# STATE OF HARYANA AND ORS v. CH. BHAJAN LAL AND ORS

- **Citation:** [1990] Supp. 3 S.C.R. 259
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1990-11-21
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 5412 of 1990
- **Bench:** S. Ratnavel Pandian, K. Jayachandra B Reddy
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/state-of-haryana-and-ors-v-ch-bhajan-lal-and-ors-10922
- **Pages:** 61

## Headnote

Constitution of India, I950: Article 226-Quashing of criminal
proceedings-Circumstances under which power could be exercisedGuidelines given.
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973: Sections 154, 155, 156, 157,
159-Cognizable offence-Field of investigation-Exclusive domain of
investigating agencies-Court's interference-When justified.
Section 482-/nherent powers of courts-Exercise of-Circumstances necessitating quashing of criminal proceedings-Guidelines
indicated.
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947: Section 5-Investigation by
designated officers-Express prohibition of officers below certain
rank-Whether directory or mandatory-Exceptions only on adequate
reasons-To be disclosed-Authorising such non_designated officers
without reasons-Whether legal and valid-Investigation carried on by
such officer-Quashing of.
Words & Phrases: "Reason to suspect"-Meaning of.
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The First Respondent was a Minister and subsequently Chief
F
Minister of Haryana State, Later he became Union Minister. On
12.11.1987 a complaint was presented before the Haryana Chief Minister, wherein serious allegations were leveUed against the First Respondent. The main aUegations were that he accumulated huge properties
worth crores of rupees in the names of bis family members, relations
and persons close to him by misusing his power and position and by
G
undervaluing the market price, and all those transactions were benami in character. According to the complainant, since the accumulation
of the properties by the First Respondent, in the shape of buildings,
land, shares, ornaments etc. was far beyond his legal means, an investigation should be directed against him.
259
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260
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1990] Supp. 3 S.C.R.
The Chief Minister's Secretariat marked the complaint to the
Director General of Police, who in torn endorsed the same to the
Superintendent of Police concerned. On the direction from the Snperin·
tendent of Police, the SHO registered a case nnder Sections 161 and 165
of Indian Penal Code, 1860 and under section 5(2) of the Prevention of
Corruption Act, 1947 and took up the investigation.
Meanwhile, the First Respondent filed a Writ Petition before the
High Conrt for a direction to quash the First Information Report and
for restraining the appellants from proceeding further with the investi·
gation. The High Court quashed the entire criminal proceedings holding
that the allegations did not constitute a cognizable offence for commenc·
ing lawful investigation.
Aggrieved by the judgment of the High Court, the appellants
preferred the present appeal by special leave, contending that the alle·
gations contained in the complaint, either individually or collectively,
constituted a cognizable offence warranting the registration of a case as
contemplated nnder Section 154(1) Cr. P.C., and a thorough investigation in compliance with various statutory provisions more particularly
Sections 156, 157 and 159 Cr. P.C.
On behalf of the Respondents, it was contended that on account of
the deep rooted political animosity and rivalry entertained by the then
Chief Minister, he used the complainant, who was stooge in his hands,
to file the complaint containing false and scurrilous allegations against
the First Respondent and hence the criminal proceedings rightly
deserved to be quashed.
Disposing of the appeal, this Court,
HELD: 1. The judgment of the High Court quashing the First
Information Report is set aside as not being legally and factually SU!l·
tainable in law. However, the commencement as well as the entire
investigation, if any, so far done is quashed on the ground that the third
appellant °(SHO) is not clothed with valid legal authority to take up the
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investigation and proceed with the same within the meaning of Section
5A(l) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. [319A-C]
2. The observations made by the High Court are unwarranted
and the historical anecdote is out of context and inappropriate. If snch a
view is to be judicially accepted and approve

## Text

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STATE OF HARYANA AND ORS.
v.
CH. BHAJAN LAL AND ORS.
NOVEMBER 21, 1990
A
[S. RATNAVEL PANDIAN AND K. JAYACHANDRA
B
REDDY, JJ.]
Constitution of India, I950: Article 226-Quashing of criminal
proceedings-Circumstances under which power could be exercisedGuidelines given.
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973: Sections 154, 155, 156, 157,
159-Cognizable offence-Field of investigation-Exclusive domain of
investigating agencies-Court's interference-When justified.
Section 482-/nherent powers of courts-Exercise of-Circumstances necessitating quashing of criminal proceedings-Guidelines
indicated.
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947: Section 5-Investigation by
designated officers-Express prohibition of officers below certain
rank-Whether directory or mandatory-Exceptions only on adequate
reasons-To be disclosed-Authorising such non_designated officers
without reasons-Whether legal and valid-Investigation carried on by
such officer-Quashing of.
Words & Phrases: "Reason to suspect"-Meaning of.
c
D
E
The First Respondent was a Minister and subsequently Chief
F
Minister of Haryana State, Later he became Union Minister. On
12.11.1987 a complaint was presented before the Haryana Chief Minister, wherein serious allegations were leveUed against the First Respondent. The main aUegations were that he accumulated huge properties
worth crores of rupees in the names of bis family members, relations
and persons close to him by misusing his power and position and by
G
undervaluing the market price, and all those transactions were benami in character. According to the complainant, since the accumulation
of the properties by the First Respondent, in the shape of buildings,
land, shares, ornaments etc. was far beyond his legal means, an investigation should be directed against him.
259
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260
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1990] Supp. 3 S.C.R.
The Chief Minister's Secretariat marked the complaint to the
Director General of Police, who in torn endorsed the same to the
Superintendent of Police concerned. On the direction from the Snperin·
tendent of Police, the SHO registered a case nnder Sections 161 and 165
of Indian Penal Code, 1860 and under section 5(2) of the Prevention of
Corruption Act, 1947 and took up the investigation.
Meanwhile, the First Respondent filed a Writ Petition before the
High Conrt for a direction to quash the First Information Report and
for restraining the appellants from proceeding further with the investi·
gation. The High Court quashed the entire criminal proceedings holding
that the allegations did not constitute a cognizable offence for commenc·
ing lawful investigation.
Aggrieved by the judgment of the High Court, the appellants
preferred the present appeal by special leave, contending that the alle·
gations contained in the complaint, either individually or collectively,
constituted a cognizable offence warranting the registration of a case as
contemplated nnder Section 154(1) Cr. P.C., and a thorough investigation in compliance with various statutory provisions more particularly
Sections 156, 157 and 159 Cr. P.C.
On behalf of the Respondents, it was contended that on account of
the deep rooted political animosity and rivalry entertained by the then
Chief Minister, he used the complainant, who was stooge in his hands,
to file the complaint containing false and scurrilous allegations against
the First Respondent and hence the criminal proceedings rightly
deserved to be quashed.
Disposing of the appeal, this Court,
HELD: 1. The judgment of the High Court quashing the First
Information Report is set aside as not being legally and factually SU!l·
tainable in law. However, the commencement as well as the entire
investigation, if any, so far done is quashed on the ground that the third
appellant °(SHO) is not clothed with valid legal authority to take up the
G
investigation and proceed with the same within the meaning of Section
5A(l) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. [319A-C]
2. The observations made by the High Court are unwarranted
and the historical anecdote is out of context and inappropriate. If snch a
view is to be judicially accepted and approved, then it will be tant·
H
amount to laying down an alarming pro!JOsition that an incoming
STATE OF HARYANA v. CH. BHAJAN LAL
261
Government under all circumstances, should put its seal of approval to
all the commissions and omissions of the outgoing Government ignoring
even glaring lapses and serious misdeeds and the deleterious and
destructive consequences that may follow therefrom. [318E-F]
Krishna Ballabh Sahay & Ors. v. Commissioner of Enquiry &
Ors., [1969] l SCR 387; A.R. Antu/ay v. R.S. Nayak and Anr., [1988] 2
SCC 602; State of Punjab v. Gurdial Singh, [1980] l SCR 1071; relied
on.
P. V. Jagannath Rao & Ors. v. State of Orissa & Ors., [1968] 3
SCR 789; Sheonandan Paswan v. State of Bihar and Ors., [1983] l SCC
438 and Sheonandan Paswan v. State of Bihar & Ors., [1987] l SCC
288; referred to.
3.1. If any information disclosing a cognizable offence is laid
before an officer-in-Ch!'rge. Of a police station satisfying the requirements of Section 154(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code, the said police
officer has no other option except to enter the substance thereof in the
prescribed form, that is to say, to register a case on the basis of such ·
information. [279Gr
3.2. Though a police officer canoot investigate a non-cognizable
offence on his own as in the case of cognizable offence, he can investigate a non-cognizable offence nnder the order of a Magistrate having
power to try such non-cognizable case or commit the same for trial
within the terms under Section 155(2) of the Code but subject to Section
155(3) of the Code. Further, under the newly introduced Sub-section (4)
to Section 155, where a case relates to two offences to which atleast one
is cognizable, the case shall be deemed to be a cognizable case notwithstanding that the other offences are non-cognizable and, therefore,
under such circumstances the police officers can investigate such offences with the same pi>wers as be has while investigating a cogni•.able
offence. [2798; 280A-B]
4. The core of the Sections 156, 157 and 159 of the Code 11fCriminal Procedure is that if a police officer has reason to suspect the commission of a cognizable offence, he must either proceed with the investigation or cause an investigation to be proceeded with by his subordinate; that in a case where the police officer sees no sufficient ground for
investigation, he can dispense with the investigation altogether; that the
field of investigation of any cognizable offence is exclusively within the
domain of the investigation agencies over which the Courts canoot have
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262
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[ 1990] Supp. 3 S.C.R.
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control and have no power to stitlle or -impinge upon the proceedings in
the investigation so long as the investigation proceeds in compliance
with the provisions relating to investigation and that it is only in a case
wherein a police officer decides not to investigate an offence, the concerned Magistrate can intervene and either direct an investigation or in
B
the alternative, if he thinks fit, he himself can, at once proceed or
depute any Magistrate sub-ordinate to him to proceed to hold a preliminary inquiry into or otherwise to dispose of the case in the manner
provided in the Code. [283G-H; 284A-B]
State of Bihar and Anr. v. J.A.C. Saldanha and Ors., [1980] 1
SCC 554; S.N. Sharma v. Bipen Kumar Tiwari and Ors., [1970] 3 SCR
C
946; Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir Ahmad, A1R 1954 P.C. 18 and
Abhinandan v. Dinesh, [1967] 3 SCR 668; referred to.
5.1. The expression "reason to suspect the commission of an
offence" used in Section. 154(1) Cr. P.C. would mean the sagacity of
0
rationally inferring the commission of a cognizable offence based on the
specific articulate facts mentioned in the First Information Report as
well in the Annexures, if any, enclosed and any attending circumstances
which may not amount to proof. In other words, the meaning of the
expression "reason to suspect" has to be governed and dictated by the
facts and circumstances of each case and at that stage the question of
E adequate proof of facts alleged in the First Information .Report does not
arise. [286E-F]
5.2. The commencement of investigation by a police officer is
subject to two conditions, frrstly, the police officer should have reason
to suspect the commission of a cognizable offence as required by Section
f. 157(1) and secondly, the police officer should subjectively satisfy himself as to whether there is sufficient ground for entering on an investigation even before he starts an Investigation into the facts and circumstances of the case as contemplated under clause (b) of the proviso to
Section 157(1) of the Code. [2888-C]
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Pakala Narayanaswami v. Emperor, AIR 1939 P.C. 47; Emperor
v. Vimlabai Deshpande, AIR 1946 P.C 123; United States v. Cortez, 66
L.Ed. (United States Supreme Court Reports) page 623; Dallison v.
Caffery, [1964] 2 All E.R. 610; State of Gujarat v. Mohan/al J. Porwal,
[1987] 2 SCC 364; Pukhraj v. D.R. Kohli, [1962] Supp. 3 SCR 866;
State of West Bengal & Ors. v. Swapan Kumar Guha & Ors., [1982] 3
H
SCR 121; referred to.
STA1E OF HARYANA v. CH. BHAJAN LAL
263
Webster's Third International Dictionary; Corpus Juris SeconA
dum, Vol. 83 pp. 923, 927; Words and Phrases, (Permanent Edition
40A) pp. 590, 591; referred to.
6. The investigation of an offence is the field exclusively reserved
for the police officers whose powers in that field are unfettered so long
as the power to investigate into the cognizable offences is legitimately
B
exercised in strict compliance with the provisions falling under Chapter
XII of the Code and the Courts are not justified in obliterating the track
of investigation when the investigating agencies are well within their
legal bounds. A noticeable feature of the scheme under Chapter XlV of
the Code is that a Magistrate is kept in the picture at all stages of the
police investigation but he is not authorised to interfere with the actual
investigation or to direct the police how that investigation is to be conC
ducted. But if a police officer transgresses the circumscribed limits and
improperly and illegally exercises his investigatory powers in breach of
any statutory provision causing serious prejudice to the personal liberty
and also property of a citizen, then the Court, on being approached by
the person aggrieved for the redress of any grievance has to consider the
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nature and extent of the breach and pass appropriate orders as may be
called for without leaving the citizens to the mercy of police echelons
since human dignity is a dear value of our Constitution. No one can
demand absolute immunity even if he is wrong and claim unquestionable right and unlimited powers exercisable upto unfathomable cosmos.
Any recognition of such power will be tantamount to recognition of E
'Divine Power' which no authority on earth can enjoy. [2900-G I
Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir Ahmad, AIR 1945 P.C. 18; R.P.
Kapur v. The State of Punjab, [1960] 3 SCR 388; Nandini Satpathy v.
P. L. Dani & Anr., [1978] 2 SCC 424; S.N. Sharma v. Ripen Kumar
Ti.Vari and Ors., [1970] 3 SCR 946; Prabhu Daya{ Deorath etc. etc. v. F
The District Magistrate, Kamrup & Ors., [1974] 2SCR12; State of West
Bengal and Ors. v. Swapan Kumar Guha and Ors., [1982] 3 SCR 121;
referred to.
7.1 The view of the High Court that the non-filing of a written
statement by a competent authority of the State Government by way of G
reply to the averments in the Writ Petition was serious flaw on the part
of the appellants and as such the averments of Respondent No. 1 should be
held as having disproved the entire .crimination alleged in the F.I.R.,.is
neither conceivable nor comprehensible. [2930]
7 .2. It is true that some of the allegations do suffer from misty
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[ 1990] Supp. 3 S.C.R.
vague~ess and lack of particulars. Further, there are no specific averments that either Respondent No. 1 or his relaticns and friends had no
source of income to accumulate the properties now standing in their
names and that Respondent No. 1 showed any favour to the1n by misusing his official position. [294B-C]
These are all matters which would be examined only during thr
course of investigation and thereafter by the court '" the materih.
collected and placed before it by the investigating agencies. The question whether the relations and friends of Respondent No. 1 have independently purchased the properties out of their own funds or not, also
cannot be decided by the Court at this stage on the denial statement of
Respondent No. 1 alone. [294C-D]
State of West Bengal and Ors. v. Swapan Kumar Guha and Ors.,
[1982] 3 SCR 121; distinguished.
State of Bihar and Anr. v. J.A.C. Sa!danha and Ors., [1980] 1
D
SCC 554; relied on.
8.1. In the exercise of the extra-ordinary power under Article 226.
or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, the following categories of cases are given by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of
E
the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice,
though it may uot be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined
and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae
and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such
power should be exercised:
p
(a) where the allegations made in the First'lnformation Report or
the complaint, eveu if they are taken at their face value and accepted in
their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or .make out a
case against the accused;
(b) where the :dlegations in the First Information Report and
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other materials, if any, accompanying the •'.I.R. do not disclose a
cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under
Section 156(1) of the Code except u&der an order of a Magistrate within
the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code;
(c) where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or comH plaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose
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STATE OF HARYANA v. CH. BHAJAN LAL
265
the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused;
(d) where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable
offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is
permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code;
(e) where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so
absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent
person can ever reach a jnst conclusion that there is sufficient ground
for proceeding against the accused;
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(f) where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the
provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal
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proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the
concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the
aggrieved party;
(g) where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with ma/a
fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an
ulterior motive for wreaking vengence on the accused and with a view to
spite him due to private and personal grudge. [305D-H; 306A-E]
8.2. In the instant case, the allegations made in the complaint, do
clearly constitute a cognizable offence justifying the registration of a
case and an investigation thereon and this case does not call for the
exercise of extraordinary or inherent powers of the High Court to quash
the F .I.R. itself. [307B]
State of West Bengal v. S.N. Basak, [1963]. 2 SCR 52;
distinguished.
R.P. Kapur v. The State of Punjab, [1960] 3 SCR 388; S.N.
Sharma v. Bipen Kumar Tiwari and Ors., [1970] 3 SCR 946; Hazari
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Lal Gupta v. Rameshwar Prasad and Anr. etc., [1972] 1 SCC 452;
Jehan Singh v. Delhi Administration, [1974] 3 SCR 794; Amar Nath v.
State of Haryana, [1977] 4 SCC 137; Madhu Limaye v. State of G
Maharashtra, [1977] 4 SCC 551; Kurukshetra University and Anr. v.
State of Haryana and Anr., [19771 4 SCC 451; State of Bihar and Anr.
v. J.A.C. Saldanha and Ors., [1980] 1 SCC 554; Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Purshotam Dass Jhunjunwala and Ors., [1983] l SCC
9; State of West Bengal and Ors. v. Swapan Kumar Guha and Ors.,
[1982] 3 SCR 121; Smt. Nagawwa v. Veeranna Shivalingappa Konjalgi
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[ 1990] Supp. 3 S.C.R.
& Ors., [1976] Supp. SCR 123; Pratibha Rani v. Suraj Kumar and
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Anr., [1985] 2 SCC 370; Madhavrao Jiwaji Rao Scindia μnd Ors. v.
Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre and Ors., [1988] l SCC 692; State of
Bihar v. Murad Ali Khan and Ors., [1988] 4 SCC 655; Ta/ab Haji
Hussain v. Madhukar Purshottam Mondekar and Anr., [1958] SCR
1226; L. U. Jadhav v. Shankarrao Abasaheb Pawar, [1983] 4 SCC 231;
B
J.P. Sharma v. Vinod Kumar Jain and Ors., [1986) 3 SCC 67; State of
U.P. v. V.R.K. Srivastava and Anr., [1989) 4 SCC 59; Emperor v.
Khwaja Nazir Ahmad, AIR 1945 P.C. 18; referred to.
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9.1. The entire matter is only at a premature stage and the
investigation has not proceeded with except some prelhltinary effort
taken on the date of the registration of the case. The evidence has to be
gathered after a thorough investigation and placed before the Court on
the basis of which alone the Court can come to a conclusion one way or
the other on the plea of ma/a fides. If the allegations are bereft of truth
and made maliciously, the investigation will say so. At this stage, when
there are only allegations and recriminations but no evidence, this
Court cannot anticipate the result of the investigation and render a
finding on the question of mala [ides on the materials at present avail·
able. Therefore, it cannot be said that the complaint should be thrown
overboard on the mere unsubstantiated plea of mala [ides. Even assuming that the complainant has laid the complaint only on account of his
personal animosity that, by itself, will not be a ground to discard the
complaint containing serious allegations which have to be tested and
weighed after the evidence is collected. [307G-H; 308A·DJ
9.2. The dominant purpose of registration of the case and the
intended follow up action are only to investigate the allegations and
present a case before the Court, if sufficient evidence in support of those
allegations are collected but not to make a character assassination of the
person complained against. [308H; 309A)
S. Pratap Singh v. The State of Punjab, [1964) 4 SCR 733; State of
Haryana v. Rajindra Sareen, [1972) 2 SCR 452; Express Newspapers
Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., [1985) Supp. 3 SCR 382;
P. V. Jagannath Rao & Ors. v. State of Orissa & Ors., [1968) 3 SCR
789; The King v. Minister of Health, [1929) l K.B. 619; Rex v. Brighton Corporation Ex-parte Shoosmith, 96 L.T. 762; Earl Fitzwilliam's
Wentworth Estate Co. Ltd. v. Minister of Town and Country Planning,
[1951] 2 K.B. 284; referred to.
10.1. A police officer with whom an investip~ of an offence
STATE OF HARYAl>A v. CH. BHAJAN LAL
267
under Section 5(l)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act is entrusted
should not proceed with a pre-conceived idea of guilt of that person
indicated with such offence and subject him to any harassment and
victimisation, because in case the allegations of illegal accumulation of
wealth are found, during the course of investigation as baseless, the
harm done not only to that person but also to the office he held will be
incalculable and inestimable. [297C-E)
10.2. In the instant case, the SP seems to have exhibited some
over-enthusiasm, presumably to please 'some one1 and had directed the
SHO to register the case and investigate the same even on the very first
day of the receipt of the complaint-from the DGP, in whose office the
complaint was lying for merely 9 days. This unprecedented overenthusiasm shown by the S.P., without disclosing the reasons for making an order entrusting the investigation to the SHO who is not a
designated officer under Section 5A(l), really shocks ones' sense of
justice and fair play even though the 11ntested allegations made in the
complaint require a thorough investigation. Still, it is an inexplicable
riddle as to why the S.P. had departed from the normal rule and
hastly ordered the SHO to investigate the serious allegations, levelled against a former Chief Minister and a Minister in the Cabinet of
the Central Government on the face of the registration of the case.
However, this conduct of the SP can never serve as a ground for
quashing the FIR. [298C-E)
Sirajuddin v. State of Madras, [1970) 3 SCR 931; The State of
Uttar Pradesh v. Bhagwant Kishore Joshi, [1964) 3 SCR 71; relied on.
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11.1. A police officer not below the rank of an Inspector of Police
authorised by the State Government in terms of the First proviso can
take up the investigation of an offence referred to in clause ( e) of Section
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5(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, only on a separate and independent order of a police officer not below the rank of a Superintendent
of Police. A strict compliance of the second proviso is an additional legal
requirement to that of the first proviso for conferring a valid authority
on a police officer not below the rank of an Inspector of Police to
investigate an offence falling under clause (e) of Section 5(1) of the Act.
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This is clearly spelt out from the expression "further provided" occurring in the second proviso. Thus, investigation by the designated Police
Officers is the rule and investigation by an officer of a lower rank is an
exception. [311H; 312A-B)
11.2. The granting of permission under Section SA of the PrevenH
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[ 1990] Supp. 3 S.C.R.
lion of Corruption Act authorising an officer of lower rank to conduct
the investigation is not to be treated by a Megistrate as a mere matter of
routine, but it is an exercise of his judicial discretion having regard to
the policy underlying and the order giving the permission should, on the
face of it, disclose the reasons for granting such permission. The
Superintendent of Police or any police officer of higher rank while
granting permission to a non-designated police officer in exercise of his
power under the second proviso to Section SA(l), should satisfy himself
that there are good and sufficient reasons to entrust the investigation
with such police officer of a lower rank and record his reasons for doing
so; because the very object of the legislature in enacting Section SA is to
see that the investigation of offences punishable under Sections 161, 16S
or 16SA of Indian Penal Code as well as those under Section S of the Act
should be done ordinarily by the officers designated in clauses (a) to (d)
of Section SA(l). The exception should be for adequate reasons which
should be disclosed on the face of the order. Strict compliance with
Section SA(l) becomes absolutely necessary because it expressly prohibits police officers below certain ranks, from investigating into offences nnder Sections 161, 16S and 16SA IPC and under Section S of the
Act without orders of Magistrates specified therein or without the
authorisation of the State Government in this behalf and from effecting
arrests for those offences without a warrant. [314H; 31SA-D]
11.3. The main object of Section SA is to protect the public
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servant against harassment and victimisation. Section SA of the Act is
mandatory and not directory and the investigation conducted in violation thereof bears the stamp of illegality but that illegality commited
in the course of an investigation does not affect the competence and
the jurisdiction of the Court for trial and where the cognizance of
the case has in fact been taken and the case is proceeded to terminaF
tion the validity of the proceedings with the preceding investigation
does not vitiate the result unless miscarriage of justice has been caused
thereby. [311C; 312D-E)
11.4. In the instant case, there is absolutely no reason, given by
the S.P. in directing the SHO to investigate and as such the order of the
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S. P. is directly in violation of the dictum laid down by this Court in
several decisions. The third appellant, SHO is not clothed with the
requisite legal authority within the meaning of the second proviso of
Section SA(l) of the Act to investigate the offence under clause (e) of
Section S(l) of the Act. [31SE-F)
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H.N. Rishbud and Inder Singh v. The State of Delhi, [1955] 1
STAIB OF HARYANA v. CH. BHAJAN LAL {PANDIAN. J.]
269
SCR llSO; The State of Madhya Pradesh v. Mubarak Ali, [1959]
Supp. 2 SCR 201; A.C. Sharma v. Delhi Administration, [1973] 3
SCR 477; A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, [1984] 2 SCR 914; Major E.G.
Barsay v. The State of Bombay, [1962] 2 SCR 195; Munna Lal v. State
of Uttar Pradesh, [1964] 3 SCR 88; S.N. Bose v. State of Bihar,
[1968] 3 SCR 563; Muni Lal v. Delhi Administration, [1971] 2 SCC 48;
Khandu Sonu Dhobi & Anr. v. State of Maharashtra, [1972] 3 SCR
51 O; relied ou.
12. The Government order authorised the Inspector General of
Police to investigate only the offences falling under Section 5 of the Act.
Therefore, the SHO who has taken up the investigation of the offences
inclusive of those under Section 161 and 165 IPC is not at all clothed
with any authority to investigate these two offences, registered under
the IPC, apart from the offence under Section 5(2) of the Act. However,
as the question relating to the legal authority of the SHO is raised even
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at the initial stage, it would be proper and also desirable that the
investigation, if at all to be proceeded with in the opinion of the State
Government, should proceed only on the basis of a valid order in strict D
compliance with the mandatory pron.ion of Section 5A(l). [3 lSG-H; 316A-B]
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 5412
of 1990.
From the Judgment and Order dated 8.9.1988 of the Punjab and
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Haryana High Court in C.W.P. No. 9172 of 1987.
Rajinder Sachhar, S.C. Mohanta and Mahabir Singh for the
Appellants.
K. Parasaran, P. Chidambaram, R.K. Garg, Mrs. Ayasha F
Karim, Ms. lndu Malhotra, G. Subramanium and S. Srinivasan for the
Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
S. RATNAVEL PANDIAN, J. Leave granted.
"The king is under no man, but under God and the law"-was
the reply of the Chief Justice of England, Sir Edward Coke when
Jam es-I once declared "Then I am to be under the law. It is treason to
affirm it"-so wrote Henry Bracton who was a Judge of the King's
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Bench.
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Sl.!PREME COURT. REPORTS
[ 1990] Supp. 3 S.C.R.
The words of Bracton in his treatise in Latin "guod Rex non
debet esse sub homine, sed sub Dea et Legu" (That the king should not
be under man, but under God and the law) were quoted time and time
again when the Stuart Kings claimed to rule by divine right. We would
like to quote and requote those words of Sir Edward Coke even at the
threshold.
In our democratic polity under the Constitution based on the
concept of 'Rule of Law' which we have adopted and given to
ourselves and which serves as an aorta in the anatomy of our democratic system, THE LAW IS SUPREME.
Everyone whether individually or collectively is unquestionably
under the supremacy of law. Whoever he may be, however high he is,
he is under the law. No matter how powerful he is and how rich he may
be.
The heated and lengthy argument advanced in general by all the
learned counsel on the magnitude and the multi-dimensional causes of
corruption and also about the positive and constructive remedial measures and steps to be taken for its eradication has necessitated us to
give a brief exordium about its perniciousness, though strictly speaking, we would be otherwise not constrained to express any opinion on
this.
At the outset we may say that we are not inclined to make an
exhaustive survey and analysis about the anatomy, dimensions and
causes of corruption. It cannot be gainsaid that the ubiguity of corruption is always associated with a motivation of private gain at public
expense.
Though the historical background and targets of corruption are
reviewed time after time; the definitional and conceptual problems are
explored and the voluminous causes and consequences of corruption
are constantly debated through out the globe, yet the evils of corruption and their autonarcotic effect _pose a great threat to the welfare of
society and continue to grow in menacing proportion. Therefore, the
canker of the venality, if not fought against on all fronts and at all
levels, checked and eradicated, will destablize and debilitate the very
foundations of democracy; wear away the rule of law through moral
decay and make the entire administration ineffective and dysfunctional.
STATE OF HARYANA v. CH. BHAJAN LAL [PAND!AN, J.]
271
Mere rhetorical preaching of apostolic sermons listing out the
evils of corruption and raising slogans with catch-words are of no use
in the absence of practical and effective steps to eradicate them; because 'evil tolerated is evil propagated'.
At the same time, one should also be alive to cases where false
and frivolous accusations of corruption are maliciously made against
an adversary exposing him to social ridicule and obliquy with an
ulterior motive of wreaking vengence due to past animosity or
personal pique or merely-Out of spite regardless of the fact whether the
proceedings will ultimately culminate into conviction or not.
We would like to make it clear that the above exordial note is
given without casting any aspersion against any of the parties to the
prese,nt proceedings or touching the individual merit of the case.
The relevant facts giving rise to this appeal, though have been set
out in great detail in the impugned judgment of the High Court, have
to be recapitulated in order to enable us to give our own reasons for
the findings which we will be arriving at on the interpretation of certain provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code ('the Code' for short)
and of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 ('the Act' for short).
This appeal by grant of special leave is directed by the appellants, namely, the State of Haryana and two others assailing the judgment dated 8.9.1988 of a Division Bench of the High Court of Punjab
and Haryana rendered in Writ Petition No. 9172/87 quashing the entire criminal proceedings inclusive of the registration of the Information Report and directing the second respondent, Mr. Dharam Pal to
pay the costs to the first respondent, Ch. Bhajan Lal.
Ch. Bhajan Lal was a Minister in 1977 when Ch. Devi Lal was
the Chief Minister of Haryana state and he· became the Chief Minister
of the state o.f Haryana in 1982-87. During the initiation of this criminal proceeding in question, he was the Union Minister for Environment and Forests, Government of India.
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In the general election to the legislative assembly of the state of
Haryana in June 1987, Smt. Jasma Devi, the wife of Ch. Bhajan Lal
contested from Adampur constituency on being sponsored by the Congress (I) party as against the second respondent, Mr. Dharam Pal who
was a nominee of the Lok Dal. Mrs. J as ma Devi was successfully
elected. Dharam Pal presented an election petition calling in question
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1990] Supp. 3 S.C.R.
the election of Smt. Jasma Devi on a variety of grounds. Ch. Devi Lal,
the third respondent in this appeal who was the second respondent in
the writ petition also contested on Lok Dal's ticket and became
successful. Thereafter Ch. Devi Lal became the Chief Minister of the
State of Haryana in 1987.
It seems that after the general election there were a number of
criminal proceedings between the parties one of which being a criminal
prosecution against Dharam Pal under Section 307 !PC registered in
Adampur police station. On account of the political rivalry and the
institution of a number of criminal cases and counter cases there was
bad-blood between Ch. Bhajan Lal on the one hand and Ch. Devi Lal
on the other.
While it was so, on 12th November 1987 Dharm Pal presented a
complaint before Ch. Devi Lal making certain serious allegations
against Bhajan Lal, a brief note of which is given below:
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Before 1969 Ch. Bhajan Lal was a man of ordinary means and
did not have any definite source of income, but after he was inducted
in the Cabinet as a Minister and particularly after he became the Chief
Minister of the State, he accumulated huge properties worth crores of
rupees in the names of his family members, relations and persons close
to him by misusing his power and position and also by undervaluing
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the market price and all those transactions are benami in character. In
the complaint, Mr. Dharam Pai has given the details citing 20 independent allegations, alleging that a palatial house is being constructed at
Hissar at the cost of about Rs.50 lakhs and that extensive lands at
various places have been purchased either in the name of his wife,
J as ma Devi, or in the names of his sons Kuldip and Chander Mohan or
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benami in the names of his relations etc. and that two petrol pumps
valuing about Rs.5 lakhs have been installed in the name of his wife,
and that certain shops have been constructed etc. Besides these allegations, it is said that Bhajan Lal has acquired several other properties
either in his name or in the names of his benamidars such as shares in
the cinemas of Sirsa and Adampur, besides owning trucks, cars etc.
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and is possessing gold, silver and diamond ornaments valuing about
Rs.5 crores. The accumulation of all those properties in the shape of
buildings, land, shares and ornaments etc. is far beyond his legal
means and, therefore, an investigation should be directed and
appropriate action be taken against Ch. Bhajan Lal.
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On the complaint presented by Dharam Pal, the Officer on
STATE OF HARYANA v. CH. BHAJAN LAL [PANDIAN, J.]
273
Special Duty (OSD) in the Chief Minister's Secretariat made an
endorsement on 12. lL 1987 .in Hindi, the translation of which reads
"C.M. has seen. For appropriate action" and marked the same to the
Director General of Police (DGP), who in turn made an endorsement
on 12.11.1987 itself reading "Please look into this; take necessary
action and report" and marked it to the Superintendent of Police
(S.P.) Hissar. The said complaint along with the above endorsements
of OSD and DGP was put up before the S.P., the second appellant on
21.11.1987, on which date itself the S.P. made his endorsement reaqing "Please register a case and investigate".
The SHO (the third appellant) registered a case on the basis of
the allegations in the complaint under Sections 161 and 165 of the
Indian Penal Code and Section 5(2) of the Act on 21.11.1987 itself at
6.15 P.M. and took up the investigation. On the foot of the First
Information Report (F.I.R.) the following- endorsement has been
made:
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"Police proceeding that the S.P. Hissar after registering
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the case on the above application has ordered to investigate
the case. That FIR u/s 161, 165 IPC. 5.2.1947 P.C Act has
been registered at P.S. Sadar Hissar. An Inspector, along
with constables Sumer Singh 700, Randhir Singh 445, Attar
Singh 47 proceed to the spot. Constables Sumar Singh 700,
and Randhir Singh 445 were handed over one rifle along
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with 50 cartridges each and copy of the FIR as a special
report is being sent through Head constable Bhaktawar
Singh, 602 at the residence of Illaga Magistrate and other
offices.
Tara Chand,
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Inspector,
Police Station, Sadar."
The third petitioner (SHO) after forwarding a copy of the first
information report to the Magistrate and other officers concerned,
himself took up the investigation and proceeded to the spot accomG
panied by three constables of whom two constables were handed over
one rifle each and 50 cartridges.
While the matter stood thus, the first respondent filed the writ
petition No. 9172/87 under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of
India seeking issuance of a writ of certiorari quashing the first informaH
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[ 1990] Supp. 3 S.C.R.
lion report and also.of a writ of prohibition restraining the petitioners
herein from further proceeding with the ·investigation. It is stated that
the High Court granted an ex-parte stay which was thereafter made
absolute.
Initially 3 separate written statements were filed before the High
Court, one by Inspector Kartar Singh (on behalf of the State of
Haryana, the S.P. and S.H.O. who were respondents 1, 3 and 4 in the
writ petition and who are the appellants herein); another by respondent No. 2 Ch. Devi Lal (who is the third proforma respondent in this
appeal) and the third one by respondent No. 5 in the writ petition (who
is the complainant and the second respondent in this appeal). Subsequently realising that Kartar Singh was not competent to file the written statement on behalf of the State, SP and SHO in terms of the Rules
of Business, separate written statements one by the then S .P. Lekhi
Ram and another by Inspector Tara Chand (who registered the case)
were filed on 14.7.1988. However, no written statement was filed on
behalf of the State of Haryana. The High Court before which several
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contentions were raised by the respective parties examined each of the
allegations in detail in the light of the explanatory and denial statement which according to the High Court has not been either explained
or denied by the State and rejected the plea of the appellants 2 and 3
submitting that it is wholly premature to say anything with regard to
the truthfulness or otherwise of the allegations and observed as
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1. " ......... it is clear that the allegations made are just
imaginary and fantastic."
· 2. " ........ his (respondent No. 2 Dharam Pal) sole
object in putting complaint Annexure P-9 was to set the
machinery of the criminal law in motion against the
petitioner without verifying the truth or otherwise of his
own allegations before levelling them against the petitioner
in the complaint Annexure P-9 and that he was solely
depending upon the fishing enquiry which may be undertaken by the police in the course of its investigation without
being himself possessed or known to or seen any material
or documents justifying his allegations of benami purchases, or under valuation of property allegedly purchased
by the petitioner."
3. "Allegations obtaining in Annexure P-9 are, therefore,
the outcome of a desparate, frustrated mind ..... "
STATE OF HARYANA v . . CH. BHAJAN LAL [PANDIAN, J.]
275
4. "Irresponsible manner in which indiscriminate allegations have been levelled by Dharam Pal, respondent No. 5
against the petitioner in Annexure P-9 is patent from the
assertions made in respect of benami ownership of house
No. 1028, Friends Colony, New Delhi by the petitioner."
5. "Respondent No. 5 appears to have made these allegations only to curry favour with respondent No. 2 and to
avenge his own insult of defeat in elections against the
petitioner's wife. The charges levelled in the complaint
Annexure P-9 by respondent No. 5 against the petitioner
are, therefore, all groundless."
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6. "It was only the S.P. Lekhi Ram and the Inspector Tara
Chand both of whom filed. their individual written statements on July 14, 1988 more than eight months after the
filing of the writ in December 1987, who tried to be more
loyal to the king than the king himself and in tum respectively ordered the registration of the case against the
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petitioner and proceeded to the spot (God knows which
one and for what purpose) with duly armed constabulary.
Mala fides, if at all these can be attributed are attributable
to S.P. Lekhi Ram and Inspector Tara Chand but not to
Chaudhary Devi Lal, Chief Minister Haryana arrayed as
respondent No.