# STATE OF HARYANA v. ·STATE OF PUNJAB AND ANR

- **Citation:** [2004] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 849
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 2004-06-04
- **Case number:** LA. No. 4 In Or:ginal Suit 6 of 1996
- **Bench:** Ruma Pal, P. Venkatarama Reddi
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/state-of-haryana-v-state-of-punjab-and-anr-20116
- **Pages:** 53

## Headnote

Constitution of India, 1950; Articles 131, 144, 145 and 202/Punjab
Reorganisation Act, 1966; Section 78/Supreme Court Rules, 1966; Order
XXIII Rule 6 and Order XL VII Rule 6 :
A
B
c
Apportionment of river waters between Haryana and PunjabConstruction of Satluj-Yamuna Link Canal-Portion of the Canal not
completed by Punjab-Suit filed byHaryana for directions to Punjab and
another suit filed by Punjab challenging Section 78 of the Act-Supreme
Court decreed the suit of Haryana and issued a mandatory injunction
directing Punjab to complete construction of the canal within one year else D
Union Government to get it done-Rivew Petition-Dismissed by Supreme
Court-Application for enforcement of the decree-Held : Supreme Court
has been conferred with exclusive jurisdiction to decide any dispute
between the States/States and Centre provided the dispute involves question
on which the existence/extent of a legal right depends-However, the E
phrase 'cause of action 'as appears in Order XX/// Rule 6(a) could be
construed in the context to Article 131 since it gives effect to limitation
implicit in the Article itself-Hence, the Rule can not be held to be ultra
vires Article 131-Neither the circumstances on the basis of which the
decree was passed changed nor the grounds founded the decree have F
changed-Period specified in the decree has long since been over-Refusal
to comply with the decree of the Supreme Court under Article 131 amounts
not only to contempt but would also shake the very foundation of the
Constitution-Union of India worked out a contingent action plan 10
complete work on the canal-Union of India to carry out the work as G
planned within the specified time frame-Directions issued-Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908-Sections 20 & 51(e).
Specific Relief Act, 163; Sections 36 to 42 :
'Temporary injunction' and 'Permanent injunction '-Distinction H
849
850
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.
A between.
B
c
D
Civil Procedure Code, 1908 :
Decree-Meaning of-Discussed.
Doctrine of res-judicata-Applicability of-Held: Applicable, since
both issues pertaining to jurisdiction of the Court have been considered
and decided inter-par/es by the Supreme Court and order of withdrawal
was not conditional one.
Inter-State Water Disputes Act, 1956; Section 14 :
Section 14-Constitutionality of-Held : since grounds given in
support of challenge ex-facie and no cause of action has beer disclosed
to challenge constitutional validity, the challenge rejected in limine.
A notification was issued by the Union of India under the
provisions of Punjab Reorganisation
Act inter alia providing for
division of the river water between the States of Punjab and Haryana;
In connection thereto, the Sutlej-Yamuna Link Canal was required fo
E be constructed through both the States. State ofHaryana had completed
portion of the Canal passing through its territory. However, the State
of Punjab did not complete its portion of the canal. Haryana filed a
suit seeking directions to Punjab for construction of the canal. Punjab
in turn filed a suit challenging Section 78 of the Punjab Reorganisation
F Act. During pendency of the suits, an agreement was entered into
between the State of Haryana, Punjab and Rajasthan, which provided
that the Sutlej-Yamuna Canal Project would be implemented in a time
bound manner, within a maximum period of two years from signing
of the agreement and the suits were withdrawn. However, the portion
of the canal in Punjab remained incomplete. Later, a settlement - the
G Punjab Settlement - was arrived at, whereby construction of the canal
was agreed to be completed by Punjab within the stipulated period;
and the issues relating to the usage, share and allocation of the RaviBeas water referred to the Waters Tribunal. Since Pu.njab could not
complete the construction, Haryana filed a suit seeking a decree of
H mandatory injunction compelling the State of Punjab to complete the
STATEv. STATE
851
construction. This Court decreed the suit directing th

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STATE OF HARYANA
v.
·STATE OF PUNJAB AND ANR.
JUNE 4, 2004
[RUMA PAL AND P. VENKATARAMA REDDI, JJ.]
Constitution of India, 1950; Articles 131, 144, 145 and 202/Punjab
Reorganisation Act, 1966; Section 78/Supreme Court Rules, 1966; Order
XXIII Rule 6 and Order XL VII Rule 6 :
A
B
c
Apportionment of river waters between Haryana and PunjabConstruction of Satluj-Yamuna Link Canal-Portion of the Canal not
completed by Punjab-Suit filed byHaryana for directions to Punjab and
another suit filed by Punjab challenging Section 78 of the Act-Supreme
Court decreed the suit of Haryana and issued a mandatory injunction
directing Punjab to complete construction of the canal within one year else D
Union Government to get it done-Rivew Petition-Dismissed by Supreme
Court-Application for enforcement of the decree-Held : Supreme Court
has been conferred with exclusive jurisdiction to decide any dispute
between the States/States and Centre provided the dispute involves question
on which the existence/extent of a legal right depends-However, the E
phrase 'cause of action 'as appears in Order XX/// Rule 6(a) could be
construed in the context to Article 131 since it gives effect to limitation
implicit in the Article itself-Hence, the Rule can not be held to be ultra
vires Article 131-Neither the circumstances on the basis of which the
decree was passed changed nor the grounds founded the decree have F
changed-Period specified in the decree has long since been over-Refusal
to comply with the decree of the Supreme Court under Article 131 amounts
not only to contempt but would also shake the very foundation of the
Constitution-Union of India worked out a contingent action plan 10
complete work on the canal-Union of India to carry out the work as G
planned within the specified time frame-Directions issued-Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908-Sections 20 & 51(e).
Specific Relief Act, 163; Sections 36 to 42 :
'Temporary injunction' and 'Permanent injunction '-Distinction H
849
850
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.
A between.
B
c
D
Civil Procedure Code, 1908 :
Decree-Meaning of-Discussed.
Doctrine of res-judicata-Applicability of-Held: Applicable, since
both issues pertaining to jurisdiction of the Court have been considered
and decided inter-par/es by the Supreme Court and order of withdrawal
was not conditional one.
Inter-State Water Disputes Act, 1956; Section 14 :
Section 14-Constitutionality of-Held : since grounds given in
support of challenge ex-facie and no cause of action has beer disclosed
to challenge constitutional validity, the challenge rejected in limine.
A notification was issued by the Union of India under the
provisions of Punjab Reorganisation
Act inter alia providing for
division of the river water between the States of Punjab and Haryana;
In connection thereto, the Sutlej-Yamuna Link Canal was required fo
E be constructed through both the States. State ofHaryana had completed
portion of the Canal passing through its territory. However, the State
of Punjab did not complete its portion of the canal. Haryana filed a
suit seeking directions to Punjab for construction of the canal. Punjab
in turn filed a suit challenging Section 78 of the Punjab Reorganisation
F Act. During pendency of the suits, an agreement was entered into
between the State of Haryana, Punjab and Rajasthan, which provided
that the Sutlej-Yamuna Canal Project would be implemented in a time
bound manner, within a maximum period of two years from signing
of the agreement and the suits were withdrawn. However, the portion
of the canal in Punjab remained incomplete. Later, a settlement - the
G Punjab Settlement - was arrived at, whereby construction of the canal
was agreed to be completed by Punjab within the stipulated period;
and the issues relating to the usage, share and allocation of the RaviBeas water referred to the Waters Tribunal. Since Pu.njab could not
complete the construction, Haryana filed a suit seeking a decree of
H mandatory injunction compelling the State of Punjab to complete the
STATEv. STATE
851
construction. This Court decreed the suit directing the State of Punjab A
to complete the construction of the canal. Instead of complying with
the directions of this Court, Punjab preferred a Review Petition, which
was dismissed. Later, when Haryana filed a petition for execution of
the decree, Punjab filed a suit for declaring Section 78(1) of the Punjab
Reorganisation Act and Section 14 of the Inter-State Water Disputes B
Act ultra vires the Constitution of India, and to declare the Punjab
Settlement not enforceable under the changed circumstances and to
discharge the State of Punjab from the obligation to construct the
canal. Haryana filed applications under Order XXIll Rule 6 r/w Order
XLVll Rule 6 of the Supreme Court Rules for execution of the decree
and State of Punjab filed a writ petition for declaration of Rule 6(a) C
of Order XXlll of the Supreme Court Rules ultra vires the Constitution.
It was contended by the State of Haryana that the suit filed by
the State of Punjab to set aside the decree was not maintainable; that
the suit seeking to raise water disputes could not be entertained by this D
Court; that the State of Punjab could not challenge the vires of Section
78 of the .Punjab Reorganisation Act; that the issue raised earlier in
a suit and withdrawn later could not be raised again and that Punjab's
challenge to Section 14 of the Inter-State Water Disputes Act is barred
by estoppel.
E
State of Punjab submitted that it could resist execution of the
decree by reason of changed circumstances as per provisions under
Article 131 of the Constitution; that the requirement of cause of action
under Order XXlll Rule 6(a) of the Supreme Court Rules could not F
be imported into Article 131 of the Constitution; that Order XXIII
Rule 6(a) of the Rule is ultra vires Article 131 of the Constitution; and
that the petition should be heard by a Bench of three Judges.
Allowing the application, the Court
HELD: I. The normal rule is that' an application for modification
of the decree or order is to be made before the Bench which passed
the decree or order. Merely because the litigating parties are States,
would not alter this position. In any event, no such issue has been raised
G
which requires determination by a larger Bench. 1866-C-D)
H
852
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.
A
2. It is evident that the phrase "cause of action" as occurring in
Order XXIII Rule 6(a) does not appear in Article 131. A suit under
Article 131 is not an 'ordinary' suit, and the phrase "cause of action"
is conspicuous by its absence in the Article. But it cannot be said that by
the use of the phrase in Order XXllI Rule 6(a) of the Rules, the burden
B and limitations created by judicial interpretation of the phrase in
connection with 'ordinary' suits are necessarily introduced, shackling
an otherwise exclusive jurisdiction. The phrase as occurring in Order
XXIII Rule 6(a) of the rules will have to be read and construed in the
context of Article 131 unimpaired by the meaning judicially given to it
C in other contexts. Literally, the phrase means nothing more than the
'ground to sue'. The 'cause ofaction' under Rule 6(a) is the 'sole condition'
which is required to be satisfied before the jurisdiction of this Court can
be invoked. If the plaint does not ex facie show the fulfilment of that
condition, it would not be maintainable. This follows from the language
D of Article 131 itself. Therefore merely because the phrase "cause of
action" has been used in Order XXIII Rule 6(a) does not mean that
principles enunciated in the context of Section 20 of the Code of Civil
Procedure are imported. Rule 6(a) only gives effect to limitations implicit
in Article 131 itself. It follows that it does not violate Article 131 or any
E other provision of the Constitution. (867-B, E-F-G; 870-F-G-HI
State of Rajasthan v. Union of India, (19771 3 SCC 592 and State
of Karnataka v. Union of India, (19771 4 SCC 608, followed.
D. Ramachandran v. R. V. Janakiraman, (19991 3 SCC 267, 271,
F referred to.
3. Unless the plaintiff could establish that there exists a legal right,
there would be no question of this Court deciding any dispute regarding
the extent or existence of such right under Article 131 of the Constitution.
G The plaintiff in the present case claims that the legal right in question is
the right to have an injunction modified by reason of changed
circumstances. The general law relating to injunctions as contained in
Sections 36 to 42 of the Specific Relief Act may not limit the powers of
this Court under Article 131 nevertheless they provide valuable guidelines
H as to the nature of this form of equitable reilief. (873-8, F-G-HJ
STATE v. STATE
853
State of Rajasthan v. Union of India, 11977) 3 sec 592, followed. A
4.1. An injunction may be permanent/perpetual or temporary. A
permanent injunction is final and conclusive of the facts in the context
of which it is granted. A temporary injunction by contrast is granted
on a prima facie view of the facts and, as the word 'temporary' itself B
indicates, is an interim order pending a final adjudication of the rights
of the parties. This distinction is not to be confused with the distinction
between a prohibitory or preventive injunction on the one hand and
a mandatory injunction on the other. In the first case a party is
prevented from doing a particular thing or continuing with a particular C
action. A mandatory injunction on the other hand commands an act
to be done and is provided for under Section 39 of the Specific Relief
Act. In the present case the decree granted a final mandatory injunction.
1874-A-B-C)
Khazan Singh v. Ra/la Ram, AIR (1937) Lahore 839; Yashpal Singh D
v. VIII Addi. District Judge and Others, 119921 2 SCC 504; Surinder
Kumar v. Ishwar Dayal, [1996) 3 SCC 103 and Municipal Board,
Kishangarh v. Chand Mal, (19991 9 SCC 198, referred to.
Albert H Ladner v. Clarence R. Siegel, 68 ALR 1172; United States E
of America v. Swift & Company, 286 US 105, 76 L.Ed. 999; Santa Rita
Oil Company v. State Board of Equalization, 126 ALR 757; Coca Cola
Company v. Standard Bottling Company, 138 F.2D 788 and System
Federation No. 91, Railway Employees Dept. v. 0. V Wright, 364 US 642,
5 L.Ed. 2d 349, referred to.
F
Kerr on Injunctions 6th Edn. p.40, referred to.
4.2. A decree cannot reach a prima facie conclusion. The use of
the phrase 'prima facie' is clearly an accident of language and does not
detract from the conclusiveness of the finding and the finality of the G
mandate. It directed the construction of a canal as a final adjudication
of rights. The mandate in the decree was to carry out the obligations
under the agreement. It did not envisage a "continuing process over
which the equity court necessarily retains jurisdiction in order to do
equity'. Principle relating to modification of decree is absent, since the H
854
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2004] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.
A decree was not based on the quantum of water that may be made
available to Haryana, the fact that Punjab's complaint was pending
under Section 3 of the inter-State Water Disputes Act or that Haryana
may, in the future, be entitled to more water is immaterial. for the
same reason the principle (if any) of the right to ask for a review of
B water allocations would not apply. The decree was not based on the
Punjab Settlement. It was noted that the parties had acted on the
agreement and that despite the fact that Punjab sought to reopen the
agreement in so far as it related to the quantum of water to be shared
between the two States, the construction of the SYL canal remained
C undisputed. (880-F; 881-E-F; 882-B-C-D-E-F[
4.3. It is evident that the Punjab Settlement was referred to as a
piece of evidence that the parties had kept the co:istruction of the canal
distinct from the disputes relating to the sharing of river waters
between the two States. If the other clauses in the Punjab settlement
D are allegedly not being complied with by Haryana that is not a
challenge of circumstance or ground for modification of the decree.
The change to Section 14 of the Inter State Water Disputes Act is also
inapposite to the question of modification of the decree. It has not been
averred that either of the two grounds which founded the decree have
E in any sense of the word "changed". [883-A-B-C[
4.4. Since the plaint in the present suit does not even exfacie fulfil
all four conditions subject to which decree may be modified, there is
no legal right to apply for modification of the decree with the meaning
F of Article 131. Hence, there lies no "cause of action" within the
meaning of Article 131 as far as the prayers relating to the discharge
of the injunction granted by the decree is concerned. (883-E-Fl
5.1. The doctrine of res judicata and Order XXXII Rule 2 are not
technical rules of procedure and the fundamental to the administration
G of justice in all Courts that there must be an end of litigation. Since
the doctrine of res judicata is an essential part of the rule of law it
follows that if the issues raised in the suit are barred by res judicata
exfacie then this Court is required to reject the plaint in terms of Order
XXIII Rules 6(b) of the Rules. There is no substance in the submission
H of Punjab that even when there is no dispute of fact the issue of res
-
-
STATE v. STATE
855
judicata should be left for consideration at the trial of the suit. The A
same objection relates to the challenge to Section 78 of the Punjab
Reorganization Act. But there is an additional ground apart from res
judicata for holding that the issue as to the constitutional validity of
Section 78 cannot be raised. The State of Punjab had earlier filed a
suit, in this Court challenging the validity of section 78 of the Punjab B
Reorganisation Act. 1883-D; 887-H; 888-A-B-C-Dl
Surayya v. Balagangadhar, AIR (1948) PC 3, referred to.
Daryao v. State of UP., (19621 I SCR 574 and Cauve1y Water
Disputes Tribunal, 11993) Suppl. I SCC 96 (ii), relied on.
C
5.2. Rule 2 Order XXXII of the Rules allows a plaintiff to file a
fresh suit in respect of the same subject matter as in the earlier withdrawn
suit subject to certain conditions. However, in the order allowing the
earlier suit to be withdrawn no such conditions are present. Consequently D
a fresh suit in respect of the same subject matter viz., the validity of
section 78 of the 1988 Act does not lie. Similarly the challenge to Section
14 of the 1956 Act is rejected at the threshold. The notification was
issued under Section 14 of the Inter-States Water Disputes Act. There
was no dispute raised as to the constitutionality of Section 14 at any E
stage. This Court in its judgment dated 15th January 2002 considered
the arguments of the parties relating to Section 14 and negatived Punjab's
submission as to the construction of the said Section. Punjab could have
challenged the constitutional validity of Section 14 in its written
statement. It did not then. It cannot do so now being barred by the F
doctrine of res judicata. (889-A-B-C-D-E-F-; 890-E-F-G; 891-D)
5.3. It is well established that constitutional invalidity of a
statutory provision can be made either on the basis of legislative
incompetence or because the statute is otherwise violative of the
provisions of the Constitution. Neither the reason for the particular G
enactment nor the fact that the reason for the legislation has become
redundant, would justify the striking down of the legislation or for
holding that a statute or statutory provision is ultra vires. At least prima
facie acceptable grounds in support have to be pleaded to sustain the
challenge. In the absence of any such pleading the challenge to the H
856
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.
A constitutional \'alidity of a statute or statutory provision is liable to be
rejected in limine. (892-F-G-Hl
S.4. The grounds given in support of Punjab's challenge to Article
14 are exfacie no grounds in law and no "cause of action" has been
B disclosed to challenge the constitutional validity of Section 14 of the
I 9S6 Act. Not only does the plaint filed by Punjab disclose any cause
of action, but it is also evident from the statements in the plant that
the suit is barred by law. (893-B-CI
S.S. Punjab, instead of accepting the decree in good grace, has
C taken every possible step to thwart the decree. There was no stay granted
by this Court at any stage of any of the vari~us proceedings filed assailing
the decree. Even when the final assault was made by it in filing a S'!it,
this Court did not grant any stage and it is basic law that the mere filing
of proceedings does not operate as a stay. The correspondence and the
D record of minutes show that the Chief Minister of Punjab as well as the
Government officials have arrogated themselves the power of sitting as
a super-judicial body over this Court. (89S-H; 896-E-Fl
S.6. The Constitution provides for an ordered polity within this
E country to promote integrity of the country. When disputes arise
between States there are usually political underpinnings. The resolution
of such a dispute in favour of one party would invariably have a
political impact. Article 131 of the Constitution has given this Court
the exclusive jurisdiction to decide such a dispute strictly on legal
F considerations and in keeping with the provisions of the Constitution.
To resist the execution of the decree on the ground that it would have
a political fallout would result in subversion of the Constitution, an
endorsement of anarchy and the disintegration of the country. Apart
from rendering the provisions of Article 131 a dead letter such a stand
is contrary to Article 144 of the Constitution. It is not in the
G circumstances expected, that Governments whether at the Centre or
in the State, would not comply with the decree of this Court. By
refusing to comply with the decree of this Court under Article 131 not
only is the offending party guilty of contempt but the very foundation
of the Constitution which the people governing the State have sworn
H to uphold when assuming office and to which this country owes its
STATE v. STATE
857
continued existence, is shaken. It is the Constitutional duty of those A
who wield power in the States to create the appropriate political
climate to ensure a respect for the constitutional processes and not set
such processes at naught only to gain political mileage. The vague plea
relating to the possible rise of militancy by the construction of the
Canal is not an acceptable defence at all. 1896-G-H; 897-A-B-C; HJ B
Cauve1y Wa111r Disputes Tribunal, IJ993j Supp. 1 SCC 96 (ii),
followed.
5.7. The 1954 Order has been issued by the President in exercise
of powers under Article 142(1) of the Constitution. Punjab's objection C
to the maintainability of Haryana's application for execution because
of alleged non-compliance with paragraph 2(d) of the 1954 Order is
unsustainable. The mode of enforcement which may be specified under
clause 2(b) of the 1954 Order may be similar to the methods of
.execution legally provided in respect of decrees or orders of any Court, D
Tribunal or Authority. The specification of the mode may be done in
the decree itself or by a subsequent order made on an application of
any party to the proceeding. The decree in the case had not specified
the mode of execution. Haryana's application is expressed to be under
clause 2(b) of the 1954 Order. It cannot be said that Haryana's E
application is not maintainable. (898-C; 899-A-B-C-DJ
5.8. It is manifest that the suit has been filed by State of Punjab
with a view to subvert the decision of this Court with all the
disingenuousness of a litigant to resist its execution. In the circumstances, F
the suit is dismissed under Order XL VII Rule 6 of the Rules. (893-Dj
6. The residuary power under Section 5l(e) C.P.C. allows a Court
to pass orders for enforcing a decree in a manner which would give
effect to it. The period specified in the decree for completion of the
canal by Punjab is long since over. The Union of India has said that G
it had worked out a contingent action plan during this period. The
contingency, in the form of expiry of the one year period in January
2003 has occurred. It has not been told whether the contingency plan
has been put into operation. Although if appears that the Cabinet
Committee on Project Appraisals had approved the proposal for H
858
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.
A completion of the SYL canal by the Border Roads Organisation (BRO)
and the then Prime Minister directed the BRO to take over the work
for completion of the SYL Canal in the minimum time possible. After
the decree the Central Water Commission Officials have inspected the
canal. The report has assessed a minimum period of about two years
B for removing suit deposits, clearing of trees and bushes, completing the
damaged and balance works and making the canal functional. In the
circumstances, Union of India is directed to carry out its proposed
action plan within the specified time frame. (900-A-B-C-DI
C
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : LA. No. 4 In Or:ginal Suit
6 of 1996.
Under Article 131 of the Constitution of India.
WITH
D
I.A. Nos. 1-2 in Original Suit No. 1 of 2003.
Shanti Bhushan, V.A. Bobde, Ashok Kr. Aggarwal, A.G. ofHaryana,
K.K. Lahiri, Abhimeet Sinha, Gourav Kejriwal, Ms. Minakshi Nag, Amit
E Patnaik, Ejaz Maqbool. Keshav Mchan and Rajesh Mittal for the Petitioner.
F.S. Nariman, Harbhagwan Singh. Advocate General for State of
Punjab, Arun Kathpalia, Mohan V. Katarki, Subhash Shanna, G.S. Hooda,
Asst. Advocate General Punjab, Vinay K. Shailendra, R.S. Suri, Shailesh
F Madiyal and G.S. Sidhu for the Respondent in I.A. No. 4 in O.S. No. 6/
96 & Petitioner in O.S. No. 1/2003.
Mukul Rohtagi, Additional Solicitor General, Kailash Vasdev, S.
Wasim, A. Qadri, D.S. Mahara, Ajay Sharma, Sayed, Naqvi, Ms. Sushma
Suri, S.N. Terdal for Union oflndia, Ranji Thomas, Ms. Bharti Upadhyaya
G and V.N. Raghupathy for the State of Rajasthan.
H
Ms Kamini Jaiswal (NP) and Ms. Naresh Bakshi for the Union
Territory of Chandigarh.
The Judgment of the Cou1i was delivered by
..
STATE v. STATE [RUMA PAL, J.]
859
RUMA PAL, J.: Consequent of the creation of the State ofHaryana A
from the erstwhile State of Punjab, the question of appointment of the river
waters made available to the erstwhile State of Punjab between Haryana
and Punjab arose. A notification was issued by the Union of India on 24th
March, 1976 under Section 78 of Punjab Reorganisation Act, 1966, inter
alia dividing the river waters between the two States. The Sultej-Yamuna B
Link Canal Project covering about 214 KMs. was to be constructed through
the States of Punjab and Haryana. Out of the 214 KMs, 122 KMs were
to run through the territory of Punjab and 92 KMs through Haryana. The
cost of completion of the canal was to be met by the Central Government.
Haryana's portion of the canal was completed by June 1980. The State of C
Punjab had not completed its share of the canal although it had been paid
the amount necessary for the purpose as also for the recurring expenditure·
towards maintenance of the canal.
A suit was filed by the State of Haryana in 1979 being Suit No. I D
of 1979 in this Court under Article 131 of the Constitution seeking
completion of the construction of the canal. The State of Punjab also filed
a suit being Suit No. 2 of 1979 inter alia challenging Section 78 of the
Punjab Reorganisation Act and the notification dated 24th March 1976 by
which the river waters were directed to be shared between Haryana and E
Punjab. During the pendency of the suits, an agreement was entered into
between the States of Haryana, Punjab and Rajasthan in the presence of
the Prime Minister of India on 13th December 1981. The agreement, in
so far as it is relevant, provided that the Sutlej-Yamuna Canal Project
would be implemented in a time bound.manner. The canal and appurtenant
works in the Punjab territory were to be completed within a maximum F
period of two years from the date of the signing of the agreement. On the
basis of and after recording this agreement, the suits were allowed to be
withdrawn by this Court on 12th February, 1982.
The date for completion of the canal by Punjab in terms of the G
agreement dated 13th December, 1981 expired. The Punjab portion of the
Canal remained incomplete. The agreement was sought to be repudiated
by the State. A settlement was then arrived at on 5th November 1985
known as the 'Punjab Settlement' which dealt with the several disputes
between the State of Haryana and Punjab. For the present, we need only H
860
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.
A note clause 9 of the settlement. It reads :
B
c
D
"9. Sharing of River Waters
9.1. The farmers of Punjab. Haryana and Rajasthan will continue
to get water not less than what they are using from the Ravi-Beas
system as on I. 7 .1985 waters used for consumptive purposes will
also remain unaffected. Quantum of usage claimed shall be
verified by the Tribunal referred to in para 9.2. below.
9.2. The claims of Punjab and Haryana regarding the shares in
their remaining waters will be referred for adjudication to a
Tribunal to be presided over by a Supreme Court Judge. The
decision of this Tribunal will be rendered within six months and
would be binding on both parties. All legal and constitutional
steps required in this respect be taken expeditiously.
9.3. The construction ofSYL Canal shall continue. The canal shall
be completed by 15.8.1986."
In approval of the settlement and in terms of the first two clauses of
E clause 9 of the Settlement, Section 14 was added to the Inter-State Water
Disputes Act, 1956 and issues relating to the usage, share and allocation
of the Ravi-Beas waters were referred to the adjudication of the Waters
Tribunal by the Union of India under Notification dated 2nd April 1986.
The Tribunal submitted its report on 30th January 1987 inter alia allocating
F the Ravi-Beas Waters between Punjab and Haryana. An application was
made by Punjab before the Waters Tribunal for review of its decision. That
application is pending.
However, Clause 9.3. of the Settlement which was kept distinct from
the water disputes under Clauses 9.1. and 9.2. continued to operate. The
G State of Punjab completed about 90% of the construction of the canal, but
about 10% of the construction remained incomplete. The State ofHaryana
then filed a second suit being suit No. 6 of 1996 for :
(a)
a decree declaring that the order dated 24.3.1976, the
H
agreement of3 l.12. l 981 and the settlement of24.7.I 985 are
STATE v. STATE [RUMA PAL, J.]
861
final and binding inter alia on the State of Punjab casting A
an obligation on Defendant No. I to immediately resta1t and
complete the po1iion of the Sutjej-Yamuna Link Canal
Project as also make it usable in all respects, not only under
the aforesaid order of 1976, agreement of 1981 and settlement
of 1985 but also pursuant to a contract established by B
conduct from 1976 till date.
(b)
a decree of mandatory injunction compelling Defendant I
(failing which Defendant 2 by or through any agency) to
discharge its/their obligations under the said notification of C
1976, the agreement of 1981 and the settlement of 1985 and
in any case under contract established by conduct, by
immediately restarting and completing that p.ortion of the
Sutlej-Yamuna Link Canal Project in the State of Punjab and
otherwise making it suitable for use within a time bound
manner as may be stipulated by this Hon'ble Court to enable D
the State of Haryana to receive its share of Ravi and Beas
waters".
A written statement was filed by the State of Punjab questioning the
jurisdiction of this Cou1i under Article 262 of the Constitution of India. E
It was also contended that the suit was barred under Order XXIII Rule I
of the Code of Civil Procedure and under Order XXXll Rule 2 of the
Supreme Court Rules, 1966. According to the State of Punjab the
agreement dated 31st December 1981 was superseded by the sett lenient
dated 24th July 1986 which did not bind the State. It was averred that the
SYL canal was unnecessary because the State of Haryana was to get
additional water supply from other rivers and that the State of Haryana had
no right to the water from the river Ravi.
F
The Union of India in its written statement, apart from affirming the
facts as noted by us earlier, also stated that it was essential that the Punjab G
portion of the SYL canal be completed at the earliest.
After considering the material on record, on 15th January, 2002 this
Cou1t decreed the suit in favour of the State of Haryana and issued a
mendatory injunction directing the State of Punjab to complete the H
862
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2004] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.
A construction of the canal and make it functional within one year from the
date of the judgment. If within that period the canal was not completed
by the State of Punjab, the Union Government was directed to get it done
through its own agency as expeditiously as possible.
B
The State of Punjab did not comply with this Court's decree and the
canal remains incomplete. On 8th January 2002, it filed an application for
review of the judgment and decree of this Court which we dismissed on
5th March 2002.
On 22nd March 2002, a writ petition under Article 32 was filed by
C Bharatiya. Kisan Union (W.P. No. 94 of 2004) claiming to be a registered
association of Indian citizens and seeking to question the decree and
purporting to raise issues relating to the availability of water of the RaviBeas for allocation to the State of Haryana. An interlocutory application
was also filed for stay of the decree dated I 5th January 2002. The writ
D petition was dismissed by this Court on 10th Februry 2004.
E
F
G
On I 8th December 2002, an application was filed by Haryana for
implementation of the judgment and decree dated 15th January 2002. This
application was registered and numbered as I.A. No. I of2002 in Suit No.
6 of 1996.
On 13th January 2003, the State of Punjab filed a suit being Suit
No. I of 2003 for the following reliefs :
(a)
discharge/dissohe the obligation to construct SYL Canal
imposed by the mandatory injunction decreed by this Hon 'ble
Court in its judgment/decree dated 15.01.2002 in OS No. 61
1996 for the reasons set out in the plaint;
(b)
to declare that the judgment/decree dated 15.01.2002 in OS
No. 611996 is not binding or enforceable since the issues
raised in that Suit could only have been decided by a
Constitution Bench in terms of Article 145(3) of Constitution
of India.
(c)
To declare that Section 14 of the Act, 1956 is ultra-vires the
H
Constitution of India;
.,
STATE v. STATE [RUMA PAL, J.]
863
(d)
to declare that Section 14 of the Act 1956 is no longer A
enforceable for the reasons set out in the plant;
(e)
to declare the Punjab Settlement (Rajiv-Longowal Accord)
is not enforceable under the changed circumstances as set
out in the Plaint :
in the alternative
B
in case it is held by this Hon'ble Court that the Punjab
Settlement dated 24.07 .1985 is an enforceable Agreement
then direct enforceability and compliance ofother 10 issues C
and to keep in abeyance obligation to construct SYL canal
till other conditions set out in the settlement are implemented
and/or the Water Disputes arising from the reallocation of
Ravi-Beas waters are resolved under the Act, 1956.
(f)
Declare that Section 78(1) of the Act, 1966 is ultra vires of
the Constitution of India, and that all acts, deeds and things
done pursuant thereto or in consequence thereof including
all Notifications, Agreement, etc. are null and void including
D
the notification dated 24.03.1976 and the Agreement dated E
31.12.1981 as non-est and void ab initio.
The State of Haryana then filed an application under Order XXIIJ
Rule 6 read with Order XL VII Rule 6 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1966
for rejection of the plaint alternatively for summary dismissal of the suit. F
The application, which has been numbered as I.A. No. 1 of2003 has been
opposed by Punjab inter alia contending that Order XXlll Rule 6(a) of the
Supreme Court Rules is unconstitutional.
Haryana's application for enforcement of the decree (I.A. 1 in O.S.
No. 6of1996) was sought to be amended in I.A. No. 3. The State of Punjab G
sought to file a counter affidavit to I.A.No. 1 in O.S. No. 1 of 1996 which
was numbered as I.A. No. 2. On 13th August 2003, the State
of Ha1yana filed a second application for a direction on the Union of
India to carry out its obligation under the decree since the period of one
year fixed by the decree had expired. This has been numbered as I.A. No H
864
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.
A 4 in OS I of 1996. In view of this last application of Haryana, I.A. Nos.
I, 2 and 3 in O.S. No. I of 1996 we.re dismissed as infructuous on 17th
December 2003.
At this stage, the State of Punjab filed a Writ Petition No. 30/2004
B for a declaration that Rule 6(a) of Order XXlll of the Supreme Court Rules,
1966 is 11/tra-vires the Constitution alternatively for a declaration that Rule
6(a) of Order XXlll cannot be invoked in suits filed under Article 131 of
the Constitution of India. This writ petition was not entertained in view of
the fact that the same issues had been raised by the State of Punjab in
C answer to the application of the State of Haryana under Order XXIII Rule
6 of the Supreme Court Rules.
Therefore, out of this welter of litigation what survives for disposal
is :
D
(I)
Haryana's application for enforcement of the decree dated
E
15th January 2002 (I.A. No. 4 in O.S. 6/1996);
(2)
Punjab's suit inter alia challenging the decree dated 15th
January 2002 (0.S. 1/2003); and
(3)
Haryana's application for rejection of the plaint in Punjab's
suit (I.A. I in O.S. 1/2003).
Necessarily the last proceeding is required to be disposed of at
F the outset because on the outcome of this application will depend the
fate of the second proceeding which may in turn have an impact on the
first.
!A. No. I in O.S. I of 2003.
G
Order XXIII Rule 6 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1966 under which
I.A. 1 of 2003 has been filed provides :
"The plaint shall be rejected :
H
(a) where it does not disclose a cause of action.
'·.
STATE v. STATE [RUMA PAL, J.]
865
(b)
where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint A
to be barred by any law.'·
According to Haryana, a suit to set aside a decree of this Court, as
Suit No. I of 2003 purports to do, is not maintainable under Article 131
of the Constitution. It is also submitted that the suit seeks to raise water B
disputes which are not capable of being entertained by this Cou11 by virtue
of Article 262 of the Constitution and that the prayer (c) to (f) were barred
by the doctrine of resjudicata. Additionally, it has been urged that the State
of Punjab could not competently challenge the vires of Section 78 of the
Punjab Reorganisation Act, 1986, apart from the fact that under Order C
XXXll Rule 2 of the Rule the issue having been raised in OS 2 of 1979
could. not after its withdrawal, be raised again. Punjab's challenge to
Section 14 of the Inter-State Water Disputes Act, 1956 is also stated to be
barred by estoppel because Punjab had submitted to the jurisdiction of the
Tribunal, suffered an Award and made an application under Section 5(3)
of the Act before the Tribunal which was still pending. It has been D
submitted that the plaint did not disclose any cause of action and had been
filed in abuse of process of this Court and that this Court should not
countenance such frivolous and vexatious litigation and should dismiss the
suit under Order XL VII Rule 6 of the Rules.
E
In answer, the State of Punjab has submitted that it had a legal right
to resist execution of the decree by reason of changed circumstances which
right could only be enforced under Article 131 by way of a suit. It is said
that the constitutional remedy available to the States or Union under Article
131 was extraordinary in character and the requirement of a cause of action F
could not be imported into Article 131. It is submitted that Order XX111
Rule 6(a) of the Supreme Court Rules which allowed the rejection of the
plaint on the ground of non-disclosure of a cause of action was ultra vires
Article 131. Reliance has been placed on the decisions of this Court in State
of Karnataka v. Union of India, [1977] 4 SCC 609, p. 690, 709 as well
the decision in State of Karnataka v. State of A.P., [2000] 9 sec 572 in G
support of this submission. The ground that Rule 6(a) suffers from "over
exclusive classification" and was otherwise violative of Article 14 was
however not pressed. It is further submitted that the judgment of this Court
dated 15th January 20.Q2 decided a water dispute and that the decision of
this Court in dismissing the review application filed by the State of Punjab H
1
866
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.
A was wrong. As far as the question of res judicata is concerned. it is
submitted that that is an issue to be decided in the suit and not by way of
an application under Order XXlll Rule 6 of the Rules. Punjab has also
submitted that Haryana's application for rejection of the plaint should be
heard by the Bench of three Judges. It may be mentioned that by an Order
B dated 1st Januaiy 2004, Haryana's application was directed by the learned
Chief Justice to be listed before a Bench of which one of us (Ruma Pal,
J.) is a member. By a subsequent order date 14th January 2004, the question
whether the application for rejection of the plaint should be heard by Bench
of three judges was left to the same Bench to decide.
c
There is no legal provision by which the issues raised by Haryana in
its application is required to be heard by a Bench of three judges. On the
other hand the suit filed by Punjab seeks modification of a decree. That
decree was passed by a Bench of two judges. The nonnal rule is that an
application for modification of the decree or order is to be made before
D the Bench which passed the decree or order. Merely because the litigating
parties are States, would not alter this position. In any event we are not
of the view that any such issue has been raised which requires detennination
by a larger Bench. This submission of the State of Punjab, therefore, is
rejected.
E
It is also our opinion that Punjab's challenge to Order XXlll Rule
6(a), even if successful, would not result in dismissal of Haryana's
application because the grounds made out for rejection under Order XXIII
Rule 6 pertain not only to clause (a) but also to clause (b) thereof. Haryana
F has also invoked this Court's powers under Order XL VII Rule 6 which
provides that :
G
"Nothing in these rules shall be deemed to limit or otherwise
affect the inherent powers of the Court to make such orders as may
be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the
process of the Court.
Besides the challenge to clause (a) of Rule 6 of Order XXIII is
unsustainable. Article 131 of the Constitution which has clothed this Court
with exclusive original jurisdiction to decide any dispute (a) between the
H Government oflndia and one or more States or (b) between the Government
>
STATEv. STATE [RUMA PAL, J.]
867
of India and any State or States on one side and one or more States on the A
other, or ( c) between two or more States, has laid down as a condition for
the exercise of such jurisdiction, that the dispute must involve any question
(whether of any law or fact) on which the existence or extent of a legal
right depends. It is evident that the phrase "cause of action" as occurring
in Order XXlll Rule 6(a) does not appear in Article 131. The phrase, which B
occurs in Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure and is commonly used
in connection with 'ordinary' suits, has, in that context,
"acquired a judicially-settled meaning. In th.e restricted sense
cause of action means the circumstances forming the infraction
of the right or the immediate occasion for the action.