# STATE OF GUJARAT v. Wanchoo I - **Citation:** [1964] 6 S.C.R. 461 - **Court:** Supreme Court of India - **Decided:** 1964 - **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/state-of-gujarat-v-wanchoo-i-3205 - **Pages:** 133 ## Headnote 6 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS be for the detenu to show that the order bad gone beyond 1964 the needs of the situation and was therefore contrary to s. 44. a. s. Paruldar No such thing bas been shown in the present cases and we s 1v.M_L . fi d h b d . . . b .d tale 0 anaraare satis e t at t e or ers m queshon cannot e sa1 to go •htra beyond the needs of the situation, even assuming that s. 44 is mandatory as urged on behalf of the appellants and no: merely directory as urged on behalf of the State. The appeals therefore fail and are hereby dismissed. Appeals dismissed STATE OF GUJARAT v. Wanchoo I. VORA FIDDALI BADRUDDIN MITHIBARWALA 1964 (B. P. SINHA, C. J., K. SuBBA RAO, M. HIDAYATULLAII, January SO, J. C. SHAH, RAGHUBAR DAYAL, N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR AND J. R. MUDHOLKAR JJ.) Act of State-Ruler of a 11ative 1tate granted certain right1 in /ore:ll to gra1ttecs-State merged with Domini'on of India-Dominion of India did not recognise the grant-Effect of non-recognition before Co11sti· tution and after Constitution-If non-recognitio:t of the grant anJounts to an act of State-Government of India Act 1935-Constitution of India, Art. 32. The Ruler of the State of Sant bad issued a Tharao dated 12th March 1948, granting full right and authority to the jagirdars over the forests in their respective villages. Pursuant to the agreement dated March 19, 1948, the State of Sant merged with the Dominion of India. On October 1, 1948, Shree V. P. Menon, Secretary to the Government of India, wrote a letter to the Maharana of Sant State expressly declaring that no order passed or action taken by the Maharana before the day of April !st 1948, would be questioned. After merger there was obstruction by the forest officers when the respondents were cutting the forests, but after some correspondence they were permitted to cut the trees on furnishing an undertaking that they would abide by the decision of the government. The Government of Bombay, after considering the implications of the Tharao, decided that the order was ma/a nde and cancelled it on 8th July 1949 In the meantime these respondents were stopped ;rom working the forests by the Government of Bombay. 1964 Stat• of G11iarat Y, Yor11 Fldda/i SUPREME COURT REPORTS Thereupon these respondents filed suits for declaration of rights in the forests and for a permanent injunction against interff.rence with those rights by the State. The respondents claimed in these suits that the rights of the grantees to the forests were not liable to be cancelled by the Dominion of India after the merger of the State of Sant in June, 1948, by executive action, and that the Government of Bombay was not competent to obstruct them in the exercise of those rights. Their claims were opposed by the State of Bombay mainly on the ground that in the absence of recognition, express or implied, by the successor State of the rights conferred by the former ruler on the jagirdars the respondents could not enforce them in the Municipal Courts. These respondents qied five suits against the State of Gujarat. All suits except one were dismissed by the Trial Court. The District Judge on appeal ordered the dismissal of that suit also and dismissed the appeals of the plaintiffs in the other suits. The plaintiffs then appealed to the High Court and the High Court allowed all appeals and the suits were decreed.' The High Court held on the basis of the letter written by Shri Y. P. Menon, Secretary that the succeeding sovereign had waived or relinquished its right to repudiate the Tharao. The High Court further held that the Tharao was not a legislative action of the Ruler of Sant State. The State Government appealed to this Court by special leave. Hence the appeal. Per majority: Hidayatullah J. (i) The Act of State come .. to an end only when the new sovereign recognises either expressly or impliedly the rights of the aliens. It does not come to an end by an action of subordinate officers who hav~ no authority to bind the new soverei ## Text _Characters 0–39,862 of 295,563. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39862 for what follows._ 6 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS be for the detenu to show that the order bad gone beyond 1964 the needs of the situation and was therefore contrary to s. 44. a. s. Paruldar No such thing bas been shown in the present cases and we s 1v.M_L . fi d h b d . . . b .d tale 0 anaraare satis e t at t e or ers m queshon cannot e sa1 to go •htra beyond the needs of the situation, even assuming that s. 44 is mandatory as urged on behalf of the appellants and no: merely directory as urged on behalf of the State. The appeals therefore fail and are hereby dismissed. Appeals dismissed STATE OF GUJARAT v. Wanchoo I. VORA FIDDALI BADRUDDIN MITHIBARWALA 1964 (B. P. SINHA, C. J., K. SuBBA RAO, M. HIDAYATULLAII, January SO, J. C. SHAH, RAGHUBAR DAYAL, N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR AND J. R. MUDHOLKAR JJ.) Act of State-Ruler of a 11ative 1tate granted certain right1 in /ore:ll to gra1ttecs-State merged with Domini'on of India-Dominion of India did not recognise the grant-Effect of non-recognition before Co11sti· tution and after Constitution-If non-recognitio:t of the grant anJounts to an act of State-Government of India Act 1935-Constitution of India, Art. 32. The Ruler of the State of Sant bad issued a Tharao dated 12th March 1948, granting full right and authority to the jagirdars over the forests in their respective villages. Pursuant to the agreement dated March 19, 1948, the State of Sant merged with the Dominion of India. On October 1, 1948, Shree V. P. Menon, Secretary to the Government of India, wrote a letter to the Maharana of Sant State expressly declaring that no order passed or action taken by the Maharana before the day of April !st 1948, would be questioned. After merger there was obstruction by the forest officers when the respondents were cutting the forests, but after some correspondence they were permitted to cut the trees on furnishing an undertaking that they would abide by the decision of the government. The Government of Bombay, after considering the implications of the Tharao, decided that the order was ma/a nde and cancelled it on 8th July 1949 In the meantime these respondents were stopped ;rom working the forests by the Government of Bombay. 1964 Stat• of G11iarat Y, Yor11 Fldda/i SUPREME COURT REPORTS Thereupon these respondents filed suits for declaration of rights in the forests and for a permanent injunction against interff.rence with those rights by the State. The respondents claimed in these suits that the rights of the grantees to the forests were not liable to be cancelled by the Dominion of India after the merger of the State of Sant in June, 1948, by executive action, and that the Government of Bombay was not competent to obstruct them in the exercise of those rights. Their claims were opposed by the State of Bombay mainly on the ground that in the absence of recognition, express or implied, by the successor State of the rights conferred by the former ruler on the jagirdars the respondents could not enforce them in the Municipal Courts. These respondents qied five suits against the State of Gujarat. All suits except one were dismissed by the Trial Court. The District Judge on appeal ordered the dismissal of that suit also and dismissed the appeals of the plaintiffs in the other suits. The plaintiffs then appealed to the High Court and the High Court allowed all appeals and the suits were decreed.' The High Court held on the basis of the letter written by Shri Y. P. Menon, Secretary that the succeeding sovereign had waived or relinquished its right to repudiate the Tharao. The High Court further held that the Tharao was not a legislative action of the Ruler of Sant State. The State Government appealed to this Court by special leave. Hence the appeal. Per majority: Hidayatullah J. (i) The Act of State come .. to an end only when the new sovereign recognises either expressly or impliedly the rights of the aliens. It does not come to an end by an action of subordinate officers who hav~ no authority to bind the new sovereign. Till recognition, either express or implied, is granted by the new sovereign, the Act of the State continues. In the present case, the Act of State could only come to an end if Government recognised the rights flowing from Tharao. That Government never did. There was thas no recognition of the Tharao or the rights flowing from it at any time.- In the present case, the subordinate officers of the Forest Department allowed each respondent to cut the trees on furnishing an undertaking that he would abide by the decision of the Government and 50 the question of waiver or relinquishment does not arise. Secretary of State in Council for India v. Kamachee Boye Sahaba, (1859) 13 Moore P. C. 22, Secretary of State v. Sardar Rustom Khan and Others, (68) I. A. 109, M/S. Dalmia Dadri Cement Co. Ltd. v. Com· missioner of lncome·tax, [1959} S.C.R. 729, The State of Saurashtra v. Memon Haji lsmale Haji, [1960] 1 S.C.R. 537, Jagan Nath Agarwala v. State of Orissa, [19621 1 S.C.R. 205, State of Saurashtra v. Jamadar Mohamed Abdulla and Ors., [1961} 3 S.C.R. 970 and Vaje Singhji Jorwar Singh v. Secretary of State for India, (1924) L.R. 51 I.A. 357, relied on. Virendra Singh and Ors, v. The State of Uttar Pradesh [1955] I S.C.R. 415, disapproved. Bhola Nath v. State of Saurashtra, A.l.R. 1954 S.C. 680, Bhojrajji Y. The State of Saurashtra, 61 Born. LR. 20, referred to. 6 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS (ill The Act of State did not come to an end by virtue o! Article 299(1) of Government of India Act, 1935 and so the respondents could not claim the protection of that section. Section 299(1) did not come into play because it could only come into play after the rights were recognised. In the present case the rights were never recognised by the Government. (iii} The original Act of State continued even after January 26, 1950, because there was no state succession on January 26, 1950 in so far as the people of Sant State were concerned. For them state succession was over some time in 1948. The Act of State which began in 1948 could continue uninterrupted even beyond 1950 and it did not lapse or get replaced by another Act of State. These rights in question cannot be protected under the Constitution because these rights were not recognised even before 1950. (iv) That the impugned Tharao was not a law as it did not lay down any rule of conducl. It was a grant made to the Jagirdars mentioned in the Tharao.. The fact that Maharana's Tharao was passed to benefit a larger number of persons en bloc does not make it any the nlore a law if it did not possess any of the indicia of a law. The Tharao did give rights to the grantees but did not lay down any rule of conduct. It is a grant and as a grant it was open to the new sovereign not to .rccognis.. it Madhorao Pha/ke v. The State of Madhya Bharat, [1961] 1 S.C.R. 957, distinguished. Ameer-unnissa Begum and Ors. v. Mahboob Begum and Ors. A.l.R. 1955 S.C. 352. distinguished. Maharaja Shri Umaid Mills Ltd. v. Union of India and Others. A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 953 and The Bengal Nagpur Catton Mill Ltd. v. Tlie Board of Revenue, Madhya Pradesh and Others, A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 888 relied on. (v) The right claimed here is not even a concessionary right such as has received the support of the International writers. It is more of the nature of a gift by the Ruler at the expense of the Slate. It lacks bona {ides which is one o[ the things to look for. There is no treaty involved and v.•hatever guarantee there is, Art. 363 of the Constitution precludes the Municipal Courts from considering. This distinguishes the jurisdiction and power of the Supreme Court of the United States in which considera· tion Of treaties is included. In the United States the Constitution declares a treaty to be the law of the land. In India the position is different. Article 253 enables legislation to be made to implement international treaties. This Court has accepted the principles laid down by the Courts in England in regard to the limits of the jurisdiction of Municipal Courts. The view of the Supreme Court of United States or the view taken in inttrnauonal Jaw has not been accepted by this Court. Politically and 1964 Stat• at Gll/tlrtll ,.. Vora Flddall 1964 6- of Gu/arat v. VOlll Fidda/i SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1g64] ethicaily there might have been some reason to accept and respect such concessions but neither is a reason for the Municipal Courts to intervene. The Rule that the Act of the State can be questioned in a Municipal Court has never been adopted and it has been considered that it is a matter for the political departments of the State. However desirable it may be that solemn gTJarantees should be respected, this Court should not impose its will upon the State, because this is outside its jurisdiction. Jn this case, the present respondents who were not parties to the merger agreement or to the letter written by Mr. Menon which was m:tde expressly a part of the Agreement cannot take advantage of cl. 7. U they were parties, Article 363 would bar such plea. Maharai Umeg Singh and Others v. The State of Bombay and Other•· ll955) 2 S.C.R. 164, relied on. · U.S. v. Fercheman, 32 U.S. 51 at 86, disapproved: Shapleigh v. Miar, 299 U.S. 468, referred to . . Salaman v. Secretary of State for India, [1906) I K. B. 613, referred to. Cook v. Sprigg. [1899) A.C. 572, referred. to. Foster v. Nielson. (1829) 2 Pet. 253. referred to. Birma v. The State, A.I.R. 1951 Rajasthan I to 7, referred to. Amodutiiani v. Secretary Southern Nigeria, Ll921J 2 A.C. 399, referred to. Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503. referred to. West Rand Ceiural Gold Minning Co. v. Regem, [1905] 2 K.B. 391, referred to. Secretary of State v. Bal Raj Bai, ( 19 5) L.R. 42 IA. 229, relied on. Per Shah J. (I) The rule that cession of territory by one State to another is an act of State and the sub,jects of the former State may enforce only those rights in Municipal Courts which the new sovereign recognises has been accepted by this Court. Mis. Dalmia Dadri Cement Co., Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income· Tax, [1959) S.C.R. 729, Jagannath Agarwala v. State of Orissa, [1962) I S.C.R. 205, Promod Chandra Dev v. State of Oris3a, [1962) Suppl. I S.C.R. 405 and the State of Saurashtra v. lamadar Mohd. Abdullah, 11962) 3 S.C.R. 970, relied on. The Secretary of State in Council of India v. Kamachtt Boye Sahaba, 7 Moore's I.A. 476, Vajesinghji Joravarsinghji v. Secretary of State for India in Council, L.R. 51 I.A. 357 and Secretary of State v. Sardar Runam Khan and Others, L.R. 68 I.A. 109, relied on. 6 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS (ii) The Constitutional provisions in the United States arc son1ewhat 4ilf=nL Under the Constitution of the United States each treaty becomes a part of the law of the land; the provisions thereof are justiciable .m the covenants enforceable by the Courts. In India the treaties have aot the force of law and do not give rise to rights or obligations enfor· c:eable by the Municipal Courll. In the present case by virtue of Art. 363 of the Constitution, it ;,, eat open to the respondents to enforce the covenants of the agreement es llaled in the letter of guarantee written by Mr. V. P. Menon in the Municipal Courts. United Stat<1 v. ParchSS) 2 S.C.R. 164, relied on. (iii) An act of State may be opread over a period and does not ari,. eerety on the point of acquisition of sovereign right. Nor ii tbc new aovercign required to announce his decision when he assumes or accepts aovereignty over foreign territory, about the rights created by the quond::tm IO~ign, on pain of being held bound by the right '° created. Therefore till the right to property of the subjeets of the former Indian State ._ recognized by the new sovereign there· was no title capable of beinJ enfon:cd in the courts of the Dominion or the Union. (iv) The functions of a State whether it contains a democratic set Gp or is administered by an autocratic sovereign fan into three broad categories-executive, legislative and judicial. The line of demarcation of these functions in an absolute or autocratic form of government may be thin and may in certain cases not easily discernible. But on that accuunt it is not possible to infer that every act of an autocratic sovereign has a legislative content or that every direction made by him must be regarded as law. The legislative power is the power to n:iake, alter, amend or repeal Ian and within certain definite limits to delegate that power. Therefore It is power to lay down a binding rule of conduct. Executive power is Che power to execute and enforce the laws, and judicial power is the power to' ascertain, construe and determine the rights and obligations of the parties before a tribunal. In the present case the order dated Man:h 12, 1948, is expressly in the form of a grant of the rights which were· not previously granted and does not either expressly or by implication seek to lay down any binding rule of conduct. The impugned order - not a law or an order made under any law within the meaning of d. 4 ot. the Administration of the Indian States Order of 1948. Promod Chandra Dtb and Oth A.l.R. (1963) S.C. 1638, distinguished, discussed . Madhorao Phalke v. The State of Madhya Bharat, [1961] I s.c.a: 951 discussed. Maharaja Shree Umaid Mills Ltd. v, Union of India, A.I.R. 1963S.C. 953, relied on, TM Bengal Nagpur 'Cotton Mills Ltd. v. The Board of Revenut', Madhya Pradesh and Others, C.A. No. 416 of 1961 decided on July 30', 1963, relied on. (v) To attracts. 299(1) of the Government of India Act, 1935, thert must, exist a right to property which is sought to be protected, The subjects of the acceding State arc entitled only to such rights as the new soVereign cbOoseS to recognize, in the abSence of the any recl1gnition of the rights o~ the respondents or their predecessor J agirdars, there waS 110 rigqt tq .property of which protection .could be claimed. On the same . ~pning, grantees of the Ruler !X>uld not claim protection under Ar\. 31 (1) of the Constitu_tion. ' P1r Mo4holkar J. (i) The rule of international law on which the m·eral Privy Council decisions as to the effect of conquest or cession on the private righ"ts of the inhabitants of the conquered or ceded territory arc founded has become a part of the common law of this country. This being a "liiw in force" and at the commencement of the Constitution is saved by Art. 372 of the Constitution. The Courts in India are, therefore, bound to e°" force that rule and not what according to Marshall C.J. is the rule of International Law governing the same matter, though the latter has alSQ received the approval of several text book writers. The rule which h8' been appljed in this country is not inequitor nor can it be: regarded U bt> an anachronism. Virendra Singh v. The State of Uttar Pradesh, [19SS] S.C.R. 41', · United State v. Percheman, (1833) 32 U.S. SI, disapproved. SecretarY of State for India v. Kamachee Boye Sal1iba, (ISS9) 13 Moore P. C. 22, Asrar Ahmed v. Durgah Committee, )ljmer. A.J.R. 1947 P.C. l, Dalmia Dadri Cement Co. Ltd. v. The Commissioner of lncomttax, (19591 S.C.R. 729, State of Saurashtra v . • \.fenion lluji Ismail. [1960] I S.C.R. 537, State of Saurashtra v. Jamadar Mohamed Abdullah and Ors., [19621 3 S.C.R. 970, Vajesinghji v. Secretary of Strds a right which cannot on its own strength be enforced against a sovereign in the Courts of that sovereign must be deemed to have ceased to exist. It followa therefore that a right which bas ceased to exist does not, require repudiation. Municipal courts derive their jurisdiction from the Municipal law and not from the Jaws of nations and a change in the laws of nations brought about by the consent of the nations of the world cannot confer upon a Municipal Court a jurisdiction which it does not enjoy under the Municipal law. (iii) The grantees of the Ruler could not claim the protection or L 299 of Government of India Act, 193S or of Art. 31 of the Constitution of India as they possessed no right to property enforceable against the new eovercign. (iv) The impugned Tharao was not law. Madhorao Phalk< v. Th< Stat< of Madhya Pradesh (1961) I S.C.R. 'S1, referred to. Pu minority Sinha CJ. and Ayyangar J. (i) 'lbe juristic basis of tile theory underlying the Privy Council decisions is that with the extinction of the previous sovereign the rights theretofore exerc!seabl.:: by the subjc.:ts of that sovereign by virtue of grants for that sovereign were likewise extinguished and that without ~gnition which is really tantaftiount to a fresh grant by the new sovereign. no title enforceable in the municipal courts of the succeeding sovereign came into being. The doctrine of Act of State evolved by English courts is one purely. of municipal law. It denies to such a court jurisdiction to enquire into the consequences of acts which are inseparable from an extension of its sovereignty. That doctrine was, however, not intended to deny any rule of International Law., The British practice that bas prevailed in this country bas not proved in actual practice to lead to injustice. but bas proceeded on a just balance between the acquired rights of the Private individual and the economic interests of the community, and therefore there is nothing in it so out of tune with notions of propriety or justice to call for its rejection. Even in the case of Virendra Singh this Court did not express any decisive opinion in favour of accepting the observations in Percheman's case as Proper to be applied by the municipal courts in India. This Court has in subsequent decisions followed the Privy Council decisions. The view of the Supreme Court of the United States has net been accepted bY this Court for the reason that the Constitutional position in regard to the recognition of treaties in both countries are different. In the United States a treaty has the force oflaw, which is not the position here. Besides, in India by virtue of Article 363 of the Constitution, Municiral Courts are deprived of jurisdiction to enforce any righlll arisina from ciertaiA treaties. J!IU Stat• of G•/GNI "· Yoiw FIMall JINU ,.,.ofO.;..t y, YON P!Mall .¢8 SUPREME COURT REPORTS . Vinrendra Sinalr v. T/w Star. of Uttar Prad•sh, [1955) 1 S.C.R. 415, diaapprovcd. Vajesinghji v. So ponden.t and persons similarly situated who had title to immovable property in the Sant State had a tille to the said property and were in actual possession thereof. They had title to the property except against tho State and they had, at any rate, possessory title therein. The Constitu· tion in Article 31 ( 1) declares that no person shall be deprived of bis property save by authority of law. That is, the Constitution recognised the title of the citizens- of erstwhile State of Sant, and issued an injunction against the sovereign created by it not to interfere with that right except in accordance with law. A recognition by the Supreme Law of the land must be in a higher position than that of an executive authority of a conquering State. It was held that the title to immovable property of the respondent was recognised by the Constitution itself and, therefore, necessarily by the sovereign which .s bound by it ., 6 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 471 In the present case the letter written by the Government of India dated October I, ! 948, clearly recognized the title of the respondents to their properties. 1be letter clearly contains a statement in paragraphs S and 7 thereof that enjoyment of J agirs, grants etc., existing on April l, 1948, were guaranteed and that any ·order passed or action taken by the Ruler before the said date would not be questioned. 'Ibis is a clear recognition of the property rights of the respondent and si!Dilar e>tbers. Virendra Singh v. The State of Uttar Pradesh, (1955) I S.C.R. 4U, retied on. Mis. Dalmia Dadri Cement Co. Ltd. v. The Co1nmissioner of Incom~ tax [1959). S.C.R, 729, Jagan Nath Agarwa/a v. The State of Ori$ S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 475 authority and jurisdiction in such manner and through such agency as it may think fit." Under Article 3 of the agreement, the ruler agreed to furnish to the Dominion Government before October 1, 1948 a list of all his private properties over which he was, under the terms of the agreement, to retain full ownership and enjoyment. After this agreement came in force on June 10, 1948, the Central Government delegated its functions to the Bombay Government by virtue of the powers vested in it by the Extra-Provincial Jurisdiction Act. 1947. Subsequently, Shri V. P. Menon. Secretary in the Ministry of State, wrote a letter to the Maharana'of Sant on October !, 1948 (Ex. 194). This letter was entitled a "Letter of Guarantee" and was to be treated as supplementary to the Agreement of Merger dated Mnrch 19, 1948. Amongst other matters. it provided by cl. 7: "No order passed or action taken by you before the date of making over the administration to the Dominion Government will be questioned unless the order was passed or action taken after the 1st day of April, 1948, and it is considered by the Government of India to be palpably unjust or unreasonable. The decision of the Government of India in their respect will be final." In view of the forthcoming integration of the territory of Indian States into the Dominion of India, the Government of India Act, 1935, was amended ands. 290-A was inserted. In exercise of the powers conferred by that section, the Governor-General of India promulgated the States Merger (Governor Provinces) Order, 1949, on July 27, 1949 which came into force on August 1, 1949. As a result of that order the in'egration of Indian States, indudin3 the Sant State with that of the province of Bombay, was completed with effect from that date, namely August 1, 1949. In the meantime, the ruler of the Sant State passed or issued "a resolution" or Tharao on March 12, 1948, which has given rise to the present series of litigations. Under this *instrument" marked as Ex. 192, to use a neutral expres19" Stat• of Gll/ar• •• Vo"' Fiddali A.11anior /. J,76 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] lftU sion in view of the controversy as to its nature, called I- 01 Gaiut11 Tharao, an order was passed by the Maharana of Sant State Y, h Yoro Plddali w ose terms will be referred to later and discussed in greater "'"""'"' I. detail, granting forest rights to holders of certain specified tenures. The holders of such tenures in the mt State entered into a number of agreements with thi, parties, parting with their rights in the forest timber, e1c., for a specified period, in consideration of cash payments made by those third parties to the holders of the tenures. It is not necessary to set out in detail all those agreements; it is enough to mention, by way of a sample the agreement dated August 21, 1948 (Ex. 175) whereby the tenure-holder granted as briefly adverted to earlier to Vohra Hatimbhai Badruddin Mithiborwala the right to cut and remove timber and firewood from the. forest of Mouja Gothimada for a consideration of Rs. 9,501 for a period of three years. The written agreement contains quite a number of clauses which it is not necessary to set out for the purposes of this case. After the aforesaid grants, correspondence started between the grantors and the grantees on the one hand, and the State Forest Department on the other. When the Di5trict Forest Officer was informed about the transactions aforesaid.