# STATE OF KERALA & ANR v. N. M. THOMAS & ORS

- **Citation:** [1976] 1 S.C.R. 906
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1975-09-19
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 1160 of 1974
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/state-of-kerala-anr-v-n-m-thomas-ors-6689
- **Pages:** 102

## Headnote

906
STATE OF KERALA & ANR,
A
v.
N. M. THOMAS & ORS.
September 19, 1975
IA. N. RAY, C.J., H. R. KHANNAJ,
K. K. MATHEW,
M. H. BEG,
v. R. KRISHNA !YER, A C. GUPTA AND s. MuRTAZA FAZAL Au, JJ.]
B
Kera/a State Subordinate Service Rules.
1958. r.
13AA-Constitulionnl
i·afidity of.
Constitution of India, 1950-Arts 16, 46 and 33S.--Scope of.
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes-if a caste-Exen1ptio11 granted frorn
passing special departtnenta/ tests-if violative of Art, 16.
Rule 13(a) of the Kerala State Subordinate Services Rules. 1958, provides
tha-t no person shall be eligible for appointment to any service or any post unless
he possessed such special qualifications and has passed such special tests as may
be prescribed in that behalf in the Special Rules.
For promotion of a lower division clerk -to the next higher post of upper
division clerk, the Government made it obligatory for an employee to pass
the special departmcnta·l tests.
Rule 13A which was introduced sometime later,
gave temporary exemption from passing the departmen~al tests for a period of
two years.
·rhe rule also provided that an einployee who did not pass the
unified departmenl'al tests within the period of two years from the
date
of
introduction of the test would be reverted to thic lower post and further said
tha,t he •3hall not again be eligible for appointment under this rule.
Provi&o 2
to this rule. gave ten1porary exen1ption of two years in the case of Scheduled
Caste~ and Scheduled Tribes candidates.
A Harijan Welfare Association represented to the State Government that a large number of Harijan employees in
the State service ~re, facing immediate reversion as a result of this rule and
reque~ted the Government to grant exemption in respect of Scheduled Caste~
and Scheduled 'Tribes employees from passing the obligatory departmental tes'.5
for a period of two years with immedia'·e effect.
Accordingly,
the
St1~e
Government introduced rule 13AA giving further exemption of two year:> to
members belonging to Scheduled Tribes and Scheduled Castes in the service from
pa<;sing the te'its referred to in r. 13 or r. 13A.
c
D
E
Respondent no, 1 passed the special tests in November, 1971.
The other
F
respondents belonging to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes viere pron1oted
as Upper Division Clerks even though they had not passed the prescribed tests.
Respondent no. 1 who was not promoted in spite of the fact
that, he
had
passed the requisite tests moved the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitu~
tion seekin~ a declaration that r. 13AA under
which
exemption
had
hecn
granted to the other respondents in the matter of promotion wa<> violative of
Art. 16 of the Constitution. The High Court struck down the imugned rule
a~ violative of Art. 16( I) and (2) and A·rt. 335 of the Constitution.
G
Allowing the State's appeal to this Court,
[Per n1ajority, Ray C.J., Mathew, Beg. Krishna Iyer, S. M. Fazal Ali. JJ.;
Khanna and Gupta. JJ. dissenting]
HELD ; (Per Ray_ C.J.) ~fhe dassification of employees belonging
to
Scheduled Castes and ScheduJed Tribe3 for allowing them an extended period
11
of two years for passing the special tests for promotion is a just and reasonable
classification having rational nexus to the object of providing equal opportunity
for all citizens in matters relating to employment or appointment to
public
-Offices.
[9JOH]
"
A
B
t
c
D
E
F
• -t
G
H
KERALA v. N. M. THOMAS
907
(1) Articles 14, 15 and 16 form part of a string of constitutionally guaranteed:
rights.
These rights supplement each other. Article 16 is an
incident
of
guarantee of equality contained in Art. 14. Both Articles 14 and 16( l) permit
reasonable classificll!tion having a nexus to the objects to be achieved.
Under
Art. 16 there .can be a rea5onable classification of the employees in 1natters
relating to employment or ap.pointn1ent.
[926 F1
State of Gujarat and Anr. etc. v. Shri Anibica Afil!s Ltd. Ahn1edabad etc.
A.l.R. 1974 S.C. 1300, referred to.
(2) Equa·lity is violated if it rests on

## Text

_Characters 0–39,833 of 327,819. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39833 for what follows._

906
STATE OF KERALA & ANR,
A
v.
N. M. THOMAS & ORS.
September 19, 1975
IA. N. RAY, C.J., H. R. KHANNAJ,
K. K. MATHEW,
M. H. BEG,
v. R. KRISHNA !YER, A C. GUPTA AND s. MuRTAZA FAZAL Au, JJ.]
B
Kera/a State Subordinate Service Rules.
1958. r.
13AA-Constitulionnl
i·afidity of.
Constitution of India, 1950-Arts 16, 46 and 33S.--Scope of.
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes-if a caste-Exen1ptio11 granted frorn
passing special departtnenta/ tests-if violative of Art, 16.
Rule 13(a) of the Kerala State Subordinate Services Rules. 1958, provides
tha-t no person shall be eligible for appointment to any service or any post unless
he possessed such special qualifications and has passed such special tests as may
be prescribed in that behalf in the Special Rules.
For promotion of a lower division clerk -to the next higher post of upper
division clerk, the Government made it obligatory for an employee to pass
the special departmcnta·l tests.
Rule 13A which was introduced sometime later,
gave temporary exemption from passing the departmen~al tests for a period of
two years.
·rhe rule also provided that an einployee who did not pass the
unified departmenl'al tests within the period of two years from the
date
of
introduction of the test would be reverted to thic lower post and further said
tha,t he •3hall not again be eligible for appointment under this rule.
Provi&o 2
to this rule. gave ten1porary exen1ption of two years in the case of Scheduled
Caste~ and Scheduled Tribes candidates.
A Harijan Welfare Association represented to the State Government that a large number of Harijan employees in
the State service ~re, facing immediate reversion as a result of this rule and
reque~ted the Government to grant exemption in respect of Scheduled Caste~
and Scheduled 'Tribes employees from passing the obligatory departmental tes'.5
for a period of two years with immedia'·e effect.
Accordingly,
the
St1~e
Government introduced rule 13AA giving further exemption of two year:> to
members belonging to Scheduled Tribes and Scheduled Castes in the service from
pa<;sing the te'its referred to in r. 13 or r. 13A.
c
D
E
Respondent no, 1 passed the special tests in November, 1971.
The other
F
respondents belonging to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes viere pron1oted
as Upper Division Clerks even though they had not passed the prescribed tests.
Respondent no. 1 who was not promoted in spite of the fact
that, he
had
passed the requisite tests moved the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitu~
tion seekin~ a declaration that r. 13AA under
which
exemption
had
hecn
granted to the other respondents in the matter of promotion wa<> violative of
Art. 16 of the Constitution. The High Court struck down the imugned rule
a~ violative of Art. 16( I) and (2) and A·rt. 335 of the Constitution.
G
Allowing the State's appeal to this Court,
[Per n1ajority, Ray C.J., Mathew, Beg. Krishna Iyer, S. M. Fazal Ali. JJ.;
Khanna and Gupta. JJ. dissenting]
HELD ; (Per Ray_ C.J.) ~fhe dassification of employees belonging
to
Scheduled Castes and ScheduJed Tribe3 for allowing them an extended period
11
of two years for passing the special tests for promotion is a just and reasonable
classification having rational nexus to the object of providing equal opportunity
for all citizens in matters relating to employment or appointment to
public
-Offices.
[9JOH]
"
A
B
t
c
D
E
F
• -t
G
H
KERALA v. N. M. THOMAS
907
(1) Articles 14, 15 and 16 form part of a string of constitutionally guaranteed:
rights.
These rights supplement each other. Article 16 is an
incident
of
guarantee of equality contained in Art. 14. Both Articles 14 and 16( l) permit
reasonable classificll!tion having a nexus to the objects to be achieved.
Under
Art. 16 there .can be a rea5onable classification of the employees in 1natters
relating to employment or ap.pointn1ent.
[926 F1
State of Gujarat and Anr. etc. v. Shri Anibica Afil!s Ltd. Ahn1edabad etc.
A.l.R. 1974 S.C. 1300, referred to.
(2) Equa·lity is violated if it rests on an unreasonable basis.
The concept
of equality has an inherent limitation arising from the very nature of the constitutional guarantee. Those who are similarly circumstanced are entitled to
equal treatment. Clas·sification is to be founded on substantial differences which
distinguish persons grouped together from those left out of the groups and su.:h
differentia-1 attributes must bear a just and rational relation to the object sought
to be achieved.
[927 CJ
(3) If there is a rational classification consis 'ent with the purpose for which
such classification is made equality is not violated. The categories of classification for purposes of promotion can never be closed on the contention that they
are all members of the same cadre in service.
If classification is made on
educational qualifications for purposes. of promotion or if classification is made
on the ground that the persons are not similarly circumstanced in regard to
their entry into employment such classification can be justified.
{9127E-FJ
C. A. Rajendran v. Union of India [1968] 1 S.C.R. 721, followed.
( 4) Art. 16 ( 1) does not bar a reasonable classification of employees or
reasonable tests for ·~heir sele:tion. There is no denial of equality of opportunity
unles·s the person who complains of discrimination is equally situated with the
person or persons who are alleged to have been favoured.
[928 B]
State of Myso~e v. v. P. Narasinga Rao [1968] 1 S.C.R. 407, referred ta.
(5) Under Art. 16(1) equality of opportunity of employment means eqtia.
lity as be~ween members of the same class of employees and not equality beh~reen
members of 'Separate, independent class. The present case does not
create
separate avenues of promotion for these persons.
[928 F]
All India Station Masters and Assistant Station Masters' Association v.
General lt1anager, Central Railways [1960'] 2 S.C.R. 311, referred to.
(6) The Legislature understands and appreciates the needs of its own people.
that it·s laws are directed to problems made manifest by experience and thai
its discriminations are based upon adequate grounds.
The rule of classification
is not a na 'ural and logical •corollary of the rule of equality, but the rule of
differentiation is inherent in the concept of equality. Equality means parity of
treatment under parity of conditions.
Equality
does
not
connote
absolute
equality.
A classification, in order to be constitutional, must rest upon distinc~
tions that are substantial and not merely illusory. The test is whether it has
a reasonable basis free from artificiality and arbitrariness embracing all and
omitting none naturally falling into that category. [929 D]
Govind Dattatray Kelkar v. Chief Controller of lmports, [19671 2 S.C.R. 29;
Ganga Ra1n v. Union of lndia [1970] 1 S.C.C. 377 and Roshan Lal Tandon v.
Union of India [1968] 1 S.C.R. 185, referred to.
(7) The relevant touchstone of validity is to find out whether the nlle of
preference secures adequate representation for
the
unrepresented
backward
community or goes beyond it. [930 GJ
( 8) The historical background of the rules justifies the classification of the
personnel of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes for the purpose of
granting them exemption from special tests with a view to ensuring them the
908
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1976] 1 s.c.R.
equality of treatment and equal opportunity in matters of employment having
segard to their backwardness and under-representation in the employment of
. the State.
(931 CJ
(9) (a) The Constitution n1akes a· classification of Scheduled Castes and
Scheduled Tribes in numerous provisions- namely Arts. 46, 335, 338 and 341
:and gives a mandate tcr the State to accord_ special or favoured treatment to
them.
[931 DJ
(b) The impugned rule and the orders are related to this cons~itutional
mandate. Without providing for relaxation of special tests for a temporary
period it would not have been possible to ·give adequate promotion to the
-Lower Division Clerks belonging to the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes
to the posts 'of Upper Division Clerks. The temporary relaxation of test qualifk:ation made in favour of ·the Scheduled Ca·stes and Scheduled Tribes is
warranted by their inaidequate representation in the services and their overall
backwardness.
The classification of the members of the Scheduled Castes and
Scheduled Tribes made under r. 13AA is within the .Purview of constilu1iona1
·mandate under A1i. 335 in COil'sideration of their claims to redress imbalance
in puhlic service and to bring about parity in the communities in the public
·services. [93 lH; 932A-B]
(10) Scheduled :caistes and Scheduled Tribes are not a caste \Vithin the
<lrdinary meaning of castes.
[932 E]
Bhaiyalal v. Harikishan Singh and Ors. [1965] 2 S.C.R. 877, referred to.
( 11) (a) Our Constitution aims at equality of '3tatus and opportunity for all
citizens Including those who are socially, economi:::ally and educationally backward.
The claims of members of backward classes require adequa:te representation ill
legislative and executive bodies.
If members of Scheduled Castes and Schedi:tlei
Tribes who are said by this Court to be backward classes, can maintain minimum
necessary requirement of admini·strative efficiency, not only representation bot
also preference may be given to them to enforce equ~lity and to eliminate
inequality. [932G-HJ
(b) Equality of opportunity for unequals can only
mean aggravation of
inequality.
Equality of opportunity admits discrimination with reason and
prohibits discrimination without reason.
Preferential
represen~a-tion for the
backward classes in services with due regard to adminis·trative efficiencv is a
permissible object and backward classes are a rational classifica-tion recOgni-.;ed
by the Constitution.
Therefor~, differential treatment in standards of selection
is within the concept of equality.
[933B·CJ
(c) The rule in the present case does not impair the test of efficiency in
·administration inasmu:h ais members of Scheduled Castes and Tribes who are
promoted have to acquire the qualification of passing the test.
The only
Telaxation which is done in their case is that they are granted two years more
time than others to acquire the qualification. [933 DJ
A
B
c
D
F
(12) (a) Equal protection of 1aw,; necessarily involves classification. '1'he
validity of the classification must be adjuBted with reference to the purpose of
the law.
[933 GJ
G
(b) 'l}ie ~lassification in the present case is justified because the purpose of
class1ficatton ts to enable members of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Trih~s to
find representation by promotion to a limited extentFrom tbe point 0f view
of time a differential treatment is given to members of Scheduled Cast~ and
Tribes for the purpose of giving them equality consistent with efficiency. [933 H]
(13) The High COurt was wrong in basing its conclusion that the result
of application of the_ impeached rule and th-=: orders is excessive and exorbitant.
The Dromotions mad~ in services as a whole are nowhere near 50% of the
total number of posts, It is correct that r. 13AA and the orders are meant
to implement not only the direction under Art. 335 but also the directive
prn!Ciple under Art. 46. [932C-D]
H
....
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A
B
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KERALA V. N. M. THOMAS
909
Per Mathew, J.
( 1) The concept of equality of opportunity is an aspect of the more comprehensive notion of equality. The idea of equality has different shades of meaning and connotations. It has many facets and implications.
(948 Al
(2) The notion of equa:lity of opportunity has meaning only when a limited
good or a limited number of posts as in the present case should be anocated
on grounds whic_h do not a priori exclude any section of citizens of those that
desire it.
A priori exc1usion means exclusion on grounds other than
those
appropriate or rational for the good in question. The notion requires not merely
that there should be no exclusion from access on grounds other than those
appropria!e or rational for the good in question but the grounds considered
appropriate for the good should themselves ~be such that people from aH sections
of society have an equal chance of satisfying theni.
[950A-B1
(3) To give equality of opportunity for employmen'. to the
rnen1ber~ of
Scheduled c·astes and Scheduled Tribes, it is necessary to take note of their
so:ial, educational
~nd economic environment.
Not only is the Directive
Principle embodied in Art. 46 binding on the law.maker as ordinarily under!tood
but it. should eQuallv inform and illuminate the approach of the Cotn1 when
it makes a decision as the Court also is 'State' within the meaning of Art. 12
and makes law even though interstitla1Iy.
[951 El
llis Holiness Kesavananda Bharati Sripadaga[ayaru v. State of Keralfl and
Another, etc. [1973] Supp. S.C.R. 1, referred to.
(4) Equality of opportunity is not simply a matter of lega-1 equalitr.
lt'S
existence depends not merely on the absence of disabilities but on the pretience
of abilities. {951 Fl
(5) The guaran''ee of equality before the Jaw or the equal opportunity in
matters of employment is a guarantee of something more than what is required
by formal e.quality.
It implies differentia-1 treatment of persons ·whq a:re unequal.
Egalitarian principle has, therefore, enhanced the growing
belief
that
Government has an affirmative duty to eliminate inequalities and to provide
opportunities for the exercise of human rights and claims. [951 H]
(6) Fundamental Rights as enacted in Part III of the Constitution are, by
and large, essentially negative in character. They mark off a world in which
the Government should have no jurisdiction. In this realm, it \Vas: assumed
that a citizen has no daim upon Government except to be let alone. {952 A]
F
(7){a) But. the language of Art. 16(1) is in marked contrast with thal of
G
H
Art. 14. Whereas the accent in Art. 14 is on the inju.nction that the State
shall not deny to any person equality before the Jaw or the equal protection
of the laws, that is, on the negative character of the duty of the State, the
emphasis in Art. 16(1) is on the mandatory aspect. [952 BJ
_ (h) If equality of opportunity guaranteed under Art. i6(1) means effective
materi"1 equality, then Art. 16(4) is not an exception to Art. 16(1). It is
only an emphatic way of putting the extent in which equality of opportunity
could be carrie<l namely. even upto the point of making reservation. (956 C]
(c) Art. 16(1) is only a pa:rt of a comprehensive scheme to ensure equality
in all spheres. It is an instance of the at_JPlication of the larger concept of
equali'y u.nder the law embodied in Arts. 14 and 15.
Article 16(1) pern1its
of classifi:ation just as Art. 14 does.
But, by the classification, there can be no
discrimination on the ground only of race, caste and other factors mentioned in
Art. 16(2). [951 FJ
S. C. Jaisinghani v. Union of India & Ors. [1967] 2 S.C.R. 7()3, at 712:
State of Mysore & Anr. v. P. Narasing Rao [1968] 1 S.C.R. 407 at 410 &
C, A. Raiendran v. Union of India & Ors. [1968] 1 S.C.R. 721, at 729 referred
t<i.
910
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1976] 1 S.C.R.
(d) The word 'caste' in Art. 16(2) does not include Scheduled Castes. The
definition of 'Scheduled 'Castes' in Art. 366(24) shows th&t it is by virtue of
the notifica ion of the President that the Scheduled Castes come into being.
Though the n1embers of the Scheduled Castes are drawn from castes, races or
tribes, they attain a new status by virtue of the Presidential notificatiOn.
Moreover, though the members of tribe might be included in Scheduled Castes,
tribe as such is not mentioned in Article 16{2). [957 A]
(e) Article 16 ( 1) and Art. 16(2) do not prohibit the pre.scription of a
rea-sonable qualification for appointment or for promotion.
Any· provision as
to qualification for employru-cnt or appointment to an office reasonably fixed and
applicable to all would be consistent with the cto;;trine of equality of opportunity
umkr Art. 16(1). [957 El
The General Manager, Souther11 Railway v. Rangachari [1962] 3 .S.C.R. 586
referred :o.
(8) Today, the sense that Government has affirmative responsibility for
elimination of inequalities, 5'.0cial, economic or otherwise, is one of the dominant
forces in constitutional law.
[952 E]
(9) The concept of equality of opportunity in matters of employment is
wide enough to include within it compensatory measures to put the members
of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes on par \Vith the members of other
;;ommunities which would enable then1 ,'o get their share of repr(;.'sentation in
public service.
[954 E]
(IO) If reservation is necessary ei her at the initial stage or at the ~tage
of promotion or at both to ensure for the members of the Scheduled Cas:es
a·nd Scheduled Tribes equality of opportunity in the matter of employment.
the1·e is no reason why that is not permissible under Art. 16(1) as that alone
might pnt them on a parity with the forward communities in the matter of
achieving the result which equality of opportunity would produce. Equality
of result is the test of equality of opportunity.
[954 G-H]
( 11) The State can adopt any measure which would ensure the adequate
representation in public_ service of the men1bers of the Scheduled Castes and
Scheduled Tribes and justify it as a compensatory measure to ensure t~quality
of opportunity provided the 1 measure does not dispense with the acquisition
of the minimum basic qualification necessary for the efficiency of administration.
[956 D]
(12) It is a mistake to assume a priori that there can be
no classification
within a class, say, the Lower Division Clerks. If there are intelligible differentia
which separate a group within tihat class from the rest and that differentia have
nexus with the object of classification, there is no objection to a further classification within the class.
[957 CJ
All lndia Station Masters and Assistant Station Afasters Association v. General
Afanager, Central Railway and Others [1960] 2 S.C.R. 311, S. C. Jaisinf!hani v.
[/riion of India and Others [1967] 2 S.C.R. 703 at 712 & State of lammu & Kashndr v. Triloki Nath Khosa & Others [19741 1 S.C.R. 771 held in~pplicable.
(13) Jn the instant case. Rule 13AA has been enacted not with the idea of
dispensing with the minimum qualification require.d for promotion to a higher
category or class, but only to give enough breathing space to enable the mem~
bers of ?cbe~uloed Cast~s and Sche?uled Tribes to acquire it.
The purpose of
the class1fication made in r. 13AA is to enable them to have their due claim of
representation in the higher category without sacrificing the efficiency implicit
in the passing of the test.
[958 B]
(14) The classification made in r.13AA has a reasonable nexus with the
purpose of the Jaw.
Rule 13AA is not intended to give permanent exemption
to the members of ~beduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes from passing the test
but only reasonable time to enable to them to do so. That the power is liable to
be abused is no reason to hold that the rule itself is bad.
[958 E]
A
B
c
E
F
G
H
A
B
c
D
E
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G
:H
KERALA V. N. M. THOMAS
911
Per Beg J,
The only ground given by the High Court for refusing to give tho benefits
of the impugned rules and orders to the backward class Government servantss
that they fall outside the purview of Art. 16(4) was not substantiated. The
respondent has not discharged the burden establishing a constitutionally unwar-.
ranted discrimination against him. [963 H]
( 1) 'Vhen c'..tizen<i are already· employed in a particular grade as govcrnmen•
servants considerations relating to the sources from which they were drawn lose
much of their importance.
Neither as 1nembers of a single class. nor for pur ...
poses of equality of opportunity which is to be afforded to this class does the
fact that some of them are also members of economically ~and socially backward
class continue to be material or, even relevant.
Their entry into the same
relevant· class as others must be deeiled to indicate that they no longer suffer
from the handicaps of a backward class.
For purposes of Government ser""I
vice the source from which they are drawn 'ihould cease to matter.
As Government servants. they would fonn only one class for the purpose of promotion.
[960A-B} ·
(2) (a) The specified and express mode of realisation of the objects contained in Art.
16(4), must exclude the possibility ot other methods which conld
. be implied and read into Art. 16 ( 1) for securing them in this field tho applicable
maxim being ''expressio unius ~st exclusio a[teriuS'. [960 E]
(2) (b) The purpose of equality of opportunity by means of tests is only
to ensure a fair competition in securing posts and promotions in government
service, and. not the removal of causes for unequal performances in competitions
for these posts or promotions. [960 HJ
(3) Article 16(4) is designed to reconcile the conflicting pulls of Art.
16
( 1) representing the dynamics Of justice conceived of as equaEty in condition'>
under which candidates actually compete for posts in Government service and
of Arts. 46 and 355 embodying the duties of the Stat.e to ·promote the interests
of lhe economically, educationally and soc!.ally backward so as to release them
from the clutches of social injustice. These encroachments on the field of Art.
16(1) can only be permitted to the extent they are warranted by Art. 16(4). To
read broader concepts of social justice and equality "into Art. 16( I) may stultify
this provision and make A.rt. 16( 4) otiose.
[961 C-D]
(4) It would be dangerous to extend the limits of protection against the
operation of the principle of equality of opportunitv in this field beyond its
express constitutional authorisation by Art. J6(4). [959 G]
(5) But if the impugned rules and orders could be viewed as an implementation of a policy of qualified or partial or conditional reservation -which
could satisfy the requirements of substantial equality in keeping with Art. 335
and meet the demands of equality and justice looked from the point of view
of Art. 46 of tbe Constitution, they could also be justified under Art. J 6( 4)
of the Constitution. [963 B-C]
( 6) Though the respondent was not ptomoted in spite of pasoing the e:ffi. ...
ciency test earlier the backward class employees. who were given preference
over him, were discharging their dutie~ in the higher grade quite satisfactorily
and were his seniors in service. Taking and passing of a written test earlier
than another employee could not be the sole f'actor to consider in deciding
upon a claim to superiority or to preference on grounds of merit and efficiency
for promotion as a government servant. 1%2 Ar.BJ
(7) The effect of the relaxation is that a ·backward class employoo oontinues in the post temporarily for a longer period before being either confirmed
or reverred. For this period, the post remains reserved for him. If he does
not satisfy the effidency tests even within the extended period he has to revert
to the lower grade. If he does satisfy the special efficiency tests, in this eXtended period, be is confirmed in the class of promotees into which be obtained
entry because of a reservation. One of the dictionary meanings of the word
10-L1127SCI/75
912
SUPRE~!E COURT REPORTS
[ 1976] l s.c.R.
'reserve· is "to keep back or hold over to a later time or place for further
tre;itment etc.'' The result of the rule. therefore, is a kind of reservation.
[962 F-HJ
A
(8) lf reservation of posts unUer Art. 16(4) for employee~ of backward
classes could include complete resen1ation of higher posts to \vh1ch they could
tie promoted, there is no reason why it could not be partial or' for a part of
the duration of service and hedged round with the condition that a temporary
promotion would operate as a complete and confir.med promotion only if the
B
temporary promotec sati~fies some tests within a giYen time.
{963 A]
I.n the instant cases apart from the fact that it is only one of partial or
i
temporary and conditional reservation, it is disputed here that the favoure<l
class of employees constituted_ more than 50o/o of the total number of Government servants of this class (Clerks) if the overall position is taken into account.
Furthermore, a large number of temporary promotions of
backward
class
Government servants of this grade had taken place in 1972 in tl1e Department
C
because promotions of this class of employees had been held up in the past due
to want of necessary provision in the rule~. The totality of fact:-; of' this case
is distinguishable in their effects fro1n those in T. Deradt1sa11 v. Union of Indic•
[1964] 4 S.C.R. 680 and M. R. Balaji &_ OrJ. v. State of ivty.1·orC' [19631 Suppl.
l S.C.R. 439.
[963 D-F]
Per Krishna Tyer, J.
(1) The Indian Constitution is a great social document. aln1ost revolutionD
ary in its ain1 e>f transforming a medieval, hierarchical !';Ociety into a modern.
egalitarian. democracy. Its provisions can bC comprehended only by a spacious, social-science approach, not by pedantic, traditional legalism. [964 El
(2)(a) The Preamble to the (011.stitution
silhouettes.
a
'justice-oriented'
community, The Directive Principles of State Policy, enjoin on the State the
promotion with special care the educational and economic interests of
the
weaker- sections of the people. and. in particular, of the Schedukd Castes and
tbe Scheduled Tribes and protect them from social injustice. To neglect this
E
obligation is to play 1n1ant with Art. 46.
Econon1ic interests of a groupas also social justice to it-a1~ tied up with ih place in the services under
the State. [974 A-Bl
(b) The unanimous opinion of this Court in Kesfia1·a11a11da Rha1Ei's c;;ase
is that the Court must wisely read the collective Directive Principles of Part
TV into the individual fundamental rights of Part III, neither
part being
su.pcrior to the· other. In this case, the supplementary theory, treating both
F
Parts as fundamental, gained supremacy. [977 AJ
(c) The upshot is that Art. 46 has to be given en1phatic expression while
interpreting Art. 16(1) and (2). Indeed. Art. 335 is more specific and C3MOt
be brushed aside or truncated in the operational ambit vis a vis Arts. 16 (1) and
(2) without hubristic aberration.
(977 p_...G]
(3) The conclusioru; that could be drawn from the provisions of the Constitution are : ( 1) The Constitution itself demarcatCs harijans from others.
(2)
G
This is based on the stark backwardness of this bottom layer of the community.
(3) The differentiation has been made to cover specifically the area of
appointments to posts under the State.
(4) The t\vin objects. blended into
one. are clain1s of harijans to be considered in such posts and the maintenance of administrative efficiency.
(5) The State has been obligated to promote the economic interests of l1arijans and like backward classes, Arts. 46 and
,__ .
335 being a testament and Arts. 14 to 16 being the tool-kit. To blink at
this panchs11eel is to be unjust to the Constitution.
[9.75 B-CJ ·
(4) To relax on basic qualifications is to
compromise with
m1n1mum
H
administrative efficiency; to relent, for a thne, on additional test qualifications
as to take a calculated but controlled risk,. assured of a basic standard of performance: to encourage the possession of higher exce1Ience is to upgrade the
A
B
t
c
D
E
•
F
,
G
H
KERALA V. N. M. THOMAS
913
efficiency status of the public servant and eventually, of the department. This
is the sense and essence of the sit_uation arising in the present case, viewed
from the angle of administrative requirements or fair 'employment criteria.
[967 C-DJ
( 5) Efficiency means, in terms of good government, not marks in examina,...
tions only, but responsible and responsive service to -the people. [976 C]
(6)(a) A bare reading of Arts. 341 and 342 brings out the quintessential
concept that the Scheduled Castes and Tribes are no castes in the Hindu fold
but an amalgam of castes, races. groups, tribes, communities or parts thereof
found on investigation to be the lowliest and in need of massive Stare aid
and notificcl as such by the President. [977 HJ
(b) The discerning sense of the Indian Cdrpus Juris has generally regarded
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, not as a castoe but a<> a large backward
group de9erving of societal compassion.
[978- B]
(7)(a) Given two alternative understandings of the relevant sub-Arlicles
[Arts. J 6(1) and (2)] the Court .must so interpret the language as to remove
lhat ugly 'inferiority' complex which has done genetic damage to Indian polity
and thereby suppress the malady and advance the remedy, informed by sociology and social anthropology.
The touch-stone is that functional democracy
postulates participation by a1l sections of the people and fair representation in
administration is an index of such participation.
[971 E·F]
(b) Clause (4) of Art.
16 if closely exaimned, is an illustration of consti ..
tutiona1ly sanctified classification. Art 16(4) need not be a saving clause
hut put in due to the over.anxiety of the draftsman to make matters dear
beyond possibility of doubt.
[978 H]
(c)
Reservation confers pro tanto monopoly, but
classification
grants
under Art. 16( 1) ordinarily a Jes.ser order of advantage. The former is more
rigid, the latter more flexible, although they may overlap sometimes.
Art.
16(4) covers all backward classes; but to earn the benefit of grouping under
Art. 16(1) baSed on Art. 46 and 335, the twin considerations of terrible
backwardness of the type fzarijans endure and maintenance of adn1inistrative
efficiency must be satisfie(i. 1979 C-DJ
( d) The fact that better educational prescription for promotion posts have
been upheld by this Court does not rule out other reasonable clifferentia, having
a nexus with the object. The true test is. what is the object of the classification
and is it permissible? Further, is· the differentia sound· and substantial aitl
clearly related to the approved object ? [980 HJ
(e) The ~enius of Arts. 14 to 16 consists not in literal equality but in
progressive elimination of pronounced inequality. To treat sharply dissimilar
perSon~ equally is subtle injustice.
Equal
opportunity
is
a
hope, not a
menace.
[981 BJ
In tlie present case the economic advancement and ,promotion of the claims
of the grossly unde!'-represented and pathetically noglected classes. otherwise
described as Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, consistently with
the
mainte11l1nce of administrative efficiency is the object, constitutionally sanctioned
by Arts. 46 and 335, and reasonably accommodated in Art 16(1 ). The differentia so loudiy obstrusive. is the dismal ~cial milieu of harijans.
This hM
a rational relation to the object set out above.
[981 CJ
(8) It is a statistically proved ,;ocial reality in India that the depressed
etnPloyment position of /larijans is the master problem in the battle against
generations of retardation. and reservation and other solutions have made no
significant impact on their empJOym.ent in public services. Jn such an unjust
situation, to maintain mechanical equality is to prepetuate actual inequality.
Relaxation of 'tests' qualification at the floor level of clerical posts is a part of
this multiform strategy to establish broader. though
se<mingly
differential
equality. [983 F]
914
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[ 1976] 1 s.c.R.
Per Fazal Ali, J.
A
Rule l 3AA is a valid piece of statutory provision which b fully justified1
under Art. 16( 1) of the Constitution and does not fall within the purview of
Art. 16(4). (1007 f1
( l) (n) Equality of opportunity would mean a fair opportunity not only to
one ~ction or the other but to all :::.ecrions for removing the handicaps if a
particular section of the society suffers from the same. What Art. 14 or Art.
16 forbids is hostile discrimination and not reasonable classification. Jn other
B
words. the idea of classification is implicit in the concept of equality because
t:quality 1ncans equality to all and not merely ro the advanced and educated
sections of the society.
[992 H; 993 B]
·
.. (b) It follo.ws that in order to provide the equality of opportunity to all
...:1t1r.ens, every class of citizens must have a sense of equal participation in
building up an egalitarian society.
[993 C)
( c) The only manner in which the objective of equality as enshrined in
Art. 14 and 16 can be achieved is to boost up the backward classes by giving
them concessions, relaxations, facilities, removing handicaps and making
suit~
able reservations so that the weaker sections may compete with the more
advanced and in due course become equals and backwardness is banished for
ever. [993 D]
(2)(a) There is complete unanimity of judicial opinion of this Court that
tile Directive Principles and the Fundamental Rights shou1d be construed in
harmony with each other and every attempt should be made by the Court to
resolve apparent inconsistency.
[993 H]
(b) The Directive Principles contained in Part IV constitute the stairs to
climb the high edifice of a sociali9tic State and the Fundamental Rights are
the means through which one can reach the top of the edifice. (993 HJ
c
D
In Re The Kera/a Education Bill. 1957, (1959) S.C.R. 995; Mdhd. Hw1if
Quareshi & Others v. The State of Bihar. (1959] S.C.R. 629, 648; I. C. Golak
L
Nath & Others v. State of Punjab & Anr., (1967] 2 S.C.R.
762, 789-790;
Chandra Bhavan Boarding and Lodging, Bangalore v. The State of Mysore and
Anr., [19701 2 S.C.R. 600 612, His Holiness K 0 shavanandtl Bharati Sripad{lgc.Jvaru v. State of Kerala and Anr., [1973] 4 s.C.C. 225, referred to.
(c) The Directive Principles form the :i'undamental feature and tho- social
conscience of the Constitution \Vhich enjoins upon the State to implement these
Directive Principles. The Directives, thus provide the policy, the guidelines
and the end of socio-economic freedom and Arts. 14 and 16 are the means to
implement the policy. to achieve the ends sought to be promoted by the Directive
Principles.
So far as the Court are concerned where there is no apparent
inconsistency benveen the Directive Principles contained in Part IV and the
Fundamental Rights mentioned in Part ID, . there is no difficulty in puttin~ it
harmonious construction which advances the object of the Collstitution. [996 E-F]
(3)(a) The word 'caste' appearing after 'Sched.uJcd' is really a misnon:ler
F
and has been used only for the purpose of identifying this particular class
G
of citiz.ens which has a special history of several hundred years behind it.
The Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes have been a special class of citi~
z.ens who have been so included and described that they have come to be
identified as the most backward classes of citizens of this country. [997 A-B]
(b) Properly analysed, Art. 46 contains a mandate to the State to take
special care for the educational and economic interests of the weaker sections
of the people and as illustrations of the persons who constitute the weaker
·sections the provision expressly mentions the Scheduled Castes and the SchedulH
ed Tribes. [997 Fl
(c) A combined reading of Art. 46 and clauses 24 and 25 of Art. 366
clearly shows that the members of the Scheduled Castes and the S<:heduled
t
...
1
A
B
c
D
E
KERALA V. N. M. THOMAS
915
Tribes mus.t be presumed to be backward ciasses of citizens particularly when
the Constitution gives the example of the Soheduled Castes
0and the Soheduled
Tribes as being the weaker sections of the society. [997 GJ
(d) The members of the Sohedul<ed Castes and the Tribes have been given
a special status in the Constitution and they constitute a claSs by themselves.
That being the position it follows that they do not fall within the purview of
Art 16(2) of the Constitution
which prohibits
discrimination
between the
members of the same caste. If the members of the Scheduled Castes and the
Soheduled Tribes are not castes then it is open to the Stato to make reasonable
classification in order to advance or lift these classes so that they may be
able to be properly represented in the services under the State. [998 A-BJ
(4)(a) Art. 16 is merely an illcident of Art. 14 and both these articles
. form a part of the common system seeking to achieve the same end. [998 DJ
Store of Jammu &: Kashmit v. Tri/oki Nath Khosa & Or>., [1974] I S.C'
771, 783; Mdhammad Shujat Ali and otllers v. Umon of Jna•a aiut others, [1975J
3 S.C.C. 76, 102; Govind Dattatray Kelkar and others v. Chief Controller of
lmports &: Exports and others, [1967J 2 S.C.R. 29, 33; S. G. Jaisinghani v.
Union of India and others. [1967] 2 S.C.R. 703, 712 and The General Manager,
Southern Rai1wa-:i v. Rangachari, [1962J 2 S.C.R. 586, 597, rererred to.
(b) Art. 16 applies to all classes of appointment including promotions and
selection posts. [999 E]
,
C. A. Rajendran v. Union of India and Ors., [1968J I S.C.R. 721, 728-729,
referred to.
(c) Art. 16 permits a valid classification. [999 HJ
State of Jammu &: Kashmir v. Triloki Nath Khosa &: Ors •. [1974J I S.C.R.
771, 789; C. A. Rajendran v. Union af lndii; and Ors., [1968J I S.C.R. 721,
1728-729; S. G, Jaisinghani v. Union of India and others. Jl9<67] 2 S.C.R. 703.
712; The General Manager, Southern Railwt>y v. Rangachari. [1962] 2 S.C.R.
586, ~597 and Moham1nad Shujat Ali and others v. Union of India and others,
[1975J 3 S.C.C. 76, 102, referred to.
(d) Equality of opportunity for all citill!ns envisaged in Art. 16(1) implies
that opportunity must be given not only to a particular section of the- society
or a particular class of citizens who may be advanced or otherwise more afilnent but to all classes of citirens. This can be achieved by making a reasonable classification so that every class of citizeD.9 is duly represented in the
services which wiU enable equality of opportunity to all citizens. The classification must. however, be reasonable and must fuJfil the following condiF
tions.
[1000 GJ
G
II
(i) Jt must haVe a rational basis; (ii} It must have a close riexus with
the object sought to be achieved and (iii) It should not select any person for
hostile discrimination at the cost of others.
[1000 HJ
(5) (a) if the promotees do not belong to a caste as contemplate<! by Art.
16(2) then they dd not fall within the mischief of Art. 16(2) at all. Thus the
case of the promotees squarely falls within .the four-corners of Art. 16(1 l and
can be justified as based on reasonable classification. [1002 B]
" (b) Clause ( 4) of Art. 16 of the Constitution cannot be read in isolation
oul has to be read as part and parcel of Art. 16(1) and (2). [1002 EJ
(c) Clause (4) of Art. 16 i• not an exception to Art. 14 in the sense that
whatever classification can .be made can be d_one only thro1:1gh clause_ f 4) of
Art. 16.
Clause (4) of Art. !6, bowe~er, is an e.xplanat_lon .contaln1ng an
exhaustive and exclusive provision regarding reservation which 1s o,ne of. tJie
form., of classification. ·Thus clause ( 4) of Art. 16 deals exc!U9lvely with
rerervation and not other forms of classificat!on whi~h .. can be !Mde under
Art. 16(1} itself. Since clause (4) is a special provision regarding reserv:;t""
lion it can safely be held that it override9 Art. 16(1 l to that extent and no
rese;.,,ation can be made under Art. 16(1). [1002 G-HJ
916
SUPREME COURT REPORT$
[1976] I s.c.R.
(d) -Art. l6(4) is not a proviso to Art. 16(1) but this clau~ cover!> the
whole field of Art. 16.
Dissenting view of Subba Rao, J. in T. Dcrad,uan v.
Union of India. [1964] 4 S.C.R. 680, applied.
(c) Clause 4 of Art. 16 contains express provisions empowering the State
to . make' reservations. in suitable cases provided t~ following conditions are
satisfied :
(i) That the class for which reservation is n1ade 1nust be socially and educationally backward.
B
(ii) That the class for which reservation is made is not adequately rcpresenred in the services under the State.