme. The owner of the reconstituted plot who gets the
benefit of the scheme must make contribution towards the expenses of the scheme; the owner who loses his property must similarly be compensated. For the purpose of determining the compensation, the Legislature has adopted the basis of market value of
land expropriated, but the land is valued not on the date of exA
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GUJARAT v, SHANTILAL (Shah, J.)
351
tinction of the owner's interest, but on the date of the declaration
of intention to make the scheme.
In the view of the High Court this pattern of computing compensation infringes the fundamental right guaranteed under Art.
31 (2), of the Constitution. Since the Act authorises comjlulsory
transfer of ownership in land to the local authority for pubhc purposes the High Court held it clearly falls within the terms of Art.
31(2A) of the Constitution, and on that account there is acquisition of land within the meaning of Art. 31(2) of the Constitution,
and the Act is not protected by Art. 31(5)(b)(ii). The High Court
further held that in determining the compensation payable to the
owner of the land which is appropriated to public purposes, the
increase in the value of the reconstituted plot allotted cannot be
taken into account, because it is not attributable or relateable to
the acquisition of their plots, but is a benefit which they share in
common with the other members of the community as a result
of the scheme, "quite irrespective whether their, plots are acquired
or not", aod it is, therefore, not liable to be-ciken into account in
determining whether the compensation received by them for acquisition of their plots was adequate, that in any event the increment in the value of the plot allotted to the owner is uncertain as
well as irreleyant as a principle for determining compensation,
since it is quite possible that no plot may be allotted to an owner
of land in a Town Planning Scheme. Further, observed the High
Court, compensation for loss of land being determined under s.
67 of the Act only on the basis of the market value at the date of
declaration of intention to make the scheme and not the market
value at the date on which the scheme comes into force, the Act·
dues not give for the original plot of land of the owner a reconstituted plot together with compensation for loss of the difference
in the area between the original and reconstituted plot. The High
Court further observed that a provision for awarding compensation on the basis of market value under s. 67 of the Act is a sufficient specification of a principle of compensation within the meaning of Art. 31 (2), but the Act was still not saved for two reasons-
(1) that there was no principle for compensating' an owner of land
to whom no reconstituted plot was allotted; and (2) that payment
provided by the Act in satisfaction of the claim to land statutorily
exprnpriated based on the market.valu_e of the land at the date of
the declaration of intention to make a scheme was not payment
of compensation guaranteed by Art. 31(2). The High Court was
of the view that compensation based on the market value may be
sufficient specification of principle of compensation within Art.
31 (2) only if it is a just equivalent of the land expropriated and
payment. computed on the market value at a date many years before
the date on which the land was acquired is inconsistent with the
C<mstitutional a:uarantee under Art. 31 (2).
fhe High Court in
352
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(19691,3 S.C.R.
coming to that conclusion felt itself bound by the observations
made in the judgments of this Court ~n P. Vajravelu Mudaliar v.
The Special Deputy Collector, Madras('),
The State of West
Bengal v. Mrs. Bela Banerjee and Others('); N. B. Jeejeebhoy v.
Assistant Collector, Thana Prant, Thana( 3 ); and Union of India
v. Metal e:orporation of India Ltd. and Another(').
The view
taken by the High Court was that the Town Planning Act insofar
as it provides for transfer of private rights of ownership to a local
authority under s. 53(a) is a jaw relating to acquisition of lands
which attracts the protection of Art. 31 (2), and since the Act by
s. 67 provides for compensation which is not a just equivalent in
tem1s of money of the property expropriated it could not be upheld under Art. 31 (2) of the Constitution.
Mr. Bindra appearing on behalf of the State of Gujarat contends that Bombay Act 27 of 1955 is not a law relating to acquisition of lands, but it is a law dealing with health lll)d public
sanitation for it is enacted with the object of promotion of public
health and on that account falls within the terms of Art. 31(5)
(ii) of the Constitution, and is exempt from the operation of cl.
(2) of Art. 31.
Alternatively, Mr. Bindra contends that the Act
specifies the principles on which compensation is to be determined
and the guarantee under Art. 31 (2) is on that account not infringed.
Counsel urges that the object of the Town Planning Act in pith
and ·~ubstance is to facilitate
planned development, to ensure
healthy surroundings to the people living in congested localities
and.to provide them with sanitation andl other urban facilities conducive to healthy living and on that account is an Act falling
within Entry 6 of List II of the Seventh Schedule-"Public health
and sanitation", and Entry 20 of List III-"Economic and social
planning". But the competence of the Legi~lature to enact legislation on the subject matter of the Act and for the object intended
to be served thereby are irrelevant in determining whether any fundamental right of a person is infringed by the impugned Act. The
doctrine of pith and substance is applicable in determining whether
a statute is within the competence of the legislative body, especially
in a federal set up, where there is division of legislative powers : it
is wholly irrelevant in determining whether the statute infringes
any fundamental right.
For a clearer appreciation of the alternative argument it may
be useful to set out the terms of Art. 31 of the Ccmstitution as
amended by the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act,, 1955 :
"(!) No person shall be deprived of his property
save by authority of law.
(I) 11965] 1 S.C.R. 614.
(3) (196511S.C.R.636.
(2) (1954] S.C.R. 558.
(4) (1967] I S.C.R. 255.
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GUJARAT v. SHANTILAL (Shah, J.)
(2) No property shall be compulsorily acquired or
requisitioned save for a public purpose and save by
Juthority of a law which provides for compensation for
the property so acquired or requisitioned and either fixes
:he amount of the compensation or specifies the princi·
pies on which, and the manner in which, the compensation is to be determined and given; and no such law shall
be ""lied in question in any court on the ground that the
compensation provided by that Jaw is not adequate.
(2A) Where a law does not provide for the transfer
of the ownership or right to possession of any property
to the State or to a corporation owned or controlled by
the State, it shall not be deemed to provide for the compulsory acquisition or requisitioning of property, notwithstanding that it deprives any person of his property.
(3) No such law as is referred to in clause (2) made
by the Legislature of a State shall have effect unless such
Jaw, having been reserved for the consideration of the
Pr~sident, has received his assent.
(4)
( 5) Nothing in clause ( 2) shall affect-
( a)
( b) the provisions of any law which the State may
hereafter make-
( i)
(ii) for the promotion of public health or the
prevention of danger to life or property, or
(iii)
(6)
"
353
It is settled law that clauses (I) and (2) under the amended A1ticle
gu«rantcc different rights to owners of property. Clause (1) ope·
rates as a protection against deprivation of property save by authority of law, which, it is beyond question, must be a valid law,
i.e. it must be withiin the legislative competence of the State Legislature, and must not infringe any other fundamental right. Clause
(2) guarantees that property shall not be acquired or requisitioned
(except in cases provided by cl. (5)) save by authority of law
providmg for compulsory acquisition or requisition and further
1iroviding for compensation for the property so acquired or requisitioned and either fixes the amount of compensation or specifies
the principles on which, and the manner in which, the compensation is to he determined and given. If the conditions for compulsory acquis_ition or requisition are fulfilled, the law is not liable
354
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1969] 3 S.C.R.
to be called in question before the courts on the ground that the
compensation provided by the law is not adequate. Clause (2A)
is in substance a definition clause : a law which does not provide
for the transfer of tlie ownership or right to possession of any property to the State or to a corporation owned or controlled by the
State is not to be deemed to provide for the compulsory acquisition
or requisitioning of property, notwithstanding that it deprives any
person of his property.
The following principles emerge from an analysis of clauses
(2) and (2A): compulsory acquisition or requisition may be made
for a public purpose alone, and must be made by authority of
law.
Law which deprives a person of property but does not
transfer ownership of the property or right to possession of the
property to the State or a corporation owned or controlled by the
State is not a law for compulsory acquisition or requisition. .The
law, under the authority of which property is compulsorily acquired
or. requisitioned, must either fix the amount of compensation or
specify the principles on which, and the manner in which, the compensation is to be determined and given. If these conditions are
fulfilled the validity of the law cannot be questioned on the plea
that it does not provide adequate compensation to the owner.
Jt is common ground that a law for compulsory acquisition
of property by a local authority for public purposes is a law for
acquisition of property by the State within the meaning of that
expression as defined in Art. 12. The Act was reserved for the
consideration of the President and received his assent on August
1, 1955, and since it provides expressly by s. 53(a) that on the
coming into force of the scheme the ownership in the lands required by the local authority for public purposes shall, unless. it
is otherwise determined in such scheme, vest absolutely in the
local authority free from all encumbrances, tae clause contemplates transfer of ownership by law from private owners to the
local authority.
The Act is, therefore a law for compulsory acquisition of land.
We are also unable to agree with counsel for the State that
because the object of the Act is intended to promote public health,
it falls within the exception in Art. 31(5)(b)(ii). The question is
now settled by a recent judgment of this Court; Deputy Commissioner & Collector, Kamrup ~Others v.