# STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND ANOTHER v. LAL BHARGA VENDRA SINGH

- **Citation:** [1966] 2 S.C.R. 56
- **Court:** Supreme Court of India
- **Decided:** 1965-10-07
- **Case number:** Civil Appeal No. 738 of 1963
- **Bench:** A. K. Sarkar, M. Hidayatullah, Raghubar Dayal, B J. R. Mudholkar, R. S. Bachawat
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/supreme-court-of-india/state-of-madhya-pradesh-and-another-v-lal-bharga-vendra-singh-3638
- **Pages:** 7

## Headnote

Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 372-0rder of former Indian Ruler
granting allowance to member of family out of bounty-If "law" ..
On 7th March 1948, the Ruler of a former Indian State, out of his
bounty and in discharge of bis moral obligation, passed an order providC
ing for an allowance to his brother-respondent herein.
He directed the
Chief Minister of the State to do certain things, and the various parts
of the order were sent to the different departments of the State Administration for carrying them out.
The order also gran\ed to the respon-
· !
dent a house, conveyance etc. On 18th March 1948, the State along
with other States formed the United State of Vindhya Pradesh, the component States lo9ing their soveriegn status. Later, the United State merged
in India, and on the promulgation of the Constitution, the State became
D
a Part of the Indian Union. On 24th Septeml>or, 1951, the President of
India, in his executive capacity reduced the amount of allowance.
The
respondent thereupon filed a suit for a declaration, against the State and
Central Governments, that the allowance could not be reduced lJ.o.cause
it was granted to him by a law passed by the former Ruler, which law
was continued in force by the convenant constituting the United State, by
certain statutory orders made from time to time and lastly by Art. 372
of the Constitution.
The trial court dismissed the suit, but the High
E
Court, on appeal, decreed it.
In the appeal to this Court by the State and Central Governments, the
question was whether the order of the form·~r Ruler was a law.
HELD : It wao not a law and was not continued in force a~ter the
State lost its sovereignty.
The order was an executive act of the Ruler
and it was competent to the President, in his executive capacity., to
F
reduce the amount. [ 66 HJ
The nature o.f the order shows it cannot be a law according to notions
of modern jurisprudence.
It was a mere directive or grant, and even if
the money was paid out of the State Exchequer, thait fact would not
tum the order into a law. [60 C; Fl
Narsing Pratap Deo v. State of Orissa, A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 1793, referred
~
G
Promod Chandra Dev v. State of Orissa, [1962] Supp. I S.C.R. 405,
explained.

## Text

56
STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND ANOTHER
A
v.
LAL BHARGA VENDRA SINGH
October 7, 1965
[A. K. SARKAR, M. HIDAYATULLAH, RAGHUBAR DAYAL,
B
J. R. MUDHOLKAR AND R. S. BACHAWAT, JJ.J
Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 372-0rder of former Indian Ruler
granting allowance to member of family out of bounty-If "law" ..
On 7th March 1948, the Ruler of a former Indian State, out of his
bounty and in discharge of bis moral obligation, passed an order providC
ing for an allowance to his brother-respondent herein.
He directed the
Chief Minister of the State to do certain things, and the various parts
of the order were sent to the different departments of the State Administration for carrying them out.
The order also gran\ed to the respon-
· !
dent a house, conveyance etc. On 18th March 1948, the State along
with other States formed the United State of Vindhya Pradesh, the component States lo9ing their soveriegn status. Later, the United State merged
in India, and on the promulgation of the Constitution, the State became
D
a Part of the Indian Union. On 24th Septeml>or, 1951, the President of
India, in his executive capacity reduced the amount of allowance.
The
respondent thereupon filed a suit for a declaration, against the State and
Central Governments, that the allowance could not be reduced lJ.o.cause
it was granted to him by a law passed by the former Ruler, which law
was continued in force by the convenant constituting the United State, by
certain statutory orders made from time to time and lastly by Art. 372
of the Constitution.
The trial court dismissed the suit, but the High
E
Court, on appeal, decreed it.
In the appeal to this Court by the State and Central Governments, the
question was whether the order of the form·~r Ruler was a law.
HELD : It wao not a law and was not continued in force a~ter the
State lost its sovereignty.
The order was an executive act of the Ruler
and it was competent to the President, in his executive capacity., to
F
reduce the amount. [ 66 HJ
The nature o.f the order shows it cannot be a law according to notions
of modern jurisprudence.
It was a mere directive or grant, and even if
the money was paid out of the State Exchequer, thait fact would not
tum the order into a law. [60 C; Fl
Narsing Pratap Deo v. State of Orissa, A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 1793, referred
~
G
Promod Chandra Dev v. State of Orissa, [1962] Supp. I S.C.R. 405,
explained.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 738 of
1963.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and decree, dated
H
December 16, 1960 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in
First Appeal No. 105 of 1957.
•
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'
•
STATE v. BHARGAVENDRA (Sarkar, J.)
A
B. Sen, M. N. Shroff and I. N. Shroff, for the appellants.
G. S. Pathak and C. P. Lal, for respondents l(a)-l(c).
K. L. Hathi and R. N. Sachthey, for respondents No. 2.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
B
Sarkar, J.
This appeal arises out of a suit filed on August 10,
1956 by Shri Lal Saheb Bhargavendra Singh, now deceased and
represented by his legal re:presentatives, against the Union of
India, the State of Vindhya Pradesh, now merged in the State of
Madhya Pradesh, and the Collector of Satna, for a declaration
that he was entitled to receive an allowance of Rs. 650 per month
C from the Union of India.
There was another claim but that
depended on the declaratory relief claimed and need not, therefore,
be referred to further.
Shri Lal Saheb was the brother of the
Ruler of the former Indian State of Nagod and he contended that
the Ruler had by a law passed on March 7, 1948 provided for an·
D
allowance for him at the rate of Rs. 650 per month and that that
law was binding on the defendants who had by an executive
order illegally altered the amount of the maintenance. It was on
this basis that the claim was made.
The suit was dismissed by
the trial Court but was decreed by the High Court of Madhya
Pradesh on appeal by the plaintiff.
Hence this appeal.
E
F
Certain events that took place after March 7, 1948 when the
allowance was fixed have now to be stated. On March 18, 1948,
the Ruler of Nagod along with the Rulers of various neighbouring
ruling States formed a new State called the United State of Vindhya
Pradesh into which the component States were merged thereby
losing their sovereign status. Thereafter the United State merged'
in India by an agreement and pursuant thereto the Government
of India took over its administration on January 1, 1950.
Its
territories then became the Indian province of Vindhya Pradesh.
The United State ceased to exist.
On the promulgation of the
Constitution on January 26, 1950 the Province of Vim!hya PraG
desh became a Part C State of fodependent India and later from
November l, 1956 it was merged with the State of Madhya
Pradesh .
IBy the agreement constituting the United State all laws in
iii'
force in the constituent States were continued in force and likewise,
the laws of the United State were by a statutory order continued in
H
force when it merged in India. Article 372 of the Constitution
continued in force all laws which were in force in the territories of
India immediately before the commencement of the Constitution.
,5g
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[ 1966] 2 S.C.R.
.Each succeeding State could, of course, alter the laws which were
A
so continued in force in spite of the change of sovereignty, by a
Jaw duly made by it.
Neither the United State nor the Indian
.Province or States which successively administered the territories
.of the State of Nagod had made any law concerning any allowance
to be paid to Shri Lal Saheb.
The Rajpramukh (the head) of
the United State and the President ·of India had passed orders · B
.from time to time fixing his allowance at amounts lower than that
.at which it had been fixed by the Ruler of -Nagod on March 7,
1948. These were, however, executive orders and not laws.
They could not reduce the amount of allowance to Shri Lal Saheb
fixed by the Ruler of Nagod on March 7, 1948, if he had done
so by a law.
All this is not in controversy.
The only question in this appeal is whether the order of the
Ruler of Nagod of March 7, 1948 was a law. If it was, it is not
c
in dispute that the claim made in the suit must be upheld. The
High Court observed that this Court had in various cases ending
with the ca>e of Madhaorao Phalka v. State of Madhya Pradesh(')
D
held that the line between the legislative, executive and judicial
functions of absolute Rulers like the Ruler of Nagod was not at
all clear-cut and an attempt to place an order of such a Ruler in
one class or the other was of no practical importance. In this
view of the judgments of this ·court, the High Court said that it
was futile to contend that the. order of March 7, 1948 was an E
·executive act of the Ruler and had not the force of law.
The
High Court, therefore, held that the allowance had been fixed
by law and decreed the suit.
The question whether an order of a Ruler is law or not arises
because an absolute Ruler combined in himself the capacities of F
the supreme executive, judicial and legislative authorities in the
State; any particular action of his might have been in one or other
of these capacities.
Therefore, it becomes necessary to decide,
when th.e question arises as it has done in the present case, in
what capacity the Ruler acted when he made a particular order.
At times, the question has presented some difficulty. This Court G
had to discuss this question in many cases but, with respect, we
think the High Court was under a misconception about the effect
·of the decisions in those cases. It would be unprofitable to discuss
these cases for their result may be quoted from the judgment in
·the recent case of Narsing Pratap Deo v. State of Orissa(') : "The
trne legal position is that whenever a dispute arises as to whether H
:an order passed by an absolute monarch represents a legislative
·(l) [1961] 1 S. C.R. %7.
(2) A. I. R. 1.964 S. C. 179), 1798.
•
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'
•
•
I
A
B
STATE v. BHARGAVENDRA (Sarkar, J.)
59
act. ....... all relevant factors must be considered before the
question is m:swered; the nature of the order, the scope and effect
of its provisions, its general setting and context, the method
adopted by the Ruler in promulgating legislative as distinguished
from executive orders, these and other allied matters will have to
be examined before the character of the order
i.s
judicially
determined."
It is, therefore, not correct to say, as the High
Court did, that this Court has held that every order of the Ruler
is a law nwde by him.
The question whether it is so or not,
has to be determined in each case independently.
We then proceed to discuss whether the order of the Ruler of
Nagod was law.
The question arises because, as earlier stated,
the covenant constituting the United State, certain statutory ordern
made from time to time and lastly Art. 3 72 of the Consitution
said that the existing laws would be so continued.
Now, these
arc instruments dealing with sovereign States and rights.
They
are instruments based on legal ideas and notions founded on
D
modern jurisprudence. It would, therefore, be legitimate to hold
that the word "law" was used in them in a sense acceptable to
modern jurisprudence. The contention that the order of March 7.
1947 being a law could be set aside only by a law duly passed by
the succeeding States, emphasises this view. A law made by these
E
succeeding States, the last of which is the Union of India, is fully
a law as understood in modern jurisprudence. A law which is to
be set aside by such a law must, therefore, have been contemplated
as a law of the same kind. This aspect of the matter has to be
kept in mind in approaching the question.
Many tests may be suggested for detennining whether a partiF
cular thing would be considered law in modern jurisprudence. In
the decisions of this Court on the point, several of tbem have
been referred to.
It may be that they are not all applicable to
every case.
It may also be that it is not possible to give an
exhaustive list of all these tests. None the less however t11e question is capable of decision in each case.
G
The order of the Ruler of Nagod which is said to be a law, is
addressed to the Cbief Minister of the State and directs bim to
do certain things.
It starts by reciting that Shri Lal Saheb's
financial position was deplorable and the Ruler felt it to be bis
duty to sec that Shri Lal Saheb did not experience difficulties in
H
his advancing years and as no pennanent arrangement had been
made for him till then, the ruler was making the order. Then
follows the operative part of the order which is in these terms :
L!Sup. C.l./66-5
60
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1966] 2 S.C.R.
"Hence, I order that (the Kothi) (in which he is at present residA
ing) be given to Shri Lal Saheb for generation to generation and
an allowance of Rs. 650 (Rupees six hundred and fifty), per
month be granted, in addition to the same a tonga and a horse
be given, the expenses for which shall be borne by himself and
Rs. 5,000 (Rupees five thousand), be granted to him so that he
may be able to make improvements in agriculture and satisfy his
B
debts (partly)."
We think it quite impossible that this order was a law. First,
it is a direction to the Chief Minister. It is an order by which the
Ruler required the Chief Minister to do certain things.
It has
' not been shown to us that a direction to an officer to be carried C
out by him, has ever been held to be a law or can be such. It
cannot be so according to notions of modern jurisprudence. Then
we find that a copy of the order was sent under the direction of
the Revenue Minister to Shri Lal Saheb and various parts of it,
to the different departments of the Nagod Administration respec·
tively concerned with them, obviously with the object that they
D
might be carried out. This would indicate that even the Administration was not treating it as law for it would be difficult to
imagine different parts of a law being communicated to different
branches of the Administration. Further, it appears that the
Revenue Minister directed the Accounts Officer to make a report
regarding the provision to be made for the sum of Rs. 5,000 E
mentioned in the order. This is not how a law is carried out.
· The order was also an instrument granting something to Shri
Lal Saheb. Under it a kothi (house), a tonga (carriage) and
horse and Rs. 5,000 in a lump were to be made available to Shri
Lal Saheb. In regard to these the order was only a grant; it gave
F
him these things. A grant is, of course, not a law. That would
follow from the decisions of this Court in Narsing Pratap Deo's
case(') and State of Gujarat v. Vora FiddaU(2).
Now if the
rest of the order was a grant, it would be strange that one part of
it only, namely, the part providing for the monthly allowance
only, was a law. Obviously this was also intended to be a grant;
G
the fact that the order provided for future payments cannot make
it a law. The context is overwhelmingly against the view that it
was a Jaw.
Again, the recitals in the order put it beyond doubt that the
Ruler was only discharging what he considered his moral obliga· II
tion. After referring to Shri Lal Saheb's
deplorable financial
(1) A.LR. 1964 S. C. 1793.
(2) [1964] 6 S. C.R. 461.
•
•
STATE v. BHARGAVENDRA (Sarkar, J.)
6£
A pos1t10n, he said, "I take it to be my duty to see that Shri Lal
should not experience difficulties in his old days". The Ruler was,
therefore, providing for something out of his bounty and in discharge of his moral obligation. A Jaw is never made for these
reasons.
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
It was said that the money was to be paid out of the State
Exchequer. There is nothing to show, however, that it was so..or
that in Nagod the private funds of the Ruler were separate from
the State Exchequer. But assume that the payment was to come
from the State Exchequer. That cannot turn a directive or a grant
into a law.
Our attention was drawn to the decision of this
Court in
Promod Chandra Dev v. The State of Orissa(') where a grant of
an allowance was held to be Jaw. That case is clearly distinguishable. There the nature and condition of allowances to be granted
to persons entitled to them from the State had been laid down in
Order 31 of the Rules, Regulations and Privileges of Khanjadars
and Khorposbdars. It was held that "those rules, regulations of
Talcher etc. (1937)" were the Jaws of the State and that the grants
made by the Ruler in accordance with those laws became the
absolute property of the grantee. What had happened there was
that earlier lands had been granted to a certain Khorposhdar
(maintenance holder) under Order 31 aforesaid and subsequently
these were commuted into payments of monthly ainounts. It was
in those circumstances that it was held that the maintenance was
payable under a Jaw. No such circumstances exist in the present
case.
We should lilefore concluding state that the Ruler of Nagod
who made the order of March 7, 1948 himself gave evidence
stating that he had passed the order "under his legislative powers".
This statement obviously does not conclude the matter.
It was
not relied upon in any of the Courts below. The internal evidence
to which we have earlier referred shows that the order was not a
lcg~lative act.
For ail these reasons we have come to the conclusion that the·
order of the J.tuler of Nagod of March 7, 1948 was not a Jaw. It
was n'.1t con~mued in force after the State of Nagod Jost its
sovereignty m. tl1e circumstances earlier mentioned.
The order
;as a~ e~ecu'.1ve act of the Ruler providing for certain allowance
0 Shn Lal Saheb. It was, therefore, competent to the President
-----
(1} [1962] Supp. 1 S. C. R. 4iJ5
I
'62
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1966] 2 S.C.R.
:acting in his executive capacity to reduce it to a sum of Rs. 530 A
per month as he did by his order of September 24, 1951 which
was challenged in the snit.
In the result, we hold that the appeal must be allowed and
we direct accordingly.
There wil! be no order as to costs.
Appeal allowed.