# STATE OF JAMMU KASHMIR v. MIR GULAM RASUL

- **Citation:** [1961] 3 S.C.R. 969
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1961
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 31 of 1957
- **Bench:** P. B. Gajendragadkar, A. K. Sarkar, K. N. Wanchoo, K. C. Das Gupta, N. Rajagopala Ayyangar
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/state-of-jammu-kashmir-v-mir-gulam-rasul-1956
- **Pages:** 5

## Headnote

Fundamental rights-Equality before law-Breach of law, if
amounts to violation of equal protection of law-Writ Petition-No
fundamental right involved-Duty of High Court-Constitution of
India, Arts. I4, 32(2A).
The Government of J ammu and Kashmir on the basis of the
report of the commission of enquiry set up by it demoted the
respondent who had been suspended earlier .. The respondent
moved the Jammu and Kashmir High Court under Art. 32(2A)
of the Constitution of India as applied to the State of Jammu and
Kashmir for a writ, inter alia, questioning the validity of the
order suspending and demoting him, alleging violation of rules of
natural justice by the commission of enquiry and breach of
statutes and rules of service. Articles 226 and 3n(2) of the Constitution of India had not been applied to the State of Jammu
Ftbrttary 23
!J70
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1961]
1961
and Kashmir. The High Court acting under Art. 32(2A) set aside
the orders suspending and demoting the respondent.
State oj
Held, that the High Court had no powers to act under
Jammu and
Art. 32(2A) of the Constitution of India as the writ petition did
l\n;hmfr
not disclose a violation of any fundamental right.
NF G 1v. R
1
Held, further, that the breach of a Jaw by the Government, if
i_r .ii ani
asu any, did not amount to a denial of the equal protection ·Of the
laws, as it had not ever been alleged by the respondent that the
benefit of that Jaw had been designedly denied only to him.
Sarkar].

## Text

'
' '
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
969
at the time of the de'.l.th of the testator and not later
1961
and that the appellant would get an interest under
Kastud
cl. 12 only if the widow of the testator pre.deceased
v.
the testator and there is no adoption by the testator
Ponnammal
before his death. If that be so, the appellant cannot
claim any right or title on the strength of cl. 12 be- Gajend,agadkar I·
cause at the relevant time it was not intended to be
operative at all. In the circumstances the appellant's
rights are provided for by cl. 11 alone, and those
rights cannot come into existence unless and until he
is adopted by respondent 1. On that view there is a
possibility of intestacy and there is postponement of
vesting; but that cannot be avoided. That is the
view taken by the courts below, and having carefully
considered the argument urged before us by Mr. Sastri
on behalf of the appellant we see no reason to interfere with the said conclusion.
Th.e result is the appeal fails; there would be no
ordQr as tu c.osts.
Appeal dismissed.
STATE OF JAMMU KASHMIR
v.
MIR GULAM RASUL.
(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, A. K. SARKAR,
K. N. WANCHOO, K. C. DAS GUPTA and
N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR, JJ.)
Fundamental rights-Equality before law-Breach of law, if
amounts to violation of equal protection of law-Writ Petition-No
fundamental right involved-Duty of High Court-Constitution of
India, Arts. I4, 32(2A).
The Government of J ammu and Kashmir on the basis of the
report of the commission of enquiry set up by it demoted the
respondent who had been suspended earlier .. The respondent
moved the Jammu and Kashmir High Court under Art. 32(2A)
of the Constitution of India as applied to the State of Jammu and
Kashmir for a writ, inter alia, questioning the validity of the
order suspending and demoting him, alleging violation of rules of
natural justice by the commission of enquiry and breach of
statutes and rules of service. Articles 226 and 3n(2) of the Constitution of India had not been applied to the State of Jammu
Ftbrttary 23
!J70
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1961]
1961
and Kashmir. The High Court acting under Art. 32(2A) set aside
the orders suspending and demoting the respondent.
State oj
Held, that the High Court had no powers to act under
Jammu and
Art. 32(2A) of the Constitution of India as the writ petition did
l\n;hmfr
not disclose a violation of any fundamental right.
NF G 1v. R
1
Held, further, that the breach of a Jaw by the Government, if
i_r .ii ani
asu any, did not amount to a denial of the equal protection ·Of the
laws, as it had not ever been alleged by the respondent that the
benefit of that Jaw had been designedly denied only to him.
Sarkar].
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION:
Civil Appeal No.
31 of 1957.
Appeal from
the judgment and order dated
September 27, 1955, of the Jammti and Kashmir High
Court in Misc. Application No. 23of1955.
J aswant Singh, Advocate-General for the State of
. Jammu and Kashmir and R. H. Dhebar, for the
appellant.
S. N. Andley, J.B. Dadachanji, Rameshwar Nath and
P. L. Vohra,.for respondent.
1961. February 23. The Judgment of the Court was
delivered by
SARKAR, J.-The respondent is a Civil Engineer
who held various positions under the appellant, the
Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. On
September 8, 1954, while the respondent was holding
the post M Development Commissioner, he was placed .
under suspension by an order made by the a.ppellant ·.
on that date. Later, the appellant passed another
order on February 12, 1955, demoting the petitioner
to the post of a Divisional Engineer.
On May 12, 1955, the respondent moved the High
Court of Jammu and Kashmir under Art. 32(2A) of
the Constitution of India as applied to the State of
Jammu and Kashmir, for a, writ directing the appellant not to give effect to the order dated February 12,
1955, and to 'recognise him as the Chief Engineer. the
substantive post held by him when he was suspended,
with effect from the date of suspension and with all
the emoluments of that office. The High Court issued.
the writ as prayed. The State appeals from the judg14ent of the High Court,
<
I
J
....
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
!l71
In the view that, we think, must be taken of this
1961
case, it is unnecessary to go into the facts a great
State •!
deal. At one stage of his career under the appellant,
fammu a•d
the respondent held a job of some responsibility in
Kashmir
what was called the Sindh Valley Hydro Electric
v.
Scheme. This Scheme wi.s for generating electric Mir G"lam Rasul
power by dams erected in theSindh water course and
for using the water for irrigation purposes. The work
on this Scheme seems to have commenced some time
ago. The respondent was connected with the Scheme
from 1949 till he was transferred from the work in
1953. It appears that the appellant was dissatisfied
~ with the progress of the work and the manner in
which it had been carried out and decided to establish
a Commission of Inquiry (a) to investigate into the
reasons. for (i)·progressive rise in the estimates, (ii) the
defective planning and the delay in the execution of
the work and (iii) the other irregularities and (b) to
fix responsibility upon the persons concerned and
make appropriate recommendations. Pending the
investigation various officers associated with the
planning and execution of the Scheme including the
respondent, were placed under suspension on September 8, 1954. Thereafter on October 20, 1954, a commission was set up by the appellant consisting of
various persons.
The Commission made certain
enquiries and eventually submittlld its report to· the·
appellant.
The appellant then · made the order
demoting the respondent purporting to act on \he
basis of the report. It is not necessary to set out the
facts any more.
·
The respondent, in his application for the writ,
questioned the validity of the. orders suspending and
demoting him on these grounds. He alleged that the
Commission did not conduct the enquiry according to
the rules of natu,ral justice. He said that he was not
even informed of the charges against him nor given a
proper hearing and that if he had been given proper
opportunity, he would have proved that he bad not
been at fault at all. He also said that the appoint-
. "
ment of the Commission could only have been made
under s. 2 of the Public Servants (Inquiries} Act, 1977
Sarkar /.
972
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961]
(Kashmir era), and must, therefore, be deemed to have
State of
been so made. He corn plained that the provisions of
J•mmu and
this Act were not observed by the Commission in
l(ashmir
making the enquiry. Lastly, he said that the responv.
dent could be reduced in rank only in accordance with
Mir Gula>• Rasul th
d
1 "d d
. th K h . c· ·1 s . .
__
e proce ure a1
own m
e
as m1r
1v1
erv1ce
Sarkar J.
Rules passed by the State Council Order No. 81-C of
1939 and this procedure had not been followed.
In
the High Court, the question as to whether these Rules
had the status of law seems to have been debated at
great length. The High Court took the view that
they had. We will proceed on the basis that the High
Court was right and the allegations made by the
respondent in his petition had been substantiated.
Now, the High Court was moved to exercise its
powers under Art. 32 (2A) of the Constitution. The
order made by it cannot be upheld if it was not justified by that provision. This is not in dispute. That
provision is in t!;tese terms:
Art. 32(2A). "Without prejudice to the ·powers
conferred by clauses (1) and· (2), the High Court
shall have power throughout the territories in
relation to which it exercises jurisdiction io issue to
any person or authority, including in appropriate
cases any Government within those territories,
directions or orders or writs, including writs in the
nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition,
quo warranto and certiorari, or any of them, for
the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by
this Part."
The High Court can then exercise its powers· under
Art. 32 (2A) only " for the enforcement of any of the
rights conferred by this Part". The Part referred to
is Part III and the rights conferred by it are the
fundamental rights. Therefore, the High Conrt can
act under cl. (2A) of Art. 32 only to enforce a. fundamental right.
The only fundamental right, however, on the
violation of which !'earned counsel for the respondent
could rely in support of the order of the High Court
was that conferred by Art. 14, namely, the right to
the equal protection of the la..ws.
He said that the . '
. -.
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
973
respondent was entitled to have the procedure prescribed by the Kashmir Civil Service Rules fo!lowed
Stale of
before the order demoting him could be made and as
Jammu ••d
that procedure was not followed, his client had been
I<a.shmir
denied the equal protection of the laws. It seems to
v.
us that even if the Rules are a law and the respondent Mir Gulam Rasul
has not been given the benefit of them, all that can
be said to have happened is that the appellant has
acted in breach of the law. But that does not amount
to a violation of the right to the equal protection of
the laws. Otherwise, every breach of law by a Government would amount to a denial of the equal protection
of the laws. We are not aware of any authority in
support of that proposition and none has been cited
to u•.
Nor are we able to find any support for it in
principle. It is not the respondent's caMe that other
servams of the appellant had been given the benefit
of those Rules and such benefit has been designedly
denied only to him. It seems to us that the appeal
must be allowed on the simple ground that the
respondent's petition does not show a violation of any
fundamental right. The High Court had no power to
act under Art. 32 (2A) at all.
We think it right to point out that Arts. 226 and
3ll(2) of the Constitution of India had not been
applied to the State of Jammu and Kashmir at any
material time.
No question of the respondent's application being maintainable in view of these articles,
therefore, arises.
The appeal is according!)!. allowed. There will be
no order as to costs.
Appeal allowed.
Sarkar].