# ~ STATE OF KARNATAKA v. UNION OF INDIA & ANOTHER

- **Citation:** [1978] 2 S.C.R. 1
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1977-11-08
- **Bench:** M. H. Beg, Y. V. Chandrachud, P. N. Bhagwati, N. L. Untwalia, P. N. Shinghal, Jaswant Singh, P. S. Kailasam
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/state-of-karnataka-v-union-of-india-another-7346
- **Pages:** 168

## Headnote

Constitution of India 1950-Art. 131-Scope of-Commission of Inquiry
appointed by the Central Government under the
Cornmissions of lr_iquiry 4ct,
1952 to inquire into allegations of corruption, favouritism and nepotlsm agaifl!t
the Chief Minister of a State-Suit filed by the State under Art. 131-If main·
tainable-Central Government, if could constitute a Commission of Inquiry
against sitting Chief Mini.ster and Ministers of the State Government-Action
of Central Government, if destructive of federal structure of the Constitution
and distribution of powers betweell the Cen1re and the States-.ff subverts the
principle of collective responsibility under which Ministers are responsible only
to the State Legislature-If violates privileges of the menibers of the Assembly
under Art. 194(3).
Co1n1nissions of Inquiry Act, 1952 validity of-Section 3-Scope of-If
s. 3 ultra vires Part XI of the Constitution-Inquiry-Purpose and scope of-
"Defintte matter of public importance" meaning of.
Article 131 of the Constitution of India provides that the Supreme Court
shall have original jurisdiction in any dispute :- (a) between the Government of
!ndia and one or more States; or (b) between Government of India and any
State or States on one side and one or more other States on the other; or ( c)
between two or more States if and in so far as the dispute involves any question
(whether of law or fact) on which the existence or extent of a legal right
depends.
A memorandum alleging corruption, favouritism and nepotism against the
Chief Minister of the State of Kamat.aka was submitted to the Union Homo
Minister by certain opposition members of the State Assembly. The Chief
Minister repelled the allegations as frivolous and· pclitica.Ily motivated. By
a notification dated May 18, 1977 .the State
Government appointed
under
s. 3(1) of the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952, a one man commission presided over by a retired Judge of the Karnataka High Court
for inquiring into the allegations specified in the nOtification.
By notifica·
tion dated May 23, 1977, the Government of India appointed under s. 3(1) of
the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952, a one man commission presided over
by a retired judge of the Supreme Court to enquire into the charges made
agaimt the Chief Minister excluding "any matter covered by the notification
of the Government of Karnataka". Thereupon, the State Qiovemment filed in
this Court a suit under Art. 131 of the Constitution.
On the pleadings of the
parties, three issues were framed by this Court. These \Vere : (1) Is the suit
maintainable·? (2) Is the impugned notification ultra vires the powers of the
Central Government under
s. 3 of the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952 ?
(3) Even if the notification falls within sec. 3 of the Commissions of Inquiry
Act is the section itself unconstitutional ?
It was contended on behalf of the plaintiff that : (I) the Central Govern·
ment has no jurisdiction or authority to constitute the Commission of Inciuiry
in the purported exercise of its powers under the Act; (2) the action of the
Central Government in appointing the Commission against the Ministers of the
State Government is destrnctive of the federal strncture of the Constitution
and the scheme of distribution of powers between the Centre and the States;
(3) under the Cabinet system of government the Council of Ministers is responsible to the Legislature for all its actions and the inquiry ordered by the
Central Government against the State Ministers, while they are in office would
subvert the principle of collective responsibility of Ministers to the Legislature;
(4) by virtue of Art 194(3) it is the privilege of the Assembly (and not of
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any other body) to appoint a Committee for inquiring into the conduct of
·,,any of its members; (S) interpretation of s. 3 of the 1952 Act in such a way
as to empower the Central Government to appoint a Co~ion for inquiring
into matters relating

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I
~
STATE OF KARNATAKA
v.
UNION OF INDIA & ANOTHER
November 8, 1977
[M. H. BEG, C.J., Y. V. CHANDRACHUD, P. N. BHAGWATI, N. L.
UNTWALIA, P. N. SHINGHAL, JASWANT SINGH AND
P. S. KAILASAM, JJ.]
Constitution of India 1950-Art. 131-Scope of-Commission of Inquiry
appointed by the Central Government under the
Cornmissions of lr_iquiry 4ct,
1952 to inquire into allegations of corruption, favouritism and nepotlsm agaifl!t
the Chief Minister of a State-Suit filed by the State under Art. 131-If main·
tainable-Central Government, if could constitute a Commission of Inquiry
against sitting Chief Mini.ster and Ministers of the State Government-Action
of Central Government, if destructive of federal structure of the Constitution
and distribution of powers betweell the Cen1re and the States-.ff subverts the
principle of collective responsibility under which Ministers are responsible only
to the State Legislature-If violates privileges of the menibers of the Assembly
under Art. 194(3).
Co1n1nissions of Inquiry Act, 1952 validity of-Section 3-Scope of-If
s. 3 ultra vires Part XI of the Constitution-Inquiry-Purpose and scope of-
"Defintte matter of public importance" meaning of.
Article 131 of the Constitution of India provides that the Supreme Court
shall have original jurisdiction in any dispute :- (a) between the Government of
!ndia and one or more States; or (b) between Government of India and any
State or States on one side and one or more other States on the other; or ( c)
between two or more States if and in so far as the dispute involves any question
(whether of law or fact) on which the existence or extent of a legal right
depends.
A memorandum alleging corruption, favouritism and nepotism against the
Chief Minister of the State of Kamat.aka was submitted to the Union Homo
Minister by certain opposition members of the State Assembly. The Chief
Minister repelled the allegations as frivolous and· pclitica.Ily motivated. By
a notification dated May 18, 1977 .the State
Government appointed
under
s. 3(1) of the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952, a one man commission presided over by a retired Judge of the Karnataka High Court
for inquiring into the allegations specified in the nOtification.
By notifica·
tion dated May 23, 1977, the Government of India appointed under s. 3(1) of
the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952, a one man commission presided over
by a retired judge of the Supreme Court to enquire into the charges made
agaimt the Chief Minister excluding "any matter covered by the notification
of the Government of Karnataka". Thereupon, the State Qiovemment filed in
this Court a suit under Art. 131 of the Constitution.
On the pleadings of the
parties, three issues were framed by this Court. These \Vere : (1) Is the suit
maintainable·? (2) Is the impugned notification ultra vires the powers of the
Central Government under
s. 3 of the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952 ?
(3) Even if the notification falls within sec. 3 of the Commissions of Inquiry
Act is the section itself unconstitutional ?
It was contended on behalf of the plaintiff that : (I) the Central Govern·
ment has no jurisdiction or authority to constitute the Commission of Inciuiry
in the purported exercise of its powers under the Act; (2) the action of the
Central Government in appointing the Commission against the Ministers of the
State Government is destrnctive of the federal strncture of the Constitution
and the scheme of distribution of powers between the Centre and the States;
(3) under the Cabinet system of government the Council of Ministers is responsible to the Legislature for all its actions and the inquiry ordered by the
Central Government against the State Ministers, while they are in office would
subvert the principle of collective responsibility of Ministers to the Legislature;
(4) by virtue of Art 194(3) it is the privilege of the Assembly (and not of
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any other body) to appoint a Committee for inquiring into the conduct of
·,,any of its members; (S) interpretation of s. 3 of the 1952 Act in such a way
as to empower the Central Government to appoint a Co~ion for inquiring
into matters relating to any of the entries in List II of the Seventh Schedule
to the Constitution would make s. 3 itself ultra vires thet provisions of Part
XI of the Constitution; and (6) r:.ince on the basis of the report the Central
Government cannot take any action against the Ministers of the State Government such . a -Comm~~>ion cannot serve any . useful purpose.
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On the other hand, the 4.efendant
(Central
Government)
raised
preli:mi-
- nary objections as to the maintainability
of the suit -on the ground that the
appointment of such a Commission does not affect any legal right of the State;
and-(2) also that the Central Government is competent to constitute a Com-
. mission to inquire into a. definite matter of public importance, -(3) that, furthermore, its notification does not cover any of the matters mentioned in the
State Government's notification, nam'!ly, the conduct of Afinisters of the State
Government.:·
I
, (Per majority_ Beg, C.J. Chandrachud, Bhagwati_ and K.ailasam, JJ)
(Untwalia, Shinghal and Jaswant Singh, JJ dissenting)
The suit is maintainable.
BEG, C. 1.
l(a) The sUte concerned~ ~1hich challenges the validity of the ·action of.th~
Central Government against one or moie of its ~Iinisters in respect of acts
involving exercise of its governmental powers, \\'Ould have sufficient interest to
maintain a suit under Art. 131 because it involves claims to what appertains to
the State os a "State."
[94 CD]
(b) The case involves consideration
of the exercise of govemffiental
powers \\'hich vest in the: Government of the State and its Ministers :is such
l-'is-a·vis those of the Central Government and its 1\finisters. It also
raises
questions relating to the meaning and the ambit and the applicability of the
particular provisions of the Constitution whose. operations are of vital inten:st
to every State. Interpretations given to those provisions mu'it necessarily be of
great concern to ~he Union as well.
[91 C·D]
( c) The Union of India, acting through the Central Government. could be
said to represent the v.1hole of the people of India. The individual States, act·
ing through their Governments and Ministers, could be said to represent the
people of each individual State and their intere'its. When differences arise between the representatives of the State and those of the whole people of India,
on questions of interpretation of the Constitution, \\'hich must affect the welfare
of the whole people, and, particularly that of the people of the State concerned,
it is too technical an argument to be accepted that a suit does not lie under
Article 131 of the Constitution. [91 E·FJ
·
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(d) Article 131 can be invoked "\Vhenever a State and other States or the
Union differ on a question of interpretation of the Constitution so that a.
decision of it will affect the scope or ex,.erci.se of governmental powers which
are attributes of a State. It makes no difference to the maintainability of the
action if the pov:ers of the State which are executive, legislative, and judicial
G
are exercised through particular individuals.. [92 F·Gl
.
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(e) The distinction between the State and its Government is, 3.t the most.---
one -between the whole and an inseparable part of the whole.
It would be
immaterial as regards claims on behalf of either the State or its Government
whether the two are distinct juristic ·entities. Assuming that these are ·distinctly
separate entities, the claim of the- Government wOUld be that of the ·'State.
.
·[91-.HJ
'· (f) The fact thai th~ s·tate aCts tbrou&h its Mini~ters ~r officials ~ot
affoct the maintainability. of a c;uit under Art. 131 of the Constitution. ; .-\rticle
166(3)_ provides for allocation of the business of the Government an1ong the
~Ii('isters for "the more convenient transaction of the business". This implies
that the State cannot act merely through its Govcmtnent as a "\vhole but also
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KARNATAKA V. UNION (Beg, C.J.)
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tbrouih its intfoidual Ministers as provi:lcd by the rules.
Articles 166(3) and
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154(1), far from establishing any antithesis between the official capacity of a
Minister and the State for which he acts, only show that, as a Minis fer, he
"is an agent or a limb of the Government of the State and, therefore, he can
be treated as an officer for purposes of Art. 154,(1).
The result is that a
Minister's official acts cannot be distinguished from those of the State on whose
behalf he acts. There is nothing in Art. 131 of the Constitution it.elf, to debar
the State, which must always necessarily act through its officers or agents or
Ministers, from suing the Central Government not only to protect one of its
B
dfficers, agents or Ministers from being proceeded against, by the Central
Government, but to prefer its own claim to exclusive power to deal with him
and this is what the plaintiff has done by means of the suit. [92 H; 93 DJ
State of Raiasthan v. Union of India A.l.R. 1977 S.C. 1361, King Emperor
v. Sibnath Benerii & Ors, 72 LA. 241 and Sanieevi Naidu etc. etc. v. State of
Madras & Anr. [1970] 3 S.C.R. 505 referred to.
The Governor-General in Council v. The Province of Madras, [1943] FCR
C
p. 1, United Provinces v. Governor·General in Council, AIR 1939 PC 58,
Attorney~General for Victoria- at the Relation of Dale and Ors. v. The Commonwalth & Ors., 71 C.L.R. 237 and Attorney-General for Victoria (At the
relation of the Victorian Chamber of Manufacturers) v. The Commonwealth
1933-1934 (2) C.L.R. 533 held inapplicable.
The Central Government's notification is valid.
[94 G)
2(a) A perusal of the tv.10 notifications sho\VS that while the State notification is meant to set up the commission which has to enquire whether the veil
worn by certain transactions is correct in fo1m and covers it fully, the Central
Government notification j5 clearly meant to enable the Commission appointed
·by it to tear down the veil of appareilt legality and regularity which may be
worn by some transactions. It cannot be said that the two notifications would
be covering "the same matter" as contemplated by proviso (b) to s. 3(1) of
the Act. If the State notification is meant only to superficially scratch the
-surface of the allegations made whereas the Central Government notification
is meant to probe into the crux or the heart of what may or may not have
gone wrong with the body politic in the State, this Court could not be too
technical or astute in finding reasons to hold that the subject-matter of the two
inquiries is substantially the same.
[36 G-H]
(b) Since the two notifications authorise inquiries into matters \Vhich are
substantially different in nature and object, the inquiry of the Central Commission cannot be said to be barred by reason of the State Government notification under proviso (b) to s. 3 (!) of the Act even if, in order to deal with
a substantially different subject-matter, central areas of fact or rules governing
the transactions may be
common.
If the
objectives
are different
the
examination of common areas of fact and Jaw for different purposes will be
permissible.
[39 Bl
3(a) The obvious intention behind the 1952 Act is to enable the machinery
· of democratic Government to function more efficiently and effectively.
It
could hardly be construed as an Act n1eant to 1hv;'art democratic methods of
Government.
[44 El
(b) In· all democratic countries when allegations and rumours circulate causing
crisis of confidence in the integrity of public life or about other matters of
public importance, it is essential that public confidence should be restored and
this can be done only by thoroughly investigating and probing the rumours and
allegations.
Such an inquiry might reveal either that the evil exists or that·
·there is no force in the rumours. In either case- confidence is restored. [40 H]
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(c) In England; the Tribunal of Inquiry (Evidence) Act 1921 was passed
·to displace the procedure of Select Parliamentary Committees which tilt then
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w~r~ use? "tp investigat~ .aJleged ytrong doing in high places". Such a method
·of 111vc~t1gullon by a political Tnbun::i1 \vas found to be wholly unsatisfa1ctory
fuecause such hod1es could never be free from party political influences. When
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reports of these committees came to be debated in the House of Commons.
the House was divided on party-lines and by a majority exonerated the minis~
ters from all blame. Therefore, investigation by a political tribunal on matters
causing grave public disquiet had been discredited and the 1921 Act was passed
for setting up some permanent investigating machinery.
Even in the United
States, where the system of Congressional Committees is still in vogue, ad hoc
tribunals (such as the Warren Commission) are appointed to avoid a matter
being referred to Congressional Committees.
This clearly, shows that. in
democratic countries, not only does modem practice but statute can provide
for inquiries of the kind which are to be conducted under the 1952 Act. The
proceedings of the Commission can only result in a report which is to be laid
before the Legislature concerned under s. 3.i( 4) of the Act. The Act contains
no provision for giving effect to the1 findings of the Commission or for enforcing
any order which can be made by the C0mmission.
t41 C-H; 44 EJ
4. The question whether a State Government or its Chief !\-1inister is or is not
carrying out the trust which the constitutional po\ver places in the hands of a
State Government and its head for the purposes of determining whether any
exercise of extraordinary powers under Art. 356 is called for or not. is a matter
which lay within the powers of the Central Government. What is contemplated by Art. 356 when it speaks of the "satisfaction" of the President fron1
a report of the Governor "or otherwise" whether a particular situation
has
arisen in which the Government of the State can be carried on in accordance
with the provisions of the Constitution is a matter which would be of public
importance. If the President deems it necessary to give the State Government
or i~ Chief Minister an opportunity of being beard before an impartial Commission of Inquiry constit'uted under the Act, it could not be said that such a
mode of exercise of power under Art. 356 is not fully covered by what i3
necessarily implied in the provisions of the Constitution, that is. the power to
on.l~~r an inquiry for the. purposes of the satisfaction jCquired by Art.
356.
[48 F-Hl
5(a) Provisions of either Art. 75(2) or Art. 164(2) cannot operate as bars
against the institution of inquiries by Commissions set up under the Act. To
infer such bars would be to misunderstand the object as well as the mode and
s):lhere of operation of these articles as also the purposes, scope, and function -
of Commissions to be set up under the Act.
[53 HJ
(b) The Council of Ministers, though theoretically <1ppointcd by the
Gvvernor. is curlectively responsible to the Legblntivc Assembly of the State.
But ihis col!ecti>.·e responsibility doe'i ~ot abrid,!!c or truncate the power of the
Central Government to appoint a Commission under s. J of tho Act. Coltectivc
responsibility has a scope and mode of operation which are very different from
those of an inquiry under s. 3 of the Act even thou,gh the same or similar
matters may some times give rise to both.
Matters investigated under s. 3 of
the Act may have no bearing on any collective responsibility.
The sphere of
inquiry under s. 3 is very different from that in which collective resoonsibility
functions.
While the obiect of collective responsibility is to make the whole
body of Ministers collectively or vicariously responsible for acts of others even
if an individual minister may not personally be responsible. the inquiry under
s. 3 has been ordered by the Central Government to determine who is actuallv
responsible for certain actions and what \vi11 be the motive behind them. [50 F]
(c) Inasmuch ns the Council of Ministers is able to stay in office only so·
long as- it continues the support and confidence of a majority of the Members
of the Legislature. the whole Council of Ministers is politica11y responsible forthe decisions and policies of each of the 1-finisters and of his department. S0
far as the Ministry's nnswerability to the Legislative Assembly is concerned, the
\Vhole Ministry has to be treated as one entity.
The purpose of Art. 164(2).
\\·hich embodies this principle, is not to find out facts or to establish the actu<il
responsibility of a Chief Minister or anv other Minister or Ministers for particular decisions or governmental acts.
The principle of individual as well as
collective miilisterial /responsibility can work most efficiently only when cases
requiring proper sifting an~ evaluati~n of evidence and ~is~ussion ~f q_u~_qons
involved have ta-ken place 1n proceedings before a Con1n11ss1on appointed unaer
s. 3 of lhe Act.
[51 F-G]
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KARNATAKA V. UNION (Beg, C.J.)
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6(a) The only sanction for the enforcement of collective responsibility is
the pressure of public opinion. In England, the principle operates as a matter
of convention backed by political judgment, but for us, this principle is stated
in our Constitution itself [Arts. 75(2) and 164(2)]. Nevertheless, here also
it depends upon convention and public opinion, particularly as reflected in
Parliament or in State Legislatures, for its effectiveness.
The principle, of
coti.:.;.tive re,•.pcnsibility also exists &eparately J.1~d independently from the IP.gal
liability of a Minister holding anr office in the Union or a State Government. [52 HJ
(b) An investigation by a Commission of inquiry should facilitate or help
the formation of sound public opinion.
A Minister's_ individual actions, however, do not bring into operation the principle of collective responsibility where
his colleagues in the Government cannot reasonably be held guilty of dereliction
or breach of any duty.
[53 C-D]
Constitutional Law-Wade & Phillips 8th Edn. p. 87.
Constitutional and Administrative Law Prof. S. A. dt1 Smith, pp. 170-179
referred to.
7. A Commission of Inquiry has an orbit of action of its own within which
it can move so as not to conflict with or impede other forms of action or
modes of redress.
A Commission of Inquiry is meant to explore and discover
real facts. It is neither a substitute for action in a court of law nor can its
report or findings relieve courts of their duty.
The appointment of a Commission is generally a confession of want of sufficient evidence to take the
matter to a court combined with an attempt to satisfy the public need and
d~re to discover what had really gone wrong and how and
where,
if
po6Sible.
[53 G-H]
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8. There is no force in the contention that Ministers answerable to the Legislature are governed by a separate law which exempted them from liabilities
under the ordinary law. Articles 194 and 105' which deal with powe~. privileges and immunities of each House as well as its Members, do not apply to
legislative powers of Parliament or of the State Legislatures. The "powers"
meant to be indicated in these Articles are powers which depend upon or are
E
necessary for the conduct of business Of each House. [57 B-C]
9(a) The Constitution could not mention and exhaust every conceivable
topic of legislation and it is precisely to meet such a situation that Art. 248'
read with Entry 97 was inserted. Therefore. Art 248 read with Entry 97 of
List I will fully cover s. 3 of the Act even if Entry 94 c>f List I does not. The
term 'constitutional law' can be neither clearly nor exhciustively defined.
A.
Constitution could be expected to contain only the basic frame-work.r It is not
a part of its nature to exhaustively deal with all ma.tters. It is well accepted
F
that nJt all ccnstitutional law need - b.~ written.
Ther~ can be no clear-cut
distinction between what could or should and what could not or should not be
comprehended within the bcxly of rule~ called _constitutional law. In practice,
what is embodied even in a written constitution depends sometimes on the
peculiar notions of a people. It reflects their views about what should be consideff!d so basic or fundamental as to find a place in the constitutional document.
To expect the content of the Constitution to be so all-embracing as to deal
with every ccri.ceivable topic of legislation exhaustively so as to leave no roon1
for doubt is to expect the humanly impracticable, if not the impossible. The
. G
most that could be expected from the human foresight of Constitution-maki;rs
is that they should provide for the residual power of legislation which could
cover topics on which Parliament or State legislatures
could legis-late
even
though the legislation may not be easily assignable to any specific entry. Such
a provision our Constitution-makers did wake. [61 H; 59 G-H; 61 B-C; D-El
(b) The term 'inquires' as used in Entry 94 of List 1 and Entry 45 of List
III, without any limitations, is wide enough to _embrace every kind of inquiry,
u:
whether a criminal offence by any one is disclosed or not by facts
alleged.
"'
Entry 45 in List Ill must include
inquires to- cover allegations
against all
persons which bring them within the sphere of Entry I of List III relatin~ to
criminal law.
Alt that "inquires" covered by Entry 45 require is that they
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must be .. for the purpose -of any of the mati:ers specified in List II or· List lll".
The language used " ...... any of the matters specified.• .. " is broad enough
to cover anything reasonably related to any of the enumerated items even if
done by holders of ministerial offices in the States. Other subjects will be
foun<;t in List II. Even assuming that neither Entry 94 -List I nor Entry 45
of list III v.:ouid cover inquires against 11inisters in the States,: relatin~ to act'\
connected \Vith the exercise of ministerial powers: Art. 248, read with Entry 97
of
List 1~- n:usl necessarily cover an inquiry against r.Hnisters on matters of
public importance, whether the allegations ·include violations of criminal law
or not. A contrary view would have the whoHy unacceptable consequence of
placing ~finisters in State Governments practically above the law. [63 C·E] .
t_ __
(c)'Since the powei-s- confefr~d by-s. 3 upon the Central and State Govern·
ments. including the PQ'o\'er to institute inquiries of the kind set up under each
of the two Notifications. are covered by the express constitutional pro••isions. no
question of any exclusion, either by necessary implication or by any principle
supposed to form a part· of or to flow
from
the ·basic
structure of the
Constitution, can arise here. Nor is it possible to so read down and interpret
s. 3 of the Act as to exclude from its purview inquiries of the. kind instituted
under the two notifications; To do so would' be to give an incentive to possible misuse and perversion of governmental machinery -and powers for objects
not \\'arranted by law. Such powers carry
constitutional
obligations
with
them. They are to be exercised like the powers ·and obligations of tlustees
who must not deviate from the purposes of their trusts. \Vhether a ~linhtcr
has or h<ls not abused his powers and privileges could be bcSt detf'rmined by
fair and honest people anyv..here only after a just and impartial inquiry hn.s
taken place into co:r;nplaints ·made against him so that jts results are before
them. {64 A-CJ
(d) There is no room for applying the rule
Exprc.~sio Ur.ius Est Excfr1jio
Alt~rius to exclude
"''hat falls within an expressly provided legislative entry.
Before the principle can be applied at rill, the Court- must find an exoress n1ode
of doing something that is provided in a statute which, by· its necessary implication, could exclude doing of that very thing and not something else in some
other way. Far from this being the case here, the constitution-makers intendt:d
to cover the making of provisions by. Parliament for inquiries for various -
object5 which 1nay be matters of public importance V.'ithout any indications of
any other limits except that they must relate to subjects found in the I.ist.- [64 }11
Coll1uhoun v. Brooks, [1888] Q.B.D. 52 @ 65 referred to.
(e)" The proposition that what is not specifically mentioned in the Consti·
tutlon must be deemed to be deliberately excluded from its purview so that
nothing short of a constitutional amendment could authorise legislation upon it,
is really to invent a "Ca.sus Omissus·~ so as to apply the rule that. \\"here there
is such a gap in the law, the Court cannot fill it. The rule, however. is equally
clear that the Court cannot so interpret a statute as to produce a ca.sus omissus
_where there is really none. If the Constitution itself provides for legislation to
fill what is sought to be construed as a lacuna, legislation seeking to it!.o this
cannot be held to be void because it performs its .intended function by an exercise of an expressly conferred legislative power.
l,n declaring the purpose of
the provisions· so made and the authority for making it~ Courts_ do not supply
an omission or fill up .a gap at all. It is Parliament ~hich can do so and has~
done it. [65 A-BJ
The Mer;~y Docks and HarbOur Board v. V. Hfnderson Brothers, [1888]
13 A.C. 595 @ 602 T'ferred to.
·
lO(a) "fhe \\'ritten Co~titution by its very nature as the embodiment ·of
the fundamental law of the land makes it imperative for Courts to determine
th;.; meanings of_ its parts. in _keeping, with its broad. and h~si.; ~ur~,·s :tnd
objectives.
It nlust be ·read: as a v..·holei and construed in keeping w1th _1ts declaTed objects and __ its f~hctio~~. Although .the Courts. actiriJ?. in exerc~e ~of
judicial pov.'cr, may supplem\~nt those parts where-the'Jetter of.the Constttut10:1
is silent or may leave room-: fo~ it'i development by either ordinary legislation _
r
r
...
KARNATAKA l'. UNION (Beg, C.J.)
7
'or judicial intcrprcta'tion, they cannot nullify, defeat, or d~t~rt the reasonably
clear meaning of any part of the Constitu~ion in order to give expression to
some theories of their own about the broad or basic scheme of the Constitution.
This must be done with reference to the express provisions of the Consti:tution.
The dubiousness of expressions used may be cured by Courts by making their
n1canings clear and definite,'. if necessary, in the Hght of the broad and basic
purposes set before themsel.ves by th-: Constitution-makers. The power of
judicial interpretation cannot· extend to Jaying down what is in direct conflict
with, express provisions of the. Constitution.
Nor can express provisions be
curtailed by importing limits based on a_ mere theory of limitations on legis·
lative powers:~ [66 C-GJ
·
(b) In the matter of interpretation of the Constitution~ in a Jong line of
decisions, this Court has held that where two constructions are possible, the
Court should- adopt that __ which will implement and discard that which .will
stultify the apparent intention~ of the Constitution-makers,
that the
Court
should adopt a construction which harmonizes rather than one which produces
a conflict between its provisions, the construction which will ensure smooth
and harmonious working of the Constitution and eschew the other which will
lead to absurdity or give rise to practical inconvenience or make well-established
provisions of existing law nugatory, that the plenitude of power to legislate,
indicated by a legislative entry, has to be given as wide and liberal an interpretatiOn as is reasonably possible.
If a subject does not fall within a
specificaily demarcated field found in List Il or List III, it would fall in List I,
apparently because of the amplitude of the residuary field indicated by Entry
97~ List I.
Legislative entries only denote fields of operation of legislative
power which is actually conferred -by one of the articles of the Constitution.
This Court has also rejected argument -that the wide range given to Entry 97
of List I, read with ArL 248 of the Constitution, would destroy the federal
structure of Our Republic.
On an application of_ a similar test. the powers.
given to the Central Government by s. 3 of the Act, cOuld not be held to be
invalid on the ground that the federal structure of the State is jeopardized_. [68 C;
E: 69 C; 70 B & DJ
·
·
-
-
A. K. Gopalan v. State of Madras
[1950] SCR
88
&
119 to
120.
State of Bi/lar v. Kame'shwar Singh. (1952] SCR 889 & 980.81, I. C. Go/aknath v. State of Puniab [1967] 2 SCR 762 @ 791, K. K. Kochuni "· State of
Madras & Kera/a, [1960] 3 SCR 887 & 905, Mohd. Hanif v. State of Ei/1ar,
[1959] SCR 629 @ 648, State of M.P. v. Ranojirao Shinde. [1963]
3 SCR
489, Prem--Chand Garg v. Excise Commissioner, U.P. [1963] Suppl. 1 SCR
885 @ 911 Deradasan v. Union of India, [1964] 4 SCR 680 @ 695, Kes-;ananda
BT.arati v. State of Kerala, [1973] 4 SCC 225 @ 426, (=1973 Suppl. SCR !),
Sakal Papers (P) Ltd: v. Union of lndia, [1962] 3 SCR 842, lagannat/i B~klh
Singh v. State of U.P., [1963] 1 SCR 2,0 @ 228-229 and Union of lndie1 v.
R. S. Dhillon, [1972] 2 SCR 33 referred to.
~
( c) Whenever the doctrine of basic structure -- bas been expounded or
applied it is only as a doctrine of interpretation of the Constitution as it actualJy exists and not of a Constitution which could exist only subjectively in the
minds of different individuals as mere theories about what the Constitution is.
The doctrine did not add to the contents of the Constitution. It did not, in
theory, deduct anything from what was there. lt only purported to bring out
~
exrlain the meaning of what was already there. It \\'as~ ·in fact, used .by
all • the Judges for this purpose with differing results simply because . their
assessments or inferences
as to what was part of the basic structure in the
Coru.titution differed. This is the correct interpretation of the doctrine of the
basic structure of the Constitution. It should only_ be applied if it is clear,
beyond the region of doubt, that what is put forward as a restriction upon
otherwise clear and plenary legislative power is -there as a Constitutional
imperative. [ 86 G-HJ
·
(d) If thfa is the correct view about the basic structure, as a mode of interprctin6 the Constitution only, the so called federalism as a fetter on legislative
poV.'er must fin~ ~xpression in some expi:ess
provision to be recognised
by
Court~. A .ma1onty of Judges who decided the Keshvanand Bharati's case
have not treated "federalism" as part of the basic structure of the Constitution
and none of them ba.s discussed the extent of the "federal" part of this struc~
tu:-e. It h r.ot enough to point out Art. 1 of the Constituiion to emphasise that
A
B
c
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E
F
G
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8
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1978] 2 S.C.Jt.
A
our R<!public is a "Union" of States. The word "Union" was used in
the
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
contex~ of the peculiar character of our federal Republic revealed by its express
~
provisions.
One . has to find from other express provisions what this "Union"
n1cans or what is th;! extent or nature of "federalism"
implied by it. The
Cons.titution itself does not use the word "federation" at all. It is not possible
to ~1scover any such. fetter which could, by a necessary implication,
preYent
PaTliament from enacting s. 3 of the Act.
[87 B~D]
Per Chandrachud, l.
The preliminary objection to the maintainability of the suit ought to be
rejected.
The proceeding brought by the State of Karna.taka is maintainable
under Art. 131 of the Constitution.
[100 C~
(a) The jurisdiction conferred on the Supreme Court by Art. 131 of the
Constitution should not b~ tested on the anvil of rules which are applied under
the Code of Civil Procedure for determining whether a suit is maintainable.
A constitutional provision which confers exclusive jurisdiction on this Court to
entertain disputes of a certain nature in th'! exercise of its original jurisdiction,
cannot be equated with a provision
conferring a right on a
civil court to
entertain a common suit so as to apply to an original proceeding under Art. 131
the canons of a suit which is ordinarily triable under s. 15 of the C.P.C. by
a court of the lowest grade competent to try it.
The Constitution docs not
describe a proceeding under Art. 131 as a suit but uses words nnd phrases
commonly
employed for determining the
jurisdiction
of
a
court
of
first instance to entertain and try a suit.
It does not Speak of a cause of
action; instead it employs the word "dispute".
Above all, Art. 131 is
a
self-contained code on matters falling within its purview.
By the very terms
of the Article, the sole conditiOn required to be satisfied for invoking the
original jurisdiction of this Court is that the dispute l1ctween the parties, referred
to in clauses (a) to (c) must involve a question on which the existence
or ex1ent of a legal right depends.
[97 E-H]
(b) The quintessence of Art. 131 is that there has to be a dispute between
the parties regarding a question on which the existence or extent of a legal
right depends.
A challenge by the State Government to the authority of the
Central Government to appoint a Commission of Inquiry clearly involves a
question on which the existence or extent of the legal right of the Central
Government to appoint the Commission of Inquiry depends and that is enough
to sustain the proceeding brought by the State under Art. 131 of the Constitution. Tlie Constitution has purposefully conferred on this Court a jurisdiction \vhich is untrammelled by considerations which fetter the jurisdiction
of a court of first instance which entertains and tries suits of a civil nature.
The very nature of the dispute arising under Art. 131 is different both in form
and substance from the nature of claims which require adjudication in ordinary suits. [98 B-DJ
(c) Part XI of the Constitution is devoted specially to the delineation of
1elations between the Union and the States. The object of Art. 131 is to
provide a high powered machinery for ensuring that the Central Government
and the State Governments act within the respective spheres of their authority
and do not trespass upon each other's
constitutional
functions or powers.
Therefore a challenge to the constitutional capacity of the defendant to act
in an int~nded n1anner is enough to attract the application of Art. 131 particularly when the plaintiff claims that right exclusively for itself. [98 F-GJ
(d) A proc~edi.ng under ,Art. 13,1.stan~s ii! s~arp contra~t with an ordinary
civil suit.
While in an ordinary c1v1l suit re1ectton of a nght asserted by the
defendant cannot correspondingly and of its own force establish the
right
claimed by the. plaintiff, proceedings under Art. 131 are adjudicatory of the
limits of constitutional power vested in the Central or the State Governments.
Jn a civil suit the plaintiff has to succeed on the strength of his own title; the
competition in a proc_eeding und~r Art~ '131 ,is. bet~een t'"'.o or D!Ore G~vern
ments. There is no third ~ltema~1vc a~ 1n :i. civil Sl}tt wherein the nght cla1iped
by the plaintiff may
reside neither 1n htm nor tn the
defendant
but 1n a
stranger. A demarcation and definili0n of constitutional power
between the
\
-,..
•
'
I
KARNATAKA v. UNION (Beg, C.J.)
9
rival claimants and restricted to t!zeni and tfiem alone is \Vhat a proceeding
A
under Art. 13 J necessarily involves.
[98 H & 99 A-C]
(e) There is no force in the defendant's contention that if a State Govern·
inent challenges the constitutional rights! .of the Central Government to t~k~
a particular course of action, Art. 131 will not be attracted.
The contention
-0f the State Government is not only that the Central Government has no power
to appoint the Inquiry Commission for enquiring into the conduct of State
Ministers but that such right is exclusively vested in the State Government.
B
There is, therefore, not only a denial of. the right. claimed. by t!'e Central
Government but an assertion
that the nght exclusively resides 1n the State
Government. [99 D-E]
State of Rajasthan v. Union of India A.I.R. 1977 S.C.J. 361 referred to,
(f) A writ under Art. 226 is hardly a substitute for a proceeding under
Art. 131. A dispute between one or more States or bet\veen the Government
Qf India and a State on the one hand and another State or other States on
C
the other, cannot properly be decided by a High Court under Art. 226. Moreover disputes of the nature described in Art. 131 being usually of an urgent
natu~e should be decided by this Court to obviate dilatoriness of a possible
appeal.
Tue original proceeding is decided once and
for all by this Court.
[100 A-BJ
2. The notification issued by the Central Government is within the scope of
s. 3 (!) of the Act. The objection of the State Government that it offends
against cl. (b) of th' proviso to s. 3(1) of the Act is factually unfounded
D
and theoretically unsound. [114 F; 10 I HJ
(a) It is wrong to contend that the Central Government has appointed the
Comn1ission of Inquiry for the purpose of inquiring into the same matter into
which the Commission of Inquiry appointed by the
State Government
is
directed to inquire. [IOI El
(b) Considering the terms of the notifications issued by the State Government and the Central Government and the matters into which the respective
E
Commissions are directed to inquire, it is obvious that the obiect and purpose
of the two inqciries is basically different
The primary object of the Stare
Government in appointing the commission is to ascertain whether imorooer or
excessive payments were made, undue favours were shown, irregularities or
fraud had occurred in the conduct of official business etc; and secondly to
find out as to who are "the· persons responsible for the lanses, if any, regarding the aforesaid and to what extent".
On the other hand, the Commission
appointed bv the Central Government is specifically directed to inquire 11whether
lhe Chief Minister practised favouritism and nepctism" in regard to various
F
matters mentioned in the notification.
[IOO G; IOI D-E]
( c) Moreover, it is hardly ever possible that the State Government will
appoint a Commission to inquire into actci of corruption, favouritism and
nepotism on the part of its Chief Minister. [IOI G]
3(a) On a plain reading of s. 3(1) of the Act, it is impossible to hold that
the section cannot be construed as authorising the Central Government to
appoint a Commission of lnquirv for the purpose of inquiring into the conduct
of a sitting Minister of a State Government. [l 02 BJ
(b) Section 3 ( 1) cannot be S?iven a restricted meaning. There is no justificaHon for readin_g down the provisions of the section to limit the. power of the
Central Government to appointing a Commission of Inquiry for inquiring into
the con.duct of persons in relation to matters concerning the affairs of the
Union Government only. The section empowers the Central Government to
appoint a Commission: for making an inquiry into any definite matter of public
importance.
It is inarguable that the conduct of Ministers of State Governments in the purported discharge of their official functions is not a definite
ma1ter of public importance .. Further, it
cannot bo said that the
Central
Go\'trnment does not even possess the power to
collect facts in regard
to
G
H
10
SUP.REME COURT REPORTS
(1978] 2 S.C.R.
A
allegations of corruption made by a section of the State Legislature
against
sitting l\linisters of the Sta.te Governn1ent.
[102 E~F]
B
c
D
E
F
G
II
(c) The argument thats. 3(1) will offend against the principle of collective
responsibility unless it is construed narrowly is without substance.