# STATE OF KARNATAKA v. SMT. SUVARNAMMA & ANR

- **Citation:** [2014] 10 S.C.R. 778
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 2014-10-14
- **Case number:** Criminal Appeal No. 785 of 2010
- **Bench:** V. Gopala Gowda, Adarsh Kumar Goel
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/state-of-karnataka-v-smt-suvarnamma-anr-29517
- **Pages:** 34

## Headnote

Penal Code, 1860: ss. 498-A and 304-B - Dowry death
C caused by bum injuries - Allegation that victim-deceased was
harassed by accused husband and in-laws on account of
dowry - Mother-in-law poured kerosene on the deceased and
ignited the fire - Deceased was taken to hospital by the
mother-in-law - Trial Court convicted the accused rejecting
o the plea that prosecution had withheld the dying declaration
that the deceased had caught fire accidentally - High Court
reversed the decision of trial court - Appeal against acquittal
- Held: Death of the deceased was within 7 years of marriage
and she was subjected to harassment for dowry soon before
E her death - The death was in circumstances other than natural
- Mere lapse of investigating agency could not be enough to
throw out overwhelming evidence clearly establishing the
case of the prosecution - Inmates of the house cannot get
away by simply keeping quiet and offering no explanation on
F the supposed premise that the burden to establish its case
lies upon the prosecution and there is no duty at all on an
accused to offer any explanation -
Case against accused
stood established - Dowry Prohibition Act - ss.3, 4 and 6.
Criminal trial: False plea by accused - Held: Can be
G taken as additional circumstance against the accused.
H
Investigation: Faulty investigation - Held: Suppression
or unfair conduct of the investigating agency would not
778
STATE OF KARNATAKA v. SUVARNAMMA
779
absolve the Court of its duty to find out the truth - Penal Code,
A
1860.
Appeal against acquittal: Held: In appeal against the
acquittal, if a possible view has been taken, no interference
is required, but if the view taken is not legally sustainable, the
B
Court has ample powers to interfere with the order of acquittal.
Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1. In the absence of direct evidence, the
circumstantial evidence can be the basis of conviction if C
the circumstances are of conclusive nature and rule out
all reasonable possibilities of accused being innocent.
Once the prosecution probabilises the involvement of the
accused but the accused takes a false plea, such false
plea can be taken as an additional circumstance against
D
the accused. Though Article 20(3) of the Constitution
incorporates the rule against self incrimination, the scope
and the content of the said rule does not require the
Court to ignore the conduct of the accused in not
correctly disclosing the facts within his knowledge. It is
E
/ also well settled that though the investigating agency is
expected to be fair and efficient, any lapse on its part
cannot per se be a ground to throw out the prosecution
case when there is overwhelming evidence to prove the
offence. [para 12, 13] [786-E-H; 787-A]
F
2. It was held in *State of Rajasthan vs. Jaggu Ram that
where an offence like murder is committed in secrecy
inside a house, the initial burden to establish the case
would undoubtedly be upon the prosecution, but the
nature and amount of evidence to be led by it to establish
G
the charge cannot be of the same degree as is required
in other cases of circumstantial evidence. The burden
would be of a comparatively lighter character. In view of
Section 106 of the Evidence Act there will be a
corresponding burden on the inmates of the house to
H
780
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2014] 10 S.C.R.
A give a cogent explanation as to how the crime was
committed. Admittedly, the marriage of the deceased took
place within seven years of her death. Her death was by
burn injuries. There was evidence of demand of dowry
soon before the death. [Paras 14, 15] [807-B-C-G-H]
B
3. Merely showing that the prosecution withheld
dying declaration (Exhibit D-7) could not be a ground for
the Court not finding out the cause of death from the
material on record and inferring that the death was
C accidental. Once dying declaration (Exhibit D-7) was
produced even by defence, the Court has to go into the
authenticity of two rival versions in the dying
declarations. It was requ

## Text

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B
[2014] 10 S.CR. 778
STATE OF KARNATAKA
v.
SMT. SUVARNAMMA & ANR.
(Criminal Appeal No. 785 of 2010)
OCTOBER 14, 2014
[V. GOPALA GOWDA AND
ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, JJ.]
Penal Code, 1860: ss. 498-A and 304-B - Dowry death
C caused by bum injuries - Allegation that victim-deceased was
harassed by accused husband and in-laws on account of
dowry - Mother-in-law poured kerosene on the deceased and
ignited the fire - Deceased was taken to hospital by the
mother-in-law - Trial Court convicted the accused rejecting
o the plea that prosecution had withheld the dying declaration
that the deceased had caught fire accidentally - High Court
reversed the decision of trial court - Appeal against acquittal
- Held: Death of the deceased was within 7 years of marriage
and she was subjected to harassment for dowry soon before
E her death - The death was in circumstances other than natural
- Mere lapse of investigating agency could not be enough to
throw out overwhelming evidence clearly establishing the
case of the prosecution - Inmates of the house cannot get
away by simply keeping quiet and offering no explanation on
F the supposed premise that the burden to establish its case
lies upon the prosecution and there is no duty at all on an
accused to offer any explanation -
Case against accused
stood established - Dowry Prohibition Act - ss.3, 4 and 6.
Criminal trial: False plea by accused - Held: Can be
G taken as additional circumstance against the accused.
H
Investigation: Faulty investigation - Held: Suppression
or unfair conduct of the investigating agency would not
778
STATE OF KARNATAKA v. SUVARNAMMA
779
absolve the Court of its duty to find out the truth - Penal Code,
A
1860.
Appeal against acquittal: Held: In appeal against the
acquittal, if a possible view has been taken, no interference
is required, but if the view taken is not legally sustainable, the
B
Court has ample powers to interfere with the order of acquittal.
Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1. In the absence of direct evidence, the
circumstantial evidence can be the basis of conviction if C
the circumstances are of conclusive nature and rule out
all reasonable possibilities of accused being innocent.
Once the prosecution probabilises the involvement of the
accused but the accused takes a false plea, such false
plea can be taken as an additional circumstance against
D
the accused. Though Article 20(3) of the Constitution
incorporates the rule against self incrimination, the scope
and the content of the said rule does not require the
Court to ignore the conduct of the accused in not
correctly disclosing the facts within his knowledge. It is
E
/ also well settled that though the investigating agency is
expected to be fair and efficient, any lapse on its part
cannot per se be a ground to throw out the prosecution
case when there is overwhelming evidence to prove the
offence. [para 12, 13] [786-E-H; 787-A]
F
2. It was held in *State of Rajasthan vs. Jaggu Ram that
where an offence like murder is committed in secrecy
inside a house, the initial burden to establish the case
would undoubtedly be upon the prosecution, but the
nature and amount of evidence to be led by it to establish
G
the charge cannot be of the same degree as is required
in other cases of circumstantial evidence. The burden
would be of a comparatively lighter character. In view of
Section 106 of the Evidence Act there will be a
corresponding burden on the inmates of the house to
H
780
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2014] 10 S.C.R.
A give a cogent explanation as to how the crime was
committed. Admittedly, the marriage of the deceased took
place within seven years of her death. Her death was by
burn injuries. There was evidence of demand of dowry
soon before the death. [Paras 14, 15] [807-B-C-G-H]
B
3. Merely showing that the prosecution withheld
dying declaration (Exhibit D-7) could not be a ground for
the Court not finding out the cause of death from the
material on record and inferring that the death was
C accidental. Once dying declaration (Exhibit D-7) was
produced even by defence, the Court has to go into the
authenticity of two rival versions in the dying
declarations. It was required to be ascertained whether
(Exhibit D-7) was a genuine and reliable dying declaration
or the oral dying declarations made before PW-1, PW-3,
D PW-4, PW-5, PW-8, PW-14, PW-15 and PW-16 were more
reliable in the circumstances on record. The stand of the
accused who were husband and mother in-law of the
deceased, living in the same house that they had no idea
that the deceased received burn injuries is clearly
E incompatible with the stand in Exhibit D-7 that the
accused mother in-law of the deceased was very much
present in the house and she shifted the deceased to the
hospital. The deceased could not have made any
voluntary and independent dying declaration in such
F circumstances as the influence of the accused could not
be ruled out. According to the said dying declaration, she
raised hue and cry when she received burn injuries which
attracted her mother in-law and the tenant, while
according 1to the mother in-law as well as the tenant they
G never heard such cries. There is no evidence of struggle
or cries and the burn injuries are to the extent of 95%. In
the case of an accident, the deceased would have tried
to run away oi;le,Scape. In these circumstances, there was
hardly any p0ssibility of accidental burn injuries.
H Extensive burns and other circumstances supported the
STATE OF KARNATAKA v. SUVARNAMMA
781
version of unnatural death. [paras 16, 17) [808-D-H; 809A
A-CJ
4. In appeal against the acquittal, if a possible view
has been taken, no interference is required, but ifthe view
taken is not legally sustainable, the Court. has ample
8
powers to interfere with the order of acquittal.
Accordingly, the case against the accused stood fully
established. [paras 22, 23) [810-F, G]
Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade vs. State of Maharashtra
(1973) 2 SCC 793: 1974 (1) SCR 489; Bharwada C
Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai vs. State of Gujarat (1983) 3 SCC 217:
1983 (3) SCR 280; Appabhai vs. State of Gujarat (1988)
Supp SCC 241; State of Haryana vs. Bhagirath (1999) 5 SCC
96: 1999 (3) SCR 529; Leela Ram vs. State of Haryana
(1999) 9 SCC 525: 1999 (3) Suppl. SCR 435; State of H.P.
D
VS. Lekh Raj (2000) 1 sec 247: 1999 (4) Suppl. SCR 286;
Gangadhar Behera vs. State of Orissa (2005) 6 SCC 101:
2005 (1) Suppl. SCR 786; State of Punjab vs. Swarqn Singh
(2002) 8 SCC 381: 2002 (3) Suppl. SCR 183; Zahira
Habibullha Sheikh (5) vs. State of Gujarat (2006) 3 SCC 37 4:
E
2006 (2) SCR 1081; Mani Pal vs. State of Haryana (2004)
10 SCC 692: 2004 (3) SCR 768; *State of Rajasthan vs.
Jaggu Ram (2008) 12 SCC 51 - relied on.
Case Law Reference:
1974 (1) SCR 489
relied on
Para 14
1983 (3) SCR 280
relied on
Para 14
(1988) Supp sec 241
relied on
Para 14
1999 (3) SCR 529
relied on
. Para 14
r-..
1999 (3) Suppl. SCR 435
relied on ' 0 .Para14
•
1999 (4) Suppl. SCR 286
relied- on
.Para 14
2005 (1) Suppl. SCR 786
relieCI on;
Para 14
~
""'
F
G
H
A
B
782
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(2014] 10 S.C.R.
2002 (3) Suppl. 5_CR 183
relied on
2006 (2) SCR 1081
relied on
2004 (3) SCR 768
c2008) 12 sec s1
relied on
relied on
Para 14
·Para 14
Para 14
Para 14
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
No. 785.of 2010.
From the Judgment and Order dated 22.12.2005 of the
c High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore in Criminal Appeal No.
1818 of 2004.
K. Parameshwar V.N. Raghupathy, Sanjay R. Hegde for
the Appellant.
·
·
D
Senthil Jagadeesan for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, J.1. This appeal has been
preferred against the Order dated 22nd December, 2005, of
E the High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore in Criminal Appeal
No.1818 of 2004 setting aside the conviction of the accusedrespondent Nos.1 and 2 passed by the Trial Court under
Sections 498-A and 304-B of the Indian Penal Code ("IPC")
F .. and Sections 3,4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, and
sentence imposed including the sentence to undergo
imprisonment for life for the offence punishable under Section
304-B of the IPC.
2. The case of the prosecution is that the deceased
G Soumya was married to the accused-Manjunath on 13th May,
1996. She,..W'1S living with her husband and his mother coaccused 'Suvarnamma. She was not treated well and was
!
•
• ' .
•
harassed for.Clowry. On 31st August, 1998 at about 6.15 P.M.,
when her lltisband 'had gone out, the accused Suvarnamma
H brought kerosener,can, poured kerosene on the deceased-
" _..
I
I
~
STATE OF KARNATAKA v. SUVARNAMMA
783
[ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, J.]
Soumya and ignited the fire. She cried for help but
A
Suvernamma put a rug on her. Thereafter, she shifted her to
Chigateri General Hospital, Davangere. PW-19, Dr. Rajeshwari
Devi, examined her. Next day in the morning of 1st September,
1998, at about 7 AM., PW-26, V. Dhananjaya, PSI, in the
presence of PW-19, Dr. Rajeshwari Devi recorded her
B
statement and on that basis registered First Information Report.
Soumya died on 3rd September, 1998. After investigation, the
accused-the husband, the mother-in-law and the sister-in-law,
were sent up for trial.
3. The prosecution examined 26 witnesses which included c
the family members of the deceased who gave evidence of
demand of dowry and also the oral dying declarations made
before them. PW-22, Taluqa Executive Magistrate, was
examined to prove the inquest report. The prosecution also
D
examined the medical experts and the investigating officers.
The accused denied the prosecution allegations and stated that
they were taken out of their house by the police at 12 AM. midnight and arrested and were not aware of anything.
4. The Trial Court held that the offences were proved
E
against the respondents-accused. However, co-accused
Geetha, sister of Manjunath was acquitted. The Trial Court held
that the demand of dowry soon before the death was
established by the evidence of family members of the
deceased which was reliable. The Trial Court rejected the plea
F
that the prosecution had withheld the dying declaration (Exhibit
D-7) recorded by PW-22 that the deceased caught fire
accidentally; she had switched on the gas stove and had gone
to change her clothes; when after returning back, she lit the
match stick, as a result of which fire broke out resulting in
G
accidental burn injuries.
5. On appeal, the High Court reversed the decision of the
Trial Court for reasons which can be summed up as follows :
"(i)
According to PW-1, the brother of the deceased,
H
784
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2014) 10 S.C:R.
A
the police had come to the hospital on the night
itself on 31st August, 1998 and he gave a
complaint to the police at that time, while,
according to the Investigating Officer he came to
the hospital on 1st September, 1998 and recorded
B
the statement of the deceased.
(ii)
The dying declaration recorded by PW-22 was not
produced though recording of such statement was
admitted by the PW-19, Dr. Rajeshwari Devi and
c
the Taluka Executive Magistrate, PW-22.
(iii)
It was doubtful that the death was either homicidal
or suicidal. The pro&_.:;ution failed to discharge the
burden to prove this fact. In absence thereof, the
death had to be taken to be by accident.
D
(iv)
There were discrepancies in the evidence
regarding the demand and payment of dowry
about the place where the negotiations took place,
the persons present at the time of negotiations
E
and the items of dowry demanded.
(v)
The Trial Court had not recorded the statement
under Section 313 Cr.P.C. properly resulting in
prejudice to the accused."
F
6. We have heard learned counsel for the parties.
7. Learned counsel for the State vehemently submitted that
the view taken by the High Court is perverse. Mere defects in
the investigation could not be the basis for acquitting the
G accused, if sufficient evidence to prove the prosecution case
was available on record. Minor discrepancies about details of
demand of dowry were not enough to discredit the
overwhelming evidence that the deceased was harassed for
dowry soon before her death. A pragmatic approach was
H required to be adopted by Court in dealing with cases of death
STATE OF KARNATAKA v. SUVARNAMMA
785
[ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, J.]
of a young bride to advance the policy of law. Though, the
A
burden of proof is on the prosecution, the facts exclusively in
the knowledge of the accused had to be disclosed by the
accused. A false plea is to be taken as an additional
circumstance against the accused. Oral dying declaration
consistently made by the deceased before' her brothers, sisters,
B
mother and brother in-law also corroborated by the dying
declaration (Exhibit P-10) recorded by the PW-26, the Police
Officer after due certification by PW-19, Dr. Rajeshwari Devi,
could not be thrown out only on the plea of the defence that
dying declaration (Exhibit D-7) made by the deceased before
C
PW-22, Executive Magistrate, in the presence of PW-19,
Dr. Rajeshwari Devi was not produced. The evidence on record
has to be appreciated in its entirety. It was submitted that the
approach adopted by the High Court was clearly erroneous. If
two dying declarations are recorded, the Court has to find out
D
as to which one was genuine and truthful.
8. Learned counsel for the respondents, on the other hand,
submitted that the acquittal recorded by the High Court could
not be reversed merely on the ground that a different view could
be taken. He submitted that the lapses of the investigation and
discrepancies in evidence are serious enough to disbelieve the
prosecution version and to give benefit of doubt.
9. We have given our anxious consideration to the rival
contentions and carefully perused the evidence on record.
10. The questions which arise for our consideration are as
follows:
(i)
Whether the acquittal recorded by the High Courl
ought to be interfered with?
(ii)
Whether the case against the accused stands
established beyond reasonable doubt?
(iii)
Whether the infirmities in investigation and
E
F
G
H
A
B
786
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2014) 10 S.C.R.
discrepancies pointed out in the prosecution
evidence make out a ground for rejecting the
prosecution version?
(iv)
Whether the plea of the accused is false and
conduct of the accused in taking false plea can be
treated as an additional circumstance against
them?
11. Before dealing with the above questions, it may be
necessary to refer to well known principles for appreciation of
C evidence.
12. The Court dealing with a criminal trial is to perform the
task of ascertaining the truth from the material before it. It has
to punish the guilty and protect the innocent. Burden of proof is
o on the prosecution and the prosecution has to establish its case
beyond reasonable doubt. Much weight cannot be given to
minor discrepancies which are bound to occur on account of
difference in perception, loss of memory and other invariable
factors. In the absence of direct evidence, the circumstantial
E evidence can be the basis of conviction if the circumstances
are of conclusive nature and rule out all reasonable possibilities
of accused being innocent. Once the prosecution probabilises
the involvement of the accused but the accused takes a false
plea, such false plea can be taken as an additional
F circumstance
against
the
accused.
Though
Article 20 (3) of the Constitution incorporates the rule against
self incrimination, the scope and the content of the said rule
does not require the Court to ignore the conduct of the accused
in not correctly disclosing the facts within his knowledge. When
G the accused takes a false plea about the facts exclusively known
to him, such circumstance is a vital additional circumstance
against the accused.
· 13. It is also well settled that though the investigating
agency is expected to be fair and efficient, any lapse on its part
H
STATE OF KARNATAKA v. SUVARNAMMA
787
[ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, J.]
cannot per se be a ground to throw out the prosecution case
A
when there is overwhelming evidence to prove the offence.
14. We may refer to the well known observations from
decisions of this Court :
(i)
Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade
vs.
State of B
Maharashtra 1
"8. Now to the facts. The scene of murder is rural, the
witnesses to the case are rustics and so their behavioural
pattern and perceptive habits have to be judged as such. c
The too sophisticated approaches familiar in courts
based on unreal assumptions about human conduct
cannot obviously be applied to those given to the
lethargic ways of our villages. When scanning the
evidence of the various witnesses we have to inform
D
ourselves that variances on the fringes, discrepancies in
details, contradictions in narrations and embellishments
in inessential parts cannot m1fitate against the veracity
of the core of the testimony provided there is the impress
of truth and conformity to probability in the substantial
E
fabric of testimony delivered. The learned Sessions
Judge has at some length dissected the evidence, spun
out contradictions and unnatural conduct, and tested with
precision the time and sequence of the events connected
with the crime, all on the touchstone of the medical
evidence and the post-mortem certificate. Certainly, the
court which has seen the witnesses depose, has a great
advantage over the appellate Judge who reads the
recorded evidence in cold print, and regard must be had
F
to this advantage enjoyed by the trial Judge of observing
G
the demeanour and delivery, of reading the
str,aightforwardness and doubtful candour, rustic naivete
and clever equivocation, manipulated conformity and
ingenious unveracity of persons who swear to the facts
1.
(1973) 2 sec 793.
H
788
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2014) 10 S.C.R. .
A
before him. Nevertheless, where a Judge draws his
conclusions not so much on the directness or dubiety of
the witness while on oath but upon general probabilities
and on expert evidence, the court of appeal is in as good
a position to assess or arrive at legitimate conclusions
B
as the Court of first instance. Nor can we make a fetish
of the trial Judge's psychic insight."
c
D
E
F
G
(ii)
Bharwada Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai vs. State of
Gujarat2
"5. . ......... We do not consider it appropriate or
permissible to enter upon a reappraisal or reappreciation
of the evidence in the context of the minor discrepancies
painstakingly highlighted by learned Counsel for the
appellant. Overmuch importance cannot be attached to
minor discrepancies. The reasons are obvious :
"(1) By and large a witness cannot be expected to
possess a photographic memory and to recall the details
of an incident. It is not as if a video tape is replayed on
the mental screen.
(2) Ordinarily it so happens that a witness is
overtaken by events. The witness could not have
anticipated the occurrence which so often has an element
of surprised. The mental faculties therefore cannot be
expected to be attuned to absorb the details.
(3) The powers of observation differ from person to
person. What one may notice, another may not. An object
or movement might emboss its image on one person's
mind, whereas it might go unnoticed on the part of
another.
(4) By and large people cannot accurately recall a
conversation and reproduce the very words used by them
H 2.
(1983) 3 sec 211.
STATE OF KARNATAKA v. SUVARNAMMA
789
[ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, J.]
or heard by them. They can only recall the main purporl
A
of the conversation. It is unrealistic to expect a witness
to be a human tape-recorder.
(5) In regard to exact time of an incident, or the time
duration of an occurrence, usually, people make their 8
estimates by guess-work on the spur of the moment at
the time of interrogation. And one cannot expect people
to make very precise or reliable estimates in such
matters. Again, it depends on the time-sense of
individuals which varies from person to person.
(6) Ordinarily a witness cannot be expected to recall
accurately the sequence of events which takes place in
rapid succession or in· a short time span. A witness is
liable to get confused, or mixed up when interrogated later
on.
c
D
(7) A witness, though wholly truthful, is liable to be
overawed by the court atmosphere and the piercing
cross-examination made by counsel and out of
nervousness mix up facts, get confused regarding
E
sequence of events, or fill up details from imagination on
the spur of the moment. The sub-conscious mind of the
witness sometimes so operates on account of the fear of
looking foolish or being disbelieved though the witness
is giving a truthful and honest account of the occurrence
F
witnessed by him -
Perhaps it is a sort of a
psychological defence mechanism activated on the spur
of the moment."
(iii}
Appabhai vs. State of Gujarat3
"13 . ......... The court while appreciating the
evidence must not attach undue importance to
minor discrepancies. The discrepancies which do
3.
(1988) Supp sec 241.
G
H
A
B
c
D
E
790
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2014] 10 S.C.R.
not shake the basic version of the prosecution
case may be discarded. The discrepancies which
are due to normal errors of perception or
observation should not be given importance. The
errors due to lapse of memory may be given due
allowance. The court by calling into aid its vast
experience of men and matters in different cases
must evaluate the entire material on record by
excluding the exaggerated version, given by any
witness. When a doubt arises in respect of certain
facts alleged by such witness, the proper course
is to ignore that fact only unless it goes into the
root of the matter so as to demolish the entire
prosecution story. The witnesses nowadays go on
adding embellishments to their version perhaps
for the fear of their testimony being rejected by the
court. The courts, however, should not disbelieve
the evidence of such witnesses a/together if they
are otherwise trustworthy. Jaganmohan Reddy, J.,
speaking for this Court in Sohrab v. State of
Madhya Pradesh observed: {SCC p. 756, SCC
(Cri) p. 824, para BJ
''This Court has held that falsus in uno falsus in omnibus
is not a sound rule for the reason that hardly one comes
across a witness whose evidence does not contain a grain
F
of untruth or at any rate exaggeration, embroideries or
embellishments. In most cases, the witnesses when
asked about details venture to give some answer, not
necessarily true or relevant for fear that their evidence
may not be accepted in respect of the main incident
G
which they have witnessed but that is not to say that their
evidence as to the salient features of the case after
cautious scrutiny cannot be considered."
(iv)
State of Haryana vs. Bhagirath4
H 4.
(1999) s sec 96.
STATE OF KARNATAKA v. SUVARNAMMA
791
[ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, J.]
"B. It is nearly impossible in any criminal trial to prove
A
all the elements with a scientific precision. A criminal
court could be convinced of the guilt only beyond the
range of a reasonable doubt. Of course, the expression
"reasonable doubt" is incapable of definition. Modem
thinking is in favour of the view that proof beyond a
B
reasonable doubt is the same as proof which affords
moral certainty to the Judge.
9. Francis Wharton, a celebrated writer on criminal law
in the United States has quoted from judicial
pronouncements in his book Wharton's Criminal C
Evidence (at p. 31, Vol. 1 of the 12th Edn.) as follows:
"It is difficult to define the phrase 'reasonable doubt'.
However, in all criminal cases a careful explanation of
the term ought to be given. A definition often quoted or D
followed is that given by Chief Justice Shaw in the
Webster case. He says: 'It is not mere possible doubt,
because everything relating to human affairs and
depending upon moral evidence is open to some
possible or imaginary doubt. It is that state of the case
E
which, after the entire comparison and consideration of
all the evidence, leaves the minds of the jurors in that
consideration that they cannot say they feel an abiding
conviction to a moral certainty of the truth of the charge.'
"
10. In the treatise The Law of Criminal Evidence authored
by H. C. Underhill it is stated (at p. 34, Vol. 1 of the 5th
Edn.) thus:
F
"The doubt to be reasonable must be such a one as an
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. honest, sensible and fair-minded man might, with reason,
entertain consistent with a conscientious desire to
ascertain the truth. An honestly entertained doubt of guilt
is a reasonable doubt. A vague conjecture or an
inference of the possibility of the innocence of the
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accused is not a reasonable doubt. A reasonable doubt
is one which arises from a consideration of all the
evidence in a fair and reasonable way. There must be a
candid consideration of all the evidence and if, after this
candid consideration is had by the jurors, there remains
in the minds a conviction of the guilt of the accused, then
there is no room for a reasonable doubt."
11. In Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra·
(1973) 2 SCC 793) this Court adopted the same
approach to the principle of benefit of doubt and struck
a note of caution that the dangers of exaggerated
devotion to the rule of benefit of doubt at the expense of
social defence demand special emphasis in the
contemporary context of escalating crime and escape.
This Court further said: (SCC p. 799, para 6)
''The judicial instrument has a public accountability. The
cherished principles or golden thread of proof beyond
reasonable doubt which runs through the web of our law
should not be stretched morbidly to embrace every
hunch, hesitancy and degree of doubt."
(v)
Leela Ram vs. State of Haryana5
"9. Be it noted that the High Court is within its jurisdiction
being the first appellate court to reappraise the evidence,
F
bJJt the discrepancies found in the ocular account of two
witnesses unless they are so vital, cannot affect the
credibility of the evidence of the witnesses. There are
bound to be some discrepancies between the naffations
of different witnesses when they speak on details, and
G
unless the contradictions are of a material dimension, the
same should not be used to jettison the evidence in its
entirety. Incidentally, corroboration of evidence with
mathematical niceties cannot be expected in criminal
cases. Minor embellishment, there . may be, but
H 5.
(1999) 9 sec 525.
STATE OF KARNATAKA v. SUVARNAMMA
793
[ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, J.]
variations by reason therefor should not render the
A
evidence of eyewitnesses unbelievable. Trivial
discrepancies ought not to obliterate an otherwise
acceptable evidence. In this context, reference may be
made to the decision of this Cowt in State of UP. v. M.K.
Anthony (1985) 1 SCC 505). In para 10 of the Report,
B
this Court observed: (SCC pp. 514-15)
"10. While appreciating the_ evidence of a witness, the
approach must be whether the evidence of the witness
read as a whole appears to have a ring of truth. Once that
impression is formed, it is undoubtedly necessary for the
C
court to scrutinise the evidence more particularly keeping
in view the deficiencies, drawbacks and infirmities
pointed out in the evidence as a whole and evaluate
them to find out whether it is against the general tenor of
the evidence given by the witness and whether the earlier
D
evaluation of the evidence is shaken as to render it
unworthy of belief. Minor discrepancies on lrivial matters
not touching the core of the case, hypertechnical
approach by taking sentences torn out of context here or
there from the evidence, attaching importance to some
E
technical error committed by the investigating officer not
going to the root of the matter would not ordinarily permit
rejection of the evidence as a whole. If the court before
whom the witness gives evidence had the opportunity to
form the opinion about the general tenor of evidence
given by the witness, the appellate court which had not
this benefit will have to attach due weight to the
appreciation of evidence by the trial court and unless
there are reasons weighty and formidable it would not be
proper to reject the evidence on the ground of minor G
variations or infirmities in the matter of trivial details. Even
honest and truthful witnesses may differ in some details
unrelated to the main incident because power of
observation, retention and reproduction differ with
individuals."
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10. In a very recent decision in Rammi v. State M.P with
Bhura v. State of M.P. (1999) 8 SCC 649) this Court
observed: (SCC p. 656, para 24)
"24. When an eyewitness is examined at length it is quite
possible for him to make some discrepancies. No true
witness can possibly escape from making some
discrepant details. Perhaps an untrue witness who is well
tutored can successfully make his testimony totally nondiscrepant. But courts should bear in mind that it is only
when discrepancies in the evidence of a witness are so
incompatible with the credibility of his version that the
court is justified in jettisoning his evidence. But too
serious a view to be adopted on mere variations falling
in the narration of an incident (either as between the
evidence of two witnesses or as between two statements
of the same witness) is an unrealistic approach for judicial
scrutiny."
This Court further observed: (SCC pp. 656-57, paras 2527)
'
"25. It is a common practice in trial courts to make out
contradicti()ns from the previous statement of a witness
for confronting him during cross-examination. Merely
because there is inconsistency in evidence it is not
sufficient to impair the credit of the witness. No doubt
Section 155 of the Evidence Act provides scope for
impeaching the credit of a witness by proof of an
inconsistent former statement. But a reading of the
section would indicate that all inconsistent statements are
not sufficient to impeach the credit of the witness. The
material portion of the section is extracted below:
'155. Impeaching credit of witness.-The credit of a
witness may be impeached in the following ways by the
adverse party, or, with the consent of the court, by the
party who calls him-
STATE OF KARNATAKA v. SUVARNAMMA
[ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, J.]
(1)-(2)
795
(3) by proof of former statements inconsistent with any
part of his evidence which is liable to be contradicted;'
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26. A former statement though seemingly inconsistent
with the evidence need not necessarily be sufficient to
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amount to contradiction. Only such of the inconsistent
statement which is liable to be 'contradicted' would affect
the credit of the witness. Section 145 of the Evidence Act
also enables the cross-examiner to use any former
statement of the witness, but it cautions that if it is C
intended to 'contradict' the witness the cross-examiner is
enjoined to comply with the formality prescribed therein.
Section 162 of Code also permits the cross-examiner to
use the previous statement of the witness (recorded under
Section 161 of the Code) for the only limited purpose i.e.
D
to 'contradict' the witness.
27. To contradict a witness, therefore, must be to discredit
the particular version of the witness. Unless the former
statement has the potency to discredit the present
E
statement, even if the latter is at variance with the former
to some extent it would not be helpful to contradict that
witness (vide Tahsildar Singh v. State of U.P. (AIR (1959)
SC 1012)."
(vi}
State of H.P. vs. Lekh Ra.f
"10. The High Court appears to have adopted a technical
approach in disposing of the appeal filed by the
respondents. This Court in State of Punjab v. Jagir Singh
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(1974} 3 SCC 277) held: (SCC pp. 285-86, para 23)
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"23. A criminal trial is not like a fairy tale wherein one is
free to give flight to one's imagination and phantasy. It
concerns itself with the question as to whether the
e.
(2000) 1 sec 247.
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accused arraigned at the trial is guilty of the crime with
which he is charged. Crime is an event in real life and is
the product of interplay of different human emotions. In
arriving at the conclusion about the guilt of the accused
charged with the commission of a crime, the court has
to judge the evidence by the yardstick of probabilities, its
intrinsic worth and the animus of witnesses. Every case
in the final analysis would have to depend upon its own
facts. Although the benefit of every reasonable doubt
should be given to the accused, the courts should not at
the same time reject evidence which is ex facie trustworthy
on grounds which are fanciful or in the nature of
conjectures."
The criminal trial cannot be equated with a mock scene
from a stunt film. The legal trial is conducted to ascertain
the guilt or innocence of the accused arraigned. In
arriving at a conclusion about the truth, the courts are
required to adopt a rational approach and judge the
evidence by its intrinsic worth and the animus of the
witnesses. The hyper technicalities or figment of
imagination should not be allowed to divest the court of
its responsibility of sifting and weighing the evidence to
arrive at the conclusion regarding the existence or
otherwise of a particular circumstance keeping in view the
peculiar facts of each case, the social position of the
victim and the accused, the larger interests of the society
particularly the law and order problem and degrading
values of life inherent in the prevalent system. The
realities of life have to be kept in mind while appreciating
the evidence for arriving at the truth. The courts are not
obliged to make efforts either to give latitude to the
prosecution or loosely construe the law in favour of the
accused. The traditional dogmatic hypertechnical
approach has to be replaced by a rational, realistic and
genuine approach for administering justice in a criminal
trial. Criminal jurisprudence cannot be considered to be
STATE OF KARNATAKA v. SUVARNAMMA
797
[ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, J.]
a utopian thought but have to be considered as part and
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parcel of the human civilization and the realities of life.
The courts cannot ignore the erosion in values of life
which are a common feature of the present system. Such
erosions cannot be given a bonus in favour of those who
are guilty of polluting society and mankind."
B
(vii) Gangadhar Behera vs. State of Orissa7
"15. To the same effect is the decision in State of
Punjab v. Jagir Singh (1974) 3 SCC 277) and Lehna v.
State of Hafyana (2002) 3 SCC 76). Stress was laid by C
the accused-appellants on the non-acceptance of
evidence tendered by some witnesses to contend about
desirability to throw out the entire prosecution case. In
essence prayer is to apply the principle of "falsus in uno,
falsus in omnibus" (false in one thing, false in everything).
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This plea is clearly untenable. Even if a major portion of
the evidence is found to be deficient, in case residue is
sufficient to prove guilt of an accused, notwithstanding
acquittal of a number of other co-accused persons, his
conviction can be maintained. It is the duty of the court
E
to separate the grain from the chaff. Where chaff can be
separated from the grain, it would be open to the court to
convict an accused notwithstanding the fact that evidence
has been found to be deficient to prove guilt of other
accused persons. Falsity of a particular material witness
F
or material particular would not ruin it from the beginning
to end. The maxim "falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus" has
no application in India and the witnesses cannot be
branded as liars. The maxim "falsus in uno, falsus in
omnibus" has not received general acceptance nor has
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this maxim come to occupy the status of rule of law. It is
merely a rule of caution. All that it amounts to, is that in
such cases testimony may be disregarded, and not that
it must be disregarded. The doctrine merely involves the
1.
c2002) s sec 381.
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question of weight of evidence which a court may apply
in a given set of circumstances, but it is not what may be
called "a mandatory rule ·of evidence". (See Nisar Ali v.
State of U.P. (AIR (1957) SC 366) Merely because some
of the accused persons have been acquitted, though
evidence against all of them, so far as direct testimony
went, was the same does not lead as a necessary
corollary that those who have been convicted must also
be acquitted. It is always open to a court to differentiate
the accused who had been acquitted from those who were
convicted. (See Gurcharan Singh v. State of Punjab (AIR
(1956) SC 460). The doctrine is a dangerous one
specially in India for if a whole body of the testimony were
to be rejected, because a witness was evidently speaking
an untruth in some aspect, it is to be feared that
administration of criminal justice would come to a dead
stop. Witnesses just cannot help in giving embroidery to
a story, however, true in the main. Therefore, it has to be
appraised in each case as to what extent the evidence
is worthy of acceptance, and merely because in some
respects the court considers the same to be insufficient
for placing reliance on the testimony of a witness, it does
not necessarily follow as a matter of law that it must be
disregarded in all respects as well. The evidence has to
be sifted with care. The aforesaid dictum is not a sound
rule for the reason that one hardly comes across a
witness whose evidence does not contain a grain of
untruth or at any rate exaggeration, embroideries or
embellishment. (See Sohrab v. State of M.P. (1972) 3
SCC 751) and Ugar Ahir v. State of Bihar (AIR 1965 SC
277). An attempt has to be made to, as noted above, in
terms of felicitous metaphor, separate the grain from the
chaff, truth from falsehood. Where it is not feasible to
separate the truth from falsehood, because grain and
chaff are inextricably mixed up, and in_ the process of
separation an absolutely new case has to be
reconstructed by divorcing essential details presented by
STATE OF KARNATAKA v. SUVARNAMMA
799
[ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, J.]
the prosecution completely from the context and the
A
background against which they are made, the only
available course to be made is to discard the evidence
in toto. (See Zwinglee Ariel v. State of M.P. (AIR (1954)
SC 15) and Ba/aka Singh v. State of Punjab (1975) 4
SCC 511 ). As observed by this Court in State of B
Rajasthan v. Kalki (1981) 2 sec 752) normal
discrepancies in evidence are those which are due to
normal errors of observation, normal errors of memory
due to lapse of time, due to mental disposition such as
shock and horror at the time of occurrence and those are c
always there however honest and truthful a witness may
be. Material discrepancies are those which are not
normal, and not expected of a normal person. Courts
have to label the category to which a discrepancy may
be categorized. While normal discrepancies do not 0
corrode the credibility of a party's case, material
discrepancies do so. These aspects were highlighted
recently in Krishna Mochi v. State of Bihar (2002) 6 sec
81). Accusations have been clearly established against
the accused-appellants in the case at hand. The courts
below have categorically indicated the distinguishing
E
features in evidence so far as the acquitted and the
convicted accused are concerned."
(viii) State of Punjab vs. Swaran Singh8
"10. The questioning of the accused is done to enable
him to give an opportunity to explain any circumstances
which have come out in the evidence against him. It may
F
be noticed that the entire evidence is recorded in his
presence and he is given full opportunity to crossG
examine each and every witness examined on the
prosecution side. He is given copies of all documents
which are sought to be relied on by the prosecution. Apart
from all these, as part of fair trial the accused is given
a.
(2005) e sec 101.
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opportunity to give his explanation regarding the
evidence adduced by the prosecution.