# STATE OF HARYANA v. HARYANA CO-OPERATIVE TRANSPORT L'TD. & ORS

- **Citation:** [1977] 2 S.C.R. 306
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1976-12-02
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 1164 of 1970
- **Bench:** Y. V. Chandrachud, P. K. Goswami
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/state-of-haryana-v-haryana-co-operative-transport-l-td-ors-7039
- **Pages:** 8

## Headnote

Constitution of India-Articles 226-227-Mentioning wrong writ-Writ of
quo warranto-Must be specifically preyed-Whether can be challenged in collateral proceedings-Industrial Disputes Act 1947-Sec. 9(1), finality of award
of Labour Court-W lzether can be challenged by a writ petition-Challenge to
appointment of the Judge of Labour Court.
The first respondent, a Co-operative Transport Society terminated the services
of respondent 3 and 4. The State of Punjab referred the dispute arising out of
the dismissal of respondents 3 to 4 under s. 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act
1947 to the Labour Court that was presided over by Mr. Das.
On Mr. Das's·
retirement Shri Hans Raj Gupta was appointed as the Presiding Officer of the
Court.
Mr. Gupta gave an award directing the reinstatement of respondents 3
and 4 with 50 per cent back wages from the date of their dismissal until the
date of reinstatement.
The first respondent being aggrieved by the award filed a writ petition in
the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution praying that the
award given by second respondent be set aside on the ground, inter a/ia, that
he was not qualified to become the Presiding Officer under s. 7 ( 3) of the Act
since he did not hold any judidal office in India for not less than 7 years.
The contention of resp9ndent No. 2 was that he held such a judicial office
because he worked as Upper Division Clerk-cum-Head Clerk, Assistant Settlement Officer and Registrar of the Pensions Appeals Tribunals. The contention
that he held judicial office was not pressed before the Hi~h Court and in this
Court by the State.
The State Government, however, supported the award on
the plea that Mr. Gupta's appointment cannot be challenged in collateral proceedings filed in the High Court for challenging the award.
Re Toronto & Co. v. City_ of Toronto 46 Dominion Law Reports 547; Bhaskara Pillai and A.nr. v. State [1950] 5DLR Travancore-Cochin 382 and Quem
Empress v. Ganga Ram ILR 16 All. 136 distinguished.
Dismissing the appeal,
HELD : 1. Considering the nature and course of proceedings in the instant
case, it is impossible to hold that the challenge to Mr. Gupta's appointment was
made in a collateral proceedjng. The appointment of Mr. Gupta could not have
been challenged before hilI!.
The challenge to his appointment having been
made by a writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution to which
Mr. Gupta was impleaded as a party-respondent, the challenge was made directly
in a substantive proceeding and not in a collateral proceeding.
Since he was
impleaded in the writ petition he had a clear and rightful opportunity to defend
his appciintment. [311 C-EJ
2. The mere circumstance that the first respondent did not in so many words
ask for a writ of quo warranto cannot justify the argument that the appointment
was being challenged collaterally in a proceeding taken to challenge the award.
On the averments .U, the writ petition it is clear that the main and real attack
on the award was the ineligibility of Shri Gupta to occupy the post of a Judge
of a Labour Court in the discharge of whose functions the award was rendered'
by him. [311 G-H, 312A]
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HARYANA v. HARYANA CO-OP. TRANSPORT (Chandrachud, J.)
307
3. The relief of certiorari asked for by the writ petition was certainly in·
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appropnate but the High Court was also invited to issue such other suitable writ,
order or direction as it deemed fit and proper in the circumstances of the case.
There is no magic in the use of a formula. The facts necessary for challenging
the appointment are stated clearly in the writ petition and the challenge to the
.appointment is expressly made on the ground that the officer was not qualified
to hold the post.
[312A-BJ
4. The finality of the orders of the Labour Court contemplated by s. 9 (1)
although widely worded must be given a limited meaning so as to bar the juris-
.diction of civil courts in the ordinary exercise of their powers. It is impossible
to construe th

## Text

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STATE OF HARYANA
v.
HARYANA CO-OPERATIVE TRANSPORT L'TD. & ORS.
December 2, 1976
[Y. V. CHANDRACHUD AND P. K. GOSWAMI, JJ.]
Constitution of India-Articles 226-227-Mentioning wrong writ-Writ of
quo warranto-Must be specifically preyed-Whether can be challenged in collateral proceedings-Industrial Disputes Act 1947-Sec. 9(1), finality of award
of Labour Court-W lzether can be challenged by a writ petition-Challenge to
appointment of the Judge of Labour Court.
The first respondent, a Co-operative Transport Society terminated the services
of respondent 3 and 4. The State of Punjab referred the dispute arising out of
the dismissal of respondents 3 to 4 under s. 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act
1947 to the Labour Court that was presided over by Mr. Das.
On Mr. Das's·
retirement Shri Hans Raj Gupta was appointed as the Presiding Officer of the
Court.
Mr. Gupta gave an award directing the reinstatement of respondents 3
and 4 with 50 per cent back wages from the date of their dismissal until the
date of reinstatement.
The first respondent being aggrieved by the award filed a writ petition in
the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution praying that the
award given by second respondent be set aside on the ground, inter a/ia, that
he was not qualified to become the Presiding Officer under s. 7 ( 3) of the Act
since he did not hold any judidal office in India for not less than 7 years.
The contention of resp9ndent No. 2 was that he held such a judicial office
because he worked as Upper Division Clerk-cum-Head Clerk, Assistant Settlement Officer and Registrar of the Pensions Appeals Tribunals. The contention
that he held judicial office was not pressed before the Hi~h Court and in this
Court by the State.
The State Government, however, supported the award on
the plea that Mr. Gupta's appointment cannot be challenged in collateral proceedings filed in the High Court for challenging the award.
Re Toronto & Co. v. City_ of Toronto 46 Dominion Law Reports 547; Bhaskara Pillai and A.nr. v. State [1950] 5DLR Travancore-Cochin 382 and Quem
Empress v. Ganga Ram ILR 16 All. 136 distinguished.
Dismissing the appeal,
HELD : 1. Considering the nature and course of proceedings in the instant
case, it is impossible to hold that the challenge to Mr. Gupta's appointment was
made in a collateral proceedjng. The appointment of Mr. Gupta could not have
been challenged before hilI!.
The challenge to his appointment having been
made by a writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution to which
Mr. Gupta was impleaded as a party-respondent, the challenge was made directly
in a substantive proceeding and not in a collateral proceeding.
Since he was
impleaded in the writ petition he had a clear and rightful opportunity to defend
his appciintment. [311 C-EJ
2. The mere circumstance that the first respondent did not in so many words
ask for a writ of quo warranto cannot justify the argument that the appointment
was being challenged collaterally in a proceeding taken to challenge the award.
On the averments .U, the writ petition it is clear that the main and real attack
on the award was the ineligibility of Shri Gupta to occupy the post of a Judge
of a Labour Court in the discharge of whose functions the award was rendered'
by him. [311 G-H, 312A]
~··'
HARYANA v. HARYANA CO-OP. TRANSPORT (Chandrachud, J.)
307
3. The relief of certiorari asked for by the writ petition was certainly in·
A
appropnate but the High Court was also invited to issue such other suitable writ,
order or direction as it deemed fit and proper in the circumstances of the case.
There is no magic in the use of a formula. The facts necessary for challenging
the appointment are stated clearly in the writ petition and the challenge to the
.appointment is expressly made on the ground that the officer was not qualified
to hold the post.
[312A-BJ
4. The finality of the orders of the Labour Court contemplated by s. 9 (1)
although widely worded must be given a limited meaning so as to bar the juris-
.diction of civil courts in the ordinary exercise of their powers. It is impossible
to construe the provisions in derogation of the remedies provided by Article
226 and 227 of the Constitution.
[3130-E]
Bezparua (G.C.) v. State of Assam A:I.R.-1954 Assam 161, lagannath Vinayak Kale v. Ahmadi-[1958] ll LL.J. 50 (Born.) and Mewar Textile Mills Ltd. v.
Industrial Tribunal-A.I.R. 1951 Raj 161, approved.
-
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1164 of 1970.
(Appeal by Special Leave from the Order dated the 5th September
1969 of the Punjab & Haryana High) Court in S. C. A. No. 197
of
1968)
Naunit Lal,' Girish Chandra and R. N. Sachthey, for the appellant.
S. B. Wad, for respondent No. 1.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
CHANDRACHUD, J.
The 1st respondent is a co-operative transport
·society carrying on transport business at Kaithal, District Kamal, State
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.of Haryana.
The Society terminated the services of respondents 3
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and 4 who were working with it as conductor and driver, respectively.
The State of Punjab, on June 22, 1964 referred the dispute arising out
of the dismissal of respondents 3 and 4, under s. 10 of the Industrial
Disputes Act (14 of 1947) for the adjudication of the Labour Court,
Rohtak.
That Court was then presided over by Shri Jawala Dass.
·On Shri Dass's retirement, Shri Hans Raj Gupta was appointed on
June 4, 1965, as the presiding Officer of the Court.
The reference
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was thereafter heard by him and on April 16, 1966 he gave an award
·directing the reinstatement of respondents 3 and 4 with 50% backwages from the date of their dismissal until the date of reinstatement. .
The Presiding Officer of the Labour Court is the 2nd respondent to this
,appeal.
Being aggrieved by the award, the 1st respondent filed Writ Petition No. 1575 of 1966 in the High Court of Punjab and Haryana
under arts.
226 and 227 of the Constitution, praying that the award
given by the 2nd respondent be set aside on the ground, inter alia,
that he was not qualified to hold the post of a Judge of the Labour
·Court, and, therefore, the award was without jurisdiction.
The Writ
petition having been allowed bv a Division BPnC"h hv its judgment dated
March 26, 1968 the State of Haryana has filed this appeal by spec;
1eave.
The Presiding Officer of the Labour Court was impleaded
:to the Writ Petition as the 2nd respondent.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1977] 2 S.C.R.
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The only question for decision in this appeal is whether Shri Hans
Raj Gupta who gave his award as the presiding Officer of the Labour
Court was qualified for being appointed as a Judge of the Labour
Court.
Section 7 ( 1) of the Industria~ Disputes Act provides that
the appropriate Government may constitute one or more Labour
Courts for the adjudication of Industrial disputes relating to any matter
specified in the Second Schedule to the Act. A Labour Court, under
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s. 7 (2), shall consist of one person only to be appointed by the Governc
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ment.
Sub-section ( 3) of s. 7 reads thus :
" ( 3) A person shall not be qualified for appointment as the
presiding officer of a Labour Court, unless-
( a) he is, or has been, a Judge of a High Court; or
- (b) he has, for a period of not less than three years, been
a District Judge or an Additional District Judge; or
(c) he has held the office of the chairman or any other
member of the Labour Appellate Tribunal constituted under
the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950 ( 48
of 1950), or of any Tribunal, for a period of not less than
two years; or
(d) he has held any judicial officer in India for not less than
,seven years; or
(e) he has been the presiding officer of a Labour Court
constituted under any Provincial Act ot State Act for not
less than five years".
It was common ground in the High Court that Shri Gupta did not
satisfy the qualifications laid down in any of the clauses (a), (b),
(c) and (e) of s. 7(3).
It was, however, urged in the High Court,
in the first instance,
that Shri Gupta had held a judicial office
in India for not less than seven years and was, therefore, qualified for
being appointed as a Judge of the Labour Court under clause ( d) of
s. 7 ( 3).
This argument was made before the learned Chief Justice
of the High Court who, while hearing the Writ Petition singly, felt that
the question raised was of public importance.
He, therefore, referred
the matter to a Division Bench.
The contention that Shri Gupta was
qualified to hold the office of a Judge of the Labour Court under
clause (d) of s.7(3) was, however, given up by the State before the
Division Bench.
Before us, the learned counsel for the appellant,
the State of Haryana, rightly did not pursue the unstatable contention.
Shri Hans Raj Gupta was initially working as an Upper Division
Clerk-cum-Head Clerk.
Thereafter, he worked from January 14,
1941 to October 19, 1954 as the Registrar to the Pensions Appeals
Tribunal, Jullundur Cantonment.
After relinquishing that post,
he
was reverted as an Upper Division Clerk-cum-Head Clerk, which office
he held till February 17, 1957. Subsequently, he was appointed as an
Assistant Settlement officer in which post he worked till September
1962.
It is obvious, and requires no clever argument to show, that
Shri Gupta was holding clerical posts which, with some courtesy, may
HARYANA v. HARYANA CO-OP. TRANSPOllT (Clwndrachud, J.) 309
be described as posts calling for and furnishing admi~istrative experience.
As an Upper' Division Clerk, even if th~ dunes of that post
were combined with those of the Head Clerk, Shn Gupta was nowhere
in the shadow of a judicial office.
As a Registrar of the Pensions
Appeals Tribunal, Jullundur Cantonment, he was admittedly discharging administrative functions.
A circumstance which seems to · have
blurred the perception of the State Government perhaps was that the
Pensions Appeals Tribunal was a ju~icial or. q1;1asi-judicial body a~d
since shri Gupta was1 closel~ associated ~1t~ .1t, does not m~tt~r m
what capacity, he could be said to hold a 1ud1c1al office.
Adm1mstrative proximity with judicial work was regarded as an excuse
good
enough to elevate the administrator into a holder of judicial office. This
was a wholly misconceived approach to a matter of some moment for,
were it so, many a judicial clerk would be qualified to be appointed
to a judicial office.
Having never held any judicial office, Shri Gupta
totally lacked judicial experience and was incompetent to discharge
the functions of a Judge of the Labour Court.
His appointment was
therefore illegal and ·his award without jurisdiction.
We are happy
to note that the State Government did not take the time of the Division
Bench of he High Court and of this Court in· arguing an impossible
proposition.
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Nevertheless, the award given by Shri Gupta as the Presiding
Officer of the Labour Court is defended by the State Government on
1the Plea that Shri Gupta's appointment cannot be challenged in a
collateral proceeding filed in the High Court for challenging the award.
Reliance is placed in support of this submission on the following passage in Cooley's "A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations" (8th
edn; vol. 2; pages 1255-1358);
"An. officer de jure is one who, possessing the legal qualificatlons, has been lawfully chosen to the office in question,
and. has f~lfilled any ~onditions precedent to the performance
of its duties.
~.Y bemg thus chosen and observing the
precedent con.d1t10ns, su~h a person becomes of right entitled
~o the pos~ess10n and enjoyment of the office, and the public,
m who~e mterest t~e offi~e is create~, is entitled' of right to
·have him perform its duties. If he 1s excluded from it the
exclusion is both a public offense and a private injury. '
.An officer de jure may be . excluded from his office by
~ither an officer de facto or an intruder.
An officer de facto
1s one who by some color of right is in possession of an office
and ~or the time being performs its . duties with public
acqmescence though
having no right in fact.
His color
of right may come from ~n election or appointment made by
some officer or body havmg colorable but no actual right to
make ~t; or mad~ in such disregard of legal requirements as
.to be meffectual m law; or ~ade to fill the place of an officer
illegally removed; or made 111 favor of a party not having
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1977] 2 S.C.R.
the legal qualifications; or it may come from public acquiescence in the officer holding without performin_g the precedent
conditions, or holding over under claim of right after his
legal right has been terminated; or possibly from
public
acquiescence alone when accompanied by such circumstances
of official reputation as are calculated to induce people, without inquiry, to submit to or invoke official action on the
supposition that the person claiming the office is what he
assumes to be.
An intruder is one who attempts to perform
the duties of an office without authority of law, and without
the support of public acquiescence.
No one is under obligation to recognise or respect the acts
of an intruder, and for all legal purposes they are absolutely
void.
But for the sake of order and regularity,
and to
prevent confusion in the conduct of public business and in
security of private rights, the acts of officers de facto are
not suffered to be questioned because of the want of legal'
authority except by some dire~t proceeding instituted for the
;. purpose by the State of by some one claiming the office
de iure, or except when the person himself attempts
to
build up some· right, or claim some privilege or emolument,
by reason of being the officer which he claims to be.
In
alt other cases the f!Cts of an officer de facto are as valid
and effectual, while he is suffered to retain the office, as
though he were an officer by right, and the same legal consequences will flow from them for the protection of the public .
and of third parties.
This is an important principle, which
finds concise expression in the legal maxim that the acts of
officers de faf;to cannot be questioned collaterally."
Equally strong relian_ce was pl_?ced by the State Government on
a decision of the Ontario Supreme Court in Rs Toronto N. Co. City of
Tornoto{l) in which, after an examination of several American and
other decisions, Meredith, C.J.O., observed :
"That it is not open to attack, in a collateral proceeding, the status af a de facto Judge, ha\ling at least a colourable title to the office, and that his acts are valid, is clear,
I think, on principle and on authority, and it is also clear
that the proper proceeding to question his right to the office
is by quo warranto information." (PP. 551-552)
Learned counsel for the State, Shri Naunit Lal, further drew our
attention to a decision of the High Court of · Travancore-Cochin in
Bhaskera Pillai and Anr. vs. State( 2 ) which, relying upon the passage
in Cooley's Constitutional Limitations and the Canadian case,
held
that the appointment of the Chief Justice of that Court could not be
questioned collaterally in a proceeding for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court against the decisions rendered by him. Some sustenance was
also sought to the same argument from a decision of a Full Bench of
(1) 46 Dominion Law Report 547.
(2) (1950) 5, D.L.R. Travancore-Cochin 382.
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HARYANA v. HARYANA CO-OP. TRANSPORT (Chandrachud, J.)311
the Allah~bad High Court in Queen Empress vs. Garsa Sam ( 1)
in
whic)l it was held that where a person had in fact been exercising ~
the functions of a Judge of the High Court, the appointment even
if
apparently ultra vires must nevertheless be presumed, in the absence of
fuller information, to have been legally made in t!Ie exercise of sOI~e
power, unknown to t!Ie Court, vested in the Secretary of State for India.
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Broadly, the starting point and t!Ie primary basis of these decisions
is the passage from Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, which
we
have extracted above. That passage says and means that the acts of
officers de facto cannot be suffered to be questioned for want of legal
authority except by some direct proceeding.
This important principle,
according to Cooley, finds concise expression in the legal maxim that
the acts of officers de facto cannot be allowed to be questioned collaterally.
Considering t!Ie nature and course of proceedings in the instant
case, it seems to us impossible to hold that the challenge to Shri Gupta's
appointment was made in a collateral proceeding.
That Shri Gupta's
appointment was not challenged in the very proceeding before
him
does not meet the point and in any case, if the proper mode to challenge
the validity of an appointment to a public office is by a petition for the
writ of quo warranto, the Labour Court over which Shri Gupta presided was hardly an appropriate forum for challenging the appoinment
of its Presiding Officer. The 1st respondent, the Haryana Co-operative
Transport Ltd., against whom Shri Gupta ga~e the award, filed a writ
petition in the High Court of Punjab and Haryana to challenge the
award on the ground that Shri Gupta was not qualified to hold the
office of a Judge of the Labour Court and, therefore, the award given .
by him was without jurisdiction.
The challenge to Shri Gupta's appointment having been made by a writ petition under arts. 226 and 227
of tfie Constitution, to which Shri Gupta was impleaded as a partyrespondent, the challenge was made directly in a substantive proceeding and not collaterally.
The writ petition was filed
mainly with
a view to challenge Shri Gupta's appointment on the ground t!Iat he
W'!S not qualified to fill the post to which he was appointed.
Having
been impleaded to the writ petition he had a clear and rightful opportunity to defend his appointment.
The proceedings by way of
a
writ petition were taken not collaterally for attacking an appointment
to a judicial office in a proceeding primarily intended for challenging a
so-called judicial decision, but the proceeding was taken principally and
predominantly for challenging the appointment itself.
None of the
decisions, nor indeed the passage in Cooley's Treatise, 'is therefore, any
answer to the prayer that the award be declared to be ultra vires on
tho ground that the officer .who gave it was not qualified to hold that
post in the exercise of whose functions the award was given.
The mere circumstance that the 1st respondent did not in so many
words ask for the writ of quo warranto cannot justify the argument that
the appointment was being challenged collaterally in
a proceeding
takes to challenge the award.
Considering the averments in the writ
petition, it seems to us clear that the main and real attack on the award
(3) I.L.R. 16. All. 136.
4·-1546 SCT/76
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was the ineligibility of Shri Gupta to occupy the post of a Judge of
the Labour Court, in the dischan>e of whose functions the award was
rendered by him.
The relief ot' certiorari asked for by writ petition
was certainly inappropriate but by clause (c) of paragraph, 16, the
High Court was invited to issue such other suitable writ, order or
direction as it deemed fit and proper in the circumstances of the case.
There is no magic in the use of a fonnula.
The facts necessary for
challenging Shri Gupta's appointment are stated clearly in the
writ
petition and the challenge to his appointment is expressly made
on
the ground_ that he was not qualifioo to hold the post of a Judge of the
Labour Court.
It must be mentioned that in the Canadian case of re Toronto vs.
City of Toronto (supra) the contention was that the Ontario Railway
and Municipal Board 'was a "Superior Court" within the meaning of s.
96 of the British North America Act and its members, not having been
appointed by the Governor General, had no jurisdiction to exercise the
powers conferred upon the Board by the Act by which it was created.
This argument was repelled firstly on the ground that the Board was not
a Court but an administrative body and secondly on the ground that
there was nothing to show that the members of the Board were not
appointed by the Governor General.
In the Travancore Cochin case the Chief Justice whose appointment
was challenged was qualified to hold that post since he had held the
office of a Judge of the Madras High Court though he had retired from
that office on attaining the age of 60.
The question really turned on
the construction of art. 376(2) of the Constitution which confers power
on the President is detennine the period for which a Judge of a High
Court in any Indian State corresponding to any State specified in part
B of the First Schedule holding office immediately before the commencement of the Constitution may continue to hold that office.
Besides,
the Chief Justice's appointment was challenged collaterally in applications for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court against the judgments
pronounced by him.
The Full Bench judgment of the Allahabad High rested on the
presumption, in the absence of fuller information, that the appointment
must be deemed to have been made in the exercise of some power vested
in the Secretary of State for India even if such power was unknown
to the Court.
Delivering the judgment of the Court, Edge, C. l observed at pageJ 57 : "Being in ignorance as to whether or not any power
existed under which Mr. Justice Burkitt may have been lawfully
appointed to act as a Judge of this court, we hold that the prec~umption
that he was duly appointed, which arises from the fact of his having
acted as a Judge of the Court since November 1892, has not been
re-butted.
This mav seem to he a lame and imnotent <'O'lclnsinn for a
Court of Justice to arrive at concerning the validity of the appointment
of one of its acting Judges, but our lack of necessary i'lforma•ion as to
the appointment, coupled with the circumstances of the case, permits
of our arriving at no other."
Learned counsel for the State of HHrvana contencls that there is
one more impediment in the Court holding that Shri Gupta was not
IIARYANA v. HARYANA CO-OP. TRANSPORT (Chandrachud, !.)
313
qualified under s. 7 (3) of the Act to be appointed as a Judge of the
Labour Court.
Reliance is placed in support of this argument on
s. 9 ( 1) of the Act which reads t!htus :
A
"9. Finality 01f orders constituting Boards, etc.-(1) No
order of the appropriate Government or of
the
Central
Government appointing any person as the chairman or any
other member of a Board· or Court or as the presiding officer
of a Labour Comt, Tribunal ·or National Tribunal shall be
called in question in any manner; and no act or proceedin~
before any Board or Court shall be called in question in any
manner on the ground merely of the existence of any vacancy
in, or defect in the constitution of, such Board or Court."
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It is true that s.9(1) is worded so widely and generally that it could c
cover any and every challenge to the appointment to the particular posts
therein mentioned. But it is impossible to construe the provision as
in derogation of the remedies provided by arts. 226 and 227 of the
Constitution.
The rights conferred by those articles cannot
be
permitted to be taken away by a broad and general provision in the
nature of s.9 ( 1) of the Act.
The words "in any manner" which
occur in s.9(1) must, therefore, be given a limited meaning so as to bar
D
the jurisdiction of civil courts, in the ordinary exercise of their powers,
to entertain a challenge to appointments mentioned in the sub-section.
The High Court of Assam('), Bombay(') and Rajasthan(') have
taken, like the High Court of Punjab and Haryana in the instant case, a
correct view of the scope and meanin~ of s.9(1) of the Act by limiting
its operation to ordinary powers of the civil Courts.
The rights conferred by arts. 226 and 227 can be.abridged or taken away only by an
E
appropriate amendment of the Constitution and their operation cannot
be whittled down. by a provision like the one contained in s.9(1)
of
the Act.
Accordingly, it is open to the High Courts in the exercise of
their writ jurisdiction to consider the validity of appointment of any
person as a chairman or a member of a Board or Court or as a presiding officer of a Labour Court, Tribunal, or National Tribunal.
If the
High Court finds that a person appointed to any of these offices is not
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eligible or qualified to hold that post, the appointment has to be
declared invalid by issuing a writ of quo warranto or any other appropriate writ or direction.
To strike down usurpation of office is the
function. and duty of High Courts is· the exercise of their constitutional
powers under arts.
226 and 227.
In the result we affirm the judgment of the High Court and dismiss
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this appeal. We are thankfi:l to Sjiri Wad for assisting the Court as
amicus.
S.R.
Appeal dismissed.
(1) Bozbarua (G.C.) v. Sate of Assam-1954 Assam 161.
H
(2) Jagannath Vinayak Kale v. Ahmedi-(1958) II L.L.J. 50 (Born.)·
(3) Mewer Textile Mills Ltd. v. Industrial. Tribunal-A.I.R. 1951 Raj. 1961